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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the impact of the adoption of the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance 2001 and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange {presently known as Malaysia 
Bourse) Listing Rulings 2001 by 221 listed Main and Second Board firms of the Bourse on their firm 
performance. To fulfil this objective, the study hypothesised the relationship between the firms’ board 
of directors’ and its sub-committees’ (i.e. audit committee, nomination committee and remuneration 
committee) composition, structure and competency on firm performance. The study findings indicated 
that the presence of an independent director with corporate governance experience (i.e. a senior 
independent director) on the board of directors and its subcommittees had a positive impact on firm 
performance. Specifically, when domineering executive directors and family-member director(s) were 
present on the board and its subcommittees, the appointment of senior independent director 
safeguarded and strengthened the quality of independence, credibility, and influence of independent 
directors’ views and decisions. Moreover, the board of directors that was led by an independent 
director, non-executive director or founder, and that had a separate chairman and CEO position 
established appropriate control and monitoring of authorization of power on the organisational process 
and board members conducts.
Further, the presence o f a high proportion of independent directors on the board and its sub­
committees was important to monitor family-member director and CEO, CFO and/or managing 
director influence on the board’s and its sub-committees decisions. The study also found, the 
appointment of an independent financial expert, namely someone with practising accountant 
experience on the audit committee to be crucial given that some companies had the tendency to 
appoint the CEO, CFO, managing director and/or family-member director with a financial background 
to fulfil the position. In addition, directors with industry knowledge and experience were substantial in 
enhancing board entrepreneurship skills, strategic investment planning and improving the overall 
decision making process. The study further revealed that foreign directors and institutional investors 
that were active in monitoring of firm activities vital for shareholder value creation.
The findings of the thesis make several important contributions to the corporate governance literature 
in identifying the impact of family-member directors’ membership of audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees on such committees’ effectiveness. Further, the empirical evidence gathered 
will assist the policy-makers in evaluating and improving current corporate governance ruling for 
better protection of investors’ interests and greater commitment of corporations to practise responsible 
corporate governance conduct.
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Chapter 1
~Introduction to the search ~
1.0 Introduction to the Study
The continuance of and increase in firms’ top executives’ and insiders’ misconduct has been 
heavily criticised and attributed in many studies to weaknesses in firms’ corporate governance 
practices (see, for example, Beasley, 1996; Gomez and Sundaram, 1997; Aziz, 1998; Claessens 
et al., 1999; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Chang Aik Leng and Abu 
Mansor, 2005; Dionne and Triki, 2005). Pre-emptive measures have included the recognition 
that strong collaborative commitments and efforts amongst market participants, notably firms, 
regulators, legislators, institutional bodies, shareholders and stakeholders, need to be 
established. In particular, these parties need to concur with each other on the purposes and 
objectives of good corporate governance practices because appropriate attitudes and stances are 
important stimuli for the enforcement of effective monitoring and controlling mechanisms in the 
firm (see, Parker, 2005).
It is therefore seen as relevant and important to closely examine the roles, functions and 
commitment of the internal governing bodies, namely, the board of directors and board 
subcommittees, particularly in their execution of oversight responsibilities (MBSB, 2004) since 
there appears to be disparity at the top management level in what constitutes the appropriate and 
sufficient supervision and oversight and assessment of directors’ and executives’ trustworthiness 
when managing and administrating a firm’s affairs. As a result, some research has been 
undertaken to identify the characteristics of firms that may incline them towards engaging in
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fraudulent conduct given the state of their board members’ monitoring and control of activities 
(Sonnerfeld, 2004).
Adam Smith (1776:700) contended that the divergence between investors’ and corporate 
officers’ interests underscores the imperativeness of exercising appropriate caution, given 
managers’ level and extent of authority in conducting a company’s business activities. He 
specifically stated that managers’ conduct requires continual monitoring and oversight because:
“ ...being the managers o f other people's money rather than their own, it cannot well be 
expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private co-partner frequently watch over their own...Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in their management o f the 
affairs o f  others... ” (Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776:700).
In view of his observations, independent outside director placements on the firm’s board of 
directors is therefore deemed crucial to establish an impartial and objective oversight body 
within the firm that is free from management influence so its’ integrity and credibility can be 
relied upon. For this purpose, outside such directors should not have links with the firm, whether 
through employment, business and/or family relations. Moreover, unless they are vigilant, 
committed and proactive when conducting decision making and evaluating activities, 
independent directors will not be effective in combating misconduct and incidents of fraud (Lee 
et al., 2004; Chang Aik Leng and Abu Mansor, 2005). Further, without effective corporate 
governance mechanisms, investors are susceptible to receiving erroneous information and may, 
as a consequence, lose their investments, mainly due to the absence of timely information as a
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result of their lack of control over the type and amount of information that companies decide to 
disseminate.
1.1 Background to the Study
For decades, many financial commentators and experts have pointed out that managers can 
expropriate a firm’s assets when ownership and management of the business are conducted by 
separate individuals, due to the conflict of interests between the two respective parties (see, for 
example, Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). Importantly, investors’ diminishing trust in capital market conduct and supervision could 
affect market viability, development, expansion and competitiveness, and domestic and 
international finance (OECD, 1999; Malaysian Security Commission, 2001; OECD, 2002; 
Murray and Gray, 2006).
An improvement in the transparency of corporations’ practices is imperative in the Malaysian 
business environment in order to restore and secure the integrity of its capital market system 
after the 1997 economic crisis (MEPU, 2001). Aziz (1998) has also highlighted the importance 
of making transparent the disposal of public assets through privatisation in Malaysia. He argues 
that this is crucial to ensure best governance practices have been properly implemented in 
private and public procurement procedures in the country and to inhibit the practice of crony 
capitalism. Greater transparency of firms’ management will also discourage corrupt behaviour in 
Malaysian society (Aziz, 1998). So far, the requirement by the Securities Commission and 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange1 for firms to disclose the identity of previously 20 and latterly 
30 of their substantial shareholders has provided clarification of the identity of these large
1 Presently known as M alaysia Bourse Securities Limited (MBSB)
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shareholders2 (who previously could have been disguised behind appointed nominees) and has 
enhanced investors’ assessment of major shareholders’ connections with and influence on firms’ 
decision-making processes (Aziz, 1999).
In addition, the presence of high calibre, competent and credible outside independent directors 
on Malaysian public listed boards is imperative to inhibit the widespread practice of managers’ 
entrenchment at the expense of minority interests, as occurred in the case of United Engineer 
Malaysia Berhad’s (UEM) acquisition of a 32.6% stake in its troubled parent company, Renong 
Berhad, at a price double its current market value (Doraisami, 2005) and the Malaysian Airline 
Systems Berhad (MAS) chairman’s exploitation of the corporation’s funds to settle his personal 
debt (Johnson et al., 2000: 144).
Prowse (1998), Claessens et al., [1999, 1999(a) and 2000] and Mitton (2002) reported the 
expropriation of assets by family-controlled owners in East Asian listed firms at the expense of 
minority shareholders’ interests was precipitated by the prevailing pyramidal firm ownership 
structure3 (Thillainathan, 1999; Ow-Yong and Kooi, 2000; Gugler, 2001; Johnson et al., 2001; 
La Porta et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2005). Moreover, the 
pyramidal organisational structure further intensifies agency problems created by the separation 
of ownership and control, as Volpin’s (2002) study detected a lower percentage of Q ratios at 
the bottom of the pyramidal group than the holding firm.
2 This disclosure requirement is mandated in Malaysia Bourse Securities Limited (MBSB) Listing Requirements, particularly in 
paragraph 8.15 and under the classification o f material information section in paragraph 9.03 and 9.19.
3 The control o f  a firm through a chain o f  ownership relations (see Almeida and Wolfenzon. 2005)
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Significantly, authorities and regulatory bodies, such as the Stock Exchange, the Securities 
Commission, the Accounting Standards Board, private organisations/institutions, and the 
government, operate as the external mechanism that disciplines firms’ activities via guidelines 
and recommendations, legislation, regulations and enforcement policies (Karpoff et al., 1989; 
Franks and Mayer, 1990; La Porta et al., 1998; Iskander et al., 1999; OECD, 2002; Barako et al., 
2006). Their governing authority allows them to dictate and prescribe the requirements for 
emulating and ensuring quality corporate governance practice, specifically by listing rulings 
with regard to the required standards of information disclosure and enforcement, the 
transparency and accountability of business entities’ participants and imposing heavy penalties 
for insider trading (Laufer, 2000; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).
Moreover, the enactment of investors’ protection legislation provides legal security and 
validation, especially when pursuing lawsuits on the discovery of mistreatment of investors’ 
rights (Franks and Mayer, 1990; Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). Another measure of external 
monitoring is the establishment and enforcement of codes of corporate governance and best 
practices by firms, whether on a voluntary, hybrid or prescriptive basis. These disciplining 
measures inculcate, guide and/or stipulate appropriate governance practice in corporations (see, 
for instance, Cadbury, 1992; Combined Code, 2000; FCCG, 2001; Higgs, 2003; OECD, 2004).
As regards to the internal corporate governance mechanisms, studies continue to examine the 
actual role of Boards of Directors, specifically their strategic decision -making, monitoring, 
service, and accessing scarce and critical resources function (Pfeffer, 1972; Henn, 1974; Kosnik, 
1987; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Van den Berghe
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and Levrau, 2004; Kor and Mahoney, 2005; Wan and Ong, 2005). Moreover, research on the 
functions and effectiveness of the Board of Directors and its subcommittees, notably, audit 
committees, nomination committees and remuneration committees, has recognised its functions 
as a governance instrument with delineated responsibilities and the potential to improve the 
quality of financial reporting [Yermack, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998; Klein, (1998, 2002); Vafeas, 
1999; Carson, 2002; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Long et al., 2005; Gendron and Bedard, 
2006].
1.2 Research Objectives
In recognition of the significance of investigating the corporate governance practices of 
Malaysian corporations and considering them in terms of their potential effects on firms’ 
financial viability, this thesis aims to fulfil the following research objectives:
1. To show the significance of board of directors’ independence from management
influence in sustaining a firm’s financial performance.
2. To show the significance of the role and function of board and sub-committee chairmen
in sustaining a firm’s financial performance.
3. To show the significance of the board of directors’ knowledge and skills in fulfilling
their duties in sustaining a firm’s financial performance.
4. To show the significance of the formation, composition, leadership of board committees
and, where appropriate, their accounting and financial background for the fulfilment of 
their duties in sustaining a firm’s financial performance.
6
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH
1.3 Research Questions
Primarily, this thesis aims to examine the influence of Malaysian corporations’ adherence to 
corporate governance practices as stipulated by the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
Principles and Best Practices and the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Listing Requirements 2001 
on firms’ financial viability. In particular, this study investigates the effect of firms’ boards of 
directors’ and board subcommittees’ c ompliance with these stipulations on firms’ financial 
performance.
Accordingly, the following research questions were constructed to evaluate the effects of firms’ 
implementation of internal monitoring and control mechanisms on their financial position:
1. Does the independence of board of directors’ members from management influence
affect a firm’s financial performance such that they
provide appropriate monitoring and control over family owner-managers ’ 
entrenchment endeavours?
are committed to and accountable in pursuing their overseeing responsibilities in 
the firm  on shareholders ’ behalf?
2. Does the structure of the board of directors affect a firm’s financial performance?
When the power and authorities o f the CEO at the top hierarchy o f management 
is balanced and disciplined by the designation o f  a separate Chairman, 
particularly an independent Chairman, will this reduce the CEO’s unwarranted 
empire building and/or wealth seeking motives?
1
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3. Do the knowledge and skills of the board of directors’ members affect a firm’s financial 
performance?
When the board comprises members with specific accounting, finance, business- 
related knowledge and skill and legal background will these aspects have an 
influence on their performance o f financial and non-financial overseeing duties?
4. Does the independence of audit committee members from management influence affect a 
firm’s financial performance?
When audit committee members are free from an association with members o f 
management, will the independent quorum become an effective body that can 
conduct an objective and appropriate evaluation o f the f irm ’s financial reporting 
practice and internal control procedures and hence safeguard and enhance 
shareholders ’ investments interests?
5. Does the leadership of the audit committee affect a firm’s financial performance?
When the Chairman o f the audit committee has prior accounting experience, will 
the focus and considerations o f the statutory audit work plans and assignments, 
and subsequently the assessment o f audit findings, support the external and 
internal auditors ’ recommendations fo r  credible corporate reporting and hence 
safeguard and enhance shareholders ’ investments interests?
6. Do the accounting and financial knowledge and skills of audit committee members affect 
a firm’s financial performance?
Being capable o f overseeing accounting and/or financial issues, will the audit 
committee be able to comprehend clearly their financial governing duties and so 
make a productive contribution to the scope and discussion o f the appraisal o f 
the financial position and reporting and the state o f  internal control o f the firm  
and hence safeguard and enhance shareholders ’ investments interests?
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7. Does the formation of nomination and remuneration committees affect a firm’s financial 
performance?
By establishing designated committees that monitor the selection o f board’s 
candidates and oversee the arrangements fo r  executive remuneration, will board 
members ’ objectivity and credibility in the accomplishment o f their duties and the 
confinement o f  unnecessary payments to executives be assured and protected and 
hence contribute to firm  value creation?
8. Does the independence of nomination and remuneration committee members from 
management influence affect a firm’s financial performance?
Will the placement o f non-ajfiliated board members in the corresponding 
committees enable them to reinforce firm, impartial and conscientious views (of 
the board’s performance) when nominating suitable persons for further board 
effectiveness, and to execute control over inordinate executive compensation and 
hence contribute to firm value creation?
9. Does the structure of nomination and remuneration committees affect a firm’s financial 
performance?
When these committees are led by independent directors, will their members' 
objectivity and goal o f scrupulous activity in conducting their duties be assured 
and hence contribute to firm value creation?
1.4 Research Methodology
The current research study employed a cross-sectional research approach where the corporate 
governance practice and financial performance of Main and Second Board Malaysian listed 
firms were examined over a two year period. In addition random sampling was used to identify 
the sample size of Malaysian Main and Second Board listed companies to be examined in 
furtherance of research objectives. Financial data were gathered from Malaysian public listed
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companies’ annual reports, Datastream and OSIRIS database. Data were subsequently explored 
and analysed using multiple regression analysis to examine and identify their statistical 
significance for the purposes of the study.
1.5 Motivation for the Study
The main motivation of the study is to examine the impact of firms’ board of directors’ and 
managers’ adherence to the Principles of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance and their 
implementation of Best Practices have on firm performance. In view of their long-standing 
business traditions and customs, some family-owned enterprises, where firms’ shares are 
significantly owned by the founders have raised their concerns about the impact of the new 
corporate governance code on the business perceptions of their board members since the 
importance of accepting certain risks in business is viewed as essential for the growth of firms 
(Chairman of the Securities Commission of Malaysia, 2003)4.
However without the implementation of appropriate and sufficient governing rules and 
regulations it is difficult to inhibit, control and prevent controlling owners from expropriating 
minority shareholders’ interests in Malaysia corporation [See Claessens et al., 1999(a); Johnson 
et al., 2000; OECD, 2004]. Moreover, the disparity between control and cash flow rights in 
Malaysian corporations as a result of investors’ indirect links with several associated firms (or 
pyramidal business links) can create incentives for investors to divert resources into the firm that 
gives them the greatest cash flow rights (Thillainathan, 1999). Also, family-controlled firms
4 Notably, the family-member board 's executive director may have particular long standing business traditions and customs that 
may be affected with the firm 's adoption o f  Malaysian Codes on Corporate governance (see Abdul Kadir, 2003)
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have the tendency to put the interests of the family members above shareholders’ interests 
(Hermalin, 1991).
The current research’s examination of the impact of board of directors’ and board sub­
committees’ attributes, namely, their independence, structure and competency on firm 
performance will be able to ascertain the significance and effectiveness of such boards’ and 
subcommittees’ oversight of firm’ activities and whether they are pursued in line with 
shareholders’ value maximisation.
Moreover, central to the Malaysian economic crisis between mid 1997 until the last quarter of 
1999 were the weaknesses in Malaysian firms’ corporate governance practices. Many studies 
have identified these elements as one of the main causes of the country’s economic suspension 
(for instance, the Malaysian Economic Planning Unit, 1998; Claessens et al., 1999; Iskander et 
al., 1999; Thillainathan, 1999; Johnson et al., 2000; Kawai, 2000). In particular, the weak 
monitoring and controlling measures prevailing in most Asian-concentrated ownership firms 
contributed to the lack of accountability of companies’ owners and managers (Prowse, 1998). 
This left minority' shareholders’ interests vulnerable to expropriation by controlling interests 
(Claessens et al., 1998, 1999; Johnson et al., 2000). The issue of the mismanagement of funds 
required policymakers to take action to establish an efficient and competitive financial system 
(See Abdul Majid, 1998) that fairly distributed gains among borrowers, equity holders, the 
government and external creditors. So doing would raise investors’ diminishing confidence and 
promote trading in the capital market (Iskander et al., 1999).
11
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH
Notably, the second objective of Malaysia’s National Economic Recovery Plan5 was to restore 
market confidence. Within this objective, improvement in transparency and in the regulatory 
environment was made a priority (Wee, 1998: 9) to ensure investors became well informed to 
make appropriate investment decisions. One way of ensuring this was to regulate the 
information that needed to be disclosed by companies to the public as well as the frequency of 
such information’s availability. In particular, Malaysia’s Securities Commission and Stock 
Exchange were entrusted with enforcing strict rulings and curbing corruption in industries. 
Raising the level of transparency and the quality of corporate disclosures was viewed as 
imperative to facilitate the monitoring and controlling of large inside shareholders’ activities and 
to prevent investors from remaining misinformed (Kawai, 2000).
The establishment of rules and policies provides systematic assurance of safety and protection 
within an investment platform (McKinsey, 2000). On a large scale, it affects a country’s 
economic viability, financial stability and capital market competitiveness (La Porta et al., 1997, 
1998; Maher and Andersson, 1999). Importantly, corporate governance research conducted in 
response to economic trouble may also help to identify specific problems and to instigate 
corresponding resolutions (Murphy and Topyan, 2005). Malaysian policy-makers’ (i.e. members 
of the High Level Finance Committee and Working Groups on Best Practices of Corporate 
Governance) establishment of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance indicated their 
immediate response and recognition of the need to enforce good corporate governance practices 
in Malaysian corporations. Hence, the currenfs examination of Malaysian firms’ adoption of 
Corporate Governance Principles and Best Practices in their board of directors’ and board
5 This comprehensive plan was prepared by M alaysia’s National Economic Action Council (NEAC) [in collaboration with other 
governmental institutions, private organisations, professional associations, industry participants. World Bank. IMF and non­
governmental organisations] in 1998 to make recommendations to the Government in respect o f restoring the economy and 
preventing further recession.
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subcommittees’ composition, structure and characteristics will provide empirical evidence of 
their effectiveness in terms of firm performance and whether policy makers’ corporate 
governance initiatives have been sufficient or need to be extended further.
The presence of independent non-executive directors and/or non executive directors on listed 
companies’ board of directors in Malaysia is imperative because the majority of these 
companies are individual and/or family owned (Thillainathan, 1999; Claessens et al., 1999 (a), 
(b), (c), (d) and 2001; Johnson et al., 2000; and Ow-Yong and Kooi Guan, 2003) and the owners 
or families are also members of the board of directors. In order to provide a check and balance 
of power in the decision-making process at the board of directors level, the role and presence of 
a certain number of independent non-executive directors and non-executive directors on the 
board become important. In addition,
An owner manager has greater discretion than a non-owner/manager because 
the legal and moral case for an unusual application o f corporate resources is 
greater fo r  the former and because the owner-manager's control position is 
likely to be more secure
(Herman, 1981:247)
There have been several studies researching the effect on firm performance of establishing board 
committees. The number of studies on the role and importance of audit committees is immense 
and continues to grow and the number of studies on the role of other board committees, such as 
nomination and remuneration committees, is also increasing. The formation of board 
committees can be seen as a delegation of duties of the board of directors for the improved 
control and monitoring of the efficiency of board of directors’ tasks.
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In addition, the compliance of many Malaysian corporations with the Principles and Best 
Practices of Corporate Governance does not necessarily indicate their enforcement of the 
guidelines’ true meaning or of the substance of the Code, demonstrating the importance of 
examining the implications of firms’ adherence to the Code of Corporate Governance by 
measuring their efforts in value deliverance in terms of firm value.
1.6 Scope of the Study
The aim of this thesis is to examine the association between a given set of corporate governance 
control and monitoring mechanisms and firm performance. The model of this research 
concentrates on the elements of firms’ internal monitoring and control mechanisms in its 
examination of the impact of firm governance practices on firm performance. Their relationships 
are presented in Figure 1.1.
<Fiau.iT 1.1: Research ^Modef 
FIRM PERFORMANCE
♦
c o m p o s  rr ion STRUCTURE
BOARD A l lR lliU TES
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1.7 Outline of the Thesis
As noted in previous sections, the core aims of the research are to examine corporate governance 
mechanisms, board of directors’ and board committees’ attributes, role and contribution in 
improving firm performance and evaluating Malaysian business practices. Chapters 2 - 4  review 
the literature pertaining to these elements.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of Malaysia’s business environment, economic history and 
development. In particular, the chapter deliberates on the Malaysian financial and capital market 
regulatory environment, namely, regulatory bodies’ functions in monitoring and establishing 
corporate accountability in Malaysian industries’ activities and in promoting Malaysia as a 
potential investment platform. Further, the chapter discusses corporate governance initiatives 
and development by regulatory bodies and private organisations.
Chapter 3 examines several corporate governance theories that have been adopted in relation to 
the roles, functions and contribution of boards of directors to firm performance. Theories 
include the Legalistic view, Resource Dependency view, Agency theory, Managerial-Class 
Hegemony theory, Stakeholder theory and Stewardship theory.
Chapter 4 focuses on the roles of the Board of Directors and examines board attributes, namely, 
composition, structure, characteristics and processes, and their respective implications for 
fulfilment of the board’s duties. In addition, the role and functions of the board’s 
subcommittees, notably, audit, nomination and remuneration committees, are examined 
individually. The chapter then discusses market value and accounting-based measures of
15
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financial performance. In addition founder-family presence and firm ownership structure are 
discussed to identify their impact on the board’s and its sub-committees’ performance of 
oversight duties and hence firm performance.
Chapter 5 presents the research hypotheses and research models established to test the research’s 
propositions regarding the impact of board of directors’ and its subcommittees’ independence, 
structure and characteristics on firm performance.
The research design, sampling techniques, data sources and types of data collected by the 
researcher for implementation of the current study are discussed in Chapter 6. The chapter also 
describes the research models’ variables, namely, independent, explanatory and control 
variables and their characteristics. The chapter also details the research data analysis technique, 
primarily multiple regression analysis, focusing on its assumptions and the suitability of the 
research models’ parameters for examination using this technique.
Chapter 7 and 8 present the analysis and discussion of the impact of board of directors’ and its 
sub-committees’ attributes on firm performance, respectively. The results are elaborated upon 
to link them with previous research findings.
Chapter 9 summarises the overall findings derived from the research and suggests areas for 
future extension of this study.
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Figure 1.2 shows the overall structure of the thesis.
figure 1.2: Structure erf the Thesis
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1.8 Conclusion
This chapter has provided an introduction to the study, explained the research objectives, 
presented the research questions, and briefly detailed the research methodology, motivations and 
scope of the study. It has also outlined and summarised succeeding chapters. The next chapter 
will focus on the economic background and development of corporate governance in Malaysia.
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"Malaysia. (Background and Corporate governance (Development~
2.0 Introduction
Chapter 1 presented an overview of the research framework and design. This chapter details 
Malaysia’s business environment, economic history and development and capital market. The 
initiatives and involvement of regulatory bodies, private institutions and professional bodies in 
the development of corporate governance rules and regulations are then considered. A 
discussion of the subsequent adoption and enforcement of these directives by Malaysian public 
listed companies subsequently follows. The elements and subjects reviewed provide insight into 
Malaysia’s adaptation of its governance practices to international norms and endorsements of 
stipulated corporate governance good practices.
2.1 Malaysia's Economic History and Overview
The Malaysian economy continued to prosper from the 1960s to the late 1990s. Initially, the 
economy was concentrated on agricultural and mining activities, particularly rubber and tin, 
which accounted for 70% of total export earnings (Malaysia Economic Planning Unit, 2006). 
Private sector investment was the main economic driver, with an annual growth rate of 7.3%. In 
addition, the economy also relied on foreign trade to finance its economic development. Among 
the Malaysian government’s objectives was the eradication of rural poverty. In response, the 
modernisation of agricultural production was initiated, together with the promotion of industrial 
development with the implementation of an import substitution strategy. Such development 
provided a stronger economic base for Malaysia since it encompassed agricultural,
19
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manufacturing, utilities and services sectors. Timber and palm oil also emerged as significant 
new export commodities.
Later, in the 1970s, the economy diversified into export-oriented manufacturing industries, 
specifically, the production of textiles, electrical and electronic goods, and rubber products. 
Malaysia’s economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s was the result of the booming oil and 
natural gas industries. Table 2.1 presents the list of economic development plans that have been 
undertaken by the government prior to Malaysia Independence and post independence6.
Table 2.1: An Overview of Malaysian Economic Development Plans
Draft Development Plan of Malaya 1950-1955* June 1950
P rogress R epo rt on  D ev e lo p m en t P lan 1950-1952 1953
G eneral P lan  o f  D ev e lo p m en t 1956-1960 O ctober 1956
Second Five Year Plan 1961-1965 1 S ep tem ber 1961
Interim  R ev iew  o f  S econd  Y ear P lan 1961-1965 D ecem ber 1963
First Malaysia Plan 1966-1970 25 N o v em b er 1965
M T R  o f  F irst M a lay sia  P lan 1966-1970 25 January  1969
Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975 25 June 1971
M T R  o f  S econd  M a lay s ia  P lan 1971-1975 20  N o v em b er 1973
Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980 5 Ju ly  1976
M T R  T h ird  M a lay sia  P lan 1976-1980 3 S ep tem ber 1997
Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985 16 M arch  1981
M T R  Fourth  M a lay sia  P lan 1981-1985 29 M arch  1984
Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-1990 21 M arch 1986
M T R  F ifth  M alay sia  P lan 1986-1990 23 June 1989
OPP2 1991-2000 17 June  1991
Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991-1995 7 O ctober 1991
M T R  S ix th  M alay sia  P lan 1991-1995 16 D ecem ber 1993
Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996-2000 5 June 1996
M T R  S even th  M a lay sia  Plan 1996-2000 22 A pril 1999
OPP3 2 0 0 1 -2 0 1 0 3 A pril 2001
Eight Malaysia Plan 2001 -2005 23 A pril 2001
M T R  E ighth  M a lay sia  Plan 2001 -2005 30  O ctober 2003
Note * 6 years duration; \1TR= Mid Term Review: OPP= Outline Perspective Plan
[Source: MEPU, 2006(i)]
6 Malaysia gained its independence on 3 1st o f August 1957.
2 0
CHAPTER 2: MALAYSIA BACKGROUND AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENT
Graph 2.1: The Annual Growth of Malaysia's Real Gross Domestic Product
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Table 2.2: Malaysia‘s Key Economic Indicators (2002 -  2006)
KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2002 2001 2004 2006 2006
Unit RM million % p a RM million % p.a. RM million % p a RM million % p a RM million % pa
1.1 Gross Domestic Product (m 1867 constant prices) 220.442 4 4 232,359 5 4 248,954 7 1 262,028 5 3 277,826 6.0
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 18.064 2 6 20,134 5 6 21.137 5.0 21,585 2.1 22,010 2.0
Mining 15.810 4 3 16,720 5.6 17,372 3 9 17,504 0 8 18,378 5 0
Manufacturing 66.018 4 3 71,544 8 4 78,558 9 5 82,394 4 9 88,122 7.0
Construction 7,251 2 0 7,359 1.5 7,248 -1.5 7,133 -1.6 7,204 1.0
Services 127,868 0 5 133,751 4 5 142,848 6 8 152,205 6 5 161.330 6 0
1.2 Gross National Product (In 1887 constant prices) 203,168 5 0 217,155 8 9 233,084 7.3 248,030 6 4 262.462 5.8
Private consumption 101.845 4 4 106,722 6 6 120.181 10.5 131,266 9 2 140,132 6 8
Private investment 22,181 -15 1 22,270 0 4 20,815 25.8 31,047 108 34,145 10 0
Public consumption 30.826 10.4 34,476 11.5 36,558 6.0 38,727 5 9 39,979 3 2
Public investment 41.068 112 42,690 3 9 38,981 -8.7 39,128 0 4 40,194 2 7
Eifion of goods & services 237,804 4 5 251.463 5 7 292,478 16.3 316,959 8 4 345,075 8 9
Import oi  goods & services 216,802 0 3 225,986 4 2 272.721 20.7 293,391 7.8 322,789 10.0
Per capita GNP RM 13,722 14,870 16,616 18,106 19,484
U S i 3611 3913 4373 4781 5145
% of GNP %  Of GNP % of GNP % of GNP %  Of GNP
13 Balance of payments 72,117 21 4 97,701 2 63 104,474 24.7 126,454 28 7 138,401 26.7
Goods •31,067 •8 3 -37,553 -10 2 -33,329 -7.5 -34,157 -7 2 -33.969 -65
Services & income 30,484 8.1 50,848 13 7 56,511 13.4 75,334 159 89,409 17.2
Current account balances 14,181 4 2 39,059 10.5 83,061 19.6 12,820 2,7
Overall balance 131,384 38 2 170,452 46.1 253,513 59 9 256,354 56 3
Central bank reserves 5 4 6.6 8.0 7.6
Months of retained imports
1.4 Federal Government Accounts 83,515 24 8 92,608 24.8 99,397 23.4 106,304 22.5 114.569 22.1
Revenue 68,688 20.4 75,224 20.2 91,298 21 5 97,744 20.7 101246 19.5
Operating erpendlure 35,068 104 38,312 10.3 27,518 6 5 27,284 5 6 32,758 6.3
Development erpendlture (net) -20.253 •60 -20,928 -5 6 •19,419 -4.6 -18,724 -4.0 •19,435 -3.7
Unit 1988 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1.5 Price Indices
Consumer Price Indor (CPI) % p a 6  3 2 5 1 0 1.4 1 0 1.2 1.4 3 0 3 5 - 4 0
Producer Price Index PPI) % p a 107 -3 3 3.1 -8 0 4 4 8.7 0 9 0.0
% of
labour
16 Unemployment force 3 1 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.6 3 0 3.5 3.5 3.5
1 7 Eichange Rates (average per penod)
RM /U SS 3 920 3.800 3.800 3 800 3.800 3.800 3 800 3.800 3.644"
RM / 1 0OYen 3 000 3 381 3827 3 130 3 039 3.282 3.542 3.618 3 162 *
R M /SS 2 340 2242 2 206 2.122 2 123 2.181 2 242 2.332 2.289*
RM / Pound Sterting 6 496 6.190 6 764 6 474 5.170 6211 6 985 7 246 6 500"
1 S Money & Banking
Money supply M1 RM million 54,135 73,447 78,216 80,728 89,072 102,104 114269 124,023 126,961 b
Money supply M2J RM million 296,472 337,138 354,702 362,512 383,542 426,061 534,163 616,178 636,191 b
Money supply M 33 RM million 401.459 434,690 456,496 469,519 501,125 549,649 617,639 667,327 679,254 b
Commercial Banks
Total deposits4 RM million 307,440 339,708 362,991 368.792 388,405 433,008 550,930 644,891 670.276 b
Total loans 5 RM million 30,269 296,332 314,798 325.072 338,242 355,839 448,354 526,771 555,482 b
Non-performing loans % of total bans 6 7 5.5 5 4 7 4 6.9 8 4 5 3 4.4 4 .6 b
Interest rates
3-month inter-bank Avg at end-period (%) 9.43 4 00 3.19 3.13 2 92 2.00 2 54 2 00
3-month fixed deposit Avg at end-period (%) 6 03 3.33 3.40 321 3.20 3.00 3.00 3.02 3 04 b
Savings deposit Avg at end-period (%) 3 07 2 70 2.72 2 20 2.12 1.00 1.50 1 41 1 43 b
Base lending rate Avg, at end-period (%) 0 04 0.79 0.70 0 39 0.39 0.00 5 95 0.20 6 34 b
3-month Treasury Bils Avg al end-period (%) 0 00 3.53 2 00 2 79 2.73 2 79 2 40 2 60 2.86 b
N otes: ( 0  F orecast,"  D ata as at 26 A pril 2006, Data as at end  o f  F ebruary  2006 
1 C urrcncy  ho ld in g s  and  d em an d  deposits  o f  the priva te  sector
2 M l plus fixed sav in g s  and o th er dep o sits  o f  the p riv a te  secto r p laced  w ith the C entral Bank, com m erc ia l banks, n ego tiab le  certifica te  d eposits  and C entra l Bank certifica tes  
C urrency  in c ircu la tion  plus all p rivate  secto r deposits  w ith the C en tra l B ank, co m m erc ia l banks, finance com pan ies, m erchan t banks and d iscoun t houses ex c ludes p lacem en ts  am ong  th ree  financial institu tions 
As from  April 1997 includes foreign  cu rrency  dep o sits  w hich w ere p rev io u sly  included  in the various type o f  deposits  
'  S tarting  from  1996 based  on  new  c lassifica tion
S ources: E conom ic P lanning  Unit, M in istry  o f  F inance. D epartm en t o f  S ta tistics, Bank N egara  M alaysia  (i.e. C entra l B ank) and  the B ursa M alaysia  (M alaysia  B o u rse ) [Sources: MEPU, 2006(H) ]
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Table 2.3: Turnover of Malaysian Industries between the Periods 2001 to 2006
■
2001
Volume Value 
(mill (RM 
units) mill)
2002
Volume Value 
(mill (RM 
units) mill)
2003
Volume Value 
(mill (RM 
units) mill)
2004
Volume Value 
(mill (RM 
units) mill)
2005
Volume Value 
(mill (RM 
units) mill)
20061
Volume Value 
(mill (RM 
units) mill)
Consumer Products 1,820.3 7.549.6 3,788.8 13,225.1 7,022.2 17,250.7 8088.8 19,051.5 7,987.8 15,505.6 3,404.5 7,002.4
Industrial Products 6.625.4 9.678.7 7,399.1 13,365.0 19,865.7 30,164.6 22,841.0 32,174.3 21,079.7 22.990.3 6,913.1 5,837.7
Construction 5,074.2 8,480.3 5,388.9 10,732.5 9,245.0 17,094.7 6,883.7 13,229.0 5,943.5 9,210.3 3,354.8 3,433.3
Trading/Services 12.729.0 33,207.9 15,143.4 44,920.4 27,587.3 62,860.7 26,898.9 77,688.0 26,334.8 69,330.3 9,952.9 17,800.5
Technology1 831.2 3,803.6 946.2 3,688.0 6,621.7 7,734.8 8,167.7 9,016.4 10,506.1 6,537.8 11,567.3 6,007.9
Finance 8,193.7 19,645.2 7,946.3 24,059.8 13,444.2 30,964.1 12,753.6 41,553.2 2,828.7 4,913.0 1,073.6 1,721.6
Hotels 472.1 384.5 1,129.9 1,001.2 1,135.5 910.6 1,736.7 2,242.0 12,241.2 41,364.7 2,918.7 9,697.9
Properties 4,350.7 2,985.1 6.851.5 6,403.3 16,341.3 15,021.1 14,033.2 20,262.9 1,430.0 1,195.1 256.1 90.4
Plantation 1,255.8 3,045.3 1,899.9 5,962.9 3,844.9 11,024.0 5,258.1 15,062.3 12,273.7 13,117.9 4,328.6 2,239.5
Mining 137.5 193.3 246.2 589.0 193.1 387.8 110.4 353.4 3,015.3 10,616.3 752.3 3,166.7
Trusts
Infrastructure Project
17.8 10.3 26.5 15.7 23.6 16.1 45.9 41.5 0.2 9.8 0.1 4.8
Companies 578.0 1,752.1 389.2 1,175.0 1,516.0 3,620.7 1.199.6 3,347.0 337.2 392.0 173.4 188.5
Closed Fnd Fund 
Exchange T radcd
16.9 7.8 36.6 22.9 70.0 46.3 58.9 45.0 59.0 51.6 25.3 23.4
Fundc - - - - - - - - 45.1 47.4 6.0 6.2
Loans 2.331.8 1,093.5 1.168.9 1,054.8 1,448.7 1,471.2 1,657.8 1,553.8 1,386.6 1,006.7 1,681.3 460.5
Loans (PN4) - - 6.8 1.4 2.3 0.4 - - - - - -
TSR d / Warrant 10,063.1 4,148.3 8.836.5 5,194.4 13,332.2 6,210.5 10,424.9 5,501.3 11,716.0 3,604.3 2,842.5 694.2
T S R d/W arrant (PN4) - - 53.6 12.2 9.5 1.0 2.8 0.5 - - - -
PN4 Condition - - 750.7 208.9 846.6 174.8 573.0 168.3 - - - -
Trading o f Rights 451.7 30.6 735.5 232.7 528.2 191.4 287.8 118.1 671.1 147.1 65.6 2.7
Call Warrants Board - 1 - - 1,122.2 1,192.8 1,657.5 2,453.4 963.1 1,049.9 151.4 114.3
Grant Total 54.949.2 96.016.1 62,744.5 131,865.2 124,200.2 206,338.3 122,680.3 243,861.9 118,819.1 201,090.1 49,467.5 58,492.5
Notes: Figures are inclusive Direct Business
1 D ata  as a l 31* M a rch  2006
“ th e  M a m  H aunt, S e c o n d  H oard  a n d  M T.SD AO  M a rke t fM liS D A O  M a rk e t m e rg e d  w ith  M a la ysia  H ourse w ith e ffec t I S 11' M a rch  2002  
h L a u n ch ed  on  15'h M a y  2005  
‘ L a u n ch ed  on  IS '1' du ly  2005  
(l T ransferable  Subscrip tio n  S ig h ts
[Source: MEPU, 2006(iv)\
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Moreover, the growth of Malaysia’s economy has primarily been driven by investment 
activities, which accounted for 40.5% of the country’s Gross National Product (GNP) in 1994 
(Mohamad, 1995). In terms of the country’s gross domestic level, it has been growing at the 
average rate of 6% since the first quarter of 2003 (see Graph 2.1).
As shown in Table 2.2, manufacturing and services are the two industries that have contributed 
most to Malaysian GDP over the previous five years (see further Table 2.3). In addition, the 
growth of the export of goods and services has remained stable at 8% for the last two years. In 
2006, the per capita GNP level was at its highest value and had been increasing during the past 
five years. Also, the Malaysian unemployment level, on average, has remained low, at 3.4%.
In addition, the country is rich in natural resources (such as petroleum), and in raw materials, 
has a high supply of low-cost high-skilled workers, is a member of designated economic zones 
to enhance business trading and scope, and has lenient tax structures and business-friendly 
regulatory policies (Abdul Razak, 2007). These characteristics are essential to promote a higher 
level of investment activities along with a broader scope of business opportunities in Malaysia.
2.1.1 1997-1999 Economic Crisis and Recovery Plans
From mid 1997 until the last quarter of 1999, Malaysia’s economy was affected by a financial 
crisis (Malaysia Economic Planning Unit, 2001)7. In response to the crisis, the government in 
collaboration with the private sector and other institutions undertook several initiatives to reform 
and restructure the economy and introduced new rulings and policies to expedite the country’s 
recovery. One of the recovery schemes was the imposition of currency control on 2 September
7 In this review. M alaysia's economy was reported to be recovering from the crisis, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth o f 5.8% in 1999 and 8.5% in 2000.
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1998 by fixing the exchange rate at USD 1= Malaysian Ringgits 3.8 (Low, 2000). At that time, 
such a decision was necessary to alleviate fluctuations in the currency rate amidst speculative 
activities as well as to stabilise the domestic environment. Later, beginning in July 2005, the 
exchange rate of the Malaysian Ringgit was administered under a managed float scheme where 
economic fundamentals were used to determine the currency value (Central Bank, 2005).
During the crisis period, corporate and financial reform rescue plans were set up to assist the 
restructuring of affected and ailing financial and non-financial companies. In particular, 
Danaharta, a National Asset Management Company, was formed to address the issue of raising 
non-performing loans (NPLs) by keeping respective loans at a manageable level. This was 
accomplished by removing NPLs from the balance sheets of financial institutions at a fair 
market value and maximising their recovery value (Zainal Abidin, 1999). Danaharta remained to 
administer financial institutions’ recuperation period until 2005. In addition, Danamodal, a 
recapitalisation agency, was set up to recapitalise troubled financial institutions. For this 
purpose, the sum of RM 6.4 billion was injected into 10 financial institutions to protect the 
financial sector from potential systemic risks (Zainal Abidin, 1999). In addition, the merger of 
58 financial institutions into 6 groups was initiated on 29 July 1998 as an important component 
of the financial sector’s restructuring plan. The six groups comprised merchant banking and 
securities and commercial banking and finance company activities amongst others (Zainal 
Abidin, 1999). This measure was also undertaken to prepare domestic banks for the eventual 
opening of financial services under the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
25
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In addition, the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) was commissioned to manage 
the out-of-court settlement of corporate debts of the corporate sector. Mainly, this involved the 
restructuring of companies without government support and reaching a consensus with creditors 
for settlement of companies’ debts without full repayment. Later, in August 2002, the CDRC 
ceased operations after having succeeded in reducing the corporate debts of 32 companies from 
RM52 million to RM36 million.
Since the economic crisis, the Malaysian corporate governance outlook has been far reaching 
and progressive. New corporate governance rules, regulations and policies were viewed as 
necessary, reflecting credible long-term commitment from market players, mainly, industries 
and, more specifically, the accompanying companies. Significantly, such hastened the 
establishment of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance in January 2001 as part of the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Revamped Listing Requirements. The long-term plan for the 
development of an orderly, effective and efficient competitive capital market under the Capital 
Market Master Plan also commenced and the Securities Commission Law and its authority were 
strengthened.
2.2 Malaysia's Capital Market Environment
2.2.1 An Overview
According to Singh and Weisse (1998), the strength of the stock market of developing countries 
has influenced on the development and viability of their financial structures and promoted the 
receipt of injections of capital from advanced economies. In particular, the level of the 
capitalisation ratio of the securities market is an important indicator of a country’s development. 
In providing a conducive environment for investment initiatives, Malaysia’s capital market plays
2 6
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a primary function as a platform for raising and investing capital (Mohamad, 1990; Malaysian 
Securities Commission, 2001). This further emphasises the importance of its efficiency to 
stimulate and sustain Malaysia’s economic development and stability (Abdullah, 2003).
Notably, the capital market of Malaysia comprises public and private debt securities issues and 
equity issues (Anwar, 2005). The growth and performance of its equity market is greatly 
influenced by the viability of the long-term income trends of its economy (Malaysian Securities 
Commission, 2001). Moreover, equity market contributions and participation in private sector 
growth are important, notably in funding and achieving the country’s aims for a knowledge- 
based economy and the expansion and development of its Islamic capital market and small- 
medium enterprise businesses (Anwar, 2005).
The proper functioning of a country’s equity market is also affected by the governance imposed 
on capital market activities and the extent of legal, regulatory and institutional reliability and 
enforcement [La Porta et al., (1997, 1998)]. According to Li (2002), Malaysian stock market 
leads the highly valued equity market in developing countries with a projected worth of 95% of 
the capacity of its valuation frontier8. In addition, the Malaysian Securities Commission has 
implemented various schemes to strengthen the reliability of its capital market and ensure the 
protection of investors’ investments. These include instituting and enforcing an effective 
corporate governance framework in listed issuers, enhancing firms’ disclosures and the 
transparency of information and activities, and monitoring, enforcing and ensuring that directors 
of corporations are extensively educated, and are trained to be competent in and are committed 
to performing their statutory duties (Anwar, 2005).
8 T he m axim um  feas ib le  ou tp u t from  g iven  inputs
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The performance of Malaysia’s equity market is measured first by the Malaysia Bourse 
Composite Index (KLCI). This benchmark measures the performance of the 100 most successful 
listed corporations, and further indicates their representation in the major sectors of the 
Malaysian economy. It is calculated as the ratio of the current aggregate of equities market 
capitalisation to the base aggregate market capitalisation [see Bursa Malaysia, 2007(i)]. Further, 
since the first quarter of 2002, die market capitalisation of Malaysia Bourse composite index has 
been growing steadily (see Graph 2.2).
Graph 2.2: The Market Capitalisation of the Malaysia Bourse Composite Index (2002-2007)
BURSA MALAYSIA
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In the Malaysia Bourse key indicators report (see Anwar, 2005), the Composite Index showed a 
stimulus level of 1196.45 points, which represented its third highest achievement since its 
inception in 1990 and a nearly 200% improvement since its lowest point of 400 points in mid 
1998, during the financial crisis period (see Anwar, 2005). Further, the issues of new equities 
grew steadily from 1990 to 1997. During the crisis period, participation was reduced, however, 
since the year 2000, activity has recovered to the momentum of the pre-crisis period (see Anwar, 
2005). Between 1990 and 2007, the market capitalisation value of Malaysian equities has 
continued to improve [See Anwar, 2005; MEPU, 2006(iv), 2007] and presently the figure has 
reached Malaysian Ringgits 943.37 billions (that is, USD 268 billions9) [MBSB, 2007]. This 
amount represents the total market capitalisation of the Main Board, Second Board, Call 
Warrant and MESDAQ market of the Malaysian Securities Exchange.
With respect to the distribution of ownership of share capital in Malaysian corporations, the 
foreign investors’ shareholdings in Malaysian corporations have gradually increased since 1990 
(see Table 2.4). They bring in a source of funds to the country, which further contributes to the 
stabilisation and growth of the Malaysian economy. This fact also emphasises the importance of 
established laws and regulations that protect investors’ interests appropriately and can be 
depended upon to monitor and discipline corporations’ behaviour.
9 Based on the Central Bank o f Malaysia (www.hnm.gov.mv) currency exchange rate o f  RM 3.5115 for USD 1 on 9 March 
2007.
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Table 2.4: Ownership of Share Capital (At Par Value) of Limited Companies 1
IHH
RM % RM % RM % RM % RM % RM %
M illion Total M illion Total M illion Total M illion Total M illion Total M illion Total
B u m ip u te ra 20,877.5 19.3 36981.2 20.6 59,394.4 19.1 62,976 18.9 73,161.8 18.7 100,037.2 18.0 10.5
Individuals & 
Institu tions
15,322.0 14.2 33,353.2 18.0 54,046.0 17.4 57,173.6 17.2 66,746 .0 17.1 91,340 .6 17.2 10.6
T rust A gencies2 5,555.5 5.1 3,628 2.0 5,348.4 1.7 5 ,802.4 1.7 6,415.8 1.6 8,696.6 1.7 9.1
N o n -B u m ip u te ra 50,754.0 46.8 78,026.9 43.4 125,013.3 40.3 137,412.8 41.3 168,962.7 43.2 214,972 .6 40.6 10.7
C hinese 49,296.5 45.5 73,552.7 40.9 117,372.4 37.9 129,318.3 38.9 159,806.9 40.9 206,682 .9 30.0 10.9
Indians 1,068.0 1.0 2,723.1 1.5 4,752 .9 1.5 5,136.8 1.5 5,951.1 1.5 6 ,392.6 1.2 8.9
O thers 389.5 0.3 1,751.1 1.0 2,888.0 0.9 2 ,957.7 0.9 3 ,204.7 0.8 1,897.3 0.4 0.8
F o re ig n e rs 27,525.5 25.4 49,792 .7 27.7 101,279.2 32.7 103,909.4 31.3 112,727.6 28.0 172,279.6 32.5 13.2
N om inee  C o m p a n ie s 9 ,229.4 8.5 14,991.4 8.3 24,389.5 7.9 28,119 .4 8.5 35,969.5 9.2 42,479.1 8.0 11.0
T o ta l 198,377.4 100.0 179,792.2 100.0 310,076 .4 100.0 332,417 .6 100.0 390,821.6 100.0 529,768.7 100.0 11.4
Notes: Excludes Government H oldings (except through trust agencies)
2 Refers to shares held through trust agencies, such as Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) and State Economic Development Corporation (SEDCs)
Source: Economic Planning Unit and Companies Commission o f  M alaysia
[Source: MEPU, 2006(iii)}
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To further encourage and increase the participation of investors in the capital market, the 
Malaysian government has introduced several initiatives, including reducing the stamp duty for 
all securities trading on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (presently known as the Bursa 
Malaysia) to Malaysian Ringgits 200 (that is, USD 5710) per contract.
To facilitate further comprehension of the circumstances prevailing in Malaysia’s financial and 
capital market regulatory environment, the following subsections will examine the roles and 
functions of capital market regulatory bodies in their attempts to achieve high corporate 
governance standards in practice.
2.2.2 Regulatory Bodies
2.2.2.1 The Treasury and Ministry of Finance
The Federal Treasury was formed in 1957, under the administration of the Ministry of Finance, 
mainly for the purposes of formulating, planning and implementing fiscal policies in line with 
the nation’s medium and long-term development plans, the New Economic Policy (NEP) and 
the National Development Policy (NDP)11. Specifically, the Finance Division of the Federal 
Treasury is responsible for the development of the capital and financial markets. In addition, the 
Central Bank of Malaysia and the Securities Commission maintain a close relationship with the 
Finance Division in regulating the financial12 and capital markets in the country.
1(1 Based on the Central Bank o f Malaysia (wvvvv.bum.gov, m v) currency exchange rate o f  RM 3.5115 for USD 1 on 9 March 
2007.
11 The objectives o f  these economic plans were to promote sustainable economic growth, improve national economic resilience, 
and ensure equitable sharing o f  national wealth.
12 The money and foreign exchange markets (i.e. the capital market), the commodity futures market and the financial futures and 
options markets collectively form the financial markets o f Malaysia.
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As regards to the monitoring of the capital market, the Finance Division responsibilities include:
i. Ensuring that the securities laws are being complied with so that reasonable measures are 
undertaken to maintain investors’ confidence in the securities and futures markets;
ii. Considering and recommending reforms to the laws relating to securities and futures 
contracts; and
iii. Eliminating illegal, unethical and improper practices in securities and futures markets.
(Low, 2000:27)
Moreover, the Ministry of Finance has been one of the major contributors to and active 
participants in the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance that was formed in 1998 to 
identify and mitigate the weaknesses highlighted by the economic crisis in the governance 
framework of industries. Subsequently, in March 1999, after extensive collaboration between 
various private and public parties, the Finance Committee published the Report on Corporate 
Governance that ultimately constituted the Malaysian Corporate Governance Code of 2001.
2.2.2.2 Bank Negara Malaysia (or the Central Bank of Malaysia)
The Central Bank of Malaysia was formed in 1959, following an economic proposal put forward 
by the World Bank in 1954 (Watson-Caine Report 1956), which subsequently led to the 
enforcement of the Central Bank of Malaya Ordinance in 1958 (Low, 2002:31). Primarily, its 
responsibilities range from monitoring monetary stability to regulating the banking industry in 
Malaysia.
In terms of corporate governance initiatives, the issuance of Guideline No.l in 1994 made it 
compulsory for all licensed banks and insurers to form an audit committee comprising a 
majority membership of independent directors. Later, in the same year, this rule was 
incorporated by the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange into its Listing Requirements, further
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emphasising the importance of monitoring committee establishment and its role in promoting 
appropriate governance practices in listed companies.
Moreover, it recently announced further liberalisation of the administration of foreign exchange 
dealings and the ruling took effect from 1 April 2007. The implementation is part of the Bank’s 
continuous efforts to enhance Malaysia’s competitiveness as an international investment 
platform and amongst others will assist in:
(i) Providing greater flexibility to licensed onshore banks to undertake foreign currency 
business,
(ii) Facilitating non-residents investments in Ringgit assets and financial products and
(iii) Reducing the cost of doing business and ensure greater business efficiency.
[Source: Central Bank o f  Malaysia (BNM), 2007]
2.2.2.3 Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC)
The Securities Commission was established in March 1993 under the Securities Commission 
Act 1993 (SCA) as a self-funding statutory body. Officially, the Commission is responsible for:
• supervising exchanges, clearing houses and central depositories
• registering authority for prospectuses of corporations other than approving
• authority for corporate bond issues
• regulating all matters relating to securities and futures contracts
• regulating the take-over and merger of companies
• regulating all matters relating to unit trust schemes
• licensing and supervising all licensed persons
• encouraging self-regulation
• ensuring proper conduct of market institutions and licensed persons
{Source: Malaysia Securities Commission. 2003)
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From the capital market perspective, the Commission plays a major role in developing, 
regulating and sustaining the securities and futures markets in Malaysia, given that it is 
answerable to the Ministry of Finance and that its rules and regulations are gazetted in the 
Parliament. Its powers range from investigating breaches of securities regulations to enforcing 
rules and regulations and prosecuting securities offences. In preparing and establishing the 
strategic future direction o f the Malaysian capital market, the Commission deployed a 10-year 
plan in 2001 under the Capital Market Master Plan (CMMP). Primarily, the CMMP was 
executed as a response to the debilitated state of the capital market during the economic crisis, 
and to facilitate future business development and the creation of a competitive capital market in 
Malaysia.
Predominantly, the Commission aimed to shift the regulatory framework from a merit-based 
regulatory scheme13 to a disclosure-based regulatory system, recognising the latter's usefulness 
and appropriateness in an era of business globalisation, technological and financial innovation, 
and the rapid production and flow of information (Malaysia Securities Commission, 1998). In 
particular, a disclosure-based regulatory system could be expected to permit the liberal 
involvement and participation of private sector companies in managing their own investment 
decisions and hence would promote efficient and equitable capital allocation and decision­
making in Malaysia’s capital market (Malaysia’s Security Commission, 1998).
As such, this move helped to improve the standard and operation of capital market activities and 
facilitate reinforcement of the capital market regulatory framework. Notably, the disclosure-
13 U nder th is schem e th e  S ta te  h ad  assum ed  a paternal role in assessin g  th e  im portance  o f  investm ent opportun ities 
by playing th e  ro le o f  in te rm ed ia ry  betw een  u sers and supp lie rs o f  cap ita l.
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based regulatory system would be further enhanced by the adoption and implementation of the 
new system of co-regulation or sharing of regulatory powers amongst industries, regulators and 
other market observers. In addition, this would also provide a solid base for company 
participation in the practices and enforcement of good corporate governance in their operations.
2.2.2.4 Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad [or Malaysia Bourse Securities Limited 
(MBSB)]
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) was established in 1973, following agreement by 
the Malaysian and Singaporean governments to administer a separate securities exchange14. 
However, it was officially de-linked from the Singapore Stock Exchange in 1990. Two decades 
later, in April 2004, the KLSE was de-mutualised and re-named Malaysia Bourse Securities 
Limited (hereinafter refers as MBSB)13. The restructuring was vital in providing and developing 
strong and competitive financial intermediaries (Anwar, 2005).
Primarily, the MBSB functions as a self-regulatory organisation for the capital market. Among 
others, its responsibilities include governing the conduct of its members in securities dealings, 
surveillance of the marketplace, and the enforcement of listing requirements (MBSB, 1998). 
Moreover, its close collaboration with the Central Bank (Bank Negara), the Securities 
Commission, and the Ministry of Finance, has helped strengthen its position as a safe, secure 
and attractive investment platform, which is important in establishing an internationally 
competitive market place for fund raising and investment (MBSB, 2006).
14 At that time, it was called the joint Stock Exchange o f  Malaysia and Singapore.
15 See ‘K.LSE Converts to Public Company Limited by Shares’ [See MBSB. 2004(i)]
35
CHAPTER 2: MALAYSIA BACKGROUND AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENT
The MBSB’s efforts to improve and implant good governance practice in listed companies were 
assisted in 1987 with the addition of a new section on corporate disclosure policies and penalties 
in the new listings manual. Shortly after, in 1993, the MBSB ruled all listed companies must 
form an audit committee. Eight years later, in January 2001, Revamped Listing Requirements 
were endorsed, making it compulsory, starting from June 2001, for all listed companies in Main 
Board, Second Board and MESDAQ Board to produce a corporate governance statement and 
related information in their annual reports as prescribed by Chapter 15 of the Malaysia Bourse 
Listing Requirements 2001.
Most important of all, the corporate governance disclosure requirements of the Revamped 
Listing Rulings adopted the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2001 Principles and Best 
Practice. Additionally, to safeguard investors’ interests and the market trading share, in February 
2001, with the issuance of Practice Note No.4 (PN4), the Malaysia Bourse temporarily de-listed 
companies that did not meet the minimum financial requirement and classified them as PN4 
companies (MBSB, 2002). These companies were given a specific time to undertake corporate 
and financial restructuring. Encouragingly, since then, the number of PN4 companies has 
reduced from 100 to 20 companies (see further MBSB 2002, 2006(a) and Table 2.3).
There are four main indices in MBSB (see Table 2.5), namely, the Composite Index (which 
represent the index of the top 100 main board companies), the Emas Index, the Second Board 
Index [which represents listed companies with paid up capital between MR 40 million (USD
11.21 million) and MR 60 million (USD 16.82 million)], and the MESDAQ index.
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Table 2.5: The Performance of the Malaysia Bourse Securities Limited Indices in Year 2001 to 2006
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Bursa Malaysia Index
Composite Index 696.1 646.3 793.9 907.4 899.8 926.6
Emas Index 165.2 157.3 195.6 214.3 203.9 213.4
Second Board Index 134.1 98.2 140.6 110.9 80.4 91.1
MESDAQ Index 88.1 83.3 152.3 162.5 87.1 111.2
Market Valuation (RM billion) 465.0 481.6 640.3 722.0 695.3 732.9
Selected World Stock Market Indices
Dow Jones New York 10,021.5 8,341.6 10,453.9 10,783.0 10,717.5 11,109.3
Nikkei, Tokyo 10,542.6 8,579.0 10,676.6 11,488.8 16,111.4 17,059.7
Hang Seng, Hong Kong 11,397.2 9,321.3 12,575.9 14,230.1 14,876.4 15,805.0
New Listing
Main Board 6.0 22.0 16.0 15.0 13.0 -
Second Board 14.0 22.0 22.0 26.0 17.0 -
MESDAQ Market - 7.0 20.0 31.0 46.0 7.0
Total 20.0 51.0 58.0 72.0 76.0 8.0
Listed Company
Main Board 520.0 562.0 598.0 622.0 646.0 645.0
Second Board 292.0 294.0 276.0 278.0 268.0 266.0
MESDAQ Market - 12.0 32.0 63.0 107.0 114.0
Total 812.0 868.0 906.0 963.0 1,021.0 1,025.0
[Source: MEPU, (2006(iv)]
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Recently, MBSB has announced its plans to increase efficiency in the market’s infrastructure 
and improve investors’ means of investing, aimed mainly at increasing the degree of 
transparency in the market [The Star, 2007 (iv)]. This includes completing the infrastructural 
and regulatory framework for allowing foreign entities to be listed on the Stock Exchange. By 
June 2007, the Bursa had launched a trading fund based on its FTSE-Bursa Malaysia 30, to give 
investors immediate exposure to 30 of Malaysia’s largest listed corporations. A tradable Syariah 
Index was introduced simultaneously to promote and expand Syariah-based investment 
opportunities to investors.
Previously, the MBSB had focused on improving market liquidity and velocity by investing in 
high-technology equipment to establish an integrated trading platform, the Bursa Trade, for the 
derivatives market and to improve the infrastructures for equities trading [The Star, 2007 (iv)], 
whilst, for the bonds market, the Stock Exchange had undertaken to establish an electronic 
trading platform equipped with order matching, trade negotiation, trade reporting, surveillance 
and price dissemination.
2.2.2.4.1 MBSB Public Listed Companies’ Listing Requirements
The Malaysia Bourse Securities Limited listing requirements 2001 significantly incorporated the 
recommendations of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2001 recommendation into 
Corporate Governance Principles and Best Practices. Moreover, the revamped listing rulings, 
combined, supplemented and incorporated previous Main Board Listing Requirements (MBLR) 
and Second Board Listing Requirement (SBLR) to form standardised rules for both boards 
(MBSB, 2001 (a): Question 3). In addition, to assist listed issuers’ further understanding and
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adoption of the new requirements, the Exchange, through its Practice Notes, detailed the 
required implementations of and related changes in the newly enacted listing provisions.
Moreover, the listing rulings of the Main Board and Second Board are motivated by the 
Exchange objectives to:
(i) Improve listed issuers’ governing practices and transparency
(ii) Increase efficiency in capital market activities
(iii) Enhance investors’ protection
(iv) Restore and encourage investors’ participation in capital market activities
[Source: MBSB, 2001(a): Question 1]
Further, extensive measures have been put in to ensure the realisation of good corporate 
governance objectives, ease of adoption by listed issuers, and safeguarding of investors’ vested 
interests by:
(i) Strengthening the provisions of disclosure, corporate governance, continuing listing 
obligations, financial reporting and protection of minority interests
(ii) Codifying unwritten rules and procedures relating to listed issuers
(iii) Simplifying procedural requirements and processes
(iv) Clarifying requirements and removing ambiguities, and
(v) Adopting global trends and standards in listing rules where applicable
[Source: MBSB, 2001(a): Question 1]
Notably, the listing requirements of paragraphs 9.03 of the Exchange Rulings (see Appendix 
2A) relating to the scope and quality of material information signify the Exchange’s constant 
awareness of investors’ need for reliable and credible information to make informed economic 
judgements on their investments. In addition, paragraph 9.19 of the Exchange rulings identifies 
those events that require immediate announcements to the Exchange by listed corporations.
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These include a change in the composition of the board of directors and audit committee of the 
listed issuer, in the chief executive officer, company secretary, or external auditor of the listed 
issuer, the memorandum of association or articles of association, the acquisition and disposal of 
shares and a deviation of 10% or more between the profit after tax and the minority interest 
estimated profit.
2.3 An Overview of Corporate Governance Issues in Malaysia
According to Johnson and Mitton (2001), the bias the Malaysian government shows to 
entrepreneurs’ well-being may not effectively assist investors’ protection. As Johnson and 
Shleifer (2001) point out, a country with a weak legal system requires strong support from its 
regulator to ensure investors’ protection and to strengthen the credibility of its financial market. 
Moreover, the East Asian 1997 financial crisis demonstrated the importance of establishing 
formal rules and regulations to monitor and discipline corporations’ behaviours and to secure 
investors’ investments (World Bank, 1998).
Moreover, many family businesses in South East Asia practise self-monitoring to ensure 
appropriate and sufficient governance of their firms (Khan, 1999). Notably, senior leaders will 
participate in the training of new management teams to ensure the efficient and effective running 
of the business. Claessens et al., (1999) also noted that in South East Asia the inherent 
concentrated ownership in large corporations by individuals, family members and the state 
requires an appropriate monitoring mechanism at board level to protect investors’ interests from 
being expropriated by substantial shareholders who are also board members. Further, 
Thillainathan (1999) identified a serious effect of the pyramidal and cross-holdings structure of
4 0
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many corporations in Malaysia. Notably, these structures of ownership allow insiders that have 
majority control to pursue private rent seeking disguised as transfers of assets from a holdings 
company to subsidiaries or vice versa.
According to Dogan and Smyth (2002), main political parties in Malaysia are substantial 
shareholders of various listed companies. The business relationship between Malaysian 
corporations with politically influential individuals and the government has also been 
documented by Gomez and Sundaram (1997). The significance of this association is that it 
allows the company to gain access to government projects, which are high in value. In return, 
some corporate leaders support the election expenses of politically influential politicians (see 
Gomez and Sundaram, 1997). In another study, Aziz (1999:22) highlighted the mismanagement 
of government projects by United Engineers Berhad, a company that was too inexperienced to 
conduct large and complex civil engineering works, but was granted the contract to build public 
motorways. It was found that the owner of the company had close links with the Finance 
minister at that time.
In East Asian economies, founder-owned firm and public listed firms are seen as contributors to 
economic growth, employment and stability (Scott, 1999). In the case of Malaysia, the pervasive 
insider corporate governance system, the higher level of concentrated ownership, the cross­
holdings and the significant participation of owners in management emphasise the important 
role of independent directors in overseeing and controlling management misappropriation 
(Khatri et al., 2002)
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2.4 Corporate Governance Initiatives in Malaysia
In the following sections the corporate governance initiatives undertaken by Malaysia regulatory 
bodies and private organisations are further discussed
2.4.1 The H igh L eve l F inance C om m ittee an d  W orking G roups a n d  M alaysian Code on 
Corporate G overnance
The High Level Finance Committee and Working Group on Best Practices in Corporate 
Governance were formed during the financial crisis in 1998 to examine the weaknesses in the 
corporate governance practice in Malaysian industries with the aim of producing a set of best 
practices that would command effective and respectable business conduct (Finance Committee, 
1999; United Nations, 2001). The committee was chaired by the Secretary General of the 
Treasury, Ministry of Finance and its members comprised of the Governor of the Central Bank, 
the Chairman of the SC, the Chairman of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (presently known 
as the Malaysia Bourse Securities Limited), the Chairman of the Financial Reporting Foundation 
and representatives of various industry organisations.
Meanwhile, two working groups were established by the high level Finance Committee to 
develop its proposed corporate governance and best practices framework. The first group was 
the working group on best practices in corporate governance (JPK1), responsible in developing 
best practices standards for the industry and training programmes for corporate individuals 
(MCCG, 2001). Whilst, the working group on law reform issues in corporate governance (JPK2) 
was formed to improve certain key elements of corporate regulations to establish an effective 
enforcement mechanism on the implementation of good corporate governance practice by 
companies. This was imperative to promote investor confidence in the capital market (FCCG,
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1999). Subsequently, in 1999, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was endorsed by 
the working group on best practices in corporate governance (JPK1).
2.4.1.1 Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) and the Malaysian 
Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG)
In March 1998, the High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance formed the 
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG)16 under the Companies Act 1965, which 
is mainly responsible for raising the awareness and implementation of good corporate 
governance in Malaysian industries. Namely, it concentrates on issues of management and the 
conduct of corporations in Malaysia, with the objectives of inspiring and safeguarding 
shareholders’ initiatives for long-term value creation and enhancing the financial prosperity of 
businesses (MICG, 2001). On the public side, it aims to build up and encourage shareholders’ 
awareness and involvement in corporate governance issues. Membership of the MICG 
comprises of the Federation of Public Listed Companies (FPLC), Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants (MIA), Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), 
Malaysian Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (MAICSA), and Malaysian 
Institute of Directors (MID). The MICG functions include:
(i) Providing continuing education programmes on corporate governance development 
and best practices to company directors, chief executive officers, company 
secretaries, company advisers, company auditors, accountants, lawyers, members of 
audit committees and investors in Malaysia.
(ii) Providing advice, technical and support services on the establishment of corporate 
governance best practices in organisations.
I6A non-profit public company limited by guarantee
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(iii) To work closely with stakeholders, regulators, investors, business and professional 
bodies, educational institutions and relevant authorities in strengthening the integrity 
and governance of the corporate sector. {Source: MICG, 2004)
Officially, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was published by the MICG in January 
2001. The Code is divided into three main parts: the Principles of Corporate Governance, Best 
Practices in Corporate Governance, and Principles and Best Practices for Corporate Governance 
Participants.
The Principles of Corporate Governance emphasise the significance of the following elements:
i. Board of Directors
Corporate governance principles requires the firm to be managed by an effective board, the 
board’s power to be balanced by appropriate representation of executive, non executive 
and independent directors on the board, board members to be supplied with timely and 
quality information for the better accomplishment of duties, the firm to establish and 
implement transparent procedures for board appointments, and the company to carry out a 
re-election process of board members every three years.
ii. Directors’ Remuneration
Regarding this aspect, the Code emphasises the importance of setting up an appropriate 
compensation package for retaining competent directors to ensure a firm’s long-term 
success. In the case of executive directors, their pay structure should be commensurate 
with the corporation’s and their individual performance. In respect of non-executive 
directors, their experience and level of responsibilities represent the main elements for 
setting their level of remuneration. Further, the company needs to establish formal and fair
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remuneration policies and procedures for directors’ compensation. Moreover, the 
transparency of directors’ remuneration can be enhanced by the disclosure of each 
director’s pay in the annual report.
iii. Shareholders’ Communication
In this case, the Code focuses on the significance of communication between a firm and its 
investors, primarily, the institutional shareholders. It encourages both parties to take the 
initiative to establish consistent dialogue between them based on mutual understanding of 
objectives. In addition, companies should also use annual general meetings to establish 
direct contact with private investors and promote their participation in the firm’s well­
being.
iv. Accountability and Audit
The three main areas of concern of the Code here are the roles of the board and its duties in 
overseeing the firm’s financial reporting, its internal control practices, and its relationship 
with auditors.
To strengthen the effectiveness of the board of directors’ fulfilment of its duties and hence firm 
performance, Best Corporate Governance Practices to promote board responsibilities include:
• being vigilant when monitoring the firm’s internal control system with respect to its 
reliability and adequacy to detect in time the firm’s risks regarding the subsequent 
implementation of corrective measures, and overseeing company compliance with 
respective laws, regulations, rules, directives and guidelines
• accountability and audit, exclusively the Audit Committee’s anticipated role and 
functions.
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• ensuring business decisions are made with shareholders being aware and sufficiently 
informed of the company’s operations in concurrence with its policies, and being offered 
facilities to give feedback on respective matters
• ongoing dialogue between companies and investors, persuading institutional investors to 
participate in the direct investigation of the company’s performance, and shareholders’ 
concerns being communicated directly to the top management, the Board and senior 
management
• evaluation of Governance Disclosures, highlighting the importance of institutional 
investors and firm’s advisers assessing critically the board’s composition and structure 
and board members’ investment in other firms
• ensuring external auditors’ relationship with the shareholders demonstrates their 
independent statutory and professional conduct, and financial reporting practices and 
internal control measures reflect the prevailing position.
2.4.2 Minority Shareholders’ Watchdog Group (MSWG)
Incorporated in 2000, as a public company limited by guarantee, as a result of a proposal made 
by the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance in 1999, the organisation aims to improve 
corporate governance practices in Malaysian industries. Since the commencement of its 
operation in 2002, it has the potential to promote better and more effective corporate governance 
practice given the presence of the Code on Corporate Governance (MWCG, 2001). Moreover, in 
2002, it was granted an Investment Adviser Licence, expanding and strengthening further its 
role, and improving its capability to protect and represent minority shareholders’ interests.
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2.4.3 M B SB  a n d  B est P ractices o f  th e  C orporate G overnance D isclosure Task Force
The main duties of the Corporate Governance Disclosure Task Force17 are to facilitate public 
listed companies’ compliance with the Malaysia Bourse Listing Requirements in respect of the 
Corporate Governance Code of Best Practices in light of their voluntary implementation (Best 
Practices Task Force, 2004). Significantly, compliance with the Best Practices Code is 
emphasised as a means of safeguarding market integrity; monitoring corporate information 
disclosure standards, quality and credibility; and encouraging companies’ commitment to 
building a good relationship with investors.
Further, companies are advised to establish a Company Disclosure Policies and Procedures 
committee, the key function of which is to oversee the administration and achievement of 
credibility in the dissemination of corporate information disclosures, feedback and 
announcements. To achieve this aim, boards of directors are given the ultimate responsibility for 
ensuring their appropriate and sufficient implementation. Board members are further 
recommended to instigate frequent communication with members of top management to assure 
the practicality and suitability of corporate disclosure policies and practices.
2.4.4 P ricew aterhouseC oopers (PwC) Survey o f  M alaysia  B ou rse M ain B oard  Com panies 
2005
The PwC (2005) survey of Main Board listed firms’ corporate governance practices (see Table 
2.8) indicated that corporations were implementing the Principles of the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance and Best Practices appropriately.
17 The task force comprises executive members o f  Bursa Malaysia Securities Limited, several professional bodies, namely, the 
Malaysia Institute o f  Corporate Governance (MICG), accountants, regulatory boards (i.e. the MIA. MICPA). the association o f 
chartered secretaries (i.e. MAICSA), asset management companies, merchant banks associations and accounting firms (i.e. BDO 
Governance Advisory).
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Table 2.6: Main Board Companies Corporate Governance Practices
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A. BOD Composition, Structure and Size
L Size o f  Board o f  Directors
■ On average, 30 of the total 105 firms in the top 100 group {henceforth referred to as MBTop) 
employed 8 members on their BOD.
i i  Managing Director/ CEO Board Membership:
■ More than 2/3 of the firms (that is, 79%) appointed their Managing Director/ CEO to the BOD.
iii Composition o f  Independent (INED), Non Executive (NED) and Executive Directors (ED) in BOD
■ Commonly, the firms appointed 4 INED, 3 NED and 2 ED on their BOD. 
iv. Chairman o f  BOD
■ 80% and 20% of firms appointed NED and ED as Board Chairman (where 8% of the latter
Chairmen also held a position as Managing Director/CEO of the company).
B. BOD Process
L Frequency o f  Board Meetings
■ Notably, the MBTop firms conducted more board meetings annually than their counterparts
since the former on average had held 6 meetings in comparison to 5 meetings in the case of the
latter.
i i  Length o f  M eetings
■ At the top quartile of 1%, this group of firms spent 6 hrs in board meeting(s)
■ The next quartile of 28% firms spent 3-6 hours in board meeting(s)
■ More than 2/3 (that is, 71%) of firms spent less than 3 hours in board meeting(s)
C. BOD Members’ Performance Review
L Formal Performance Assessment -
■ Overall, 54% of the firms practised a formal appraisal of their Board of Directors’ 
performance
■ However, this practice was more common in MBTop firms (that is, 71%).
i i  The Practice o f  Board and Individual Appraisal -
■ 64% of the firms reviewed their board members' service through the BOD evaluation, and
41% also adopted a Peer and Self-evaluation method.
iii Other Forms o f  Appraisal
■ The 105 firms specifically appointed the BOD Chairman and Nomination Committee to 
appraise other board members’ achievements.
iv. Measures o f  Directors ’ Performance
■ More than 35% of the firms evaluated their BOD members’ performance based on the level of 
the firm’s profit.
■ A sizeable number of firms i.e. more than 30%, had been benchmarking their BOD members’ 
performance against the firm’s revenue level.
■ Several firms i.e. more than 20% assessed their board members’ achievement based on the 
firm’s cost-savings rate and this group of firms represented more than 25% of MBTop firms
■ More than 20% of firms also used customer satisfaction level as their BOD members’ 
achievement standard.
More than 1/5 of firms and more than 'A of MBTop companies rewarded their board members
based on the improvement in the firm’s share price.
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Table 2.6: .Main Board Companies Corporate Governance Practices (Continued)
[ \  ote \  m/thcr o t  /u  s p a m L  ills 10? \L tu i  BoarU I in n s  nluil  is. J d  <>t llicsc f irm s arc  B u rsa  \ f a l a \  sni I up  10(1 c o m p a n ies  t j
D. Board Remuneration
L M ethod o f  BOD Compensation:
■ Fixed Fee and Meeting Fees were common methods of remuneration for ail the firms
4- In particular, MBTop firms paid higher amounts for these than other firms 
4- The level of fees were set and approved at the annual general meeting 
4- 55% of firms extended such payments to include their board members’ directorship of 
subsidiaries. 
i i  Non Executive Directors' Compensation
■ Over time, the level of Non Executive Director payments had been progressively increasing, 
such that Independent Non Executive Directors were benefiting more with the highest rise in 
their level of compensation.
E. Board Benefit
L Company Cars fo r  Board Chairman
■ This was a privilege for 50% of firms’ BOD chairman
i i  Stock Options Payment
■ This type of compensation was common to the Executive Directors of 40% of firms 
Independent and Non Executive Directors were rarely remunerated with this type of benefit
iii Top M anagement Benefits
■ 83% of firms had established this type of benefit scheme for their executive director 
iv. Other General Benefits Schemes
■ Boards of Directors in 51% of firms were protected with Directors’ Liability Insurance.
■ More than 42% of firms provided an insurance coverage service for their BOD members
■ More than 36% of firms supplied medical coverage for their BOD members
F. Board Committees
L Core Board Committees' Formation
■ All firms had formed audit committees (ACs)
■ Less than 11 companies had not yet established a nomination and remuneration committee
i i  Board Committees' Composition
■ There was at least one Independent Non Executive Director on each AC, NC and RC
■ In all firms, 99% of their AC members were INED and 35% included a BOD Chairman in 
their AC.
■ For companies with a NC, 90% of members were INED and 48%  had a BOD Chairman on the 
committee.
■ INED composition in firms with a RC was 88%, and 46%  of these firms also selected the 
BOD Chairman as a committee member.
iii Size o f  Board Committees
■ The majority of firms appointed at least three members for each AC, NC and RC
iv. Board Committees' Frequency o f  Meeting
In all firms, the AC convened more meetings than the NC and RC such that:
■ On average, the AC held 5 meetings, with a minimum number of 3 and a maximum number of 
16 meetings.
■ On average, the NC and RC conducted 2 meetings, with a minimum number of 1 and a 
maximum of 7 meetings.
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Table 2.6: Main Board Companies Corporate Governance Practices (Continued)
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v. Committees Members* Remuneration
■ AC members were remunerated with both fixed fees and meeting fees. The AC chairman and 
members were paid higher than their NC and RC counterparts
■ Commonly, NC and RC members were remunerated based on meeting fees. However, some 
companies included a committee payment scheme as a fixed fee.
vL Other Board Committees
■ 56% of firms had extended the support of their current core board committees with the 
formation of specific committees:
4- 36% of firms had formed an Executive Committee 
-4. 7% had set up a Finance Committee 
4  6% had established an Investment Committee
4- An Executive Share Option Scheme Committee, Risk Management Committee and/or 
Corporate Committee had also been set up by these firms.
{Source: Extracted from PwC, 2005) 
Notably, the frequency of board meetings exceeded the required number of meetings for interim 
reviews. Also, the practice of reviewing board members’ performance both by peer and self- 
assessment helped in monitoring the board’s accomplishment of duties, and participation and 
contribution towards shareholders’ value enhancement.
In addition, the independence and credibility of individuals nominated as board members was 
assured by the Top 100 companies’ positive response to the suggestion of establishing a 
nomination committee comprising mainly independent directors to appraise, select and appoint 
prospective board members. Moreover, a significant majority of Top 100 companies had formed 
a remuneration committee with a majority of independent directors as members indicating their 
commitment to establishing a fair executive compensation scheme in keeping with the 
company’s level of sustainability and long-term value attainment.
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2.4.5 The E stab lish m en t o f  B oard 's  Subcom m ittees in M alaysian Corporations
2.4.5.1 Audit Committee
The requirement for Malaysian public listed companies to establish an audit committee was 
made by the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange on 1 August 1994 (Ruin, 2003:5). It was further 
stipulated that the audit committee be composed of a majority of independent directors. Later, in 
January 2001, in light of the Asian financial crisis between 1997 to 1999 and cases of corruption 
and fraud by big international corporations, greater awareness of the importance of good 
corporate governance was indicated with the adoption of the principles and best practices of the 
Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2001) by the KLSE Revamped Listing 
Rulings 2001.
The provisions for audit committee composition were extended to include the following:
i) At least one of its members must be a member of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants or 
else a person with at least three years’ working experience where the person:
(a) has passed the examinations specified in Part I  o f the 1st Schedule o f the Accountants Act 
1967, or
(b) is a member o f  one o f the associations o f accountants specified in Part II o f the 1st Schedule 
o f the Accountants Act 1967;
ii) None of its members can be an alternate director and
iii) Its Chairman must be an independent director
{Source: Para 15.10: Part C, KLSE Revamped Listing Requirements, 2001)
Later, in 2002, Para 15.10: Part C of the Listing Requirements on the accounting and financial 
qualification of audit members was expanded to include any “other related respective 
qualification that fulfils the requirement as prescribed by the Exchange”. This stipulation was
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elaborated upon in KLSE Practice Note Number 13 Para 7.1 (2002), which described acceptable 
related knowledge as:
(a) a degree/master’s/doctorate in accounting or finance and at least three years’ post 
qualification experience in accounting or finance, or
(b) at least seven years’ experience as the chief financial officer of a corporation or having the 
function of being primarily responsible for the management of the financial affairs of a 
corporation.
2.4.5.2 Nomination and Remuneration Committee
The formation of nomination and remuneration committees by Malaysian public listed 
companies is voluntary and is part of the corporate governance best practices guidelines of the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2001. Even though firms are not obligated to 
establish such committees, in their annual reports they must explain and justify their non- 
compliance with best practices (KLSE Revamped Listing Requirements, 2001; MCCG, 2001: 
7).
Specifically, the MCCG (2001:13) encourages listed firms to establish a nomination committee 
that is composed exclusively of non-executive directors with a majority of independent 
directors. Its functions include recommending to the board nominees for prospective board 
membership and the appointment of directors to the various board committees, and carrying out 
the continual assessment of present directors’ performance. In considering candidates for board 
membership, the committee should take into account the recommendations of the CEO, senior 
executives and shareholders. In addition, the committee is also responsible for making an annual
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assessment of the board of directors’ required mix of skills, experience and other qualities and, 
in particular, the core-competencies that non-executive directors bring to the firm.
The MCCG (2001) recommends that listed companies establish a remuneration committee 
consisting wholly or mainly of non-executive directors. The committee’s main function is 
proposing to the board the remuneration payments of executive directors after appropriately 
evaluating management propositions and obtaining external advice regarding such remuneration 
wherever necessary. On the other hand, the remuneration of non-executive directors is 
determined by the board as a whole, with directors abstaining themselves from the discussion of 
their compensation (MCCG, 2001:15).
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the research setting has been delineated by reviewing Malaysia’s independence 
and post-independence economic activities and development plans tailored to change the 
country’s economy from a heavy reliance on mineral resources (such as tin) and plantations 
(such as rubber), and to improve the standard of living of its citizens. Subsequently, this chapter 
focused on the functions of the capital market regulators and authorities in setting capital market 
regulations, providing safe investment platforms and protecting investors’ investments. The 
chapter also drew attention to the country’s economic crisis in 1997 that forced the Malaysian 
government, regulatory bodies and private institutions to establish the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance and Best Practices to monitor and strengthen the credibility and viability 
of its corporations. Chapter 3 presents several corporate governance theories that have been
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proposed regarding the roles, functions and contributions of boards of directors to firm 
performance.
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Chapter 3
Literature Qtgview I: 
~(ItieoreticaC (Perspectives on Corporate governance ~
3.0 Introduction
In the preceding chapter, Malaysia’s economic activities, capital market authorities and 
corporate governance initiatives were described to provide insight into the research 
environment. To further the aims of this research on corporate governance practice, this chapter 
presents an examination of the purposes and roles of a board of directors and its subcommittees 
through discussion of several corporate governance theories, extended to include the effect of 
directors’ contributions and the fulfilment of their duties on firm performance.
3.1 Theoretical Perspectives on Corporate Governance
The key roles of the board of directors in the governance of a corporation, particularly its 
influence on firm performance, have been the focus of many corporate governance theories, 
including the legalistic perspective, resource dependency view, agency theory, managerial-class 
hegemony, stakeholder theory and stewardship theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; 
Freeman, 1984; Zahra and Pearce 1989; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Clarke, 2004). 
Specifically, these theories discuss the main roles of firms’ board of directors, their distinctive 
attributes and, consequently, their influence on firm performance. These are crucial in 
evaluating and determining a board’s contribution to firm value (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). While 
most of the philosophies concur on the importance of outside directors’ role to facilitate 
independence in a firm’s governance, stewardship theory emphasises executives’ distinct 
functions in a firm’s management (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Uniquely, this theory perceives
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the inclusion of the CEO and other executives on the board of directors as strategic; executives’ 
direct involvement in a firm’s day-to-day operations implies their greater knowledge of the 
firm’s activities in comparison to that of outside directors. Regarding a corporation’s top 
authority, it supports the duality of appointment of the CEO as the board Chairman. It argues 
that when the authority at the top level is unambiguous and uncontested, there will be a unity of 
direction among subordinate managers and board members, due to clear, consistent, strong 
leadership and control, provided that the CEO-Chairman’s duality of roles aims more to 
facilitate, empower, structure and enhance effectiveness and to produce superior returns to 
shareholders than when the posts are separated (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).
The following subsections present and discuss several corporate governance theories in detail.
3.1.1 Legalistic View
Primarily, this theory emphasises the role and function of the board of directors as duty of care 
and due diligence, and their effective implementation from a company law perspective (Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996). In particular, the law requires firms to establish a board 
of directors whose members are bound by specific legal fiduciary duties, in other words, they 
are legally accountable for their actions and for the decisions they make on behalf of 
shareholders or stakeholders as a whole (Miller, 1993; Cieri et al., 1994; Johnson et al., 1996; 
DeZoort, 1998; Klapper and Love, 2004). For instance, their failure to conduct their duties 
appropriately or oversee and inform their client(s) of misappropriation in the corporation could 
expose them to a potential litigation suit (Borch and Huse, 1993; Blum and Hoeffner, 2006). 
Alternatively, directors that perform their fiduciary function well will be able to prevent
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management from indulging in unconstrained self-interested activities and hence reduce 
potential agency costs (Macey and O’Hara, 2003).
Primarily, directors accomplish their legal duties using the business judgement rule, which 
operates as the bylaw upon which their decision-making should be based (Johnson et al., 1996). 
It prescribes that directors make decisions on an impartial and informed basis, in good faith and 
with the best interests of the company in mind (Enriques, 2000). Providing that directors 
implement this guidance, they are protected against any liabilities that result from uncertainty in 
the business environment and other factors beyond their control (Manning, 1984; Johnson et al., 
1996).
The business judgement rule also stipulates directors’ duty of care and duty of loyalty (Budnitz, 
1990 and Cieri et al., 1994). While the duty of care requires directors to exercise reasonable 
care, prudence and diligence in their dealings with the corporation’s management (Macey and 
O’Hara, 2003), the duty of loyalty obliges them to act with an undivided and unselfish loyalty to 
the corporation and to restrain from indulging in conflicting dealings in relation to their duties 
and self-interest (Bogart, 1994; Macey and O’Hara, 2003). In the case of violation of any of 
these duties, directors may be penalised with liability suits to protect shareholders’ interests. 
Nevertheless, these days, selective fair and/or arm’s length self-interested transactions are 
allowed between directors and corporations such as in recognition of their benefit to the 
corporation and shareholders (Gordon et al., 2004). This activity is permissible provided the 
directors have obtained approval for given transactions from other informed board members 
(Enriques, 2000) or shareholders in a general meeting (Malaysia Securities Exchange Limited,
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2006) and make subsequent necessary disclosure in the annual report to inform the public about 
such activity (Mak et al., 2002; Malaysia Securities Exchange Limited, 2006).
In terms of board functions, the legalistic view emphasises the control and service duties of 
directors (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Regarding the former, various studies have examined the 
impact of directors’ oversight functions of CEOs’ and top executives’ management of firm 
performance (e.g. Juron and Louden, 1966; Tosi et al., 1994; Huson et al., 2001). Regarding 
service duties, directors’ advisory capacity has been linked with their non-executive position and 
outside experience. These aspects have been used to justify the reliability and credibility of their 
advice to the firm’s management, their appointment as counsel to top management, and their 
involvement in the selection committee for the appointment and selection of the CEO and board 
members (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Marens and Wicks, 1999). In 
addition, both roles have been examined in studies of corporate leadership (Berle and Means, 
1932; Mace, 1971; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985; Dalton et al., 1998; Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003; Hutchinson and Gul, 2003).
Burkart and Panunzi, (2006) examined the effect of ownership type, that is, large shareholders 
and dispersed ownership and firm size on directors’ performance of control and service roles. 
They found that board of directors presiding in family-owned and family-controlled firms 
perform their advisory and monitoring duties to monitor entrenchment activities by family 
members (i.e. private-rent seeking, not-arm’s-length related party transactions and abuse of 
power), for the purpose of protecting minority shareholders’ interests [Schleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Boeker, 1992; Prowse, 1998; Claessens et al., 1999(a),(b); Mitton, 2002]. Owners are also
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likely to perform an active control function given their vested interest and empathy to preserve 
the family legacy (McConaughy et al., 1998; Anderson and Reed, 2003). Equally, even though 
smaller firms’ boards may underperform in comparison to large firms’ boards, nevertheless, they 
are active in the service role (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Daily and Thompson, 1994; 
Yermack, 1996; Fiegener et al., 2000). However, as a firm’s size increases, the firm’s operations 
become more complex and this requires the board to become more actively involved in the 
control of the firm’s management (Daily and Dalton, 1993). The legal theory anticipates the 
board’s indirect contribution to strategic actions during performance of its monitoring and 
service role. Notably, its review and appraisal of managerial plans signifies its participation in 
the firm’s strategic planning (Robinson Jr., 1982).
The theory also adopts a broader view of firm performance by considering a firm’s financial, 
systemic and social implications (Zahra and Pearce II, 1998). In many cases, research has 
concentrated on the financial aspects of firm performance, especially on measures of 
shareholders’ wealth creation, both accounting-based measures, such as the profitability ratio, 
and market-based units, such as share price and the market-to-book ratio (Klein, 1998; Vafeas, 
1999; Joh, 2003). Alternatively, researchers have investigated firm performance in terms of a 
firm’s survival and growth potential (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Kole and Lehn, 1997; Certo et 
al., 2001; Filatotchev, and Toms, 2003). As regards to a firm’s social performance, the theory 
has been employed to examine the board’s stance on and involvement in corporate social 
responsibility (Coffey and Wang, 1998).
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3.1.2 Resource Dependency View
In resource dependency theory, the board of directors is viewed as an integral component that 
can effectively connect the firm to the external environment (Boyd, 1990). In particular, board 
members’ association with certain organisations and/or interlocking directorships is valuable in 
facilitating, securing and easing the process of acquiring and accessing scarce and essential 
resources (Selznick, 1949; Zald, 1969; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Penning, 1980; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Kesner and Johnson, 1990; Scott, 1991; Mizruchi 
& Galaskiewicz, 1993; Daily and Dalton, 1993; Goodstein et al., 1994; Johnson et al., 1996; 
Kula, 2005). Indeed, it is anticipated that the image of both the organisation and its leaders will 
reflect one another’s accomplishments, such that competent leaders are expected to lead to 
organisational success and their credibility depends on their ability to fulfil organisational goals 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Sutton and Callahan, 1987). Further, according to Salancik and 
Meindl (1984), the external constituents’ faith in top managers’ abilities and continual support 
are influenced by a firm’s financial performance.
According to Boyd (1990), there are two major factors that influence board composition, 
namely, the external environment and the need to improve and maintain firm performance. In 
terms of the former, Gomez and Jomo (1997) argue that the presence of incumbent and/or 
retired government officers (who are members of the ruling party) on the board of directors of 
public firms has an effect on firms’ access to government projects. Additionally, Stearns and 
Mizruchi (1993) found that, in the US, the type of financial institutions’ representatives on large 
manufacturing firms’ boards of directors has a significant impact on the type and amount of 
financing the firms can obtain. Hillman et al., (2000) also identified a significant association
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between board composition and the changing resource dependency needs of US airlines 
undergoing deregulation.
As regards with the latter, Kaplan and Mitton (1994) observed the appointment of corporate and 
financial directors to the board of large Japanese corporations is motivated by the need to 
improve previous poor performance. Sutton and Callahan (1987) indicated in their studies of 
firms facing or emerging from a bankruptcy crisis (after filing for Chapter 11 of the Federal 
Bankruptcy Code) that, to survive from past failure, it is important to restore relationships with 
particular constituencies. Apparently, the extent of a firm’s need for environmental linkage 
determines its level of dependence on other organisations (Boyd, 1990).
In terms of a firm’s human capital needs, the theory emphasises the importance of the extent of 
top managers’ knowledge of a firm’s resources. Various researchers have emphasised the merits 
of managers that can potentially utilise a firm’s resources and capabilities for superior resource 
allocation decisions (Penrose, 1959; Kesner and Johnson, 1990; Daily and Dalton, 1993; 
Goodstein et al., 1994; Kor and Mahoney, 2005). Evidently, managers’ unique organisational 
skills and abilities give a firm a competitive advantage to generate more rents than other firms 
(Castanias and Helfat, 1991). Strategically, such key internal resources determine managers’ 
effective management of a firm’s opportunities (Penrose, 1959) and the generation of superior 
rents from the efficient use of superior or scarce resources (Castanias and Helfat, 1991). 
Specifically, Kor and Mahoney (2005) discovered that managers’ knowledge and experience of 
a firm’s products and technology are significant in the reliable management of logistic systems, 
which extend to sustaining long-term firm-client relationships and satisfaction. Similarly, studies
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by Katz (1974) and Hampton et al., (1987) on the nature of top management identified the 
inherent traits and skills of top managers that determine effective leadership.
Despite the above, the theory neglects the issue of agency problems arising within a firm, given 
the separation of ownership and control of the firm and the role of top executives as rent 
generators from the deployment of their traits, managerial and leadership skills for shareholders 
(Castanias and Helfat, 1991). For firms, overlooking this issue when making a resource 
allocation plan may jeopardise the assessment and innovative decision-making process of 
resource deployment and capability (Penrose, 1995; Kor and Mahoney, 2005).
3.1.3 Agency Theory
An agency relationship signifies a contract between the principal that is, the owner, and the 
agent, that is, the manager, of a firm, whereby the principal delegates some authority to the 
agents to perform a service on his/her behalf (Gay, 2002). Ideally, the fulfilment of this contract 
would require the agent to manage the owner’s investment in the same way as a sole proprietor 
or partners of a private company would (Hart, 1995).
However, according to Adam Smith (1776), managers cannot be expected to oversee the 
business undertaking with the same vigilance as owners themselves. Thus, the separation of firm 
ownership and control could increase the power of professional managers and create a conflict 
of interest between owners and managers (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). These factors, combined 
with a poor internal monitoring mechanism, are likely to cause managers to pursue economic 
objectives that may be contrary to the owner(s)’ profit maximisation goal (Masson, 1971; Ross,
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1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Also, the information asymmetry between owners’ and 
managers’ knowledge about the internal operations and management of the firm due to owners’ 
lack of direct participation in the firm’s management and access to inside information may result 
in adverse selection and moral hazards (Chrisman et al., 2004). To some extent, adverse 
selection will affect the principal-agent contract when the principal engages less committed and 
incompatible managers. Moreover, moral hazard actions by managers, such as shirking, 
unfounded rewards and unwarranted acquisition activities, are detrimental to the principal’s 
investments (Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995; Avery et al., 1998).
Regarding the tendency for the agency problem to arise in separately owned and controlled 
firms, Fama and Jensen (1983: 304) contend this occurs when the contract between the risk- 
bearer, that is, the owner, and the decision-maker, that is, the manager, lacks appropriate 
enforcement. They further add that it is necessary to monitor the decision-making process of 
managers who are not residual claimants so that shareholders are well-informed and aware of 
the wealth effects of managers’ actions on their investment. This is because a lack of control 
implementation by owners could leave managers’ opportunistic behaviour undetected 
(Galbraith, 1967; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The use of a disciplining mechanism is crucial 
when managers’ compensations are not linked to firm performance and /or share ownership in 
the firm (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
Although direct monitoring by owners permits a close scrutiny of managers’ activities, its 
implementation is costly and may create a free-rider problem (Hart, 1995). On the other hand, 
incentives and reward schemes that compensate managers at a level similar to that of the
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owners, such as bonus-pay and share option compensation schemes may motivate and redirect 
managers to pursuing shareholders’ value creation (Ofek and Yermack, 2000). In addition, the 
role of the board of directors as an important internal mechanism for safeguarding shareholders’ 
interests has been widely discussed. Firstly, the board has a responsibility to monitor and 
oversee shareholders’ interests given its legal authority, access to firm information, and contact 
with senior managers (Johnson et al., 1996; Subrahmanyam et al., 1997).
Moreover, the presence of independent outside directors on the board enhances the board’s 
effectiveness in managing competition among top managers (Fama, 1980), providing objective 
and unbiased views (Baysinger and Butler, 1985), monitoring fairly decision-making at the top 
level (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lee et al., 1992) and establishing a fair representation for 
minority interests (Johnson et al., 2000). The board’s significance as the shareholders’ 
‘watchdog’ is increased by its independence and separation from the influence of the 
management team. However, outside directors’ independence from management power has 
resulted in their ineffectiveness in challenging the CEO’s decisions, due to the latter having 
control and influence over their appointment, remuneration and term of office (Daily and 
Johnson, 1997; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Mohammad Abdullah, 2003). More 
discouragingly, Monks (2001) found American law does not require shareholders to approve the 
compensation scheme set for executives. Independent directors’ main purpose is further 
disturbed when they assume the directorship position as a means of associating with a 
prestigious group and/or attaining covert privileges (Monks, 2001).
For decades, research on agency problems has focused on the issue of firm ownership, namely 
small, dispersed and concentrated ownership. For instance, Berle and Means (1932) found
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evidence of managerial entrenchment in 200 non-financial firms in the US that were owned by a 
large number of small shareholders. Later, Morck et al., (1988) found higher levels of insider 
ownership caused further entrenchment by incumbent managers. According to Stulz (1988), 
initially, managerial ownerships will align their interests with those of shareholders, however, as 
managers’ share ownership rises to the point of them gaining control of the firm, managerial 
entrenchment will prevail and affect the firm’s value (Sundaramurthy et al., 2005).
Studies on agency costs in concentrated ownership firms have been extended to include family- 
controlled firms (for instance, Allen and Panian, 1982; Boeker, 1992; Claessens et al., 1999). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that owner-managed firms 
provide a solution to the conflict of interest in firms with dispersed ownership. A family 
business is often held together by strong kinship obligations or feelings of altruism between its 
members (Stewart, 2003). It is therefore believed that this binding normative moral order can 
mitigate some agency costs, given that property rights are restricted to internal decision agents 
(Schulze et al., 2002). However, family relationships may create agency problems unique to 
family businesses, such as free-riding by family members (Bruce and Waldman, 1990; Prowse, 
1998; Mitton, 2002; Morck and Yeung, 2004), ineffective family-member managers 
(McConaughy et al.,1998), and managers bypassing minority shareholders’ interests under 
orders from the controlling family [Johnson et al., 2000 (b); Morck and Yeung, 2003].
3.1.4 Managerial-Class Hegemony
Managerial-class hegemony theory posits that, professional managers dominate the strategic 
management of the firm, with the board of directors performing more of a supporting function
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(Hung, 1998). As the situation prevails, the board becomes less active in setting strategies 
(Whisler, 1984) due to members being prevented from becoming involved with this task 
(Lorsch, 1989). Further, the board’s involvement in the strategic management of the firm will be 
contingent upon the firm facing a crisis (Mace, 1971; Clendenin, 1972). Moreover, given that 
the appointment and selection of directors are subject to the managers’ discretion, directors may 
be pressured to conform to managers’ decisions to secure their post. In addition, with the 
accessibility and availability of information to the board of directors controlled by and reliant on 
managers’ cooperation, such boards are restrained from making effective independent and 
informed decisions due to lack of the required and relevant knowledge (Hung, 1998). 
Specifically, this theory describes managerial entrenchment behaviours in agency theory.
3.1.5 Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theory presents the idea of a corporation as an organisational entity connected to 
numerous and various participants, and circumstances requiring them to accomplish multiple 
and not necessarily congruent purposes (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Freeman (1984:46) defines a stakeholder as “any individual or group who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement o f the organisation’s objectives”. Thus, the nature of the 
relationship between vested parties has implications for both the firm and its stakeholders. The 
theory also highlights the potential intrinsic value of the vested parties and debates the 
possibility of the firm favouring the interests of one group over those of another (Jones and 
Wicks, 1999). Donaldson and Preston (1995) nevertheless point out that managers have the 
responsibility to select activities and direct resources to obtain benefits for all legitimate 
stakeholders. The terms of the contract signed between the firm and vested parties should 
determine who are the legitimate stakeholders and therefore the firm’s direct contributors.
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Studies on corporate social responsibilities18 have explored the link between a firm’s 
concentration on implicit claimants’ interests (that goes beyond the interests of its shareholders 
and bondholders) and their subsequent economic benefit. For instance, McGuire et al., (1988) 
found that firms with low social responsibility experienced lower returns on assets and lower 
stock market returns than firms that practised better social responsibility. In another study, 
Turban and Greening (1997) reported firms with a higher corporate social performance rating 
having a competitive advantage to attract more applicants due to their positive reputation and 
prospect as superior employers than those with a lower rating.
Amongst others, stakeholder theory has broadened the scope of a board of directors’ 
responsibilities to include the interests of numerous stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). In examining 
this, Wang and Dudley (1992) focused on the corporate social orientations of the board of 
directors in 291 public firms. They found directors are conscious of their responsibilities to 
customers, the government, employees and the society. In particular, CEO-directors were 
concerned more about issues relating to customers’ needs and expectations and laws than non- 
CEO directors, who concentrated on issues associated with shareholders. On the other hand, the 
presence of stakeholder representatives on the board of directors does not necessarily result in 
the setting up of a strategy by the firm that will improve the firm’s stakeholder relations and 
stakeholder performance (Flillman et al., 2001). The effects of stakeholders’ interests on 
stakeholder performance will vary, depending on (i) the influence of the aforementioned parties,
(ii) the effectiveness of stakeholder board members, and (iii) targeted stakeholder performance.
18 including employee and customers' goodwill schemes, charitable contributions, promoting community development plans and 
establishing env ironmental protection procedures
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3.1.6 Stewardship Theory
In contrast to agency theory’s economic approach to governing individuals’ opportunistic 
behaviours, stewardship theory promotes sociological and psychological means of overseeing 
subordinates’ actions. It views people in an organisation as possessing a collectivist, pro- 
organisational and trustworthy quality (Davis and Donaldson, 1997). Muth and Donaldson 
(1998) add that managerial behaviours are not necessarily driven by financial motives. To some 
extent, managers need to be given a certain degree of authorisation and discretion to ensure the 
business is effectively managed in the best interests of its shareholders. Also, again in contrast to 
agency theory, stewardship theory does not regard the existence of separate ownership and 
control as a setback given managers’ preference for cooperative behaviours over self-serving 
motives (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Gay, 2002) and their wide range of 
motives and behaviours (Muth and Donaldson, 1998).
Fama and Jensen [1983(a)] posits that, in a large corporation, the greater influence of inside 
board member managers than of outside directors is to be expected. They argue this is because 
these executives have valuable specific information about the organisation’s activities. 
According to Clarke (2004), stewards’ contributions to firm performance extend to 
consideration of psychological, social, cultural and situational dimensions. From the 
psychological perspective, managers will be induced to attain a higher level of performance 
when their task significance and empowerment are increased, and greater job satisfaction will be 
achieved. However, from the social perspective, managers identify themselves as representatives 
of the organisation and regard their power as an instrument to influence others to accomplish 
valid and accepted organisational goals.
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Additionally, from the situational perspective, managers are expected to perform better in an 
involvement-oriented environment where the thinking, controlling and accomplishment of duties 
are combined into one task. Moreover, where the firm’s culture is directed to collectivism 
orientation, this will further pressure of managers’ loyalty to and long-term relationship with the 
firm (Clarke, 2004).
In terms of board of directors’ effectiveness, the theory supports the insider-dominated board 
primarily because of executives’ depth of knowledge, access to current operating information, 
technical expertise and commitment to the firm (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). In addition, 
relinquishing control of the board to a Chairman who is also the firm’s CEO, will give 
consistency to the firm’s control and leadership (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Consequently, 
these aspects are predicted to have a significant impact on shareholders’ value maximisation.
3.2 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the diverse perceptions of several corporate governance theories 
regarding the roles and functions of boards of directors in firms and the link between their 
attributes and their capability to accomplish their fiduciary duties. For instance, from the 
legalistic theory point of view, directors are obliged to demonstrate they represent the interests 
of shareholders and the firm because company law legally binds and obliges them to fulfil their 
stipulated duties to the firm. On the other hand, resource dependency theory concentrates on the 
benefits that directors bring to the firm, whether in terms of leadership skills, business 
knowledge and experience and/or business contacts. Importantly, due to the uncertainty of the 
business environment, such assistance is expected to improve the firm’s reputation and future 
viability and give it an advantage over others. Stakeholders’ theory extends the range of a firm’s
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potential vested interests beyond those of its shareholders to include employees, suppliers, 
customers, the government, environmentalists, the public, and so on.
Agency theory claims that when the owners of firms employ other people, that is, managers, to 
run their business, this situation can potentially create a conflict or agency problem between two 
parties due to their disparity of interests. In contrast, stewardship theory posits from a 
psychological perspective that managers will be driven to perform the benefit of the company 
when they are given significant responsibilities and empowerment, as these enhance their job 
satisfaction and self-actualisation. The review of the theories has also identified three theories 
that are pertinent for elucidating the corporate governance environment and circumstances in the 
Malaysian context, namely, legalistic theory, resource dependency theory, and agency theory. 
The next chapter focuses on the roles of boards of directors and boards’ subcommittees.
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Literature Qtgview II: 
~  (Board of (Directors' and <lHeirSu6committees’ <Rp(es in 
Corporate governance (Practice ~
4.0 Introduction
The previous chapter has discussed several corporate governance theories with regard to 
the effect of directors’ contributions and the fulfilment of their duties on firm 
performance. This chapter explains in detail the monitoring and controlling, service and 
strategic roles of Boards of Directors and describes board attributes, namely, 
composition, structure, characteristics and processes, and their implications for the 
fulfilment of board members’ duties. In addition, the role and functions of the board’s 
subcommittees, namely, audit, nomination and remuneration committees are examined at 
length. The chapter then focuses on market value and accounting-based measures of 
financial performance.
4.1 The Roles of Board of Directors
The formation of a board of directors in a corporation is important as an internal control 
mechanism to oversee the conduct of the owner-manager and managers and prevent them 
from endangering vested parties’ interests (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Even though 
some of its responsibilities may have been delegated to firm managers, decisions relating 
to company policy and strategies’ planning, their set up and implementation, and the
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appointment, dismissal and compensation of executives are ratified and determined ultimately 
by the board [Fama and Jensen, 1983 (a)].
In order to protect shareholders’ interests appropriately, it is imperative for the board of 
directors to play a vigilant protector role (Buchholtz et al., 2005). Broadly, the board of 
directors’ duties have been examined in terms of their monitoring, service and strategic planning 
roles (Mace, 1971; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Andrews, 1987). Importantly, to ensure and 
sustain firms’ competitiveness and strategic alliances, firms’ boards need to be effective and 
efficient (Thain and Leighton, 1992; Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1995). In succeeding subsections, 
these roles are explained in greater detail.
4.1.1 Monitoring and Controlling Roles
A board’s monitoring and controlling roles include evaluating company and CEO performance 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001) such that it can be guaranteed that the business has been 
properly managed (MCCG, 2001) and managers’ conduct is in keeping with shareholders’ value 
creation and corporation growth (Uzun et al., 2004). The board’s functions also encompass 
designing compensation contracts, reviewing management succession planning in relation to the 
hiring and firing of CEOs (Walsh and Seward, 1990), replacing senior management and 
evaluating the integrity of the company’s internal control systems and management information 
systems and their compliance with the stipulated laws, regulations, directives and guidelines 
(MCCG, 2001:11)
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4.1.2 Service Roles
Directors’ service roles have been interpreted in terms of their function of providing advice and 
counselling to the management team (Conyon and Peck, 1998). Specifically, this consists of 
advising management on the selection, compensation and dismissal of top managers (Shivdasani 
and Yermack, 1999). In addition, Baysinger and Butler (1985) emphasise independent directors’ 
roles in evaluating management strategies and management progress in accomplishing set 
objectives and subsequently their impact on firm performance. Outside independent directors’ 
non-association with firm management and freedom from management influence make them 
appropriate arbiters in resolving internal managers’ disputes and carrying out duties regarding 
agency problems [Fama and Jensen, 1983(a)].
4.1.3 Strategic Roles
Over time, directors’ involvement in the setting of the firm’s strategies has been insisted upon 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Gendron et al., 2004; Turley and Zaman, 2004). Whereas in the 
past, their participation in and concentration on this duty have been passive (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Tashakori and Boulton, 1983; Mallin, 2001), it is now believed directors’ proactive involvement 
in the corporate planning team can enhance the company’s and management’s credibility 
(Robinson Jr., 1982). In particular, their challenging enquiries aimed to clarify and justify 
management’s proposals, policies and decision-making, and their taking a firm stance regarding 
the imposition of fair, appropriate and sufficient monitoring measures can benefit a firm (Ireland 
and Hitt, 2005).
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4.2 Board of Directors’ Attributes
According to Zahra and Pearce (1989), examining board members’ attributes helps to discern 
their direct and/or indirect contributions to firm performance. Notably, there are four main 
attributes that have been widely examined: board composition, characteristics, structure and 
processes. The succeeding subsections elaborate upon each of these attributes.
4.2.1 Composition
Board composition describes the number of directors on a firm’s board and the distinct type of 
directors on the board, for example, whether they are inside or outside directors. Outside 
directors represent those who are not members of top management (Fosberg, 1989), their 
associates or families (Shivdasani, 1993), employees of the firm or its subsidiaries (Abbott et al., 
2000) or members of the immediate past top management group (Rhoades et al., 2000). ‘Outside 
director’ is also the term given to an independent non-executive director who has no affiliation 
with the firm other than the affiliation derived from being on the firm’s board of directors 
(Beasley, 1996). Another director category is a ‘grey’ or ‘affiliated’ director who is not an 
employee but may not be independent of management due to their business dealings with the 
company or family association with the management (Weisbach, 1988; Daily and Dalton, 1994; 
Hillman et al., 2000).
Issues relating to the presence of minority groups on the board, such as ethnic groups, and 
gender distribution on boards of directors have also been explored to examine their impact on 
board performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Haniffa, 2003).
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4.2.2 Characteristics
Mainly, board characteristics can be divided into two categories: background and qualities. In 
terms of background, research has examined directors’ ages (Taylor, 1975; Beatty and Zajac, 
1994), educational levels (Schroeder et al., 1967; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), ethics (Bommer 
et al., 1987), and work experience (Wagner et al., 1984). Directors’ qualities have been linked to 
their individual and/or collective characteristics and the ‘personality’ of the board (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). For instance, studies have been carried out to observe directors’ style of 
management in relation to their concentration on internal and external issues (Pearce, 1981), 
shares ownership in firms (Connell and Servaes, 1990), and the setting of strategies (Kets De 
Vries and Miller, 1986).
4.2.2.1 Board of Directors’ Knowledge and Skills
Generally, the link between board of directors’ knowledge and skills with their job performance 
can be explored in relation to Bonner and Lewis’s (1990) categories of experts’ knowledge and 
skills, namely, general domain knowledge, subspecialty knowledge, and world knowledge.
4.2.2.1.1 Domain Knowledge
In particular, they defined general domain knowledge as instruction and experience acquired
from working in a particular domain. For Einhorn (1974) such knowledge reflects the ability of
a person to construct complex interactions and to discern, form and elucidate distinct courses of 
actions. Studies in psychology have explored experts’ and novices’ general domain knowledge 
in terms of their strategies formulation, retrieval of related information, scope of knowledge and
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problem solving abilities19. For instance, domain knowledge of auditing technical knowledge 
would represent the person’s medium knowledge of auditing tasks (DeZoort, 1998).
4.2.2.1.2 Subspecialty Knowledge
On the other hand, subspecialty knowledge while similar to domain knowledge is the acquisition 
of the knowledge from formal instruction and experience in the work environment (Bonner and 
Lewis, 1990). However, in terms of the focus of its contents, it is knowledge in a subspecialty 
area such as derivative contracts (Tan and Libby, 1997). Lipton (2006) argues that the 
nomination committee has the responsibility to make sure that the board of director members 
appointed possess relevant industry and business knowledge of the firm. Lee et al., (1999) found 
that outside directors who work in the financial industry and possess specific financial 
experience, namely, commercial banking and insurance and investment management experience, 
have a positive impact on firm abnormal return. Particularly, their appointment to the board of 
small firms assists companies’ access to financial markets.
In addition, many Securities Commissions and Stock Exchanges require listed firms to appoint 
at least one board member with financial knowledge and skills (see Schleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
La Porta, et al., 1998, 2000; OECD, 2002; Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002; PwC, 2003). Underlying 
this requirement are the board of directors’ oversight duties to ensure that listed issuers have 
complied and conformed to the relevant accounting standards and regulations when preparing 
financial reports (MCCG, 2001). Its effective implementation is critical, which further requires
19 For instance Chase and Simon (1973) cross-examined chess masters and novice players' game board skills and Chi et al.. 
(1982) investigate the physicists accuracy in solving physics problems based on physics principles.
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board members to be objective, vigilant and accountable particularly when performing their 
financial oversight duties (DeFond and Francis, 2005; DeDond et al., 2005). To ensure the 
accomplishment of credible and quality evaluation and the production of an accurate financial 
statement, it is necessary for the board of the firm to comprise individuals with relevant and 
related financial and accounting knowledge and expertise (Buckley and Van Der Natt, 2003)
For instance, financial experts are noted for their greater ability to evaluate appropriately the 
financial information and circumstances presented by the management (see, for example, Kirk 
and Siegel, 1996; Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999; Kirk, 2000). In particular their relevant 
knowledge and skills make them effective appraisers of the firm’s financial feasibility (see 
DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). Also, their accounting experience and skills will assist in the 
detection of creative accounting activity, such as earnings management (Agrawal and Chadha, 
2005).
Moreover, Dionne and Triki (2005) report that the presence of independent directors with 
financial knowledge and skills enhances evaluation of management resolutions’ impact on 
shareholders’ wealth. Their absence limits board of directors’ active participation in the 
evaluation of management derivatives plans (Buckley and Van Der Natt, 2003). Consistently, 
Booth and Deli (1999) and Guner et al., (2004) found that, directors with a commercial banking 
background are able to assist the firm in managing the financing options of its debts. Despite 
their relevant knowledge, financial experts’ effective performance requires them to be objective, 
vigilant and accountable when performing the oversight responsibilities (DeFond and Francis, 
2005; DeFond et al., 2005).
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The company secretary is also an important human capital to the board of directors as well as 
board subcommittees (Higgs Report, 2003). In particular the company secretary is recognised 
for his/her extensive knowledge of the firm’s business procedures, board training and induction 
programme, legal requirements, corporate governance and best practice developments (see Para 
11.30 Higgs Report 2003). Taking this into account, the secretary’s knowledge and experience 
of the firm’s operational and financial procedures will be valuable in assisting outside directors 
to obtain relevant information from the appropriate person and source in and outside the firm 
(ICSA, 2005).
Moreover, the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) further encapsulates 
the responsibilities of the company secretary to comprise knowledge of:
• Governance structures and mechanisms
• Corporate conduct within an organisation's regulatory environment
• Board, shareholder and trustee meetings
• Compliance with legal, regulatory and listing requirements
• The training and induction of non-executives/trustees
• Contact with regulatory and external bodies
• Reports and circulars to shareholders/trustees
• Management of employee benefits such as pensions and employee share schemes
• Insurance administration and organisation
• The negotiation of contracts
• Risk management
• Property administration and organisation
• Interpretation of financial accounts
{Source: ICSA, 2007)
The company secretary’s experience in handling the firm’s documents and business procedures 
will further help outside director acquisition of relevant internal and external information about 
the firm and hence to make better informed judgements. Whilst, the appointment of directors
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with a legal background will enhance board of directors’ understanding of the legislative and 
regulatory rules and procedures (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Verschoor, 1993).
4.2.2.1.3 World Knowledge
Another form of expert knowledge, world knowledge, refers to the knowledge obtained from the 
individual’s general life experience which is not specifically acquired from training or 
experience in a domain, such as general problem solving ability (Bonner and Lewis, 1990:4). 
Such knowledge may have been acquired from a person problem solving experience. For 
instance, in the case of an auditor- management dispute, the experience that a company director 
has as independent director or director of a company or member of senior management will 
influence his/her independent judgement (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001).
Directors who are commercial bankers can further advise firms on making decisions and 
managing their financing options in relation to their current debt circumstances (Booth and Deli, 
1999; Guner et al., 2004). Moreover, the practice of creative accounting such as earnings 
management, can be prevented by the detection of such conduct by directors who have in-depth 
knowledge of accounting and financial management (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005).
As well as financiers and consultants, Baysinger and Butler (1985) noted the importance of 
lawyers in providing advice and counsel to inside managers.
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4.2.3 Structure
In terms of board structure, extensive study has been made of the leadership structure in firms, 
types of board committees formed in firms, the make-up of board committees’ membership, and 
the flow of information among board committees in corporations (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In 
particular, studies on the leadership structure of boards in small corporations20 by Daily and 
Dalton (1993) indicated that when founders of the firm are active in its management, they are 
likely to hold the position of CEO as well as chairmanship of the board.
Goyal and Park (2002) further found that when the firm’s CEO is also the Chairman of its board, 
the board’s monitoring role may be impaired. In addition, the formation of board committees, 
such as the audit committee, increases the board’s involvement beyond its legitimising role such 
that it extends to the appraisal of the accuracy of information produced by management 
(Boulton, 1978). Harrisons (1987) also contended that the formation of audit, nominating and 
remuneration committees as monitoring and oversight committees is significant to protect 
shareholders’ interests. This is because these committees will provide objective and independent 
reviews of corporate affairs that will take into account the legality, integrity and ethical aspect of 
corporate activities.
4.2.4 Processes
This category details the board of directors’ approach to and extent of participation in a firm’s 
decision-making process. These include the frequency and duration of a board of directors’ 
meetings, a board’s proceedings, a board’s evaluation, and consensus amongst board members.
20 Firms with 500 or less employees and sales turnover not more than USD 20 million per year
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Notably, studies on board processes have focused on the impact of these activities on firm 
performance and the board’s effectiveness (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). A board that is active and 
independent of management will contribute to and facilitate a higher return on investors’ 
investments (Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998). In exploring board processes, Pettigrew (1987) 
observed that internal aspects, i.e. a firm’s structure, culture, power and political characteristics, 
and external aspects (i.e. industry sector, economic, social and political influence of the 
organisation have a potential bearing on the conduct and role of the board of directors).
4.3 The Significance of Independent Outside Directors
To understand the influence of board behaviours, effectiveness and dynamics, research has 
focused on the roles and contributions of different directorial types of individual board 
members, namely, the executive, non-executive and independent non-executive director. It has 
been reported that the extent of board members’ direct and indirect influence on firm’s 
governance has implications for their effectiveness and involvement (Long et al., 2000). The 
efficacy of the board as the firm’s ultimate decision-making control is crucial to its ability to 
monitor and control the discretions of top-level managers [Fama and Jensen, 1983(a)]. The 
board’s dependence on managers to supply them with the firm’s internal information (see 
Ezzamel and Watson, 1997) emphasises the importance of ensuring managers practising the 
same monitoring considerations as the board.
Notably, non-executive directors are perceived as significant long-term and impartial decision­
makers and monitors of the governance process (Tricker, 1978; Higgs, 2003). From a corporate 
governance perspective, their separation and independence from management and any
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relationship that may potentially interfere with their independent judgement and fair 
representation of shareholders’ interests, emphasise their suitability as a reliable governing 
mechanism and their potential ability to concentrate on ensuring maximisation of shareholder 
value (Beasley, 1996). Similarly, their selection from people outside of management and free 
from any business relationship with the company, enhances their objectivity and independence, 
enabling them to provide unbiased views and judgement, to act in the best interests of 
shareholders, and to represent fairly their investment in the company (BRC, 2005).
The conflict of interests between owners and managers in separately controlled and dispersed 
ownership firms and the entrenchment of minority interests by major shareholders and owner- 
managers in concentrated ownership firms has created agency problems. As outside parties that 
are free from association with management, outside directors’ involvement in the board 
proceedings is essential to minimise agency costs, especially when credible and vigilant 
monitoring duties are practised (Beasley, 1996). In other words, they should be able to perform 
monitoring tasks effectively and have fewer incentives to collaborate with management in 
expropriating a firm’s assets. Further, the board of directors is the highest internal control 
mechanism for monitoring top management’s conduct in a firm (Beasley, 1996), hence 
underscoring the importance of the participation of independent individuals of calibre in board 
monitoring, and in a firm’s advisory and strategy-setting activities.
Helland and Skyuta (2005) also suggest that, in order to motivate the monitors to perform their 
duties efficiently, their roles and incentives need to be aligned. Independent directors’ board 
membership gives them the opportunity to hold a prestigious position, improve their reputation,
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gather further business experience, and expand their networking (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; 
Srinivasan, 2005). Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that outside directors have the incentive to 
build reputations as expert monitors. Also, their external experience will supplement inadequate 
skills in both strategic processes and the setting of plans (Robinson Jr., 1982). However, given 
the global acceptance and adoption of the code of corporate governance and best practices, 
commonly by Stock Exchange listing rulings and Securities Commission policies, outside 
directors’ failure to perform their oversight duties effectively may impair their reputation in the 
future (Abbott et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2004; Srinivasan, 2005).
Significantly, independent directors are viewed as people who can provide a better quality and 
assurance of reasoned corporate judgement (Ferris et al., 2003), whereas managers, who have to 
face the pressures of day-to-day events, may overlook some of the decisions made and/or avoid 
making risky choices (Firstenberg and Malkiel, 1980). Nevertheless, having general wisdom 
alone is not sufficient for independent directors to contribute productively. They need to be 
competent and capable of understanding the firm’s business operations. In particular, the 
Combined Code (1998) emphasises non-executive directors should be those who possess 
sufficient calibre. This attribute is important for them to be able to influence board directions 
and decisions effectively and to ensure the implementation of plans that take into account the 
long-term interests of various shareholders, and the appropriate management of firm risk. In 
addition, Libby and Luft (1993) and DeZoort (1998) claim that, appointing directors with related 
and relevant skills and the knowledge to perform task-specific duties, such as the evaluation of 
the firm’s internal control and accounting procedures, will enhance the quality of information
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gathered, of the solutions to problems, and of the views held and judgements made during the 
decision-making process.
As indicated by Fairchild and Li (2005), outside directors with a variety of specialist knowledge 
will be valuable to the creation of a strong and informed board, in particular in justifying their 
views on and concern with management propositions. Moreover, according to Dionne and Triki 
(2005), board members from a non-financial background contribute by extending the company’s 
viewpoint and prospects on particular issues in terms of the broader context of the industry and 
business perspectives. The aforementioned advantages support a firm’s decision and strategy to 
include on its board of directors individuals with a mixture of skills, knowledge and experience 
in specific and a broad range of industries and from financial and non-financial backgrounds. 
Moreover, by having board members with a diverse range of expertise, the firm strengthens its 
human capital competitiveness (DeZoort, 1998; Kor, 2003; Kor and Mahoney, 2005).
In addition, outside directors’ effectiveness is enhanced when large numbers of them are 
involved in the board’s nomination process and meetings agenda since they can provide 
appropriate control over the deliberation process. To some extent, the board’s mission, 
composition and views are affected by their attitude towards and fulfilment of their governing 
responsibilities. Above all, independent directors’ inclusion in the nomination committee will 
ensure board members are chosen for their quality and experience (Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1999). Extending their authority to include the dismissal of inefficient directors will further 
improve their independence purpose (Borokhovich et al., 1994).
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A united group of independent directors who are prepared to challenge management when they 
should can be nurtured. For instance, Weisbach (1988) found that boards dominated by outside 
directors are likely to replace a poor CEO. One reason is that their incentives differ from those 
of inside directors, given that the career security of the latter is under the CEO‘s control. 
Another reason is that poor performance reduces the credibility of the CEO as an expert in 
decision-making (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, outside directors’ involvement in the selection 
of a new CEO is influenced by their need to enhance their reputation by employing a competent 
candidate, according to Borokhovich et al., (1994). They further indicated that outside directors 
are likely to choose an external candidate rather than an internal CEO since their external 
exposure and contacts will have equipped them with a broader view of the candidate options. 
Moreover, they observed a positive reaction to share returns when an external candidate is 
chosen to replace an underperforming CEO.
It is also crucial for independent directors to play an active role in determining the agenda of 
meetings to establish a commanding independent voice on the board and to ensure vital issues 
are addressed appropriately. In particular, the focus of discussions and progress of meetings can 
be oriented to cover and assess independent directors’ main issues or areas of concern. In 
addition, given the time consumed by and the potential liability associated with a director’s job, 
both the appointment of accomplished board members and their performance are affected by the 
attractiveness of their remuneration package. Independent directors who are not committed to 
fulfilling their duties will not be effective due to the substantial time needed and to learn about 
and keep themselves abreast of the development of the company’s business (Lee et al., 2004). 
Thus, dedicated directors should not hold more directorships in other companies than would
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allow them to cope with their responsibilities or that would be likely to harm their job 
performance. Accordingly, the review of board performance, specifically by peer review, 
ensures the appropriate disciplining and assessment of each director’s achievement (Ferris et al., 
2003).
Further, independent directors’ roles need to be supported by the advice of internal and external 
experts, with the latter being the crucial points of contact. This is vital to achieve objective, 
appropriate and informed decision-making. Without management acknowledging the benefit of 
sharing the company’s governance process and collaborating with the directors, hiring 
competent directors will not necessarily result in effective board performance or in value being 
added to the company. Management therefore needs to accept, invite and encourage directors to 
participate actively in the area they are good at and provide them with the information they need 
to facilitate the performance of their duties. The bargaining position of the CEO in relation to 
directors also has an effect on the board’s conduct over time (Flermalin and Weisbach, 2001).
4.3.1 Majority Presence o f  Independent Directors on the Board
In this section, the implications and influences of independent directors are examined, 
particularly in terms of their impact on the fulfilment of board responsibilities and proceedings. 
An empirical investigation by Cotter et al., (1997) into 169 tender offers in US target public 
firms from 1989 to 1992 highlighted the significant and distinctive governing characteristics of 
outside directors. In particular, even though under normal circumstances independent directors 
may be reluctant to accept tender offers, as this may have consequences for the terms of their 
directorship, nevertheless, given the circumstances, they will ensure shareholders secure higher
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gains by demanding both higher initial tender offer premiums and higher bid premium revisions. 
Moreover, the independent stance of outside directors allows them to function as appropriate 
and unbiased mediators to resolve disagreements between management and shareholders.
With regard to stock price reaction to corporate anti-takeover amendments, the evidence 
gathered by McWilliams and Sen (1997) indicates that when the board is dominated by insiders 
and affiliated outside directors, the firm is likely to experience a negative return. Seemingly, the 
market perceives management re-statement of anti-takeover policies as a means of increasing 
their veto power in takeover bids. In contrast, when the board is dominated by independent 
directors, the market views this as a positive move towards effective monitoring of management 
actions since the board ensures the amendment is set up and used to the benefit of shareholders. 
However, the majority presence of insiders and/or affiliated outside directors is seen by the 
market as detrimental as directors may deploy such amendments to retain their control at 
shareholders’ expense.
Beasley’s (1996) study on the relationship between the presence of outside directors and the 
occurrence of financial statement fraud, involving 75 companies with and without cases of 
fraud, indicated that boards of companies with no incidents of fraud comprised a significant 
number of outside directors. Beasley found the governing function of outside directors was 
further enhanced by the increase in their share ownership, the length of their term of office, and 
the reduction in the number of directorships in other companies. Lee et al., (1992) showed that 
outside directors have the tendency to ensure shareholders’ wealth interests are accounted for 
appropriately in the case of a management buyout attempt. They claim that, in this situation,
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such directors acted by forming independent committees with the necessary capabilities and 
competencies to examine properly the implications and feasibility of the company’s 
performance to ascertain shareholders’ value creation. In Kosnik’s (1987) attempts to observe 
management greenmail (i.e. a company’s private repurchasing of its stock at a premium) above­
market price, he noted that the boards of firms with a higher percentage of independent directors 
were more resistant to such a management resolution. He concluded that such directors have a 
greater commitment to challenging managerial decisions that can erode shareholders’ 
investment viability.
Shivdasani and Yermack’s (1999) study on directors’ employment in 500 Forbes firms between 
1994 and 1996 indicated that CEO involvement in the directors’ selection process has an impact 
on the nature of the appointment of board members. When the CEO takes part in the selection 
process, the firm selects directors who are less likely to monitor aggressively. In particular, the 
company employs grey directors, as these are less likely to insist on a majority of independent 
directors on the board due to their potential interest in the firm. In addition, when the CEO is 
involved in the selection process of independent directors, this will significantly impair the 
supposed reaction to stock price returns. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) claim this is likely 
when the CEO’s choice of independent directors includes those with insufficient time ‘busy’ 
directors, according to Core at al., (1999)) to engage in significant managerial monitoring. This 
fact further emphasises that the type of outside directors has an effect on their job performance.
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In examining board effectiveness and its effect on a firm’s governance, the frequency of board 
meetings has been used to measure board involvement in monitoring, service and strategic 
duties in a firm (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). For instance, firms are found to hold a greater 
number of board meetings when facing a crisis (Jensen, 1993). In another study, Vafeas (1999) 
compared the performance of firms that held board meetings regularly and that of firms with an 
inactive board. His findings indicated that an increase in the amount of board-interaction time, 
that is, board meetings, had a positive impact on a firm’s operating performance.
As well as ensuring balanced and objective views in the board’s decision-making process, the 
presence of a majority of independent directors on the board also provides stronger and more 
affirmative independent views and judgement at all board deliberations. Moreover, their 
significant number will give sufficient weight to the value of their opinions and views of the 
board’s decisions (Combined Code, 1998). Essentially, given their main role in protecting and 
acting in the best interests of shareholders and stakeholders, including acting against 
entrenchment by managers’ or misappropriation by controlling owners, the number of 
independent directors is crucial in influencing the extent of the board’s considerations and the 
fair representation of shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ interests in the board’s plans and 
resolutions.
According to Zajac and Westphal (1994), when the board is structured with more members with 
the particular objective of monitoring top management activities vigilantly, the firm will benefit 
more from the superior internal control in comparison to firms with a lower level of monitoring. 
In addition, Daily and Dalton (1993: 70), noted from a former SEC Chairman’s comment that
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subordinates of CEOs are unlikely to oppose independent directors’ opinions when there is a 
high presence of them on the board of the firm.
Although the presence of a high number of outside directors is imperative to ensure strong 
support for independent directors’ views among board members, the inputs from executive 
directors on the board are also essential. For instance, from a strategic management point of 
view, their board membership helps the CEO in conveying relevant information to outside 
directors during board meetings and assists forums in evaluating the performance of junior 
executives with a view to their potential for becoming members of the senior management team 
(Mace, 1971; Louden, 1982; Baysinger and Butler, 1985). With extensive inside experience and 
knowledge of the firm’s internal management and operations, executive directors’ contributions 
are particularly valuable to the firm in strategic planning and budget process and crisis 
management, since they can provide strong backing for an inexperienced CEO (Ford, 1988). 
The Best Practices Task Force (2004) further acknowledges the valuable input of top 
management involvement in assisting a firm’s board’s evaluation of the practicality and 
suitability of corporate information disclosure policies and procedures.
Nevertheless, these executives are also more likely to favour practices designed to entrench 
management profit-making at the expense of shareholders’ returns, such as payments of 
greenmail and severance agreements (Singh and Harianto, 1989; Manry and Nathan, 1999). Tosi 
et al., (2003) found some companies with a majority of outside directors on their board were 
ineffective in controlling and monitoring their top executives’ private rent-seeking behaviours. 
This situation is more pervasive when firm ownership is widely dispersed and a large
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shareholders’ presence is lacking. Further, improvements in the board’s control structure may 
not completely overcome the problems associated with having a certain composition of non­
executive directors on the board (Hart, 1995).
Nonetheless, the active involvement and commitment of outside independent directors in 
ensuring fair representation of shareholders’ interests will contribute to establishing and 
enforcing appropriate firm governance conduct (OECD, 2004). The impartiality of outside 
independent directors and their relevant knowledge and skills are important factors in justifying 
their presence on the firm’s board (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Wan and Ong, 2005).
4.3.2 Senior Independent Director
According to the Hampel Committee (1998), the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(2001) and the Higgs Report (2003), it is important for the company to identify a senior 
independent director of the board, even though the company has different individuals as the 
Board’s Chairman and as the Chief Executive Officer. Notably, in a situation where there is a 
potential close alliance between the Board’s Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer, the 
senior independent director can act as the independent person to whom other directors and 
shareholders may convey their concerns.
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Further, the role of a senior independent director is imperative in the relationship between major 
shareholders, for instance:
(i) to develop a balanced understanding of the issues and concerns of shareholders
(ii) where there are unresolved issues between shareholders and the Board’s Chairman 
and Chief Executive
(iii) to ensure a balanced view is taken of shareholders’ views
{Source: Higgs Report 2003 - Paragraphs 7.1-7.5, 15.15 and 15.16)
4.3.3 Independent Directors ’ Qualifications
Libby and Luft (1993) comment that education, training and experience can facilitate the means 
of accumulating task-related knowledge. Further, DeZoort and Salterio (2001) observe that the 
amount of experience that company directors have as independent directors and concurrently as 
directors of a company and members of senior management will affect the way board members 
exercise their independent judgement, such as in an auditor-management dispute case. On the 
other hand, directors with subspecialty knowledge, that is, knowledge acquired from past 
experience of working or dealing with firms in a business or industry related to that of the client, 
will enhance a person’s decision-making skills due to the distinct usefulness and applicability of 
such resources to the firm’s operations (Waller and Felix Jr., 1984).
4.3.4 Independent Chairman o f  the Board
Given the CEO’s position as the highest rank of command at management level, there is a high 
possibility of other executives cooperating with the CEO to set up high compensation for 
themselves (Yermack, 1997; Monks, 2001) and supporting the CEO’s non-strategic propositions
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for firm diversification21 (Amihud and Lev, 1981). The continuing focus on the role of the 
board’s Chairman and his/her independence from management influence has centred on his/her 
position as leader of the board that allows him/her to exert a certain degree of authority, 
including the authority to influence directly the organisational process (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1990) and initiate changes and actions in the firm (Daily and Dalton, 1993). 
Furthermore, the Chairman has a crucial role to play in ensuring impartiality in the expression of 
constructive views and the credibility of board conduct, and in setting relevant, sufficient and 
appropriate agendas for board meetings (Dayton, 1984). Consequently, separation of the board’s 
chairman and the firm’s CEO is critical to controlling and balancing the latter’s domination of 
the board of directors.
Fama and Jensen [1983(a): 314] posit that a firm will suffer in the competition for survival when 
the role of Board Chairman and CEO is combined as this allows domination of decision 
management and decision control by one person. They also indicate that this arrangement is 
likely to take place when top managers have a strong influence on the firm’s decision-control 
system. For this reason, they argue, it is imperative to separate top-level decision management 
and decision control to facilitate and motivate further the effective participation by outside 
directors in their oversight duties of management actions and hence provide better representation 
of shareholders’ interest.
As has been emphasised, the presence of a significant number of independent directors on the 
firm’s board of directors is required to ensure the objective representation of shareholders’
21 Namely for the purpose o f  empire building and to extend the C EO 's personal prestige and status.
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interests (Useem, 1998). As the leader of the Board, the independent Chairman can monitor, 
control and discipline management activities strategically on behalf of shareholders (Kose and 
Senbet, 1998). In terms of impartial and objective support, the appointment of an independent 
Chairman provides an environment conducive to encouraging participation from other 
independent outside directors, particularly in critically evaluating management agendas and 
openly conveying their concerns regarding assessments (Gregory, 2001).
At board level, the separation of the roles of Chairman and CEO is essential to ensure fair and 
objective procedures are enforced in the decision-making process without it being pressured, 
controlled and dominated by the CEO’s personal demands (Begley and Boyd, 1987). Dayton 
(1984) contends that the appointment of the CEO as Board Chairman will affect the board’s 
agendas, freedom of viewpoint, deliberations of objective discussions and the nomination of 
board members. Anderson and Anthony (1986) add that, the separation of the roles of Chairman 
and of CEO will ensure better management of the organisation and a healthy relationship 
amongst board members.
However, Donaldson and Davis (1991) argue that combining the duties of the Board’s Chairman 
and the duties of the CEO provides greater clarification and consistency in terms of the firm’s 
policies, leadership and control. Nevertheless, in order for the firm to benefit fully from this 
arrangement, the Chairman-CEO needs to project and implement actions that are in keeping 
with the firm’s value creation motives and to embrace the full spirit of stewardship and 
accountability for the firm’s long-term prosperity (Clarke, 2004).
94
CHAPTER 4: BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ AND THEIR SUBCOMMITTEES’ ROLES
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE
4.4 Non-Executive Directors and Affiliated Directors
Cheah (2003:2) describes a non-executive director as a company director who is not a full-time 
director but attends board meetings to facilitate board decisions with his/her acquired skills, 
knowledge and experience. The independence of this director from management is impeded by 
his/her business and management association with the firm and by any family relationship with 
management.
9 9Vicknair et al., (1993) describe ‘grey directors’ as directors who are not employees of the 
board of the company they are serving but potentially have an association with the company or 
its management. Their relationship may ensue from a family link with members of the 
management, the provision of a consultation service and advice, or from previous employment 
with the firm (Beasley, 1996). Emphasis on the importance of the independence and externality 
of independent directors ensures the views, advice and judgement provided by these directors 
are not impaired or compromised by their bias towards management preferences. For instance, 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) found that outside affiliated directors’ involvement in monitoring 
bidding offers is not as significant and effective as when independent directors dominate the 
board. Further, monetary incentives are one of the factors that motivate the collaboration 
between grey directors and management (Vicknair et al., 1993).
Importantly, the number of grey directors on the board may prevent the fair representation of 
interests when their numbers represent a majority vote. In particular, small shareholders’
22 The term used by Beasley (1996: 448) for directors with non-board affiliation.
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interests will not be appropriately considered if board members’ independence is compromised 
by their underlying connection with and manipulation by management (Herman, 1981; Wolfson, 
1984).
4.5 Board Subcommittees
As discussed in section 4.2.3, the board subcommittee is one of the important elements of board 
of director structure (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989). Subcommittees’ impact on board roles’ 
performance can be examined in terms of the type of subcommittee, composition of 
subcommittee membership and the dissemination of information in the committee (Zahra and 
Pearce II, 1989:307).
Further, the impact of board subcommittees on financial performance can be investigated 
directly or indirectly (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989:308). In particular, the examination of the 
subcommittees’ attributes (i.e. composition, structure, process, characteristics) directly on firm 
performance indicate the direct impact of board subcommittees on firm performance. On the 
other hand, the indirect impact of board subcommittees on firm performance indicates how firm 
performance is affected by the impact of subcommittees’ attributes on board of directors’ roles 
performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).
Primarily, the establishment of board subcommittees such as audit, nomination and 
remuneration committee is important to facilitate the management and deliberation of board of 
directors’ critical duties [Conyon and Peck, 1998; Klein (1999, 2000); Vafeas, 1999(a)]. 
Namely, the assignment of the board’s financial oversight duties to the audit committee
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establishes a formal procedure for effective evaluation of the firm’s financial position, reporting 
practice and internal control procedures (BRC, 1999). In addition, the selection process and 
nomination of board’s and top management candidatures are also part of the board of directors’ 
primary duties (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Dalton et al., 1998).
The formation of a nomination committee will lead to implementation of formal and transparent 
procedures for the selection of board members and hence the determination of board 
composition as well as board of directors’ performance on an ongoing basis (MCCG, 2001; 
Higgs Report, 2003). The Cadbury Report (1992) also emphasised the importance of 
establishing a remuneration committee in the firm. Given the tendency for executive officers to 
reward themselves with high compensation without regard of the level of firm performance (see 
Yermack, 1997), it is critical to form an independent remuneration committee (Conyon and 
Peck, 1998) which implements the practice of formal procedures in the evaluation of executives 
performance and compensation policies and scheme (MCCG, 2001; Higgs, 2003; Combined 
Code, 2006).
The following subsections will examine audit committee, nomination committee and 
remuneration committee composition and structure and their implications for the fulfilment of 
their oversight duties. In addition, the financial background of the audit committee will be 
discussed to assimilate its importance and relevance to audit committee financial oversight 
duties.
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4.5.1 Audit Committee
The importance of the audit committee as a subset of the corporate board becomes prominent 
with the delegation of specific responsibilities to oversee and govern the credibility of a firm’s 
financial position and reporting and auditing process [Public Oversight Board (POB), 1993; 
Turpin and DeZoort, 1998; Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), 1999; MCCG, 2001; McDaniel et 
al., 2002). Currently, growing public pressure for greater accountability has been brought on by 
major corporate collapses, further emphasising the need for its establishment by listed issuers 
(Baxter and Pragasam, 1999). A board will delegate the responsibilities for financial reporting 
process evaluation to an audit committee (Beasley, 1996). Moreover, an audit committee is 
needed to act as an independent and objective governing body in the firm, which is vital to 
improve the firm’s corporate governance (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001) and to facilitate effective 
enforcement of the audit committee’s oversight function, which again is critical to mitigate the 
risk of corporate failures and the lessening of public confidence (Hackenbrack and Nelson, 
1996; Lee and Stone, 1997; DeZoort, 1998).
The audit committee’s internal control oversight duties have been frequently cited by many 
researchers, for example, Abdolmohammadi and Levy (1992); Wolnizer (1995); DeZoort 
(1998); Tan and Kao (1999); MCCG (2001); and Millichamp (2002), all of whom have 
emphasised the importance and implications of the performance of such a role for the credibility 
and reliability of the firm’s systems of control and investors’ investment decisions. The audit 
committee’s experience and comprehension of the internal control evaluation process is 
necessary to support and encourage auditors’ assessment of the state of the firm’s control system
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such that their audit plan and procedures are structured to identify and uncover errors and 
fraudulent practice (DeZoort, 1998; Caplan, 1999).
Due to its primary duties in overseeing the firm’s financial processes, the formation of the audit 
committee has been linked with the strengthening of a firm’s financial control (see, for example, 
Collier 1993; English 1994; Vinten and Lee 1993). In particular, studies by Defond and 
Jiambalvo (1991) and Dechow et al., (1996) have examined the role of the audit committee in 
curbing the misrepresentation of financial statement items. Further, according to Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991), when value-maximising managers use corporate disclosure as a mean of 
reducing information asymmetry this improves the future liquidity of the company in the form 
of lower capital- cost.
A recent study by Gendron et al., (2004) on audit committee meetings, found key aspects of the 
committee’s work included asking challenging questions and evaluating the reports and 
feedback of managers and the audit findings of auditors. Such findings signify the importance of 
audit committee members’ self-awareness and initiative, that is, the need for them to be 
proactively involved and committed to the tasks and matters pertaining to their duties. On a 
large scale, these actions will generate a subsequent improvement in corporate governance, 
better protection of shareholders’ interests, and mitigation of the misappropriation of assets and 
misrepresentation of information (Kirk, 2000; Turley and Zaman, 2004). The credibility of a 
firm’s corporate governance is important to ensure and increase investors’ confidence and has 
further implications for reducing the cost of doing business (Kala, 2001)
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Additionally, the effectiveness of the audit committee depends on its collective ability to meet 
its oversight objectives (DeZoort, 1998). The rules and regulations pertaining to its authority and 
functions are strengthened by regulatory bodies’ support and this, in turn, signifies its 
importance as an oversight body in the firm and hence facilitates the ease with which it can fulfil 
its prescribed duties with the co-operation of employees and management in the firm (Carcello 
et al., 2002; Haron et al., 2005). The moves by the Stock Exchange to incorporate audit 
committee rules in its corporate governance listing requirements are perceived to be effective in 
enforcing the good functioning of the board and board committees (see, for example, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Abdulrahman et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; Orbay and Yurtoglu, 2006).
In terms of the committee’s position at board level, it functions as a committee of the board 
(FRC, 2003). This means that when there is disagreement between the committee and other 
board members, the issues will ultimately be decided in boardroom meetings.
4.5.1.1 Audit Committee Functions
According to MBSB’s Revamped Listing Requirements (2001: Para 15.13), an audit 
committee’s duties are:
i) to review the audit plan with the external auditor and subsequently make a report to the 
board of directors of the listed issuer,
ii) to review the system of internal control with the external auditor and subsequently make 
a report to the board of directors of the listed issuer,
iii) to review the audit report with the external auditor and subsequently make a report to the 
board of directors of the listed issuer,
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iv) to review the assistance given by employees to the external auditor and subsequently 
make a report to the board of directors of the listed issuer,
v) to review the adequacy of the scope, functions and resources of the internal audit 
department to ensure that it has the necessary authority to carry out its work, and 
subsequently make a report to the board of directors of listed issuers,
vi) to review the internal audit programme, and its outcomes,
vii) to review the quarterly results and year-end financial statements, prior to approval by the
board of directors, focusing particularly on:
a) changes in or the implementation of major accounting policy changes
b) significant and unusual events, and
c) compliance with accounting standards and other legal requirements,
viii) to review any related party transaction and conflict of interest situation that may arise 
within the listed issuer or group, including any transaction, procedure or course of 
conduct that raises questions concerning management integrity,
x) to view any letter of resignation from the external auditors of the listed issuer,
xi) to ascertain whether there is reason (supported by grounds) to believe that the listed
issuer’s external auditor is not suitable for re-appointment, and
xii) to recommend the nomination of a person or persons as external auditors.
According to FRC (2003), audit committee members’ roles are specifically to act independently 
from executives and ensure the financial reporting practice and internal control of the listed 
issuer are reliable and credible to protect the interests of shareholders. Importantly, the size, 
complexity of the business and risk profile of the company will further determine the extent of 
the audit committee’s oversight responsibilities and working schedules (FRC, 2003).
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4.5.1.1.1 Authority
It is important for audit committee members to recognise and understand what their job 
description requires them to accomplish, because this will affect their commitment to 
performing their responsibilities. In addition, the rights and authorities attached to their job 
designation, particularly their access to the firm’s resources, documents and personnel, 
employees’ cooperation and the company’s provision for them to seek external experts’ advice, 
will affect their efficiency and the quality of their job performance, when taking into account the 
time and costs they spend completing specific tasks.
The Kuala Lumpur Revamped Listing Requirements (2001: Para 15.18) establishes the authority 
of the audit committee as being to:
i) investigate any matter within its terms of reference,
ii) access the resources required to perform its duties,
iii) obtain full and unrestricted access to any information pertaining to the listed issuer,
iv) have direct communication channels with external auditors and person(s) carrying 
out the internal audit function or activity,
v) obtain independent professional or other advice when needed, and
vi) convene meetings with external auditors without the presence of executive members
of the committee whenever this is deemed necessary
The authority cited above signifies the Stock Exchange’s recognition of the importance of pre­
determined audit committee rights, primarily to assist committee members in dealing with 
potential resistance from management regarding access to specific company information and 
seeking outside professionals’ advice. In other words, implicit in these rights is the need for
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management to acknowledge and comply with the stipulations. Such rights can provide useful
criteria for the evaluation of directors’ effectiveness.
4.5.1.1.2 Audit Committee’s Report
Notably, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Revamped Listing Requirements (2001: Para
15.16) requires public listed companies to include the following subjects in their audit
committee report:
i) the composition of the audit committee including the names of audit committee, 
members and the chairman of the committee, and the independence of audit committee 
members from management association,
ii) the terms of reference of the audit committee [this provision prescribes the authority and 
duties of the audit committee - see MBSB’s Revamped Listing Requirements (2001: 
Para 15.12)
iii) the number of audit committee meetings held during the financial year and details of the 
attendance of each audit committee member,
iv) a summary of the activities of the audit committee in the discharge of its functions and 
duties for the financial year of the listed issuer, and
v) the existence of an internal audit function or activity and, where there is such a function 
or activity, a summary of the activities of the function or activity. Where such a function 
or activity does not exist, the listed issuer needs to provide an explanation and 
clarification of the mechanisms that exist to enable the audit committee to discharge its 
functions effectively.
103
CHAPTER 4: BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ AND THEIR SUBCOMMITTEES’ ROLES
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) extended the duties of audit committees to include selecting, 
compensating and overseeing external auditors, and resolving disputes between management 
and external auditors. These duties have also been adopted in the Malaysian Bourse Securities 
Limited (MBSB) Listing Requirements, 2001, and the US Stock Exchange Commission Listing 
Requirements, 2003. According to Abbott et al., (2003), the audit committee contributes to 
better quality audit work by advising management to appoint knowledgeable and reputable 
auditors. Kirk and Douglas (1996) claim it is important for external auditors to understand the 
practices of particular industries, and the corporate culture and motives of their client companies 
since their personal judgement is needed to assess the quality of the client’s financial reporting 
to reflect the unique and differing accounting and disclosure choices in accordance with the 
company’s circumstances. By stipulating audit committee members’ duties in the audit 
committee report, the public are being informed of their obligations and responsibilities (FRC,
2003).
Further, the audit committee’s direct communication with external auditors, notably to discuss 
the scope and coverage of audit plans and actions (DeZoort, 1997), indicates the influence that 
the committee has on obtaining greater efforts and quality from auditors. Also, meetings held 
between the committee and external and internal auditors allow both parties to have an informed 
dialogue (POB, 1993; Kirk and Siegel, 1996; McMullen and Raghunandan, 1999), and enable 
the latter parties to raise issues concerning problems encountered whilst performing their audit 
duties, for instance, in obtaining cooperation from company employees, accessing relevant 
documents, and dealing with pressures to perform the audit engagement quickly with or without
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adequate evidence and without the threat of dismissal by management (Knapp, 1985; Carcello 
and Neal, 2000 and 2003).
Further, both independent committee members and external auditors will benefit from 
convening meetings that only they attend (Kirk, 2000). At such meetings, audit committee 
members can freely address questions to external auditors and discuss problems pertaining to the 
financial reporting process as well as the state of the internal control of the company without 
feeling concerned that such matters may be too sensitive to raise with key top officers. In 
response, external auditors can comfortably give their professional opinions and indicate areas 
they believe need improvement and clarification without feeling any restraint.
If auditors face the problem of doing their job properly but at the same time not upsetting their 
clients in the process, the need to compromise certain aspects of the auditing procedures to 
retain the auditor-client relationship may affect auditors' independent conduct. If this is allowed, 
it will affect the reliability’, credibility and quality of information made available to the public in 
general and shareholders in particular. Kirk (2000) asserts that by bringing together independent 
directors and independent auditors, their corroboration in corporate governance could improve 
corporate accountability, enhance independent auditors' professionalism, and contribute a 
valuable service to the audit function.
In addition, the number of meetings held by the audit committee denotes the commitment and 
diligence of committee members in investing a substantial amount of time in their
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responsibilities (Kirk and Siegel, 1996). Moreover, McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) found 
that, regular audit meetings ensure the financial reporting process functions properly, enables the 
committee to keep abreast of accounting and control-related matters, and signifies the 
committee’s commitment to remaining informed and vigilant. Based on the 1994 study findings, 
Coopers and Lybrand (1994) suggested that an effective audit committee should meet between 
at least three to four times a year.
The BRC (1999), also states that the audit committee should conduct at least four meetings per 
financial year to ensure an adequate, appropriate and up-to-date assessment of a firm’s quarterly 
performance. By meeting regularly, the audit committee will remain abreast of accounting and 
auditing matters (Raghunandan et al., 1998). Significantly, material accounting and auditing 
issues raised during meetings with internal and external auditors can be appropriately addressed 
by directing internal and external auditors’ efforts and resources accordingly to resolve the 
matter in a timely manner. Resolving problems at an early stage reduce year-end audit time 
pressures that otherwise can potentially impair external audit quality (Public Oversight Board,
2000). Further, restatement of the financial report can be avoided by detecting and correcting 
misstatements prior to the issuance of the financial statement (Abbott et al., 2004).
Another vital role of the audit committee is to preserve and protect auditors' independence 
(Klein, 2002). This is crucial to ensure the credibility of a firm’s financial reporting practice, to 
provide fair representation and appropriate protection of shareholders’ interests, and to protect 
auditors from unnecessary pressures that may affect their work performance and expose them to 
unethical conduct inherent in their profession (Kirk and Siegel, 1996). To achieve this, the
106
CHAPTER 4: BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ AND THEIR SUBCOMMITTEES’ ROLES
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE
Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) extended audit committees’ responsibilities to evaluating the 
performance of external auditors in order to reduce management influence on auditors and thus 
strengthen auditors’ positions.
4.5.1.2 Composition and Structure
The establishment of an independent audit committee signifies a firm’s commitment to 
implement good corporate governance practice (Sommer, 1991), although the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the committee are potentially affected by the ease with which committee members 
can express their impartial views and judgements and undertake justifiable actions (Carcello and 
Neal, 2000). Bedard et al., (2004) argue that a greater number of independent directors in an 
audit committee will facilitate the objective assessment of corporate financial reporting practice, 
as they will have stronger support when speaking against management propositions when the 
need arises. Particularly, Cohen and Hanno (2000) add that the committee’s independence and 
reliability are crucial in assisting auditors’ evaluation of their client’s business viability and 
decisions regarding the control risk for specific audit assertions, including the extent of 
substantive testing to be performed.
Hence, to protect shareholders’ interests and to provide an environment conducive to auditors 
fulfilling their statutory' duties, the committee needs to oversee management activities 
objectively (Lee et al., 2004) by being impartial when dealing with matters concerning the 
management and direction of a company [MBSB, (2001, 2006)]. In other words, an independent 
audit committee member is expected to ensure that the board of directors has been fulfilling its 
oversight roles, and management, in particular the financial director (Willians, 2007:14), are
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held accountable for actions taken that are against shareholders’ interests (Haron et al., 2005). 
Equally important is managers’ affirmation of their duty of loyalty to shareholders, as this will 
determine their ultimate actions and as such have further consequences for investors’ investment 
decisions in the firm (OECD, 1999).
Lee et al., (2004: 136) identify independent directors as those who are not:
i) an employee or former employee/officer of the firm or of a related entity;
ii) a grey director, which includes:
a. a relative of an executive;
b. a person with a business relationship with the firm;
c. a large customer or supplier to the company, except for transactions taking 
place at arm's length or during the normal course of business; and
d. a director of related companies
The highly regarded Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) recommends firms form an audit 
committee comprised solely of independent directors. The presence of insiders, that is. those 
with an executive position in the firm will prevent the effective monitoring of information 
prepared by the management. Independent directors will be more productive, fair and 
transparent in performing their monitoring role on behalf of shareholders since they are free 
from any business connection as well as separate from the operation and management of the 
company. They will be valuable informers to the shareholders as their interests focus on 
ensuring a supply of reliable, sufficient and trustworthy information to them from management, 
and internal and external auditors.
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Further, the audit committee can assist in establishing an effective internal control system in the 
company through the monitoring of internal and external audit functions (Beasley and Salterio, 
2001). More specifically, the control strength of the firm acts as an indicator of the uncertainty 
level of the occurrence and extent of errors in management practice (Caplan, 1999). 
Significantly, its reliability assists the compilation of audit evidence, which is more informative 
in relation to potential fraud.
Given the increase in financial scandals, the BRC (1999) proposition was later made mandatory 
in the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002). Moreover, studies by Dechow et al. (1996) and Klein (2002) 
indicate that the presence of a greater number of independent directors in an audit committee 
reduces the likelihood of financial fraud. The appointment of outside directors to the board has a 
particular purpose, that is, to represent shareholders’ interests in the firm and hence be 
responsible for governing their interests (Fama, 1980; McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996). For 
directors to be effective on an audit committee, they need to embrace a probing attitude when 
assessing and discussing management decisions (Gendron et al., 2004). This attitude becomes 
particularly apparent when the audit committee is comprised solely of independent directors 
(McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996).
Financial reporting problems can also be averted, given independent directors’ dominant 
influence in ensuring objective, fair and firm decisions to achieve a quality assessment of 
financial, reporting and audit practice (Abbott et al., 2004). Career wise, the independent 
directors of the audit committee are potentially exposed to the ruin of their reputations and to 
legal penalties when their companies experience failures in financial reporting (Srinivasan,
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2004). Hence, since external auditors are involved primarily in the firm’s statutory audit task, 
their independence needs to be protected and assured along with the integrity and objectivity of 
their judgements to avoid any misrepresentation of information. Otherwise, the preferences of 
the client’s management may prevail over auditors’ evaluation (POB, 1993; Kirk and Siegel, 
1996). To achieve such protection and assurance, it is important that the relationship between 
the board of directors and the independent auditor be strengthened. This is because an audit 
committee and a board of directors that are well informed will be better acknowledge the 
significance of quality financial reporting and hence be more committed to fulfilling their 
corporate governance responsibilities (Kirk and Siegel, 1996).
At the same time, the chairman of the audit committee should be elected from amongst the 
independent directors. Notably, the chairman plays a vital role in ensuring the committee’s 
meetings are conducted in a fair and cooperative environment, such that each member and all 
other parties, namely, the external auditor, internal auditor and key corporate officers who are 
invited to the meeting, do not feel inhibited from expressing their real concerns (see 
Raghunandan et al.. 1998; BRC, 1999). Additionally, Kirk and Siegel (1996) suggest for best 
practice it is beneficial for auditors to meet the audit committee’s chairman in advance to 
discuss and explain any issues in a less-pressured environment. This will allow the auditors to 
clarify their motivation and objectives and give the chairman the opportunity to discuss with 
them issues of concern, which will help the auditors prepare appropriate materials for the 
forthcoming meeting.
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Moreover, the practice of establishing separate sessions for the meeting between independent 
audit committee members and external and internal auditors without the presence of executive 
directors or officers will provide an open, useful and dynamic forum (Williams, 2007:14), 
especially on issues that may be sensitive to the executives.
4.5.1.3 Financial Knowledge
Several researchers have linked the contributions of director(s) possessing financial knowledge 
to audit committee effectiveness, particularly, their potential in providing a good quality audit 
and financial assessment of the firm and in reporting and rules compliance (Treadway 
Commission, 1987; DeZoort et al., 2001; Felo et al., 2003; Defond et al., 2005). As has been 
noted, the inadequacy and failure of audit committee members to understand their 
responsibilities are due to their lack of knowledge and experience in accounting and auditing 
areas (POB, 1993). These weaknesses have been related to the technical aspects inherent in 
some of the audit committee’s oversight duties, primarily, those duties concerning internal 
control evaluations (Abdolmohammadi and Levy, 1992; DeZoort, 1998; Tan and Kao. 1999; 
Malaysia Task Force on Internal Control, 2000; Gendron et al., 2004; Haron et al., 2005).
Further, Knapp (1987) observed, disputes between auditors and management to be frequently 
associated with the accounting estimation adopted by the latter. In addition, the divergence of 
oversight decisions made by committee members with and without auditing and internal control 
experience will cast doubts on their ability to govern corporate activity and to facilitate 
corporate accountability, especially against potential fraud and internal control weaknesses 
(DeZoort, 1998).It is argued that audit committee members with accounting and auditing
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experience will provide important support and justification for auditors’ views and increase 
auditors’ productivity from members’ inputs of relevant comments (Boner and Lewis, 1990).
The efficacy and ease of communication between the audit committee and auditors are vital, 
because auditors can be an important source of information and assistance for the committee to 
oversee shareholders’ interests (DeZoort, 1998). In addition, the two-way communication 
between these parties will improve the firm’s corporate governance. Better clarification of the 
problems will assist the committee’s subsequent informed judgement (DeZoort and Salterio,
2001). Thus, according to the Cohen Commission Report (see Kirk, 2000), discussions and 
decisions made without the input of competent members may impair the audit committee’s 
judgement.
Further, Libby and Luft (1993) comment that, discrete measures need to be focused on the 
impact of accounting-related decision-making tasks and also those decision-makers who are 
involved in accomplishing this task. Primarily, this consideration will assist in improving 
understanding of the factors that influence performance in an accountancy setting. To consider 
one particular aspect, accounting-related tasks can exist with multiple degrees of complexity, 
which require a certain level of ability, knowledge and effort for their successful execution 
(Kalbersand Fogarty. 1993).
W ith regard to other aspects of accountancy, discrepancy in decision-makers’ abilities, 
knowledge, motivation and productivity have implications for job performance (DeZoort, 1998; 
Gay, 2002; Clarke 2004). Considering all these, the co-activation of both aspects, notably, 
assigning the relevant experts to perform tasks related to their wealth of knowledge, will ensure
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greater compatibility in their work engagement and hence an effective completion of their duties 
(Einhom, 1974). It has also been recognised that experts possess a greater ability to retrieve 
related information and organise more comprehensive sets of relations among pieces of 
information than novices (Bonner and Lewis, 1990).
Moreover, their experience provides a greater range of information and larger concepts for the 
solving of accountancy problems, rather than confining the problem solving to the literal and 
data driven approach used by novices (Moeckel, 1990). According to Tan and Kao (1999), 
personal commitment to the accountability of an assigned task is influenced by the individual's 
possession of the requisite knowledge and abilities. Given the task complexity, a person's 
knowledge and problem-solving ability are adapted to meet his/her accountability. Also, from 
the point of view of CPA firms, the accountability condition is necessary to persuade auditors to 
perform accordingly. In a further comment, Tan Kao (1999) claims that as accountability have 
an impact on the individual's performance, the attributes of the person performing the tasks need 
to be compatible.
Ryan et al.. (1992) found accounting practitioners have influence over the accounting practices 
of the company and due to their professional ethics will work in the best interests of 
shareholders and creditors.. Accordingly, McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) emphasise the 
significance of accounting, internal controls and auditing expertise in an audit committee and 
identify them as the key to audit committee effectiveness. One reason is that the congruity and 
svnchronicity of opinions between the audit committee and auditors are important to achieve 
sound judgement. For instance, as DeZoort (1998) observes, an audit committee with previous
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internal control experience provides greater credibility and fewer clashes of opinion with the 
auditor.
BRC (1999) identifies financial experts as those who have employment experience in 
accounting and finance, and/or CPA qualifications and equivalent experience, and include CEOs 
and senior executives with financial oversight responsibilities. Lee et al., (2004) regard financial 
experts as including those with CPA qualifications, investment bankers, venture capitalists, 
CEOs, CFOs, Vice-Presidents of Finance, controllers or treasurers. Provision of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act requires public companies to disclose to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee. In the case of Malaysia, the 
Malaysian Bourse Securities Limited (MBSB) Listing Requirements 2001 obligates public 
companies to include in their audit committee at least one member who is either a financial 
expert, such as a member of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), or with a related 
professional background, or who is financially literate, such as those possessing an 
undergraduate or postgraduate qualification in accounting and finance.
DeZoort et al.. (2001) found audit committee members with corporate governance experience 
and financial reporting and audit knowledge provided reliable and credible support to auditors in 
dispute with the client's management and could justify their substance over form concerns. 
Working in the same area of research, McDaniel et al., (2002) examined how these two groups 
with differing accounting experiences make judgements about the quality of the financial 
reporting, including their perceptions of the frameworks for evaluating reporting quality, the 
assessment of three characteristics of quality financial reporting (namely, relevance, reliability
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and comparability), the identification and reporting of concerns/issues, and the evaluation of the 
quality of the reporting of financial statement items. They revealed substantial differences in the 
response and approach of the financially literate, namely, executive MBA graduates, and 
financial experts, that is, audit managers when discussing and evaluating the quality of financial 
reporting. Notably, their level of technical accounting knowledge and their skills influence their 
answers.
McDaniel et al., (2002) further posits that the inclusion of a financial expert group in an audit 
committee will provide the appropriate structure for the discussion of overall reporting quality 
as well as improve the organisation of reporting elements. This is because, compared to the 
financially literate group, this group is consistent in relating the framework of financial reporting 
to the characteristics o f quality financial reporting. Additionally, in terms of the groups’ 
priorities regarding reporting issues and reporting treatments of financial items to discuss with 
the auditors, financial experts emphasise recurring activities, whilst the financially literate are 
likely to focus on issues that receive greater press coverage.
In terms of setback, McDaniel et al., (2002) further argue that the appointment of financial 
experts in the audit committee will focus the committee’s efforts on issues that are viewed by 
financially literate directors as having less priority. Apparently, the divergence of audit 
committee members’ areas and levels of financial knowledge and skills have further 
consequences for their decisions on the treatment of particular financial issues. Bearing this in 
mind, Carcello et al., (2006) conducted a study on the impact of certain types of financial expert 
groups, namely, accountants, financial brokers, investment brokers, CEOs, and individuals with
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management experience when performing audit committee financial oversight duties. They 
argue that the first group is critical when evaluating a firm’s compliance with accounting 
standards and treatments, whilst the second group has a significant impact on reviews of a firm’s 
investment prospect plans. Nonetheless, it is inappropriate to assign someone with CEO and/or 
general management practice to perform such duties, as they will be lacking in the training of 
task-specific knowledge.
Moreover, financial experts with auditing and accounting experience have the ability to 
communicate their views and recognise the quality of financial reporting on a timely basis (Kirk 
and Siegel, 1996). Such ability includes giving their professional opinion and evaluation of the 
relevance of the estimates of the firm’s financial items, and the appropriateness of the firm’s 
accounting principles and disclosures practice given the firm’s specific circumstances. Defond et 
al., (2005) indicated that a more positive market reaction occurs on the announcement of the 
appointment of accounting financial experts to the audit committee than the appointment of non­
accounting financial experts. Accounting financial experts are associated with the provision of a 
better quality financial reporting assessment. Also, many firms with relatively strong corporate 
governance appoint such experts, indicating their commitment to employing appropriate and 
relevant people for the designated tasks, thus ensuring shareholders’ value creation. In contrast, 
appointing audit committee members from a wide variety of backgrounds creates feelings of 
inadequacy and ineffectiveness in terms of accounting and auditing experience and technical 
knowledge (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993).
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Considering a real case situation, Williams (2007:14) gathered evidence from the trial case of 
the former Chairman of Hollinger, Lord Black of Crossharbour, who had allegedly conspired to 
steal the company’s money to the value of US$60m (£30m). His findings indicated that audit 
committee members cannot perform their financial oversight duties appropriately without the 
support of a financial expert. One of the company’s former audit committee members, 
economist Marie-Josse Kravis, informed the court that even though the committee had been 
continuously monitoring the company’s financial standing, the committee had failed to operate 
according to its governing charter, which required the involvement of financial experts in their 
decision making.
On the other hand, it is not necessarily the case that a firm’s compliance with the rules and 
regulations will guarantee users of the financial report an optimum investment decision and that 
the board of directors will meet their corporate governance responsibilities (Kirk and Siegel, 
1996). One reason is that the auditor may apply value judgements in determining the suitability 
of a particular generally accepted accounting principle over another, as well as in assessing the 
quality of the financial reporting. Moreover, the latter does not involve public reporting whereby 
auditors give their opinions to assist management and directors in making their corporate 
governance decisions. In addition, the nature of the auditors’ job means he/she should have 
considerable hands-on experience, skills, recognition of and familiarity with the mechanics, 
motives and justifications for various accounting principles, methods and estimates, and 
disclosure practices that emphasise his/her competency in the respective area.
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Further, if corporate management is left to decide the firm’s accounting disclosures on their 
own, they may barely comply with the generally accepted rules (Kirk and Siegel, 1996). 
However, ultimately, management need to decide whether to reassess and make appropriate 
changes following the suggestions of the auditor. In this instance, the influence of independent 
directors and support of the auditor’s judgement are crucial because they can persuade 
management to implement the auditor’s propositions. Importantly, management failure to 
resolve issues relating to a breach of any listed ruling that has been highlighted by the audit 
committee and by the external auditors’ assessment may result in the firm being penalised by the 
Securities Exchange and Commission (MBSB, 2001). Notwithstanding, an audit committee will 
also benefit from having members from both financial and non-financial backgrounds as such a 
quorum will enrich the committee’s views and inputs, which will be valuable for effective 
discussions of the issues at hand (Krishnamoorthy et al., 2002).
In addition, to ensure audit committee effectiveness, it is important for committee members to 
be able to comprehend the firm’s internal control process and operations to enable them to 
detect and prevent financial reporting failures and mitigate potential management fraud (Spira,
1999). Kinney (2000) indicates that such knowledge has an impact on the welfare of directors, 
management, trading partners, auditors, shareholders and society at large. In particular, such 
knowledge can assist external auditors in their audit assignment specifically by reducing audit 
risk and allowing them to fulfil their assurance duties (Beasley, 2000), especially when the 
committee meets frequently with the internal auditor and is involved on a practical level in 
building and maintaining a reliable and cooperative relationship between external auditors, 
management and internal auditors (McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996).
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Bonner and Lewis (1990) debate whether auditors’ years of experience are an indicator of 
similarity of knowledge acquired amongst them. They comment that subspecialty knowledge, 
which is acquired from working with a specific audit client or certain industries or firms, 
distinguishes the experience accumulated by practitioners regardless of their level of experience. 
Einhom (1974) adds that, the differences in approach selected by experts in managing problems 
are greatly influenced by their experience and training in particular areas. As Chapman and 
Chapman (1969) point out, experts cannot be expected to arrive at similar conclusions at all 
times since their past exposures will have influenced the development of their preconceived 
ideas, which, in turn, will determine their ways of organising information and hence of making 
decisions.
Importantly, audit committee members’ ability to identify relevant oversight issues and later to 
respond to them appropriately is critical for the committee’s overall effectiveness (DeZoort, 
1998). Specifically, this is because members who are able to anticipate and provide more related 
inputs by highlighting other potential aspects and supplementing additional information to 
oversight tasks will strategically improve the credibility of the collective decisions made by the 
committee. Nonetheless, DeZoort (1998) found members without auditing and internal control 
experience were more critical in their assessments of internal control strength than their 
experienced counterparts. Due to their lack of experience, they tended to be additionally 
cautious, conservative and diligent, which made them effective contributors to the overall 
committee effort. Such findings suggest that audit committee members’ lack of specific 
knowledge and experience related to their technical oversight task performance does not 
necessarily lead to suboptimal performance.
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4.5.2 Nomination Committee
One of the main criticisms of top executives’ involvement in the directors’ nomination process 
is their preference for individuals who are not inclined to monitor their activities (Jensen, 1993). 
Primarily, the nomination committee is important for the fair and objective selection of 
prospective board members, for the appraisal of current board members’ performance, and for 
the further control of top managers, namely, the CEO, w hose influence can dominate the 
proceedings (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Even though current procedures for the 
appointment of directors require shareholders’ approval and votes for candidates (Bathala and 
Rao, 1995), the CEO’s choice still presides because the CEO has been identified as the person 
with the greatest authority (Mace, 1971) and influence (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984) over directors’ choice of candidates. Also, shareholders’ ratification of the 
board's choice of directors’ nominees without argument has allowed this norm to persist 
(Vafeas, 1999a)
The significance of the nomination committee to a firm’s governance is underscored by its 
crucial role and proactive involvement in the assessment and evaluation of candidates to be 
selected and appointed as board members [Vafeas, 1999(a)]. In order to reduce management 
domination of and influence on the nomination and election process of directors, the nomination 
committee needs to be managed and led by independent directors (Vicknair et al., 1993). Their 
active involvement in the committee’s decision-making process will consequently determine the 
future composition of the audit committee and of the remuneration committee. The 
establishment of the nomination committee also facilitates the organised and systematic search 
for knowledgeable and experienced independent outside directors (Gregory, 2001). This is
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because the committee represents the views of people from a team of directors, sitting together 
to evaluate the performances of prospective and present directors, and is not merely an 
individual’s appraisal (Vafeas, 1999). Moreover, the quality of the committee’s decision-making 
will be enriched given outside directors’ broad knowledge and experience (Hill, 1982).
The early code of corporate governance, known as the Cadbury (1992) and later the Combined 
Code (1998), have consistently insisted on the active involvement and participation of 
independent non-executive directors in the selection and appointment process of key executives 
and top level management. Thus, commitment from competent and credible non-executive 
directors is imperative in overseeing and influencing the board of directors’ conduct.
Importantly, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) indicate that the appointment of fewer outside 
directors and more grey directors with the subsequent conflict of interest is more apparent in 
firms without a nomination committee. This is consistent with Andrews’ (1987) view of 
nomination committees, that given the scope of their authorities they are important mediums for 
increasing the representational proportion of independent directors on the board. It has also been 
observed (Yermack, 1997) that stock price movement is significantly lower in relation to the 
announcement of the appointment of independent directors if the CEO is on the nomination 
committee.
However, the appointment of outside directors to the board does not necessarily indicate 
companies’ awareness of and commitment to the need to embrace good corporate governance. 
In fact, firms experiencing poor firm performance in previous years have used the
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aforementioned governance mechanism to camouflage their dire situation (Bhagat and Black,
2002). Another study has shown how top management’s strategic choices for organisational 
performance are influenced by their outside connections (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). 
Thus, executive directors are unlikely to appoint outside directors if they view them as unlikely 
to add value to the firm.
The presence of executive directors on the nomination committee will also limit outside 
directors’ freedom to appraise top management objectively given that their future re-election to 
the board is affected by top executives’ recommendation (Tejada, 1997). On the other hand, the 
involvement of internal managers in the selection of outside directors is anticipated when the 
firm’s system of internal control is reliable, as noted by Fama and Jensen [1983(a)], In 
particular, internal managers’ experience and knowledge of the organisation’s internal activities 
will be valuable in identifying relevant human capital needs for better business operations.
Further, the establishment of the nomination committee is significant to ensure fair and objective 
selection of prospective board members as well as appraisal of current board members’ 
performance (Lipton, 2006). Top executives’ involvement in the board selection process has 
been criticised due to their preference to appoint individuals who are less inclined to monitor 
their activities (Jensen, 1993). There is also the issue of the domination of directors’ selection by 
the CEO, to increase his/her control over top managers (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Even 
though the shareholders’ approval is required for board of director appointments (see Lipton, 
2006:2), Bathala and Rao (1995) argue that this is just an assumed practice. According to 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), the CEO’s choice of board candidates will preside over other
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board members’ nominees. This practice has been linked with the higher authority of the CEO 
(Mace, 1971) and his/her influence in the firm’s management (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Also, the lack of challenge on the part of shareholders leaves the 
board with the upper hand in the choice of director’s nominees [Vafeas, 1999(a)].
Specifically, the significance of the nomination committee to the firm’s governance is 
underscored by its crucial role and proactive involvement in the assessment and evaluation of 
candidates to be selected and appointed as board members, primarily for future monitoring 
effectiveness [Vafeas, 1999 (a)]. In order to reduce management inherent domination and 
influence in directors’ nomination and election process, the nomination committee needs to be 
managed more and led by independent directors (Vicknair et al., 1993). Consistently, the New 
York Stock Exchange has imposed a ruling of full independent director membership on 
nomination committees (Lipton, 2006). Importantly, their active involvement in the 
committee’s decision-making process will determine the future composition of audit and 
remuneration committee members. Also, the establishment of a nomination committee facilitates 
the organization and systematic search for knowledgeable and experienced independent outside 
directors (Gregory, 2001). This is because the committee represents the views of people from a 
team of directors, sitting together to evaluate prospective and present directors’ performance and 
not merely an individual’s appraisal (Vafeas, 1999). Moreover, the quality of the decision­
making of the committee would be enriched considering outside directors’ broad knowledge and 
experience (Hill, 1982).
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4.5.3 Remuneration Committee
The Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995), MCCG (2001) and Higgs Report (2003) 
indicated the formation of a remuneration committee in the firm is important for the 
implementation of formal and transparent procedures in the setting of executive remuneration 
policies and package. One of the main functions of the remuneration committee is to assess the 
contract of employment of senior executives (Carson, 2002). According to Yermack (1997), the 
lack of proper monitoring and control of executives’ compensation scheme may increase 
executive officer’ alliance with the CEO in setting high compensation for themselves. Also, 
executives have been found receiving higher compensation which was not matched with higher 
firm profitability but rather due to rise in price, staff redundancy and pay reduction (Greenbury, 
1995). In addition, there is an issue of conflict of interests when the board of director is allowed 
to determine their own remuneration (Greenbury, 1995)
Due to the conflict of interests of shareholders and management, it is vital that the remuneration 
committee is comprised solely of independent directors (Yermack, 1997; Vafeas, 2000), to 
assure the reasonability of executives’ compensation levels (Monk, 2001) and where applicable, 
ensure they are consistent with the firm’s achievement of a certain level of performance. The 
aim is to reaffirm that executives’ compensation schemes are justified and have been objectively 
evaluated, and that shareholders’ investments are protected from expropriation by managers’ 
excessive remuneration policies (Gregory, 2001). Importantly, the initiative of the committee’s 
independent directors to obtain external consultant advice on executives’ compensation will be 
counterproductive if experts provide such details with inappropriate language and structure 
(Monks, 2001).
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In terms of the committee’s composition, the Cadbury Report (1992) recommends wholly or 
majority non-executive director membership including a non-executive chairman. In 
furtherance, Yermack (1997) and Vafeas (2000) proposed independent directors’ sole 
membership on the committee. This is to ensure executive directors’ particularly CEO’s, non­
participation in the evaluation of their own pay. Moreover, the remuneration appraisal process 
should be conducted objectively and impartially so that the level of executives pay reflects firm 
performance, and the outside advice obtained ensure their market rate (Monks, 2001).
According to Greenbury Report (1995), remuneration committee members should be individual 
who are accountable, competent (i.e. have good knowledge of the company’s business) and free 
from financial involvement with the firm. Moreover, the effectiveness of the remuneration 
committee will enhance the quality of financial reporting and transparency of management 
performance (Carson, 2002). On the other hand, external consultant advice on executive 
compensation will be counter productive when experts provide such details in misused language 
and structure (Monks, 2001).
4.6 Other Corporate Governance Issues
4.6.1 Founder and/or Family Business
The predominant presence of founder and family businesses in the corporate environment of 
developed and developing countries indicates their active participation in and contributions to 
the generation of a country’s income and economic stability (Bhattacharya and Ravikumar,
2001). In the US it has been reported that almost half of the Fortune 500 companies are family
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businesses (Chami, 1999), whilst in Asian regions, they account for 60% of public listed firms 
(Claessens et al., 1999).
Increasingly, studies on family businesses have examined the approaches and potential practices 
of sound and efficient business management, taking into account the factors of inheritance, 
ownership, compensation, presence of the founder, family kinship, and commitment of family 
members to the business ventures (Davis, 1983; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; McConaughy 
et al., 1998; Sharma and Rao, 2000; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Chan and Lau, 2003).
Given the conflict of interests created by the separation of ownership and management, Fama 
and Jensen (1983) concur that family-managed firms should be better at monitoring and 
controlling firm activities. It is recognised that when managers own a large number of shares in 
a firm, they are unlikely to take actions that may reduce the value of the firm’s shares (Morck 
and Yeung, 2003). Rather, the ownership of large equity mitigates managers’ indulgence in 
private rent seeking and concentrates their aim for firm value maximisation through efficient 
deployment of corporate assets (Morck et al., 1988), particularly where there is a positive 
Tobin’s Q in family-controlled firms. However, this motive seems to be less transparent when 
the shares of the firm are widely dispersed (Berle and Means, 1932).
In the case of public companies, the increase in the number of family members being assigned 
executive responsibilities is part of the strategy for strengthening the managerial vote of the 
ownership (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). Also, the number of family members in the firm is
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important for implementing the firm’s preferred financing options, as there will be stronger 
support for there being less debt financing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is to avoid the 
consequences of default debt payments that could lead to bankruptcy whereupon family 
members may have to relinquish their shares to bondholders (Agrawal and Nagarajan, 1990) and 
lose their business inheritance. On the other hand, dominant family shareholders can exert 
control over corporate policies by directly managing the firm or by closely monitoring the 
management team (Bennedson and Wolfenzon, 2000). Managers in a family business may also 
act in the best interests of family members rather than of shareholders as a whole (Johnson et al.,
2000). Further, the influence of important business associates23 may prevail in the firm, which 
may not necessarily be to the advantage of the firm’s minority shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).
In addition, the influence of the founder in a firm’s structure and process has been widely 
discussed (Eisenhardt, 1988). Studies have examined differences in the management approach 
of independent CEOs and CEO-founders (Levinson, 1971 and Willard et al., 1992). The former 
have been assessed as having more professional attributes than the latter; this may affect the 
firm's future success (Daily and Dalton, 1993). Nevertheless, the business acumen of other 
perceived founders is as legitimate as that of non-founders (Alcorn, 1982), considering the 
initiative they showed in founding the business and ensuring its viability for an extensive period 
of time24. Other studies have investigated differences in choices of governance structure 
between CEO-founder and non-CEO founder firms and found variations in the pursuance of
23 Fama and Jensen (1983: 306) define important business associates in terms o f  their goodwill and advice.
24 For instance, the period o f  management since the inception o f  the business and fulfilment o f the Securities' requirements for 
public listing.
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objectives, for example, income substitution in opposition to large scale business (Birch, 1987), 
rapid firm growth as a motivating business challenge (Churchill and Lewis, 1983), and non- 
CEO-founder firms’ goal of empire building and faster growth than the goal of steady growth 
for CEO-founder firms (Willard et al., 1992).
To discipline and oversee family firms’ governance to protect them from being inappropriately 
managed and influenced by family members, the market authorities, such as the Securities 
Exchange and Commission, enforce requirements for corporations to increase their transparency 
and disclosure of information (Rhee, 1997-1998; La Porta et al., 2000), including information on 
potential family relationships amongst board members and shareholders, shareholdings in firms 
and related party transactions (Thillainathan, 1999; Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 2001).
4.6.2 Firm Ownersh ip and Shareholdings
Berle and Means (1932) claim the distribution of firm share ownership has an impact on firm 
performance because when the firm is widely owned by a large number of small shareholders, 
the separation of ownership from the management of the business increases the potential for a 
conflict of interest between owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hill and Snell 
(1989) observed a positive relationship between concentrated ownership and firm productivity. 
The presence of large shareholders signified their influence and close monitoring of firm 
activities ensured its operational efficiency, in this case, a diversification strategy and R&D 
investments. Similarly, Leech and Leahy (1991:1418) reported that structure of firm share
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ownership has implications for firm performance in that small shareholders’ voting power 
and/or incentives may not be sufficiently influential to enforce profit maximisation.
On the other hand, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found no relationship between firm ownership 
structure and firm performance when examining the impact of firm ownership structure in 
relation to firm size, type of industry and regulated or non-regulated business on firm accounting 
profit rates. In another study, Monsen et al., (1968) observed deterioration in a firm’s return on 
investment, when the ownership of the firm was dispersed. However, when separately owned 
and managed firms act in line with the profit maximisation goal, firms’ long-term performance 
can be sustained (Williamson, 1970).
Leech and Leahy (1991) examined firm ownership through owner concentration and control 
type. They measured the first by identifying the stake that the largest holdings represented, that 
is, whether it fell within 5%, 10% or 20% and more of the shareholding spread whilst for the 
second they employed Cubbin and Leech’s probabilistic-voting model where control is defined 
as *securing a simple majority in a shareholder vote ’ (Leech and Leahy, 1991:1419).
4.6.2.1 Directors’ Shareholdings
According to Kosnik and Bettenhausen (1992) and Gay (2002), the financial motives 
discrepancies between owners and managers can be alleviated with appropriate incentives 
system namely, compensation policies that rewards managers comparable to owners’ returns. 
Specifically, the board of director primary duties was to oversee and control management 
activities in safeguarding shareholders interests. The setting of director’s remuneration scheme
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which rewarded them in accordance to their governing efforts is pertinent for the establishment 
of appropriate conduct and practice of the firm’s governance (Burton, 2000). Bukart et al., 
(1997) argued the ownership of firm’s shares by management is an important incentive to 
encourage managers practice of effective control on firm activities. They gathered the control 
right will enhance the managers efforts in making informed economic decision.
Moreover, the firm’s shareholdings structure shows the controlling influence of individual 
owners in deciding who should be the prospective owners (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
Demsetz (1983) examined the linear relationship between ownership structure and accounting 
measure of profit by making ownership structure an endogenous variable. He found no 
statistically significant relationship between corresponding variables. On the other hand, the 
investigation by Morck et al., (1988) of similar issues ignored the endogeneity potential of a 
corporation’s ownership structure. They used Tobin’s Q and accounting profit rate as measures 
of performance. Their estimation of insider ownership influence on Tobin’s Q indicated a mixed 
relationship in that management share ownership between 0% and 5% and greater than 25% 
showed a positive association with Tobin’s Q, but a negative association for management 
shareholdings of between 5% and 25%.
Elson (1996) argued in order to encourage corporate director to be vigilance in their oversight, 
their compensation should reflect their past performance as well as potential future benefit from 
their monitoring duties. In particular the opportunistic behaviour of director can be mitigated 
when directors’ compensations reflect shareholders’ returns (Jones and Goldberg, 1982). Given 
the directors non-financial stake in the firm, it cannot be expected that they would monitor the 
firm activities as what an owner of the firm would do (Smith, 1776). Bhagat et al., (1999)
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contended, the board members ownership of substantial equity in the firm would align the 
directors and shareholders’ interests, namely with effective oversight of management activities 
by them. Nevertheless they noted outside directors are less likely to hold shares in the firm than 
executive director. Mallette and Fowler (1992) argued, equity ownership can serve as an 
effective monitoring incentive for outside directors when they own a sizeable amount of shares 
in the firm.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter’s presentation and examination of the roles and attributes of boards of directors has 
indicated that those boards that are independent from management and are appropriately 
qualified are an important governing mechanism for ensuring decisions and actions at the top 
level are carried out fairly, objectively and informatively. Moreover, as a body appointed with 
primary' oversight duties in the firm, a board of directors’ actions and performance will have 
implications for the firm’s financial performance as a going concern and for its future direction, 
mainly due to directors’ involvement and participation in making and delivering firm policies, 
having direct access to the firm’s personnel and internal resources, and evaluating 
management’s judgement and actions regarding the allocation of firm resources.
Due to the various control responsibilities of boards of directors, audit committees are formed 
specifically to monitor and supervise the financial reporting process and auditing of the firm. In 
order to ensure committees’ effectiveness, that is, their capability to perform designated roles
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impartially, appropriately and sufficiently, the independence, financial knowledge and 
experience of committee members are essential, given the audit committee’s specific tasks.
In addition, the formation of nomination and remuneration committees will have an inherent 
effect on the selection and appointment of board of directors’ members and their level of 
compensation. For example, the former committee is responsible for ensuring that those 
candidates who are selected and appointed to the board are of high calibre, have high credibility, 
qualifications and commitment to perform their duties accordingly, and are proactively prepared 
to challenge management’s misguided actions. As for the latter committee, its existence and 
functioning ensures executives are compensated in accordance with their deliverance of quality 
performance while at the same time hinders the misappropriation of rewards due to the abuse of 
power, authority and unethical collaboration amongst top executives.
This chapter thus highlights the importance of research on boards of directors’ and boards’ 
subcommittees’ corporate governance practices in Malaysia, since it demonstrates the 
imperativeness of directors’ independence and qualifications for firm performance and 
protection of shareholders’ interests. Accordingly, this study’s findings will make a useful 
contribution to the economic and financial environment of Malaysia. The next chapter will 
present the research hypotheses and models.
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~  (Research Hypotheses’ and Models’ (Development ~
5.0 Introduction
In the previous chapter, corporate governance theories, empirical studies on board of directors’ 
and board subcommittees’ impact on firm performance, and the Malaysian corporate governance 
environment and associated issues were examined to provide the underlying framework for the 
development and discussion of the research hypotheses. The research hypotheses are first 
developed in relation to the impact of board of director attributes, namely, independence 
composition, leadership and competency, on firm performance. Subsequently, research 
hypotheses for board subcommittees’ attributes’ impact, specifically the influence of their 
respective independence and structure on firm performance, are proposed. Board subcommittees 
observed are the audit committee, nomination committee and remuneration committee. As 
regards to the former, its impact on firm performance is extended to include committee 
members’ competency. Further, three corporate theories, namely, the legalistic view, agency 
theory and resource dependency theory, underlie the arguments for the proposed hypotheses.
5.1 Board of Director Attributes and Firm Performance
In this section, three board of director attributes namely, independence, leadership and 
competency, are examined to develop their respective influence on firm performance.
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5.1.1 Board o f  Directors * Independence and Firm Performance
Primarily, the formation of a board of directors in a firm is underscored by the need to establish 
a cost-effective internal governing mechanism (Fama, 1980). Its main function is to oversee the 
conduct of managers and/or owner-managers in their decisions on the allocation of a firm’s 
assets such that managers’ conducts are aligned with the maximisation of shareholders’ 
investments (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Furthermore, the ultimate decisions on the firm’s 
strategic policies and planning are made at the board level, which emphasises the imperativeness 
of the board’s objectivity, impartiality and accountability when performing its duties, 
specifically in fairly representing shareholders’ interests [Fama and Jensen, (1983a); Baysinger 
and Hoskisson, (1990); Beasley, (1996); Ferris et al., (2003); Boone et al., (2007)]. In addition, 
the independence of board members will ensure that managers’ performances are evaluated 
appropriately (Baysinger et al., 1985).
The outside independent director’s non-association with the firm’s management, whether 
through past employment, business dealings and/or family relationship [see Bhagat and Black, 
(1999); BRC, (1999); Abbott et al., (2004)], underscores his/her suitability to make objective 
and impartial evaluation and decision-making on a firm’s activities and performance. Moreover, 
their higher composition on the firm’s board will ensure greater influence of independent and 
unbiased views and judgements in the board’s decision-making [see, for example, Kosnik, 
(1987); Beasley, (1996); McWilliams and Sen, (1997); Long et al., (2000)]. In particular, the 
high presence of independent directors on the firm’s board will ensure governance of a firm’s 
assets against management personal profit seeking activities is conducted objectively (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992).
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To-date, several studies have linked independent directors’ ability to enforce independent views 
and judgement at the board level by examining the impact of independent director composition 
on the board in terms of its proportion, majority (i.e. at least 50%) and dominance (i.e. 51% or 
above) on firm performance (see, for example, Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Bhagat and 
Black, 1999; Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998; Dalton et al., 1999; Carter et al., 2003). Notably, 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) found a positive relationship between the proportion of 
independent directors and stock price reaction. Similarly, Byrd and Hickman (1992) found that 
when the firm’s board comprised at least 50% of outside directors there was a positive impact on 
its abnormal return. However, the influence of independent directors’ judgements may be 
impaired by the presence of affiliated directors on the board due to the latter’s association with 
the firm’s management through former employment, business dealings and/or family 
relationship [see Lee et al., 1992; Dalton et al., 1998; Bhagat and Black, 1999; Klein, 2002(a)].
") c
According to the MCCG (2001)" and the Higg Report (2003), the presence of a senior 
independent director on the board (i.e. an independent director with years of experience as an 
independent director) will enhance and strengthen the support of independent views and 
judgement, and the efficiency of a new dependent director. Specifically, in the case of East 
Asian corporations, the presence of controlling owner-managers and/or family member directors 
on the board of firms emphasises the importance of the role of the independent director as the 
representative of minority shareholders’ interests (see, Claessens et al., 2001; Thillainathan. 
1999; MCCG, 2001; Mitton, 2002).
:5 MCCG (2001) Part 4: Explanatory Notes [Para 4.31 (VII)] states “Whether o r not the roles o f  Chairman and C hief Executive 
are combined, the b o a rd  should  identify a  sen ior independent non-executive d irector o f  a  board  in the annual report to whom  
concerns m ay be c o n v ey ed ”. Para 4.32 further emphasises the significance o f  a senior independent director as an identified 
independent figure for other directors to express their concerns, especially when the board’s Chairman is autocratic and the CEO 
is pow erful and both o f  them form an alliance].
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Notably, executive directors’ influence on board decisions is strengthened when the roles of 
Chairman and Chief Executive are combined (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Yermack, 1997) 
since this allows domination of board decisions and control of management [Fama and Jensen, 
1983 (a)]. On the other hand, the presence of an independent board chairman will strengthen 
independent decision-making at the board level (Dayton, 1984). The presence of family member 
directors on the board may also contribute to firm performance since the need to sustain 
business prosperity for their next generation may prevent them from taking action detrimental to 
the firm’s future viability (Ho et al., 2004; Morck and Yeung, 2003). However, shareholders’ 
interests will be endangered when decisions taken by family member directors are made in the 
best interests of their kin rather than shareholders as a whole (Johnson et al., 2000). Thus, 
Malette and Fowler (1992) posit that independent director presence on the firm’s board serves as 
an essential monitoring device.
In consideration of the above arguments, the following hypotheses are proposed:
HBIND 1: The proportion of independent directors on the board will have a positive impact on 
firm performance.
HBIND 2: The domination of board of director’s composition by independent directors will 
have a positive impact on firm performance.
HBIND 3: The domination of board of director’s composition by the sum of independent 
directors and non executive directors will have an impact on firm performance.
HBIND 4: The proportion of independent directors with accounting and finance knowledge will 
have a positive impact on firm performance.
HBIND 5: The presence of a senior independent outside director will have an impact on firm 
performance.
HBIND 6: The exclusion of Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer or Managing 
Director from board of director’s membership will have a positive impact on firm performance.
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HBIND 7: The appointment of an independent director as a board of director’s chairman will 
have a positive impact on firm performance.
HBIND 8: The presence of a founder director on the board will have an impact on firm 
performance
HBIND 9: The presence of family directors on the board will have an impact on firm 
performance
HBIND 10: Independent director equity holdings in the firm will have an impact on firm 
performance.
The research models for HBIND 1, 2 and 3 are developed by also examining each of the 3 
models with HBIND 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 9 and 10. According to Zahra and Pearce (1989), the board of 
director’s attributes, namely, composition, structure, characteristics and process are highly 
interrelated. Studies have found the effectiveness of independent directors in undertaking their 
oversight duties is affected by their ease and freedom to express their independent views 
(Kosnik, 1987), controlling owner influence on corporate policies (Bennedson and Wolfenzon.
2002), and their possession of relevant knowledge and skills, particularly financial skills 
[Francis et al., (1999); Dionne and Triki, (2005)].
Further, the presence on the board of a senior independent director with many years’ experience 
as an independent director will strengthen independent directors’ independence of views and 
judgement, and assist new independent directors’ understanding of their duties (see, Higgs,
2003). Such presence is particularly important since the presence of a top executive officer, such 
as the CEO, on the board may impose a barrier for independent directions to ask challenging 
questions, given that their appointment has been made by the CEO (Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1999), founder of the firm and family-member director (see Anderson et al., 2004) on the board
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of the firm. Bhagat and Black (2002) indicate that a board of directors entirely composed of 
independent directors signifies the establishment of a 'monitoring board’. While Farrer and 
Ramsay (1998) have argued that non-executive shareholdings in the firm may compromise their 
independence, Bhagat et al., (1999), on the other hand, found stock ownership by outside 
directors provided an effective monitoring incentive and had a positive impact on firm 
performance.
According to Malette and Fowler (1992), outside directors will closely align their interests with 
shareholders’ interests. Further the board’s chairman has a duty to ensure that the board’s 
procedures are carried out in an orderly and impartial manner (see, Dayton 1984). However, 
when the role of chairman and CEO is combined, the CEO may dominate board agendas and 
hence independence in the board’s views may not be achieved (Daily and Dalton, 1993). Thus, 
the appointment of an independent board chairman is important to establish unbiased views and 
judgements of board members (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990).
Based on the above, the explanatory variables for the ordinary least square model (OLS) of 
board independence and firm performance (OLS 1) are as follows:
(i) The proportion of independent directors on the board (NINED),
(ii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the firm’s board composition is dominated 
by independent directors (DOINED),
(iii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the firm’s board composition is dominated 
by the total of independent and non-executive directors (DONEDI),
(iv) The proportion of independent directors with accounting and financial knowledge 
and skill on the board (NINACF),
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(v) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when there is a senior independent director on the 
board (SRINED),
(vi) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the CEO or Managing Director is not a board 
member (EXCEO),
(vii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when an independent director has chaired the 
board o f directors (CHINED),
(viii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the founder is a board member (FOUD),
(ix) The proportion of family members on the board (NFAMDI)
(x) The percentage of independent directors’ shareholdings in the firm (NINSDG)
Hypotheses 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 will be empirically tested using the following OLS l(i) 
model:
Firm PerformanceJ 6  = a +  fioNINED + p,NINACF+ P2 SRINED  + psEXCEO + P4CHINED
5
+ B 5N F A M D I  + p 6FOUD + p 7N IN S D G  +  Y  Control Variables +
k = l
8
Y  Industry Dummy + £j
m = l
The following OLS 1 (ii) model empirically investigates research hypotheses 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
and 10.
Firm Performancefl- = a + PoD O IN E D  + PjNINACF+ P2SRIN ED  +  P3EXCEO  + P4CHINED
5
+ B 5N F A M D I  + p 6F O U D  + p 7N IN S D G  + ^C o n tro l Variables +
k=i
8
Y  Industry Dummy + £y
m=1
26 Where t represents the respective period the firm performance was observed (i.e. 2002. 2003 or 2004) and i represents the 
respective industry o f  the sampled firms.
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The following OLS l(iii) model empirically evaluates research hypotheses 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 
10:
Firm Performanceti = a + poD O N E D I +  P /N IN A C F +  P2SRINED  +  p 3E X C E O  +  p 4CH IN ED
5
+  B sN F A M D I  +  P tF O U D  + prN IN S D G  +  ^  Control Variables +
k = i
8
y  Industry Dummy + £y
m = l
Specifically, the following control variables are employed in the OLS 1 model:
(i) Firm size as measured by total asset (NASET),
(ii) Leverage as measured by the ratio of Total Debt to Firm Equity (NDEQ),
(iii) The amount of non executive directors’ remuneration (NREMU),
(iv) The percentage shareholdings of 5% and more by individuals and/or private 
companies (NINDPV) and institutional investors (i.e. government institution, public 
limited companies, unit trust and other private institutions) [NINSTL] and
(v) Industry Dummy (INDS) which represents two categories. The first category is a 
dummy variable of 1 if the company is a Main Board or 0 if otherwise (MAINB).
The second category represents the seven industries to which Main and Second
Board firms belong, namely, trading and services (TRADG), plantation (PLANT), 
finance (FIN), construction (CONSTR), consumer products (CONPRO), property 
(PROP) and miscellaneous (MISCL) [i.e. which includes infrastructure project
->7
companies, the hotel industry, and mining]' .
Control variables included in the OLS 1 model to identify factors other than explanatory 
variables that may have a potential impact on firm performance and hence ensure the robustness 
of the research model’s outputs [see, Bhagat and Black, (1999); Drobetz et al., (2004); Black et 
al., (2006)]. In particular, firms may change their corporate governance rather than improvement
21 For the purpose o f  the regression analysis o f  the research models, the industrial products industry is identified as benchmark 
industry (see Field. 2005:208) and excluded from the regression models which then leave seven industry dummies being 
regressed.
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in corporate governance practice. Accordingly, the causality relationship between firms’ 
corporate governance practice and performance would be identified as being endogenously 
determined [see Agrawal and Knoeber, (1996); Bhagat et al., (2002)] rather than the impact of 
firms’ implementation of certain internal corporate governance measures.
Drobetz et al., (2004) employed firm’s size, leverage ratio, stock exchange listing and industry 
dummy to ensure that endogeneity problems would not affect the robustness and validity of their 
study of the impact o f firms’ corporate governance rating on firm value. Similarly, Black et al., 
(2006) applied firm size and leverage ratio in their investigation of the impact of Korean firms 
corporate governance practice on firm performance. Following Drobetz et al., (2004) and Black 
et al., (2006), the potential impact of the endogeneity problem in this study is controlled with the 
utilisation of the respective control variables. In addition, the substantial changes in Malaysian 
listed firms' corporate governance practices have been mainly driven by exogenous influences, 
namely, Malaysian Securities Commission regulations and MBSB Listing Requirements in 2001 
(see KLSE and PwC, 2002). Hence, the endogeneity problem should not affect this research’s 
examination of the impact of firms' internal corporate governance practice on firm value.
The use of firm size, such as total assets (NTASET), as a control variable, will capture the 
impact of greater firm resources on facilitating firms’ productivity level and their managements' 
efficiency to promote firm value creation (see, for instance Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989). In 
addition, firm's leverage ratio (NDEQ) indicates the extent of its capital gearing, namely, its 
reliance on debts financing over equity financing (see Bhandari, 1988). The use of debts 
financing will enhance firm performance when banks and/or financial institutions closely
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monitor management’s procurement activities (see, for instance, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Drobetz, 2004; Chang Aik Leng and Abu Mansor, 2005).
Industry effects (INDS) are examined to ensure adequate conceptualisation of the industrial 
environment in which the firms under study operate and compete to prevent misleading 
interpretation (Dess et al., 1990). For instance, an industry’s profitability level can explain the 
variation in profit o f the sampled firms (Beard and Dess, 1981). Moreover, industry effects 
allow further insight and understanding of the behaviour of firms from diverse industries since 
certain industries may be confined to certain projections (Hirsch, 1975). Accordingly, the 
stratification of research samples by industry will facilitate consistent examination of 
relationships among the variables under consideration. Spurious results can be moderated and 
findings more accurately interpreted (Rosenberg, 1968). The variation in firm performance in 
different industries may be due to how firms in the same industry develop competitive 
strategies, and inherent uncertainty in a certain industry may affect the firm’s risk exposure and 
hence performance (see, for instance, Mauri and Michaels, 1998; Cockbum and Griliches, 1988; 
Lemmon and Lins, 2003)
With respect to non-executive director remuneration (NREMU), Main et al., (1996) found that 
their pay level aligns with firm performance when a share option scheme is part of their 
compensation scheme. A survey conducted by KLSE and PwC (2002) reported that non­
executive directors of public listed firms were not satisfied with their current remuneration 
payment and indicated that their performance would be enhanced with the setting of their pay 
level according to market rate.
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Ownership of substantial shareholdings28, namely, by individuals, private companies, 
government agencies, institutional investors and public listed companies has been found to 
enhance incentives of the respective groups of shareholders and hence better firm performance 
(see, for instance, Mitton, 2002) [NINDPV; NINSTL]. In particular, Gomez and Jomo (1998) 
linked the presence of Malay directors on Malaysian corporations’ board of directors to firm’s 
strategic means of accessing external resources given the directors potential links with the 
government and/or ruling party.
5.1.2 Board o f  Directors 9 Leadership and Firm Performance
In Chapter 3 (see Section 3.4.3), the significance of the board chairman’s independence was 
emphasised. The Chairman’s duties encompass being the board’s leader and setting up and 
administrating board meetings, i.e. determining their agendas, distributing information prior and 
post meetings, and establishing an environment conducive to easy and fair debate on critical 
issues amongst board members and management), and directing the company’s future prospects 
and policies' establishment [see, for example, Fama and Jensen (1983a); Dayton (1984); Kose 
and Senbet (1998)]. In addition, Eisenhardt (1988) found that a board of directors that is led by a 
founder-chairman will have an influence on the board structure and process.
In light of the above, the ensuing hypotheses are proposed to evaluate the contribution of the 
independence of the board’s chairman to firm value:
HBL 1: The appointment of an independent director as board chairman will have a positive 
impact on firm performance.
:8 A cco rd in g  to  L em m o n  and  L ins (2003 ), th e  equ ity  h o ld in g  o f  5%  o r m ore  shares  in th e  firm .
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HBL 2: The appointment of a senior independent director as board chairman will have a positive 
impact on firm performance.
HBL 3: The appointment of the founder as board chairman will have an impact on firm 
performance.
HBL 4: The appointment of a non-executive director as board chairman will have an impact on 
firm performance.
HBL 5: The appointment of a family member as board chairman will have an impact on firm 
performance.
HBL 6: The separate appointment of the firm’s board chairman and chief executive officer will 
have a positive impact on firm performance.
Importantly, hypotheses HBL 3 and HBL 5 will be observed together with HBL 6. According to 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), when the founder of the company does not serve as the CEO or 
Chairman of the company (i.e. where the CEO is a non-family member), family influence on the 
firm’s management may not add to firm value. They also found that the appointment of a 
founder family member as the firm’s CEO or Chairman is detrimental to firm value.
Specifically, the explanatory variables for the ordinary least square (OLS) model of board 
leadership and firm performance are represented by:
(i) Binary code of 1 or 0 otherwise when an independent director has chaired the board
of directors (CHINED),
(ii) Binary' code of 1 or 0 otherwise when a senior independent director has chaired the
board of directors (CHS1NED),
(iii) Binary code of 1 or 0 otherwise when a founder has chaired the board of directors 
(CHFOUND).
(iv) Binary code of 1 or 0 otherwise when a non-executive director has chaired the board
of directors (CHNED),
(v) Binary code of 1 or 0 otherwise when a family-member director has chaired the
board of directors (CHFAM), and
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(vi) Binary code of 1 or 0 otherwise when a non-executive director has chaired the board 
of directors and where there has been a separate appointment of the firms’ board 
chairman and chief executive officer (SEPCEO).
Further, the board leadership research model is controlled by:
(i) Firm Size as measured by total asset (NASET),
(ii) Leverage as measured by the ratio of Total Debt to Firm Equity (NDEQ),
(iii) The proportion of family directors on the board (NFAMDI),
(iv) The proportion of independent directors on the board (NINED),
(v) The proportion of specific foreign directors (i.e. from European countries, the USA, 
Australia, New Zealand and Singapore)29 on the board (NFORS),
(vi) The percentage shareholdings of 5% and more by individuals and/or private 
companies (NINDPV), and institutional investors (i.e. government institution, public 
limited companies, unit trust and other private institutions) [NINSTL],
(vii) Size of board of directors (NBDSZ), and
(viii) Industry' Dummy (INDS) which represents two categories. The first category is a 
dummy variable o f 1 if the company is a Main Board or 0 if otherwise (MAINB). 
The second category represents the seven industries to which Main and Second 
Board firms belong, namely, trading and services (TRADG), plantation (PLANT), 
finance (FIN), construction (CONSTR), consumer products (CONPRO), property 
(PROP) and miscellaneous (MISCL) [i.e. which includes infrastructure project 
companies, the hotel industry, and mining]30.
Board leadership hypotheses are empirically examined by the following OLS 2 model. In 
particular, the OLS 2(i) model will empirically examine hypothesis HBL 1:
8 8
Firm Performance„ = a + piCHINED  + ^  Control Variables + ^  Industry Dummy + 8 j
k = l m = l
29 These include, foreign directors from European countries (i.e. the UK. France. Germany. Denmark and Switzerland), the US. 
Australia and Singapore in light o f  their corporate governance standard ranking [See Cornelius. 2005; FTSE. 2005]
30 See ibid 27.
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In addition, the OLS 2(ii) model w ill em pirically exam ine hypothesis HBL 2:
8 8 
Firm P erform ance= a + P2 CHSINED + ^  Control Variables +  ^  Industry Dum m y + £y-
k = l m = l
The OLS 2(iii) model w ill em pirically test hypotheses HBL 3 and HBL 6:
8 8
Firm Performance^ = a + p^CHFOUD + p4SEPCEO + ^  Control Variables + Industry D um m y
k=i
+ 6j
Moreover, the OLS 2(iv) model w ill em pirically investigate hypothesis HBL 4:
8 8 
Firm Performance^ = a + PsCHNED +  ^  Control Variables +  ^  Industry Dum m y +
m = i
The OLS 2(v) model w ill em pirically exam ine hypotheses HBL 5 and HBL 6:
8 8
Firm Performance„• = a + P(,CHFAM + p 7SEPCEO + ^  Control Variables + ^  Industry D um m y
k =l  m=l
+ £j
Whilst the OLS 2(v i) m odel will evaluate hypothesis HBL 6:
8 8
Firm Performancen = a + pjSEPCEO + ^  Control Variables + ^  Industry D um m y + 8j
k = l m = l
The inclusion o f  foreign director (NFORS) as control variable in research model OLS 2 is 
motivated by the potential presence o f  foreign directors from countries with a strong corporate 
governance system , to add to the firm ’s governance practices, given  these foreign directors’ 
governance experience in their ow n country (see, for exam ple, O xelheim  and Randoy, 2003; 
Black et al., 2006). In addition, the appointment o f  foreign director(s) on the firm ’s board also 
signified foreign investors need to ensure that their substantial investm ents in the firm are being 
appropriately m anaged, especially in developing econom ies w hich are new to open markets 
system s (Ram aswam y and Li, 2001).
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As regards to the impact of board size on firm performance, Yermack (1996) found that a small 
board of directors facilitates communication amongst board members and hence decision­
making. His findings supports the contention by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) 
that large boards of directors may not be able to exchange ideas and opinions efficiently given 
the complexity of firms’ activities that they may have to evaluate within a specific period of 
time. On the other hand, the establishment of a large board of directors to accommodate the 
firm’s human capital needs for financial and non-financial knowledge and skills is imperative 
for effective board decision-making (see, for example, Beasley, 1996; Holland and Jackson, 
1998; Castanias and Helfat, 2001).
5.1.3 Board o f  Directors ' Competency and Firm Performance
One of the key responsibilities of a board of directors is to conduct appropriate oversight of a 
firm’s reporting practice, such that the production of the statutory report complies with the 
Securities Commission, Stock Exchange and related and relevant accounting standards and other 
legal requirements (see Beasley et al., 2000). Westphal and Zajac (1995) argued that an 
individual's educational level has influences on his/her ability to process complex information. 
According to the resource-dependency view, the appointment of outside directors establishes the 
firm's access to external resources, given such directors’ broad industry experience and/or 
connections in the external environment (sees for examples Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Boyd, 
1990; Abbott et al., 2004; Korand Mahoney, 2005; Kula, 2005).
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Lee et al., (1999) found the appointment of directors with a financial background, namely in 
commercial banking, insurance and investment management has an impact on the firm’s ease of 
access to financial markets. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) used the type of occupation of 
newly appointed directors to examine the CEO’s role in the director election process and its 
impact on firms’ cumulative abnormal return. They identified the potential for academics, 
lawyers, commercial bankers, investment bankers, professionals and consultants to be selected 
as CEO board of director nominees.
Knapp (1987) also reported that directors with managerial experience in public firms have 
greater awareness of accounting and reporting issues. Moreover, studies have indicated that a 
person's educational level has an impact on his/her ability to perform corporate innovations and 
strategic changes in the organisation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). In 
addition, Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Verschoor (1993) noted the significance of legal 
experts on the board of directors to provide advice and counsel on legal rules and regulatory 
requirements.
Investigation of the impact of board of directors’ competency on firm performance in this study 
is based on the following hypotheses:
HBKNOW 1: The proportion of board of directors with higher education will have an impact on 
firm performance.
HBKNOW 2: The proportion of directors with accounting, finance, law and chartered secretary 
knowledge and skills will have an impact on firm performance.
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Specifically, the explanatory variables for the board competency model are as follows:
(i) The proportion of directors with a Bachelor Degree (NDEG), Master Degree 
(NMASK), Professional qualification (NPROFL) and Doctorate (NPHD) and
(ii) The proportion of directors with accounting (NACTGK), finance (NFINK), business 
(NBUSK), law (NLAWK), executive management programme (NEXEPROG)31, and 
company secretary (NCHASEC) qualifications.
In particular, the research model OLS 3 is developed to empirically examine the respective
board of directors’ competency hypotheses. Accordingly, the OLS 3 (i) model will empirically
examine the relationship between board of directors’ educational level and firm performance:
Firm  P erform an ceti = a  + p ,N D E G  + p 2N M A S K  +  p 3N P R O F L  + p ^ P H D  +
9  8
y  Control Variables + ^  Industry Dummy + 8j
k  =  1 m = l
The control variables employed in the research model OLS 3 (i) are:
(i) Firm Size as measured by total asset (NASET),
(ii) Leverage as measured by the ratio of Total Debt to Firm Equity (NDEQ),
(iii) Proportion of family directors on the board (NFAMDI),
(iv) The proportion of independent directors on the board (NINED),
(v) The proportion of specific foreign directors (i.e. from European countries, the USA, 
Australia, New Zealand and Singapore)32 on the board (NFORS),
(vi) The percentage shareholdings of 5% and more by individuals and/or private 
companies (NINDPV), and institutional investors (i.e. government institution, public 
limited companies, unit trust and other private institutions) [NINSTL],
(vii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the firm’s external auditor is one of the big
5 audit firms (i.e. PwC, KPMG, Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen and Deloitte)
[AUF5],
31 For instance the executive programme organised by Harvard. Stanford. INSEAD and London Business Schools, etc. (see
Dionne and Triki. 2005).
32 These include, foreign directors from European countries (i.e. the UK. France. Germany. Denmark and Switzerland), the US.
Australia and Singapore in light o f  their corporate governance standard ranking [See Cornelius, 2005; FTSE. 2005].
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(viii) Size of board of directors (NBDSZ), and
(ix) Industry Dummy (INDS) which represents two categories. The first category is a 
dummy variable of 1 if the company is a Main Board or 0 if otherwise (MAINB). 
The second category represents the seven industries to which Main and Second 
Board firms belong, namely, trading and services (TRADG), plantation (PLANT), 
finance (FIN), construction (CONSTR), consumer products (CONPRO), property 
(PROP) and miscellaneous (MISCL) [i.e. which includes infrastructure project 
companies, the hotel industry, and mining]33.
Whilst, the OLS 3(ii) model will empirically test the relationship between board of directors’
areas of expertise and firm performance:
Firm  P erform an ceti =  a  +  P jN A C T G K  + p 2F IN K  + p sN B U S K  + P4N LAW K  + psN E X E P  +
5 8
peN C H A S E C  + Control Variables + Industry Dummy + £j
k = l  m = l
Respectively, OLS 3(ii) model is controlled by the following variables:
(i) Firm Size as measured by total asset (NASET),
(ii) Leverage as measured by the ratio of Total Debt to Firm Equity (NDEQ),
(iii) Proportion of family directors on the board (NFAMDI),
(iv) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the firm’s external auditor is one of the big
5 audit firms (i.e. PwC, KPMG, Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen and Deloitte)
[AUF5],
(v) Size of board of directors (NBDSZ), and
(vi) Industry Dummy (INDS) which represents two categories. The first category is a 
dummy variable of 1 if the company is a Main Board or 0 if otherwise (MAINB). 
The second category represents the seven industries to which Main and Second 
Board firms belong, namely, trading and services (TRADG), plantation (PLANT), 
finance (FIN), construction (CONSTR), consumer products (CONPRO), property
33 See ibid 27.
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(PROP) and miscellaneous (MISCL) [i.e. which includes infrastructure project 
companies, the hotel industry, and mining]34.
The employment of control variable of firm’s appointment of big 5 audit firms as external 
auditors (AUDF5) has been linked with a firm’s quality of financial reporting practice, auditing 
process and corporate governance implementation [see, for example, Beattie and Fearnley, 
(1995); Francis et al., (1999); Carcello et al., (2002); Maijoor and Vanstraelen, (2006)], and 
audit committee effectiveness (see, Carcello et al., 2000).
In particular, the quality and reliability of big 5 audit firms’ services [see McConnell, (1984); 
Eichenseher, and Shields, (1985)] has been reported to increase the audit committee’s support of 
auditors’ assessment of the firm’s financial circumstances (which will enhance auditors’ 
independence and effectiveness) and subsequently audit committee members’ influence on the 
board's assessment of the merits of management’s financial and strategic investment planning 
(see. Knapp, 1987). Further, according to Eichenseher and Shields (1985), the quality of the 
audit services of big 8 firms reduces potential litigation penalties made on firms.
5.2 Board Subcommittees and Firm Performance
The establishment of the audit committee, nomination committee and remuneration committee 
has been linked with the need to implement appropriate monitoring of a firm’s financial 
management and reporting practice (McDaniel et al., 2002), top management candidature 
selection (Dalton et al., 1998), and objective and fair assessment of executives’ compensation 
package and performance (Carson, 2002) respectively. The subcommittees’ specific functions
34 See ibid 27.
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represent the board’s critical oversight duties in the firm and will impact on the board’s 
evaluation of and decisions on issue relevant to them, i.e. the firm’s financial circumstances and 
board members’ and management’s contribution to firm activities and, hence, firm value 
creation (see Zahra and Pearce, 1989). McKinsey’s 2002 survey of global investor opinions on 
firm corporate governance practice found that, on average, investors were willing to pay a 12% 
premium on the share of firms which exhibited high governance standards.
According to Kirk and Siegel (1996) and Klein, (1998) the formation of the board 
subcommittees can assist in overcoming the information gap problem between managers and 
owners or owner-managers and minority shareholders (Haron et al., 2005). For instance, audit 
committee effectiveness in overseeing a firm’s financial reporting practice will have a 
subsequent impact on the supply of reliable and credible information to shareholders (Blue 
Ribbon Committee, 1999). Given executives’ control of internal information and their depth of 
knowledge of the firm’s industry and business, Ezammel and Watson (1998) argued that 
managers’ accountability to make decisions that are in the best interests of shareholders has to 
be monitored.
For instance, the managers’ lack of ownership of firm shares creates a conflict of interests 
between managers' and shareholders’ financial goals (see, Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Furthermore, managers have distinct firm internal information advantage in comparison to 
shareholders [see, Fama and Jensen, 1983 (a) and (b)]. In consideration of the asymmetry of 
information between owners and managers, Ezammel and Watson (1998) emphasised the 
importance of monitoring managers’ accountability in supplying appropriate and sufficient
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information about the firm’s activities. In particular, the transparency and quality of information 
supplied by managers will affect shareholders’ abilities to make informed economic decision­
making (see, Nowak and McCabe, 2003).
Notably, the effectiveness of the board’s sub-committees to perform their duties objectively and 
impartially is affected by their composition, structure and characteristics (see, for example, 
Greenbury’s Report, 1998; Abbott et al., 2000; Higgs Report 2003). For instance, Bedard et al. 
(2002) contended that an independent audit committee will strengthen the influence of 
independent director views and judgement as well as increase their active participation in 
management discussion. Further, the nomination committee’s selection of board candidates will 
also have an impact on board oversight performance (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1998).
In addition, an independent remuneration committee will facilitate objective evaluation of 
executive directors’ performance and compensation, given the level of firm performance 
achieved by them (Carson, 2002). It should also be mentioned that board members are paid an 
additional fee for being members of the board’s subcommittees as indicated in companies’ 
annual reports. The following sections will develop the research hypotheses and models for 
audit, nomination and remuneration committees.
5.2.1 Audit Committee Attributes and Firm Performance
In this section, three audit committee attributes, namely, independence, leadership and 
competency, are examined to develop their respective link with firm performance
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5.2.1.1 Audit Committee Independence and Firm Performance
As emphasised earlier in Chapter 3, subsection 3.6, and more specifically in subsection 3.6.1, 
the strength of audit committee members’ impartial views and judgement and attention to 
details, critical in overseeing a firm’s financial position, reporting and auditing practice, rely on 
the committee’s majority composition of independent outside directors (Abbott et al., 2000). 
Further, it has been argued that the presence of non-independent directors, such as top 
executives and their affiliates, may prevent committee members from easily and freely 
expressing their real concerns about current circumstances affecting the company (Bedard et al.,
2004). To ensure the quality, reliability and credibility of audit committee oversight 
performance, and vigilance regarding circumstances affecting shareholders’ interests, it has been 
highly recommended that the audit committee should comprise at least one member with an 
accounting and financial background (DeZoort, 1998), preferably an accounting practitioner. 
According to McMullen and Raghunandan (1996), the latter’s presence will ensure cognisant 
assessment of a firm’s financial reporting, accounting and auditing procedures.
In addition, MBSB Listing Rulings 2001, MCCG 2001 and the Smith Report 2003 (Para 3.10) 
emphasise the importance of an audit committee’s independent members convening at least one 
meeting in a year with the external auditor, without the presence of management representatives. 
This practice is encouraged to establish an objective and impartial assessment of the firm’s 
financial reporting practice, auditing process and financial position as well as increase auditor 
independence and hence effectiveness [see for instance, BRC (1999); Williams (2007)].
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Furthermore, in Para 15.17 of Chapter 15 of the MBSB Listing Rulings, the Stock Exchange 
requires audit committee members to report to the Exchange any company’s failure to resolve 
appropriately those issues that have been raised by the committee to the firm’s board, which has 
resulted in the company breaching the MBSB listing requirements. Further, the effectiveness 
and independence of the judgements of audit committee independent member(s) and the auditor 
will be enhanced if the two parties are able to conduct a meeting without the presence of 
executive members of the company (see Kirk and Siegel, 1996). In particular, Para 15.18(f) of 
Chapter 15 of the MBSB listing requirements and MCCG (2001: Best Practices Guide) 
stipulates such meetings as part of the rights of audit committee members. Hence, a company’s 
disclosure of its implementation of Para 15.17 and Para 15.18(f) in the audit committee report 
signifies its commitment to ensure orderly and independent reviews and judgements of its 
financial position, reporting and auditing practice.
To assess audit committee independence influence on firm performance, the following research 
hypotheses are proposed:
HACIND 1: The audit committee’s composition entirely of independent directors will have a 
positive impact on firm performance.
HACIND 2: The domination of an audit committee by independent directors will have a positive 
impact on firm performance.
HACIND 3: The audit committee’s majority composition of by independent directors will have 
a positive impact on firm performance.
HACIND 4: The presence of a senior independent director on the audit committee will have a 
positive impact on firm performance.
HACIND 5: The presence of at least one independent audit committee member with practising 
accountant experience will have a positive impact on firm performance.
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HACIND 6: The proportion of audit committee’s members with practising accountant 
experience will have a positive impact on firm performance.
HACIND 7: The presence of an audit committee chairman with practising accountant 
experience will have a positive impact on firm performance.
HACIND 8: The exclusion of Chief Executive Director, Chief Financial Officer and Managing 
Director from audit committee membership will have a positive impact on firm performance. 
HACIND 9: The presence of a family member director on the audit committee will have an 
impact on firm performance.
HACIND 10: The convening of audit committee meetings between the audit committee’s 
independent directors and the external auditor without the presence of executive members will 
have a positive impact on firm performance.
HACIND 11: The disclosure in the audit committee report of the committee’s authority to report 
firm violation of MBSB listing requirements35 will have an impact on firm performance.
Notably, the research model for HACIND 1 is developed by also examining the model with 
HACIND 4, 5, 7 and 10. In addition, the research models for HACIND 2 and 3 are similar to 
research model HACIND 1 and further investigate HACIND 8 and 9. Raghunandan et al., 
(2001) contended that the significance of the independence and effectiveness of an audit 
committee is enhanced with the appointment of at least one audit committee member with 
accounting and finance background. The establishment of an independent audit committee with 
relevant competency will enhance audit committee efficiency in performing auditing and 
internal control evaluation tasks.
35 Where the issues raised by the audit committee to the firm 's board have not been resolved satisfactorily, resulting in the firm 's 
breach o f  MBSB listing requirements.
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Explanatory variables for the audit committee independence model are represented by:
(i) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the audit committee is solely comprised of 
independent directors (AUDF),
(ii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the audit committee’s composition’s 
comprised of majority independent directors (AUGMJ),
(iii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the audit committee’s composition’s 
comprised of majority independent directors (AUDMJ),
(iv) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when there is a senior independent director on the 
audit committee (ACSIN),
(v) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when at least one of the audit committee’s 
independent members has accounting and/or financial knowledge and skills (ACPI),
(vi) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when at least one audit committee’s members has 
practising accountant experience (ACPACT),
(vii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the chairman of the audit committee has 
experience as a practising accountant (APACH),
(viii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the chief executive director, chief financial 
officer and/or managing director is not an audit committee member (AXCEO),
(ix) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when there is the presence of a family director on 
the audit committee (ACFAM),
(x) Binary' coding o f 1 or 0 otherwise when independent committee members convene at 
least one meeting with the external auditor without the presence of executive officers 
(MTEXT),
(xi) Binary' coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the firm has disclosed the right of the audit 
committee to report to the Stock Exchange any firm breaching Exchange and other 
regulatory rules (RBRE).
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Specifically, research model OLS 4 is proposed to represent the relationship between audit 
committee independence and firm performance. In particular, OLS 4(i) will empirically test the 
research hypotheses HACIND 1, 4, 5, 7, 10 and 11 respectively:
Firm P erform an ceti = a  +  poA U D F  +  p i  A C S  I N  + P 2A C P I  + P jA P A C H  + p 4M T E X T  + p sR B R E
7 8
+ y  Control Variables + y  Industry Dummy + Ej
k = l m=l
In addition, OLS 4(ii) will empirically investigate the research hypotheses HACIND 2, 4, 
5,6,7,8,9,10 and 11:
Firm  P erform an ceti =  a  + P oA U G M J +  p i  A C S  I N  +  P2ACPI +  pgA C P A C T  + P4APACH  +
P sA X C E O  + p<A C F A M  + p 7M T E X T  +  p gR B R E  +
4 8
y  Control Variables + Industry Dummy + Ej
k=l m=l
Further. OLS 4(iii) will empirically evaluate the hypotheses HACIND 3, 4, 5,6,7,8,9,10 and 11,
Firm  P erform an ceti =  a  +  p iA U D M J  +  p i  A C S  I N  + p 2A C P I  +  p$A C P A C T  +  P4APACH  +
P sA X C E O  +  pfyACFAM  + p 7M T E X T  + PgRBRE  +
4 8
y  Control Variables + y  Industry Dummy + Ej
k=l m=l
The audit committee independence model is controlled by the following variables:
(i) Firm Size as measured by total asset (NASET),
(ii) Leverage as measured by the ratio of Total Debt to Firm Equity (NDEQ),
(iii) Attendance rate of audit committee members at the committee’s meetings 
(NATEND),
(iv) The proportion of independent directors on the board (NINED),
(v) The proportion of family director members with accounting and finance knowledge
and skills (NFACF),
(vi) The proportion of independent directors with accounting and financial knowledge
and skill on the board (NINACF),
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(vii) The proportion of family members on the board (NFAMDI) and
(viii) Industry Dummy (INDS) which represents two categories. The first category is a
dummy variable of 1 if the company is a Main Board or 0 if otherwise (MAINB). 
The second category represents the seven industries to which Main and Second 
Board firms belong, namely, trading and services (TRADG), plantation (PLANT), 
finance (FIN), construction (CONSTR), consumer products (CONPRO), property
(PROP) and miscellaneous (MISCL) [i.e. which includes infrastructure project
companies, the hotel industry, and mining]36.
Specifically, control variables (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) and (viii) are employed in the 
OLS 4(i) model. On the other hand, OLS 4(ii) and OLS 4(iii) models are controlled by control 
variables (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)and (viii).
The attendance of audit committee members at committee meetings (NATEND) signifies their 
commitment to allocate significant time to audit committee oversight activities (PwC, 2003; 
Smith Report, 2003). However, to be effective, audit committee members need to perform their 
financial oversight duties with vigilance and diligence (see Bedard et al., 2004). In addition,
Klein [2002 (a)] argued that audit committee independence is affected by overall board
independence.
Moreover, the competency of family-member directors to manage the firm appropriately may 
have an impact on firm performance (see, for instance, Barney et al., 2001; MacAvoy and 
Millstein, 2002). Jensen and Fuller (2002) argue that the presence of at least one financial expert 
on the firm’s board is important to ensure appropriate board decisions on the financial position 
of the firm. Potentially, the appointment of family members with financial knowledge and skills
,t! See ibid 27.
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(NFACF) may enhance the board’s financial oversight judgement and shareholders’ best 
interests or’ on the contrary, increase the influence of family-member directors over the board’s 
strategic decisions. Considerably, such consequences would have an impact on audit 
committee’s decision-making since firm’s ultimate decisions are made at the board level (see 
Fama and Jensen, 1983 (a); Boone et al., 2007]
5.2.1.2 Audit Committee Leadership and Firm Performance
Malaysia Bourse Securities Limited (MBSB) in its listing requirements 2001 has made it 
mandatory for listed issuers to appoint an audit committee chairman from amongst its 
independent members. In particular, the Exchange’s rulings require the position of chairman of 
the audit committee to be held by an independent director so as to ensure proper conduct of 
committee meeting procedures and sufficient attention is directed to material issues (see Chapter 
15 of MBSB Listing Requirements, 2001). In addition, the role of audit committee chairman 
should include the appointment of audit committee members (see Para 3.3, Smith Report, 2003), 
and in setting the frequency and timing of the committee’s meetings (see Para 3.5, Smith Report, 
2003). Notably, the Smith Report 2003 emphasised the need for the audit committee chairman to 
commit a significant amount of time to perform audit committee duties (see Para 1.3 of Smith 
Report).
The Report also noted the importance of the audit committee chairman’s presence at the annual 
general meeting (AGM) of the company, particularly to clarify matters regarding the audit 
committee’s activities and performance of duties within the scope of its responsibilities during 
the financial year period (see Para. 6.3 of the Smith Report, 2003). Kirk and Siegel (1996) and
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Kirk (2000) also argue that, the audit committee chairman plays an important role in improving 
the communication gap between the board of directors and the auditor. Moreover, the audit 
committee's effectiveness will depend on members’, especially the committee chairman, regular 
and continuing communication with the firm’s key people involved in the firm’s governance, 
namely, the board’s chairman, external auditor lead partner, and internal auditor (Smith Report, 
2003: Para 3.9).
Moreover, the presence of audit committee members with an accounting and finance 
background has been linked with better performance of the audit committee’s financial oversight 
duties and judgements (DeZoort, 1998, and McDaniel et al., 2002). Also, the presence of audit 
committee members who possess corporate managerial experience has been linked with their 
increased participation in corporate oversight duties (Knapp, 1987).
Given the above-mentioned arguments, the following hypotheses relating to the impact of audit 
committee chairman attributes on firm performance are proposed:
HACL 1: The appointment of a senior independent director as chairman of the audit committee 
will have a positive impact on firm performance (ACHSIN),
HACL 2: The appointment of an audit committee chairman who possesses accounting and/or 
financial knowledge and skills will have a positive impact on firm performance (ACHACF), 
HACL 3: The appointment of an audit committee chairman who possesses business and 
management knowledge and skills37 will have an impact on firm performance (ACHBUS), 
HACL 4: The appointment of an audit committee chairman who has practising accountant 
experience will have a positive impact on firm performance (ACHP),
37 This includes an individual who has business and management related degrees, experience as a CEO. Chief Operating Officer. 
Chairman o f  other companies and/or is an executive o f  other companies (See Carcello et al.. 2006).
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HACL 5: The appointment of a senior independent director, who has practising accountant 
experience, as the audit committee chairman will have a positive impact on firm performance 
(ACHS1NP),
The explanatory variables for the testing of hypotheses and research models are represented by:
(i) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when a senior independent director is appointed as 
the committee’s chairman (ACHSIN),
(ii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the audit committee chairman possesses 
accounting and finance knowledge and skills (ACHACF),
(iii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the audit committee chairman possesses 
business and management knowledge and skills (ACHBUS),
(iv) Binary' coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the audit committee chairman possesses 
practising accountant experience (ACHP) and
(v) Binary' coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the committee is chaired by a senior 
independent director who has practising accountant experience (ACHSINP)
Accordingly, the control variables for the audit committee leadership research models are:
(i) Firm Size as measured by total asset (NASET),
(ii) Leverage as measured by the ratio of Total Debt to Firm Equity (NDEQ),
(iii) The presence of a family member director on the audit committee (ACFAM),
(iv) The proportion of family directors on the firm’s board (NFAMDI),
(v) The proportion o f independent directors with accounting and financial knowledge 
and skill on the board (INACF),
(vi) The proportion of audit committee members with practising accountant experience 
(NAPACT),
(vii) The proportion of independent directors on the board (NINED),
(viii) The appointment of an independent director as a board of director’s chairman 
(CHINED).
(ix) The percentage shareholdings of 5% and more by individuals and/or private 
companies (NINDPV) and institutional investors (i.e. government institution, public 
limited companies, unit trust and other private institutions) [NINSTL],
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(x) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the firm’s external auditor is one of the big 
5 audit firms (i.e. PwC, KPMG, Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen and Deloitte) 
[AUF5] and,
(xi) Industry Dummy (INDS) which represents two categories. The first category is a 
dummy variable of 1 if the company is a Main Board or 0 if otherwise (MAINB). 
The second category represents the seven industries to which Main and Second 
Board firms belong, namely, trading and services (TRADG), plantation (PLANT), 
finance (FIN), construction (CONSTR), consumer products (CONPRO), property 
(PROP) and miscellaneous (MISCL) [i.e. which includes infrastructure project 
companies, the hotel industry, and mining] .
Audit committee leadership hypotheses are empirically examined by the research model OLS 5.
In particular, the hypothesis HACL 1 will be empirically examined by OLS 5(i):
11 8
Firm  Perform anceti = a  + p jA C H S IN  + Control Variables + ^  Industry Dummy + Ej
k = l m=l
The OLS 5(ii) model will empirically investigate hypothesis HACL 2:
11 8
F irm  Perform anceti = a  + p jA C H A C F  + ^  Control Variables + Industry Dummy + Ej
k = l m=l
Whilst the OLS 5(iii) model will empirically examine hypothesis HACL 3:
11 8
Firm  Perform anceti — a  + p^A C H B U S  + ^  Control Variables+ ^  Industry Dummy + Ej
k = l m=l
The OLS 5(iv) model will empirically investigate hypothesis HACL 4:
I I  8
Firm  Perform anceti = a +  P 4A C H P  + £  Control Variables+ £  IndustrY Dummy + Ej
k = l m = l
38 See ibid 27.
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While the OLS 5(v) model will empirically evaluate hypothesis HACL 5:
11 8
Firm Performanceti = a +  fisACHSINP + ^  Control Variables + ]T Industry Dummy + Ej
k=l m=l
5.2.1.3 Audit Committee Competency and Firm Performance
The imperativeness of audit committee members possessing accounting and financial knowledge 
and skills has been linked with their significance in assisting committee members’ appropriate 
and effective performance of financial oversight duties, namely, the evaluation of the firm’s 
financial reporting and auditing process [see, for instance, Bonner and Lewis (1990); BRC 
(1999); Abbott et al. (2000) and (2004); Carcello et al., 2006]. Further, the possession of 
theoretical accounting knowledge without practical experience may not be as effective as 
possessing and acquiring both skills (McDaniel et al., 2002). Knapp (1987) showed, audit 
committee members’ managerial experience in public firms enhanced their knowledge of 
relevant accounting and reporting issues important for better management of public 
corporations.
In addition, Baysinger and Butler (1985) and DeZoort and Salterio (2001) indicated that the 
presence of legal experts on audit committees will add value to the committee’s comprehension 
of the implication and implementation of financial reporting rules and regulations. Moreover, 
the Higg Report (2003) recognised the positive impact of the knowledge and experience of the 
company secretary on a firm’s business procedures, operations and corporate governance. Such 
knowledge is particularly valuable to audit committee members for understanding a firm’s 
internal processes and accessing a firms’ internal information from the appropriate sources (see 
the Smith Report, 2003).
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In light of the above the following hypotheses are proposed to examine the impact of audit 
committee competency on firm performance:
HACKNOW 1: The proportion of audit committee members with accounting and finance 
knowledge and skills will have a positive impact on firm performance,
HACKNOW 2: The proportion of audit committee members with practising accountant
experience will have a positive impact on firm performance,
HACKNOW 3: The proportion of audit committee members with business and/or management 
experience will have an impact on firm performance39,
HACKNOW 4: The proportion of audit committee members with a law background will have an
impact on firm performance, and
HACKNOW 5: The proportion of audit committee members with company secretary experience 
will have an impact on firm performance.
The explanatory variables for the audit competency models are as follows,
(i) The proportion of audit committee members with accounting and/or finance
knowledge and skills (NAUACF),
(ii) The proportion of audit committee members with practising accountant experience 
(NAPACT),
(iii) The proportion of audit committee members with business and management
knowledge and skills (NACBUS),
(iv) The proportion of audit committee members with a law qualification (NACLAW), 
and
(v) The proportion of audit committee members with company secretary experience 
(NACSEC).
Further, the research model is controlled by the following variables:
(i) Firm Size as measured by total asset (NASET),
(ii) Leverage as measured by the ratio of Total Debt to Firm Equity (NDEQ),
39 This includes individuals who have a business and management related degree, experience as a CEO. Chief Operating Officer. 
Chairman o f  other companies and/or is an executive o f  other companies (see Carcello et al.. 2006).
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(iii) The proportion of board of director members with accounting knowledge and skills 
(NACTGK),
(iv) The proportion of board of director members with finance knowledge and skills
(NFINK),
(v) The proportion of family members on the board (NFAMDI),
(vi) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the firm’s external auditor is one of the big
5 audit firms (i.e. PwC, KPMG, Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen and Deloitte)
[AUF5],
(vii) Size of board of directors (NBDSZ), and
(viii) Industry Dummy (INDS) which represents two categories. The first category is a 
dummy variable of 1 if the company is a Main Board or 0 if otherwise (MAINB). 
The second category represents the seven industries to which Main and Second 
Board firms belong, namely, trading and services (TRADG), plantation (PLANT), 
finance (FIN), construction (CONSTR), consumer products (CONPRO), property 
(PROP) and miscellaneous (MISCL) [i.e. which includes infrastructure project 
companies, the hotel industry, and mining]40.
The research model OLS 6 will empirically examine hypotheses HACKNOW 1. 2, 3,4 and 5:
Firm  P erform an ceti = a  + fi,N A U A C F  + p 2N A P A C T  + p 3N A C B U S  + p 4N A C L A W  +
8 8
p sN A C S E C  + y  Control Variables + y  Industry Dummy + £ j
k =  l m = l
5.2.2 N om in a tion  C om m ittee  a n d  R em unera tion  C om m ittee
The formation of a nomination and remuneration committee is part of Corporate Governance 
Best Practices and a voluntary’ practice for Malaysian public listed corporations (see MCCG, 
2001; MBSB, 2001). However, companies need to disclose and give specific reasons for their 
non-compliance with best practices’ recommendations (see Para 15.26 of Malaysia Bourse 
Listing Rulings). To further enrich the study of the nomination committee’s impact on firm
40 See ib id  27
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performance, the research hypotheses are designed to examine the effect of the board 
subcommittee’s establishment and composition on firm performance.
5.2.2.1 Nomination Committee and Firm Performance
The formal establishment of a nomination committee in the firm has been linked with 
executives’ preference to nominate directors who are less inclined to monitor their activities 
(Jensen, 1993). However, the formation of a nomination committee should ensure 
implementation of an objective and impartial selection process of executives’ nominees (Vafeas, 
1999a). The committee’s duties extend to formally evaluating the performance of board 
members and hence their service period in the firm [see MCCG, (2001); Cheah, (2003); the 
Higgs Report (2003); Mehrotra, (2003)], and establishing an organised and systematic search for 
knowledgeable and experienced independent directors (Gregory, 2001).
With regard to the nomination committee composition and leadership, both MCCG (2001) and 
the Higg Report 2003 recommend a high independent directors’ presence and the appointment 
of an independent nomination committee chairman. According to Vicknair et al., (1993), the 
nomination committee’s independent composition and leadership will reduce management’s 
inherent domination of and influence over the selection process of directors. Moreover, the 
independence of the nomination committee has an impact on its assessment of the firm’s 
governance procedures, emphasising the importance of independent directors’ representation on 
the board (Andrew, 1987). Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) also observed a relationship between 
the announcement of independent director appointments and significantly low stock price 
movement when the CEO is one of the members of the nomination committee. Tejada (1997)
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also showed that the presence of a top executive on the nomination committee may affect 
outside directors’ choice of nominees to the board of directors, given executives’ influence over 
their future employment opportunities.
To assess the implications of nomination committee establishment and attributes on firm 
performance, the following research hypotheses are proposed:
HNC 1: The establishment of a nomination committee in the firm will have a positive impact on 
firm performance,
HNC 2: The proportion of independent directors on the nomination committee will have a 
positive impact on firm performance,
HNC 3: The presence of senior independent directors on the nomination committee will have an 
impact on firm performance,
HNC 4: The presence of a family member(s) on the nomination committee will have an impact 
on firm performance,
HNC 5: The exclusion of the CEO, CFO or Managing Director from nomination committee 
membership will have a positive impact on firm performance,
HNC 6: The chairing of the nomination committee by an independent director will have a 
positive impact on firm performance,
HNC 7: The chairing of the nomination committee by a senior independent director will have an 
impact on firm performance.
Specifically, the explanatory variable for the nomination committee establishment model is 
represented by a binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the firm has established such 
committee (NCEXIST). This research model also investigated the presence of the following 
corporate governance variables:
(i) Proportion of independent directors on the board (NINED),
(ii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when there is a senior independent director on the 
board (SRINED),
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(iii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the CEO or Managing Director is not a board 
member (EXCEO),
(iv) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when an independent director has chaired the 
board of directors (CHINED),
(v) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the founder was a board member (FOUD),
(vi) The proportion of family members on the board (NFAMDI).
The following control variables will also be employed in the nomination committee 
establishment research model,
(i) Firm size as measured by total assets (NASET),
(ii) Leverage as measured by the ratio of Total Debt to Firm Equity (NDEQ),
(iii) The proportion of specific foreign directors (i.e. from European countries, the USA, 
Australia, New Zealand and Singapore)41 on the board (NFORS),
(iv) The percentage shareholdings of 5% and more by individuals and/or private 
companies (NINDPV) and institutional investors (i.e. government institution, public 
limited companies, unit trust and other private institutions) [NINSTL],
(v) Size of board of directors (NBDSZ) and
(vi) Industry Dummy (INDS) which represents two categories. The first category is a
dummy variable of 1 if the company is a Main Board or 0 if otherwise (MAINB).
The second category represents the seven industries to which Main and Second
Board firms belong, namely, trading and services (TRADG), plantation (PLANT), 
finance (FIN), construction (CONSTR), consumer products (CONPRO), property 
(PROP) and miscellaneous (MISCL) [i.e. which includes infrastructure project 
companies, the hotel industry, and mining]42.
41 This represents foreign directors from European countries (i.e. the UK. France. Germany, Denmark and Switzerland), the US. 
Australia and Singapore in consideration o f  their corporate governance standard ranking [see Cornelius. 2005; FTSE. 2005].
4; See ibid 27.
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The testing of HNC 1 on the impact regarding nomination committee establishment on firm 
performance will be empirically examined by the research model OLS 7 as follows:
Firm  P erform ance ti = a  +  fioN C E X IST  +  fijN IN E D  + JS2SRINED + f i3E X C E O  +  f i4CH IN ED  +
6 8 
fisF O U D  +  fieN F A M D I + ^C on tro l Variables + ^  Industry Dummy
k =1 in = 1
+ Sj
For testing of HNC 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, the following represent the explanatory variables for the 
nomination committee attributes research model:
(i) Proportion of independent directors on the nomination committee (NCINED),
(ii) Binary' coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the senior independent director is a
nomination committee member (NCSINED),
(iii) Proportion of family member directors on the nomination committee (NCFAM),
(iv) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the CEO, CFO or Managing Director is not a
nomination committee member (NCEXCEO),
(v) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the nomination committee is chaired by an 
independent director (NCHINED),
In addition, the following corporate governance variables are included in the research model, 
namely, the:
(i) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the CEO or Managing Director is not a board
member (EXCEO)
(ii) The proportion of family members on the board (NFAMDI)
Furthermore, the nomination committee attributes model is controlled by:
(i) Firm size as measured by total assets (NASET),
(ii) Leverage as measured by the ratio of Total Debt to Firm Equity (NDEQ),
(iii) The percentage shareholdings of 5% and more by individuals and/or private
companies (NINDPV) and institutional investors (i.e. government institution, public 
limited companies, unit trust and other private institutions) [NINSTL],
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(iv) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the firm’s external auditor is one of the big 
5 audit firms (i.e. PwC, KPMG, Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen and Deloitte) 
[AUF5],
(v) Size of board of directors (NBDSZ) and
(vi) Industry Dummy (INDS) which represents two categories. The first category is a 
dummy variable of 1 if the company is a Main Board or 0 if otherwise (MAINB). 
The second category represents the seven industries to which Main and Second 
Board firms belong, namely, trading and services (TRADG), plantation (PLANT), 
finance (FIN), construction (CONSTR), consumer products (CONPRO), property 
(PROP) and miscellaneous (MISCL) [i.e. which includes infrastructure project 
companies, the hotel industry, and mining]43.
Accordingly, the following research model OLS 8 will empirically investigate the impact of 
nomination committee independence and structure on firm performance,
Firm  P erform ance*  = a  + fioN C IN E D  +  fijN C S IN E D  +  f i2N C F A M  + f i3N C E X C E O  +
4N C H IN E D  +  fisE X C E O  + fieN F A M D I  + Control Variables +
k=i
8
7  Industry Dummy + Ej
m = 1
5.2.2.2 Remuneration Committee and Firm Performance
The importance of formally establishing a remuneration committee in the firm has been 
emphasised by the Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995), MCCG (2001) and the 
Higg Report (2003). Its formation ensures formal and transparent procedures are carried out 
when evaluating executive performance and remuneration policies. The committee’s duties 
include assessing the contract of employment of senior executives (Carson, 2002). The 
efficiency of the remuneration committee, namely, its awareness of factors that may have
43 See ibid 27.
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affected the fair evaluation of executives’ compensation is important. According to (Duru et al., 
2002), the appropriate adjustment of CEO compensation from income decreasing effect (i.e. 
value enhancement strategic expenditure) to value increasing activities, such as research and 
development expenditure, provides an efficient contract between the firm’s owners and agents.
Yermack (1997) posited that the lack of proper monitoring and control of executives’ 
compensation scheme may increase executive officers’ alliance with the CEO in setting high 
compensation for executives. In addition, executives have been found receiving higher 
compensation not matched with higher firm profitability but rather due to inflation, staff 
redundancy and pay reduction (Greenbury, 1995). Notably, the Cadbury Report (1998), 
recommended the establishment of an independent remuneration committee and the appointment 
of a non-executive director as the committee’s chairman. Consistently, Vafeas (2000) has argued 
that the inherent conflict of interest between shareholders and managers justifies the 
establishment of an independent remuneration committee for better protection of shareholders’ 
investments. Further, Gregory (2001) noted management’s tendency to reward themselves 
excessively.
In consideration of the above arguments, the following research hypotheses relating to the 
remuneration committee’s impact on firm performance are proposed.
HRC 1: The establishment of a remuneration committee in the firm will have a positive impact 
on firm performance,
HRC 2: The proportion of independent directors on the remuneration committee will have a 
positive impact on firm performance,
HRC 3: The presence of senior independent directors on the remuneration committee will have 
an impact on firm performance,
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HRC 4: The presence of family member(s) on the remuneration committee will have an impact 
on firm performance,
HRC 5: The exclusion of the CEO, CFO or Managing Director from remuneration committee 
membership will have a positive impact on firm performance,
HRC 6: The chairing of the remuneration committee by an independent director will have a 
positive impact on firm performance,
HRC 7: The chairing of the remuneration committee by a senior independent director will have 
an impact on firm performance.
In particular, the explanatory variable for the remuneration committee establishment model is a 
binary' coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the firm has established the committee (RCEXIST). 
Further, this research model investigates the presence of the following corporate governance 
variables:
(i) Proportion of independent directors on the board (NINED),
(ii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when there is a senior independent director on the
board (SRINED),
(iii) Binary' coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the CEO or Managing Director is not a board 
member (EXCEO),
(iv) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when independent director chaired the board of 
directors (CHINED),
(v) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the founder is a board member (FOUD),
(vi) The proportion of family members on the board (NFAMDI)
In addition, the following control variables will be employed in the remuneration committee 
existence research model:
(i) Firm size as measured by total assets (NASET),
(ii) Leverage as measured by the ratio of Total Debt to Firm Equity (NDEQ),
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(iii) The proportion of specific foreign directors (i.e. from European countries, the USA, 
Australia, New Zealand and Singapore)44 on the board (NFORS),
(iv) The percentage shareholdings of 5% and more by individuals and/or private 
companies (NINDPV) and institutional investors (i.e. government institution, public 
limited companies, unit trust and other private institutions) [NINSTL],
(v) Size of board of directors (NBDSZ) and
(vi) Industry Dummy (INDS) which represents two categories. The first category is a 
dummy variable of 1 if the company is a Main Board or 0 if otherwise (MAINB).
The second category represents the seven industries to which Main and Second 
Board firms belong, namely, trading and services (TRADG), plantation (PLANT), 
finance (FIN), construction (CONSTR), consumer products (CONPRO), property 
(PROP) and miscellaneous (MISCL) [i.e. which includes infrastructure project 
companies, the hotel industry, and mining]43.
The testing of HRC 1 regarding the impact of remuneration committee establishment on firm 
performance is empirically examined by the research model OLS 9 and is represented as 
follows:
Firm  P erform an ceti = a  +  fioR C E X IS T  +  fijN IN E D  +  J t^ R IN E D  +  f i3E X C E O  + f i4CH IN E D  +
6 8
fisFOUD + fifJXFAMDI + ^  Control Variables + Industry Dummy + 8j
k=l m=l
With respect to the testing of HRC 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, the following represent the explanatory 
variables of the remuneration committee attributes research model:
(i) Proportion of independent directors on the remuneration committee (RCINED),
(ii) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the senior independent director is a 
remuneration committee member (RCSINED)
(iii) Proportion of family member directors on the remuneration committee (RCFAM),
44 This represents foreign directors from European countries (i.e. the UK. France. Germany. Denmark and Switzerland), the US. 
Australia and Singapore in consideration o f their corporate governance standard ranking [see Cornelius. 2005: FTSE. 2005 ].
45 See ibid 27.
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(iv) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the CEO, CFO or Managing Director is not a 
remuneration committee member (RCEXCEO),
(v) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the remuneration committee is chaired by an
independent director (RCHINED),
The following corporate governance variables are added in the research model:
(i) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the CEO or Managing Director is not a board
member (EXCEO)
(ii) The proportion of family members on the board (NFAMDI)
Respectively, the following control variables are applied in the remuneration committee 
attributes model:
(vii) Firm size as measured by total assets (NASET),
(viii) Leverage as measured by the ratio of Total Debt to Firm Equity (NDEQ),
(ix) The percentage shareholdings of 5% and more by individuals and/or private 
companies (NINDPV) and institutional investors (i.e. government institution, public 
limited companies, unit trust and other private institutions) [NINSTL],
(x) Binary coding of 1 or 0 otherwise when the firm’s external auditor is one of the big
5 audit firms (i.e. PwC, KPMG, Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen and Deloitte) 
[AUF5],
(xi) Size of board of directors (NBDSZ) and
(xii) Industry Dummy (INDS) which represents two categories. The first category is a 
dummy variable of 1 if the company is a Main Board or 0 if otherwise (MAINB).
The second category represents the seven industries to which Main and Second
Board firms belong, namely, trading and services (TRADG), plantation (PLANT), 
finance (FIN), construction (CONSTR), consumer products (CONPRO), property 
(PROP) and miscellaneous (MISCL) [i.e. which includes infrastructure project 
companies, the hotel industry, and mining]46.
46 See ibid 27.
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Accordingly, the following research model OLS 10 will empirically investigate the impact of 
nomination committee independence and structure on firm performance:
F irm  P erform anceti = a  + fioN CIN E D  + JijN C SIN E D  + f i2N C F A M  + fi3N C E X C E O  +
f i4N C H IN E D  + fisN C H SIN E D  + f i  J O I N E D  +
8
y  Industry Dummy + £j
m - 1
5.3 Measures of Financial Performance
In measuring a firm’s financial performance, numerous researchers have adopted either market- 
value measures or accounting-based measures or both of these measures. Market-value 
indicators, such as share price, market capitalisation, Tobin’s Q, estimated abnormal returns, and 
changes and growth, provide the current value of the company’s assets. Studying the effect of 
companies' announcements on the appointment of outside directors, Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) reported a positive influence on firms’ share prices. In their study of the impact of 
takeovers on firm performance, Cotter et al., (1997) noted shareholders will be compensated 
highly when firms’ boards of directors comprise a majority of shareholders. In addition, the 
share price of those companies exercising the poison pill option do not plummet when a 
majority of outside directors are present on the board as their actions are perceived as important 
in protecting investors’ interests (Brickley et al., 1994).
Accounting-based measures of performance, namely, profitability ratios, such as return on 
investment, return on assets and return on equity, profit margin liquidity ratios, such as acid test 
ratios and gearing ratios, such as debt to total equity and debt, are historical in value. However, 
many studies such as Allen and Panian, 1982; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Rechner and Dalton,
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1991; Tosi, Jr. and Gomez-Meija, 1994; Hutchinson and Gul, 2003; 0xelheim and Randoy, 
2003 have employed financial ratios as measures of firm performance in their corporate 
governance studies
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) used earning before interest and tax (EBIT) and stock return to 
measure the impact of board of directors5 composition on firm performance. MacAvoy and 
Millstein (1999) found accounting-based measures of performance to be positively linked to 
board independence. On the other hand, the use of return on assets and sales as a performance 
measure to identify the effect of companies5 employing a majority of independent directors has 
not resulted in statistically significant results (Fosberg, 1989). Nevertheless, according to 
Chakravarthy (1986) these measures are useful in evaluating firms past performance and 
historical trends.
The use of Tobin's Q as a stock market-based measure of firm-level economic performance is 
widespread [for instance, Montgomery and Wemerfelt, (1988); Yermack, (1996); Himmelberg 
et al.. (1999); Kapper and Love, (2004); Kor and Mahoney, (2005)]. In particular, the Q ratio 
explains the extent to which a firm's creation of economic value can be attributed to 
shareholders5 returns. As the value of its numerator variables denotes the market value of the 
firm, a value of Q more than 1 indicates shareholders' gains with respect to the investment 
decisions implemented by the firm over the designated financial period. The market value 
corresponds to market expectations about the future growth and profitability potential of the 
company (Montgomery and Wemerfelt, 1988).
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Notably accounting-based measures of performance have been criticised for their lack of 
recognition of differences in firms’ systematic risks across different industries (Wemerfelt and 
Montgomery, 1988). However, Baysinger and Butler (1985) argued that, the use of financial 
ratios is appropriate because of their proximity to shareholders’ returns and their frequent use in 
cross-sectional analysis. To some extent, accounting-based measures provide a reasonable 
quantification of shareholders’ returns to firms across different industries. Averaging individual 
firms’ financial ratio with the industry ratio normalises any spurious industry effects as well as 
secular trends and the influence of business cycles (Baysinger and Butler, 1985).
Market based measures such as Tobin’s Q provide an estimation of equilibrium return such that 
it implicitly encapsulates the risk-adjusted discount rate and hence minimises disparity due to 
tax laws and accounting convention (Wemerfelt and Montgomery, 1988). On the other hand, 
Dahya and Powell (1998) contend that there are other factors such as industry and economic 
circumstances that may affect the value of the firm rather than managers’ actions.
In addition, according to Chan et al., (2006), the firm’s generation of sales further indicates the 
performance of its business. Shivdasani (1993) has also examined the growth rate of a firm’s 
sales to measure board composition influence on the firm performance. Further Drobetz et al., 
(2004) examined the impact of corporate governance rating on the firm’s earnings, investment 
and sales growth.
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5.4 Summary of the Research Hypotheses and Models
As detailed in the previous section, there are ten Ordinary Least Square models examined in this 
research. The following Table 5.1 lists the study’s research models, which examine the impact 
of the board of directors’ and board subcommittees’ attributes on firm performance, 
respectively.
Table 5.1: Board of Directors’ and Board Subcommittees’ Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
Research Models
O L S Models Research Focus
Board o f  Director Attributes and Firm Performance
OLS 1 
OLS 2 
OLS 3
Audit Committee Attribute
BOD Independence and Firm Performance 
BOD Leadership and Firm Performance 
BOD Qualifications and Firm Performance 
s and Firm Performance
OLS 4 
OLS 5 
OLS 6
Nomination Committee Es
AC Independence and Firm Performance 
AC Leadership and Firm Performance 
AC Qualifications and Firm Performance 
tablishment and Attributes and Firm Performance
OLS 7 
OLS 8 
Remuneration Committee
NC Establishment and Firm Performance 
NC Characteristics and Firm Performance 
Establishment and Attributes and Firm Performance
OLS 9 
OLS 10
RC Establishment and Firm Performance 
RC Characteristics and Firm Performance
(Sote: BOD = Board o f  Directors; A C  =  Audit Committee; A 'C = Somination Committee: RC = Remuneration Committee)
The following Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 present a summary of the research hypotheses pertaining 
to the impact of board of directors’ attributes on firm performance, audit committee attributes on 
firm performance, and nomination and remuneration committees’ attributes on firm 
performance, respectively.
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Table 5.2: Summary of the Research Hypotheses Regarding the Impact of Board of Directors’ Attributes on Firm Performance
HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE IMPACT OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ ATTRIBUTES ON FIRM PERFORMANCE
Board o f  Directors’ Independence 
(OLS 1)
Board o f  Directors’ Leadership 
(OLS 2)
Board o f  Directors’ Competency 
(OLS 3)
H ypothesis H B IN D
Postulated
Relationship
(+ /- /? )
H ypothesis IIBL
Postulated
Relationship
(+ /- /? )
H ypothesis H B K N O W
Postulated
Relationship
(+ /- /? )
H B IN D  1: Proportion of IN ED s 
(N IN ED ) +
HBL 1: Appointment of IN E D  as Board’s 
Chairman (CHINED)
+
H B K N O W  1: BOD Higher Level of 
Education (i.e. NDEG, NMASK, 
NPROFL, NPH D )
+
H B IN D  2: Domination of IN ED s  
(DO INED) +
I IBL 2: Appointment of SR IN E D  as Board’s 
Chairman (CHSINED)
+
H B K N O W  2: BOD Areas of Expertise (i.e. 
NACTGK, NFINK, NBUSK, 
NLAWK, NEXEPROG, NCHASEC)
+
H B IN D  3: Domination of IN E D s and 
N E D s (DONEDI)
p H BL 3: Appointment of FOUD as Board's 
Chairman (CHFOUND)
?
H B IN D  4: Proportion of IN ED s with 
A C F  (INACF) +
HBL 4: Appointment of N E D  as Board’s 
Chairman (CHNED) ?
H B IN D  5: Presence of SRINED p H BL 5: Appointment of F A M D I as Board’s Chairman (CHFAM) ?
H B IN D  6: Exclusion of CEO, CFO, 
COO and M D (EXCEO)
+ H BL 6: Separate Appointment of CEO and 
Board’s Chairman (SEPCEO) +
H B IN D  7: Presence of Independent 
Board Chairman (CHINED) +
H B IN D  8: Presence of FOUD e
H B IN D  9 : Proportion of FAMDIs 
(NFAMDI)
P
H B IN D  10: Proportion of IN E D s’ 
shares ownership (NINSDG) +
Notes: INED =  Independent Director: NED -- Non Executive Director: ACE ~ Accounting and Finance Knowledge and Skills, SRI NED - Senior INED: CEO = Chief Executive Director: CFO = Chief 
Financial Officer: COO - Chief Operating Officer: MD ~ Managing Director: FOUD ~ Founder: FAMDI ^Family-Member Director: BOD =  Board o f  Director: +  =  positive relationship: -  =  
negative relationship: ? 1 relationship to be identified
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Table 5.3: Summary of the Research Hypotheses Regarding the Impact of Audit Committee's Attributes on Firm Performance
HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE IMPACT OF AUDIT COMMITTEE'S a t t r i b u t e s  o n  f i r m  p e r f o r m a n c e
A udit Committee's Independence 
(OLS 4)
Audit Committee's Leadership 
(OLS 5)
Audit Committee's Competency 
(OLS 6)
H ypothesis H A C IN D  
IN E D s
Postulated
Relationship
(+ /- /? )
I Iypothcsis IIA C L
Postulated
Relationship
(+ /- /? )
H ypothesis H A C K N O W
Postulated
Relationship
(+ /- /? )
H A C IN D  1: A C 's composition wholly IN ED s (AUDF) + I IACL 1: Chairing of A C  by SR IN E D  (ACHSIN)
+
H A C K N O W  1: Proportion of A C  
members with A C F  background 
(NAUACF)
+
H A C IN D  2: Domination of IN ED s in A C  composition 
(AUGMJ) +
I IACL 2: Chairing of A C  by IN  ED  
with A C F  background (ACHACF)
+ H A C K N O W  2: Proportion of A C  
members with P A E  (NAPACT) +
H A C IN D  3: Majority of IN E D s in A C  composition 
(AUDMJ) +
HA CL 3: Chairing of A C  by I N E D  
with business/  management related 
background (ACHBUS)
?
H A C K N O W  3: Proportion of A C  
members with business/  management 
related background (NACBUS)
p
H A C IN D  4: Presence o fSRIN ED s in A C  (ACSIN) + I IACL 4: Chairing of A C  by IN  ED  
with P A E  (ACHP) +
H A C K N O W  4: Proportion of A C  
members with law background 
(NAC LAW)
?
H A C IN D  5: Presence of at least one independent A C  member 
with P A E  (ACPI) +
II ACL 5: Chairing of A C  by SR IN E D  
with P A E  (ACHSINP)  ' +
H A C K N O W  5: Proportion of A C  
members with company secretary 
experience (NACSEC)
?
H A C IN D  6: Presence of at least one A C ’s members with P A E  
(ACPACT) +
H A C IN D  7: Presence of A C ’s Chairman with P A E  
(APACH) +
H A C IN D  8: Exclusion of CEO , CEO and M D  from A C  
(AXCEO) +
H A C IN D  9: Presence of FAM D I in A C  (ACFAM) p
H A C IN D  10: A C ’s Independent Director Conduct a meeting 
with auditors without management presence (M TEXT) +
H A C IN D  11: Transparency of A C  Authority to Report to 
Exchange of Firm \ /iolation of Regulations (RBRE)
p
AC  =  Audit Committee: INED -  Independent Director: PAE -■ Practising Accountant Experience: SRINED ~ Senior Independent Director: CEO =  Chief Executive Director: CFO =  Chief Financial Officer. COO = 
Chief Operating Officer: MD  ^ Managing Director: FAMDI - Family-Member Director: -i =  positive relationship: - ~ negative relationship: ? =  relationship to be identified
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Table 5.4: Summary of the Research Hypotheses Regarding the Impact of Nomination and Remuneration Committees’ Attributes 
on Firm Performance
H ypothesis H N C  (OLS 7)
Postulated
Relationship
(+/•/?)
H ypothesis H RC (OLS 9 )
Postulated
Relationship
(+/V?)
H N C  1: The establishment of nomination committee in the firm 
(NCEXIST) +
1 IRC 1: The establishment of remuneration committee in the firm 
(RCEXIST) +
H ypothesis H N C  (OLS 8)
Postulated
Relationship
(+/-/?)
H ypothesis H RC (OLS 10)
Postulated
Relationship
(+/-/?)
H N C  2: The proportion of IN E D s on N C  (NCINED) + H RC 2: The proportion of IN ED s on RC (RCINED) +
H N C  3: The presence of SRIN ED s on N C  (NCSINED) ? H RC 3: The presence of SRIN ED s on RC (RCSINED) +
H N C  4: The presence oj EAM DIs on NC (NCFAM) p H RC 4: The presence ofFAM DIs on RC (RCFAM) ?
H N C  5: The exclusion of CEO, CFO and M D from N C  membership 
(NCEXCEO)
+ H RC 5: The exclusion of CEO, CFO and M D  from R C  membership 
(RCEXCEO)
+
H N C  6: The chairing o fN C  by a IN E D  (NCH INED ) + H RC 6: The chairing o fRC  by a IN E D  (RCHIMED) +
H N C  7: The chairing o fN C  by a SR IN E D  (NCHSINED) + H RC  7: The chairing o fRC  by a S R IN E D  (RCHSINED) +
INED - Independent Director; NC - Nomination Committee: RC Remuneration Committee; SRINED -  Senior Independent Director; FAMDI =  Family-Member Director: CEO = Chief Executive 
Director; CFO =  Chief Financial Officer; MD -  Managing Director; t positive relationship; -  = negative relationship; ? =  relationship to be identified
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5.5 Conclusion
Chapter 5 has described the development of research hypotheses and models to examine the 
impact of board of directors’ and board subcommittees’ attributes on firm performance. As 
presented in Table 5.1 above, ten research questions have been developed to study the corporate 
governance practices of Malaysian firms. In addition the chapter also provides reviews on the 
types of firm performance measures used by researchers when examining the impact of firm 
corporate governance practices on firm performance. The next chapter will elaborate further 
upon the source of the data of the research models.
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-(Research (Design and MetfwdoCogy^
6.0 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explain and justify the methodology adopted in this research to 
support the validity and reliability of its findings. The research hypotheses were tested using 
secondary data published in the 2002 and 2003 annual reports of Main Board and Second Board 
companies of Malaysia Bourse47. From annual reports, information was extracted relating to 
firms' board of directors’ personal details and activities, board’s sub-committees’ related 
information , other relevant corporate governance information, other accounting data and firm’s 
shares ownership. Financial data relating to firms’ performance (namely earnings, market value, 
share price, sales and financial ratio), capital structure and size (i.e. shareholders’ equity, total 
debts ratio, assets) and other accounting data were obtained from the Datastream and OSIRIS 
database to ensure consistency of figures. The chapter also discusses the computation, 
descriptive statistics and data screening of the dependent, independent and control variables of 
the research models. The chapter proceeds with the discussion of the research data analysis 
technique, multiple regression analysis, in relation to their assumptions and implementation for 
hypothesis testing.
6.1 Cross-Sectional Research Approach
The study adopted a cross-sectional research approach to examine the relationship between 
corporate governance variables and firm value. Furthermore, the research approach was 
considered appropriate to be implemented on a reasonably detailed examination of the impact of
4 A t the  tim e  th e  data  w as co llec ted  th e  S tock E xchange nam e w as K uala  L u m p u r S tock  E xchange (K L SE)
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firms’ implementation of Principles and Best Practices of the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) 2001 and correspondingly MBSB Listing Rulings 2001 on corporate 
governance. In particular, the current study concentrates on MCCG and MBSB corporate 
governance listing requirements pertaining to board of directors’ and board subcommittees’ 
corporate governance practice. Prior to the enactment of the Revamped Listing Rulings in 
January, 2001, information about boards of directors’ members, such as their age, relationship 
with family members, independence status and educational background, was not publicly 
disclosed in the company pro-forma report.
Moreover, due to the relatively recent introduction of the MCCG 2001 and MBSB Listing 
Rulings 2001, listed companies have been in an ‘adjustment period’ in their adoption of the 
additional corporate governance disclosure and transparency requirements. Further, listed 
companies are allowed to use their discretion in deciding the format and contents of their 
disclosure to comply with Parts I and II of the Principles of Corporate Governance and Best 
Practices (Task Force on Internal Control, 2000: Para 8). Hence, it was considered useful to 
examine empirically their perspectives on the importance of and the extent of their commitment 
to complying with and enforcing the Principles of the Code of Corporate Governance and Code 
of Best Practices.
The current research has not used questionnaires surveys and interviews as part of its data 
collection method since it was felt that the deployment of the secondary data would be 
appropriate (see also section 6.4) and sufficient to provide systematic and extensive empirical 
examination to fulfil the designated research questions and objectives of the study as identified
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in Chapter 1 (Section 1.2 and 1.3) on the impact of board of directors’ and board committees’ 
attributes on firm performance. In addition, the current research models (see research models in 
Chapter 5) distinctively accounted for the direct impact of board committees’ attributes on firm 
performance (see Chapter 5, section 5.2). Furthermore, recent studies on corporate governance 
practice of Malaysian listed companies by KLSE and PwC (2002) and PwC (2005) had been 
comprehensively conducted using questionnaires survey. Moreover, the designated empirical 
study research approach accommodate investigation of Malaysian firms corporate governance 
practices for more than one year period and prospectively more companies can be researched as 
required data is gathered by the researcher rather than depending on companies responses of the 
questionnaires survey48. Respectively, the sample size of firms in this study represents almost 
50% of designated population of listed firms in Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (see further 
Section 6.3.1).
To date, the empirical studies conducted by Abdullah (2004) and Chang Aik Leng and Abu 
Mansor (2005) on the link between Malaysian listed firms’ corporate governance practice and 
their firm performance have examined the set-up in year 2001 and earlier. Much more, the 
corporate governance surveys undertaken by KLSE and PwC (2002) and PwC (2004) gathered 
wide-ranging corporate governance information notably encompassing the responses of 
members of Board of Directors, public listed companies, independent directors and institutional 
groups) on Malaysian listed firms corporate governance practice in general and in particular 
their implementation of MCCG (2001). Given the significance of continuous study on this 
subject, it was felt appropriate to utilise the respective information gathered by KLSE and 
PwCs’ surveys (amongst others) by undertaking empirical study that extends the period of
48 K L SE  and Pw C  (2 0 0 2 :1 5 ) repo rted  the  average  level o f  postal survey  response  rate for M alaysia  is 15%.
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observation of previous studies and hence providing ongoing evidence on the impact of 
Malaysian firms internal corporate governance practices on firm performance. Furthermore, the 
designation of the current study will hopefully assist in fulfilling the aim of the Malaysia 
Securities Commission and Malaysia Bourse of Securities Limited to ensure commitment 
amongst listed companies in Malaysia to enhance their corporate governance conduct 
responsibly.
6.2 Data Description
As mentioned earlier, the research examined the relationship between the internal governance of 
Main Board and Second Board companies in the MBSB49 and firm performance. The two 
boards are differentiated by their minimum required paid-up capital. Specifically, Main Board 
companies are those firms with a minimum paid up capital of Malaysian Ringgit (RM) 60 
million (or USD 16.82 million)50 of RM1.00 ordinary shares, whilst Second Board firms' 
minimum paid up capital is RM 40 million (or USD11.21 million)51 of RM 1.00 ordinary shares 
(see paragraph 3.04, Chapter 3 of MBSB Listing Requirements 2001).
Specifically, the research focused on listed companies’ board of directors’ and board 
subcommittees’ governance practices as recommended by the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance (see MICG, 2001) and MBSB Listing Requirements 2001. The latter’s corporate 
governance requirements were first adopted by listed companies with June 2001 or later months 
financial year end. The aforementioned requirements require companies to implement the
49 Starting from 20th o f April 2004 KLSE became a de-mutualised exchange and changed its name to Malaysia Bourse Securities 
Limited [See: MBSB. 2004(ii)].
50 Based on the Central Bank o f  M alaysia currency exchange rate as at 17th o f May 2006 (see. Central Bank o f Malaysia. 2006)
51 See Ibid 2.
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principles of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance and demonstrate the extent of their 
compliance with and reasons for non-compliance with the Best Practices Code of Corporate 
Governance 2001 in their 2001 statutory annual pro-forma reports (Bursa Malaysia Securities 
Berhad, 2001 (a), (b); Kulasingham, 2003).
In light of the recommendations of the Code of Corporate Governance and MBSB Listing 
Rulings 2001, the research was specifically structured to observe the impact on firm 
performance of the adoption of governance practices in the period between 2002 and 2003.
The selection of the chosen period of observation was motivated by the following factors:
(1) The period of observation was chosen to facilitate the extraction of narrative and 
financial information from the annual reports of firms with earlier than June 2001 financial year 
end.
(2) Further, as studies by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967); Pfefifer (1972); La Porta et al., 
(1999) and Shleifer and Vishny (2002) have shown, external demands, such as regulatory 
requirements, can force an organisation to reform its internal structure, which would include 
extending its disclosure contents. This validated the designated period of observation and 
minimised the possibility of data being incomplete.
(3) Extending the period of observation to two years instead of one led to a better 
understanding of the progress of firms’ corporate governance practice and disclosure and 
transparency initiatives in later years.
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(4) The observation period also allowed assessment of the Stock Exchange Rulings’ time lag
effects. Studies by Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Bhagat and Black, 
2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003, have indicated that the impact 
of firm implementation of corporate governance may be better captured by the firm’s 
subsequent year performance.
6.3 Sampling Procedures
Researchers undertake population sampling for various reasons; one reason is to facilitate the 
interpretation of the research results by choosing a reasonably large number of items to be 
assessed, thus allowing the researcher to be more focused on his/her research parameters (Stuart, 
1968). Moreover, the data in a population can number thousands of elements and it would be 
practically impossible to examine and test the data for the whole population (Henry, 1990; 
Sekaran, 2003). In addition, other factors, such as cost, time and human resource constraints 
may further restrict the possibility of using the entire population for the collection of data 
(Hakim, 2000; Bryman and Cramer, 2002). Further, the likelihood of making errors in data 
collection is reduced when a sample rather than an entire population is observed, given the 
smaller number of elements examined (Sekaran, 2003). Consequently, samples provide a 
practical and efficient means to collect information relevant to a researcher’s studies (see Stuart, 
1968; Henry, 1990; De Vaus, 2002).
There are two types of sampling techniques: probability and non-probability sampling. 
Probability sampling is based on the assumption that every element in the population has a 
specifiable probability of being selected as a sample subject (Henry, 1990; Black, 1999). It is
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suitable when the purpose of the sampling is to represent the generalisability of the population’s 
traits (Sekaran, 2003:270). In contrast, the non-probability sampling technique chooses a sample 
of elements from a population without assigning a known or pre-determined probability for the 
elements in the population to be selected (Black, 1999). Specifically, the elements in the 
population are selected based on systematically employed data, convenience, and/or subjective 
judgement (Henry, 1990).
6.3.1 Sample Size
It is imperative to justify the underlying principle for selecting a particular sample size because 
the sample is rarely the exact replica of the population from which it is taken. This is necessary 
to ensure the reliability and representativeness of the sample of the population under review 
(Nachmias, 1996). According to Black (1999), a sample size can be determined by identifying 
the fraction of the population to be sampled, taking into account the level of error to be tolerated 
between the sample and the population estimators. The selection of a large sample is, however, 
required to obtain ‘accurate’ statistical result (Saunders et al., 1997). Nevertheless, Fowler 
(1993) contends that, as long as the sample size is more than 10% of the population size, the 
fraction of the population sampled has less impact on the standard error of the mean than it 
would were the sample size less than 10%. Moreover, as the sample size (n) increases, the mean 
of the sample obtained from the population approaches a normal distribution with mean (p) and
standard deviation of -^=[see Hair et al., 1998]. As a result, regardless of whether or not the
attributes of the population are normally distributed, if the size of the sample taken is 
sufficiently large, a normal sampling distribution will be obtained.
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N S N S N S
(Population (Estimated (Population (Estimated (Population (Estimated
Size) Sample Size) Size) Sample Size) Size) Sample Size)
10 10 220 140 1200 291
15 14 230 144 1300 297
20 19 240 148 1400 302
25 24 250 152 1500 306
30 28 260 155 1600 310
35 32 270 159 1700 313
40 36 280 162 1800 317
45 40 290 165 1900 320
50 44 300 169 2000 322
55 48 320 175 2200 327
60 52 340 181 2400 331
65 56 360 186 2600 335
70 59 380 191 2800 338
75 63 400 196 3000 341
80 66 420 201 3500 346
85 70 440 205 4000 351
90 73 460 210 4500 354
95 76 480 214 5000 357
100 80 500 217 6000 361
110 86 550 226 7000 364
120 92 600 234 8000 367
130 97 650 242 9000 368
140 103 700 248 10000 370
150 108 750 254 15000 375
160 113 800 260 20000 377
170 118 850 265 30000 379
180 123 900 269 40000 380
190 127 950 274 50000 381
200 132 1000 278 75000 382
210 136 1100 285 1000000 384
[Source: Adopted from Sekaran (2003:294)] 
Based on the work of Krejcie and Morgan (1970) for determining the sample size of a research 
population, Sekaran (2003:294) provides tabulated figures of sample size for a given population 
size (see Table 6.1). In Table 6.1, the N  column represents population size, whilst the S column 
denotes estimated sample size. Where the population size falls in the range of certain values, an 
extrapolation technique is used to determine the sample size. Thus, for the present research on 
corporate governance, given that the identified population size is 486 firms (see further section
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6.3.3), this places the sample size between 214 (for a population size of 480) and 217 (for a 
population size of 500). Hence, the extrapolated sample size for a population of 486 firms is:
(486-480)
(500-480)
x (217-214) + 214 = 214.9 « 215 firms
Moreover, Roscoe (1975) suggests several rules of thumb for sample size designation as below:
1. Sample sizes that are larger than 30 and less than 500 are suitable for most research.
2. Where samples are to be broken into sub-samples, (male/female, junior/senior, etc.),
a minimum sample size of 30 for each category is necessary.
3. In multivariate research (including multiple regression analyses), the sample size
should be several times (preferably 10 times or more) as large as the number of
variables in the study.
4. For simple experimental research with tight experimental controls (matched pairs,
etc.), successful research is possible with samples as small as 10 to 20 in size.
[Source: Sekaran (2003:295)]
According to Field (2005:172), it is important to obtain a large sample size (N) given the 
number of predictors (k) employed in regression models, since the latter will have an effect on 
the estimate of R, that is, the multiple correlation coefficient, produced by the regression 
models. Hence, in deciding the sample size, he suggests using the expected R formula for
krandom data, that is, ——-, where k is the number of predictors to be used in the regression
model and N is the projected sample size. The best expected R value for random data would be 
0, which indicates no effect, and achieving this requires a large N size (Field, 2005:172).
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Further, the types of test that a researcher plans to undertake, whether to examine the overall 
fitness of the regression model or the individual predictors of the model, will also determine the 
sample size (Green, 1991; and Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). Green (1991) proposed a formula 
for a minimum sample size of 50 + 80£52 for the first type of research objective and a formula of 
104 + k to obtain an acceptable size of sample for the latter type of research objective.
After considering various options for sample size determination, following the sample size guide 
in Sekaran (2003: 294) it was found that the sample reasonably fulfilled the recommended 
minimum sample size proposed by other researchers.
6.3.2 Types o f  Probability Sampling Techniques
Probability sampling involves the selection of sample items based on a random selection 
process. It is a technique that facilitates the independent selection of each unit in the sample to 
avoid subjective bias in the selection process and to ensure a sample that is representative of 
population traits (Henry, 1990: 26). Methods of probability sampling include simple random 
sampling, systematic sampling, and stratified sampling.
Simple random sampling is a process where each item in a population has an equal chance of 
being selected as part o f the sample. It is carried out using a table or statistical software package, 
such as Microsoft Excel and SPSS, to generate random numbers to select individual samples 
from the population. Simple random sampling suits the type of research that aims to generalise 
the research findings to the whole population (Sekaran, 2003). It also minimises bias and offers
52 k is the number o f predictors or independent variables used in the regression models.
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better generalisability of population than other methods (Black, 1999; Sekaran, 2003). In 
contrast, random sampling can produce an extreme sample given the variations that may be 
embedded in the potential sample’s subject mix (Stuart, 1968).
However, according to the Central Limit Theorem, as long as the sample size is large it makes 
no difference what form of distribution the sample has, whether there are many low and few 
high values or vice versa, because the sample average will closely approximate to the normal 
distribution. Also, every sample has a unique feature and as long as the right sample selection 
technique is applied, the sample size chosen will be acceptable (Sekaran, 2003: 268).
Systematic sampling, on the other hand, draws a sample from items in the population that are 
within a certain interval. For instance, given a list of n size of population, a sample’s items are 
selected for every / th element in the population. Another sampling technique is stratified 
random sampling. This involves the stratification or segregation of subjects from the population 
by dividing the population into mutually exclusive groups or strata (Sekaran, 2003). Subjects are 
then randomly selected from each stratum to form the sample. Proportionate stratified random 
sampling selects subjects from each stratum to make up the sample size identified. On the other 
hand, disproportionate stratified random sampling takes place when large variability is suspected 
in a stratum or there is a large difference in stratum size.
Given the above characteristics of different sampling techniques, the simple random sampling 
technique was chosen as the sampling method for selecting Main Board and Second Board firms
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in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange because it provides better representation of the population 
and less bias than other techniques.
6.3.3 Sampling o f  Main Board and Second Board Companies in the KLSE
The sampling of Main Board and Second Board firms in the MBSB commenced with a perusal 
of its Main and Second Board’s list of firms. Firm population was determined from the index of 
firms in each Board published in the Investors’ Digest53 January 2000 and 2004. Specifically, 
public listed companies chosen for sampling were Main and Second Board companies that had 
remained in the same Board from the beginning of the year 1999 until end of 2003. Table 6.2 
shows the year when the sampled companies were formed (i.e. the Main Board and Second 
Board sampled firms in Table 6.5). As the listing period was extended to the early years of the 
new millennium, this presented the opportunity to evaluate firms’ visibility, prestige and, in due 
course, their future prospects, notably their liquidity and marketability (Baker et al., 1999).
Table 6.2: Number of Sampled Companies Formed Between the 1970s to 1990s
1970s 1
1980s 77
1990s 143
Earliest (Year): 1973; Latest (Year): 1999; Mode 
| (Year): 1986
It is worth noting that Malaysia had substantially recovered from the economic crisis in the mid 
1990s by the second-half of 1999 (MEPU, 2001). Making an allowance for this circumstance,
53 The Investors7 Digest was a Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange monthly publication. See pages 55 to 59 and pages 56 to 60 o f the 
January 2000 and 2004 issues, respectively.
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the observed sample firms were classified into firms that had existed before the crisis and 
survived it, and firms that were founded after the crisis, thus providing unique informational 
elements to the research. By and large, firms’ continued listing in the Stock Exchange indicated 
a history of continued economic value in the present and future, and particularly effective 
survival and adaptation strategies in the form of efficient learning and absorption of knowledge 
(Kor and Mahoney, 2005). The presence of firms with transitory periods of listing pointed to 
their tendency to attain shorter performance goals as a result of changes in their unique and 
specialist resources (Mosakowski, 1993).
The first step of the firms’ sampling procedure was to obtain the names of Main and Second 
Board companies from the Investors ’ Digest January 2000 and 2004 (see Tables 6.3 and 6.4 for 
Main and Second Board companies according to their sector grouping for the years 2000 and
2004, respectively). A list of companies that had been in operation from 1999 until 2003 was 
ultimately established. The list was then cross-referenced with the full list of Malaysian listed 
companies54 in the Datastream database to obtain companies’ full names, since company names 
had been abbreviated in the Investors ' Digest. In addition, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) was contacted to obtain the full version of the abbreviated names, since companies’ full 
names were required to identify and download their corresponding annual reports from the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange’s website55. Eventually, a list of all 486 Main and Second Board 
companies was compiled by matching the updated companies’ list in the financial year ending 
1999 with the updated companies’ list in the financial year ending 2004 (see Table 6.5: 
Population of Firms).
54 The data series code for the full list o f  the Malaysian listed companies in the Datastream database was FMAQ1.
55 See Bursa M alaysia Company Announcements at http://announcements.bursamalavsia.com/linkwebmainpage.nsf/lca.htm,
2005.
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Table 6.3: Main Board & Second Board Firms and Industries (January 2000)
Main Board Firms
Sectors Number of Companies Listed Nominal Amount (RM’000) Listed Market Valuation(RM’OOO)
Consumer Products 56 7,837,878 42,724,161
Industrial Products 107 20,338,507 68,667,580
Construction 32 7,267,703 31,351,756
Trading/Services 66 31,971,037 185,047,816
Finance 62 25,100,710 109,871,653
Hotels 6 1,750,290 1,795,204
Properties 72 16,235,524 29,343,725
Plantations 37 7,308,380 25,234,857
Mining 8 737,456 2,653,837
T rusts 4 485,276 378,887
Closed-End Funds 1 500,000 340,000
Infrastructure Project Companies 4 3,819,646 13,841,672
Total 474 123,352,407 511,251,148
Sectors Number of Companies Listed Nominal Amount(RM’OOO) Listed Market Valuation (RM’000)
Consumer Products 58 1,720,123 4,577,067
Industrial Products 132 4,260,383 11,180,818
Construction 35 1,400,096 2,775,732
Trading/Services 58 1,875,793 6,056,184
Total 283 9,256,395 24,589,801
Source: Investors ’ Digest Mid-January (2000:86)
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Table 6.4: Main Board & Second Board Firms and Industries (January 2004)
Main Board Firms
Sectors Number of Companies Listed Nominal Amount (RM’000) Listed Market Valuation (RM’000)
Consumer Products 73 10,308,864 55,900,364
Industrial Products 123 22,595,185 57,424,388
Construction 41 9,973,140 27,239,749
Trading/Services 116 45,860,808 229,554,351
Technology 15 1,462,186 9,523,934
Finance 51 35,595,969 124,770,176
Hotels 5 1,430,913 1,269,769
Properties 88 24,698,356 34,610,091
Plantations 39 8,198,027 35,302,289
Mining 2 282,943 830,483
T rusts 3 374,128 238,342
Closed-End Funds 1 500,001 355,001
PN4 Condition 33 7,190,323 2,425,592
Infrastructure Project Companies 8 7,152,040 17,219,643
Total 598 175,622,883 596,664,172
Sectors Number of Companies Listed Nominal Amount (RM’000) Listed Market Valuation(RM’OOO)
Consumer Products 50 2,271,842 3,348,193
Industrial Products 126 6,766,237 11,408,149
Construction 15 925,200 1,481,848
Trading/Services 49 3,250,413 6,014,265
Technology 5 376,707 633,527
Properties 2 94,978 87,801
Plantations 4 623,674 970,121
PN4 Condition 26 1,298,007 325,982
Total 277 15,607,058 24,269,886
Source: Investors ’ Digest Mid-January (2004: 62)
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Table 6.5: The Main Board and Second Board Companies in Operation 
Between 1999 to 2004
Sectors
Trading/Services
Finance
Consumer Products
Industrial Products
Construction
Properties
Plantations
Hotels
Infrastructure Project Companies
Mining
Trusts
Closed-End Funds 
Total
No. of Co.
66
40
37
73
21
56
31
4
4
2
2
1
337
No. of Co
32
19
21
34
9
24
17
2
2
0
160
Sectors
Trading/Services 
Consumer Products 
Industrial Products 
Construction 
Total
No. of Co.
29
28
78
14
149
No. of Co
9
11
33
8
61
S ole: For the research purposes, Hotel, M ining and Infrastructure P roject Com panies were categorised  
as m iscellaneous industry; Trust Funds and C losed  End Funds com panies were excluded from  the 
sam ple because they w ere not required to produce a corporate governance statem ent)
A sample of 221 companies was subsequently created from the 486 Main Board and Second 
Board companies using the simple random sampling technique (see Table 6.5: Sampled Firms). 
The sample size was determined based on sample size guidelines in Sekaran (2003:294) and use 
of the extrapolation technique discussed in Section 6.3.1 above. Saunders et al., (1997:132) 
recommend a sample size for research that uses the simple random sampling technique of 
slightly more than a few hundred subjects. Applying this recommendation, a sample size of 221 
meant that almost 50% of the 486 listed firms were studied. The sample size of 221 also broadly
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represented56 29% and 25% of the total number of listed companies in the Stock Exchange in 
2000 and 2003 respectively.
6.4 Data Sources
The use of documentary, administrative and archival sources has been found to be popular 
among historians, anthropologists and linguists (Dale et al., 1988). It should be noted that 
organisational documents vary, ranging from company annual reports, public relations material 
and press releases, accounts statements, and policies on rules and procedures (Forster, 1997). As 
regards to their usage in corporate governance studies, Baysinger and Butler (1985) accessed 
them to collect board biographies for their study of the impact of board composition on firm 
performance. Technology-based firms’ prospectuses have been examined by Kor and Mahoney 
(2003) to identify the process and timing of new product development revenue generation.
The advantages of organisational documents include the following:
(i) They provide rich insights into organisational life
(ii) To some extent, the data and information produced by an organisation are 
comprehensive, especially if they are to be compared with the quality of data that a 
new researcher can gather from interviews and/or questionnaires
(iii) Information gathered from the organisation in publicly available documents allows 
the researcher to examine closely, for instance, the historical process and 
developments in the organisation in comparison to its current records on related 
matters.
56 Leech and Leahy (1991:1421), justified their sample size by emphasising that their 325 o f  470 sampled companies broadly 
represented the 1000 companies in the UK Stock Exchange at that time.
2 0 0
CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
(iv) It is time saving to collect data from a company’s documents in comparison to other 
means.
(v) The researcher can avoid unnecessary processes of data collection, such as having to 
contact key personnel or a company secretary who is normally busy.
(vi) The company document is a good source of information to start with in undertaking
preliminary quantitative analysis. (Source: Forster, 1997)
However, company documentation may be fragmentary and subjective (Forster, 1997). For
instance, it may not record accurately the process of events occurring within the firm’s specific 
period of operation and in detail. Nevertheless, with the exercise of caution regarding the 
interpretation of company documents, relevant information can be extracted from them (Hakim, 
1982).
In this research, companies’ annual reports were referred to frequently to gather information on 
various board aspects, including:
(i) Composition: the number of independent non-executive directors (INED), executive 
directors (ED), and non executive directors (NED),
(ii) Characteristics: Directorships in other public companies and private companies, 
educational background, for instance, an accounting and non-accounting 
background,
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Table 6.6: Data Sources
Sources Related Information
List of Companies
Investors' Digest Mid-January 2000  
and 2004
Datastream Database
List o f  Main Board and Second Board companies as at 30 December 1999 and 31 
December 2003, and their corresponding sectors
FM AQ 1: List o f  all Malaysian Securities
Board of Director Data Annual Reports 2002 and 2003
Director’s name, age, type o f  director, appointment date, educational 
background, family relationship, chairman o f  board o f  director, director’s share 
ownership, occupation, ethnic, foreign director, founder, board com m ittees’ 
related information, board activities, other related corporate governance 
information
External Auditor Annual Reports 2002 and 2003 Nam e o f  audit company
Other Accounting Data Annual Report 2002 and 2003 Non-Executive Director Remuneration, Non-Audit Fees, Substantial 
Shareholdings,
Financial Data Datastream Database Number o f  shares, market value, earnings per share, share price, return on 
investment, return on equity, total asset and net profit
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Tabic 6.7: Sections anil/Reports in Annual Report and Information
Section/Reports * Information Collected
Company Information Nam e o f  Board o f  Director member, position in the firm, type o f  director, board o f  director’s chairman, 
board com m ittees’ formation, name o f  firm’s external auditor, board size, director ethnic group.
Directors’ Profiles
Age, appointment date, director type (executive, non-executive or independent director), outside 
directorship (public and/or listed, and/or private companies), educational background, occupation, 
nominee directors, family relationship, founder and foreigners.
Corporate Governance Statement
Board o f  Directors’ activities (i.e. meetings and attendance), Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
members, composition, structure, activities and terms o f  reference and frequency o f  meetings held and 
mem bers’, Senior independent director information, non-audit fee and non-executive director 
remuneration.
Audit Committee’s Report Members, composition, terms o f  reference and activities
Directors’ Report Board o f  directors’ shareholding in the company
Notes to Financial Statement 
Analysis of Shareholdings
Non audit fee, non-executive director remuneration 
Substantial shareholder’s groups and equity holdings
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(iii) Structure: whether there was a separate appointment for the Chairman of the BOD 
and the firm’s Chief Executive Officer (SEPCEO), whether the Chairman of the 
BOD was an independent director (INED), executive director (ED) or non-executive 
director (NED); details of board subcommittees, including the audit committee’s 
composition, the frequency of and attendance at meetings (ACMET4, AMETG4 and 
ATEND), a particular audit committee’s responsibilities, and the formation, 
composition structure and functions of the nomination and remuneration committees 
(NCEXIST, RCEXIST),
(iv) Process: frequency of and attendance at board of director meetings (BATEND), 
meetings’ agenda, access to and availability of documents, firms’ employees, and 
external independent advice.
The Datastream database was used to obtain companies’ financial data, such as their profits, 
financial ratio, share prices, assets, liabilities and number of shares issued (Ssee Table 6.6 and 
Table 6.7).
6.5 The Descriptions and Characteristics of Research Models’ Parameters
In this section, the computation and characteristics of the research models’ variables (see 
Chapter 5), namely, dependent variables (i.e. firm performance variables), explanatory variables 
(i.e. respective board of director and its committee attributes) and control variables are 
explained. The following subsections discuss each category of variables respectively.
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6.5.1 Dependent Variables: Firm Performance Measures
As discussed in Chapter 4, the firm value can be measured in terms of market value or the 
accounting-based measure of performance. According to Chakravarthy (1986) and Daily and 
Dalton (1993), when measuring firm performance, it is worth noting that there is a limitation on 
the ability of a particular measure of firm performance to capture all aspects of firm 
accomplishment. The organisation’s competitive advantage, the effectiveness of its management 
system and approach or implementation of certain strategic policies are some of the factors that 
have influenced the measures of firm performance (Vancil, 1972; Bourgeois III, 1985; Murray, 
1995). Further, as Cochran and Wood (1984) point out, there is no consensus regarding the 
choice of particular measures of firm performance when evaluating the relationship between 
firm value and corporate governance characteristics. They indicate that the choice of firm 
performance measures remains wide and ranges from accounting to market values.
For the current research purposes, seven measures of firm performance were identified which 
encompassed three market value measures and four accounting-based measures of firm 
performance. The market value measures of firm performance were Tobin’s Q, market to book 
value of equity (MBE) and market to book value of asset (MBA). The use of Tobin’s Q as a 
market value measure of firm performance in corporate governance studies has been 
widespread, namely, in the study of Himmelberg et al., (1999), Klapper and Love (2004), 
Drobetz (2004) and Black et al., (2006). In studies by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Loughran 
and Ritter (1997), Core et al., (1999), Dittmar et al., (2003) and Eng and Mak (2003), market to 
book value of equity and assets has been utilised as measure of firm performance.
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Using the accounting-based measure of firm performance, the current research examined the 
firm’s return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on investment (ROI) and earnings 
to price ratio (EARP). Financial ratios as measures of firm performance in corporate governance 
studies have been employed by Allen and Panian (1982), Baysinger and Butler (1985), Tosi, Jr. 
and Gomez-Meija (1994), Yermack (1996), Bushee and Noe (2000), Rechner and Dalton 
(1991), Hutchinson and Gul (2003), Oxelheim and Randoy (2003), Drobetz et al., (2004) and 
Chang Aik Leng and Abu Mansor (2005).
6.5.1.1 Computation o f  Market Value Measures o f  Firm Performance
For the purpose of the current research, Tobin’s Q was computed in reference to the definition 
offered by Himmelberg et al., (1999), which is as follows:
_  . . . _ Value of the Firm
lo o m  s Q =
Replacement Value of Assets
Specifically, Himmelberg et al., (1999) defined the Value of the Firm as the summation of 
market value of common equity, Book Value of Total Liabilities, and Estimated Market Value 
of Preferred Stocks. For most firms in the sample, their preferred dividends payments were nil. 
Accordingly, the computations of Tobin’s Q for a firm’s market value were reduced to two 
estimates, namely, Market Value of Equity (MVE) and Book Value of Total Liabilities, 
consistent with Kor and Mahoney’s (2005) approximation. They also measured the market value 
of common equity as the multiplication of a firm’s closing share price and number of ordinary 
shares at year end. On the other hand, they described total liabilities as the summation of long­
term and short-term debts. For the denominator of Tobin’s Q, they approximated the
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replacement value of assets as book value of total assets. The financial data for Tobin’s Q 
computation, namely, the closing share price, number of ordinary shares, long-term debts, short­
term debts and total assets were obtained from the Datastream database. In particular the data 
respectively represented the closing share price (P), number of shares in issue at year end 
(NOSH), long term debt (wc03251), total current liabilities (wc03101), and total assets 
(02999AQ) in the Datastream.
The second measure of market value of firm performance, Market Book Value of Equity 
(MBE) was computed as the ratio of market value of equity and common equity
 ^ Market Value of Equity -j closing share price (P), number of ordinary shares in issue (NOSH) 
Common Equity
and common equity (wc03501) were utilised in the computation. On the other hand, Market 
Book Value of Asset (MBA) was calculated as the ratio of market book value of equity and
total assets ( Market Valueof Equity y Similarly closing share price (P), number of ordinary shares 
Total Assets
in issue (NOSH) and total asset (02999AQ) in the Datastream were applied in the MBA 
formulae.
6.5.1.2 Computation o f  Accounting-Based Measures o f  Firm Performance
For the calculation of the financial ratios of Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA) 
and Return on Investment (ROI), items used from the Datastream were Net Income before 
Extraordinary Items/Preferred Dividends or Earned for Ordinary (01551 and 625 respectively), 
common equity (wc03501), total assets (02999AQ) and total capital employed (322 or 03998)
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were used. Whilst for the calculation of Earnings to Price ratio (EARP), items used from the 
Datastream were Earnings Per Share (18193) and closing share price (P).
6.5.1.3 Data Characteristics and Factor Analysis o f  Firm Performance Measures
Table 6.8 presents the descriptive statistics of the firm performance variables. Due to high 
skewness and kurtosis level, the data are subsequently transformed to normal scores using Van 
der Waerden approach (see Cooke, 1998). As shown in Table 6.9, the normal scores 
transformation reduced the skewness and kurtosis levels of the performance variables to a value 
near to zero. Also, the transformation improved the normality of the firm performance variables. 
The normal scores values of the firm performance variables were subsequently implemented in 
the designated research models (see Chapter 5). Table 6.10 presents the correlation analysis of 
the seven performance measures. The market value measures and accounting-based measures of 
firm performance had high correlation amongst them.
In addition, following Hutchinson and Gul (2004), factor analysis was carried out to identify the 
principal factor of the firm performance measure of the seven firm performance variables. There 
are various reasons for conducting factor analysis, some of which include:
(i) To select a subset of variables from a larger set based on which of the original 
variables give the highest correlations with the principal component factors,
(ii) To validate a scale or index by demonstrating that its constituent items load on the 
same factor and subsequently exclude proposed scale items which cross-load on 
more than one factor,
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YEAR 2002
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Minimum
Maximum
|  TOBQ02 MBE02 MBA02 ROA02 ROE02 ROI02 EARP02
0.9848 1.1987 0.5771 0.0303 0.0399 0.0180 -0.0107
0.8758 0.8326 0.4383 0.0309 0.0626 0.0496 0.0400
0.6405 1.3640 0.6675 0.1147 0.3988 0.3345 0.3003
5.8557 3.8524 5.8938 5.5951 -3.5646 -4.1279 -2.8838
50.4632 17.1954 52.5038 67.1976 42.2110 57.3758 19.8832
0.2856 -0.4544 0.0255 -0.4086 -3.6566 -3.3731 -2.2900
7.4704 9.8933 7.4470 1.2919 2.3120 2.2069 1.2100
] TOBQ03 MBE03 MBA03 ROA03 ROE03 ROI03 EARP03
0.8943 1.0693 0.4803 0.0292 0.0860 0.0844 0.0292
0.7961 0.7048 0.3640 0.0381 0.0773 0.0637 0.0500
0.5319 1.5641 0.5313 0.1146 0.6110 0.8954 0.8615
4.1070 6.0017 4.4944 -3.7953 6.2610 12.3087 0.3489
24.8971 43.1865 30.1082 36.8768 74.3544 174.3920 23.3021
0.1663 -0.7189 0.0000 -1.0412 -2.1740 -2.0812 -5.7300
5.1387 14.7813 5.0863 0.5480 6.9077 12.5781 5.0400
| TOBQ04 MBE04 MBA04 EROA04 EROE04 EROI04 EARP04
1.0261 1.5175 0.6404 0.0176 -0.1646 0.0355 0.0540
0.9082 0.9243 0.4862 0.0400 0.0900 0.0724 0.0600
0.8324 4.2090 0.8462 0.1988 2.2934 0.3622 0.5707
7.7711 12.2103 8.1010 -8.9193 -9.9721 -7.3848 5.3230
i 83.0031 165.0863 88.9714 98.5895 100.5356 82.1776 64.3259
0.0245 -2.4198 0.0196 -2.3500 -23.7900 -4.0984 -2.6200
10.5973 59.1136 10.5537 0.2600 1.4000 1.4050 6.1100
N = 221 for the year 2002 and 2003; N = 216 for the year 2004
N otes: T O B Q  = T o b in ’s  Q , M B E  -  M a rk et to  B ook Value o f  Equity, MBA = M a rk et to  B ook  Value o f  A sset, ROA  = R eturn  on A ssets, R O E  
R eturn on Equity, R O l =  R eturn on In vestm en t a n d  EARP -  E arn ings P er  S h a re / Price, 02 -  Year 2002, 03 =  Year 2003, 04 -  Y ear 2 0 0 4
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NTOBQ02 NMBE02 NMBA02 NROA02 NROE02 NROI02 NEARP02
Mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0565
Std. Dev. 0.9813 0.9813 0.9813 0.9813 0.9813 0.9813 0.9806
Skewness 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002
Kurtosis -0.2179 -0.2179 -0.2179 -0.2179 -0.2179 -0.2179 -0.2140
Minimum -2.6117 -2.6117 -2.6117 -2.6117 -2.6117 -2.6117 -2.6117
Maximum 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117
NTOBQ03 NMBE03 NMBA03 NROA03 NROE03 NROI03 NEARP03
Mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0056
Std. Dev. 0.9813 0.9813 0.9813 0.9813 0.9813 0.9813 0.9808
Skewness 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Kurtosis -0.2179 -0.2179 -0.2179 -0.2179 -0.2179 -0.2179 -0.2140
Minimum -2.6117 -2.6117 -2.6117 -2.6117 -2.6117 -2.6117 -2.6117
Maximum 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117
NTOBQ04 NMBE04 NMBA04 NROA04 NROE04 NROI04 NEARP04
Mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0578 -0.0058 0.0000 0.0809
Std. Dev. 0.9809 0.9809 0.9809 0.9786 0.9802 0.9809 0.9802
Skewness 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0016 0.0000 -0.0002
Kurtosis -0.2205 -0.2205 -0.2205 -0.2083 -0.2202 -0.2210 -0.2145
Minimum -2.6039 -2.6039 -2.6039 -2.6039 -2.6039 -2.6023 -2.6039
Maximum 2.6039 2.6039 2.6039 2.6039 2.6039 2.6023 2.6039
N = 221 for year 2002 and 2003; N = 216 for year 2004
N o tes: N T O B Q  -  N o rm a l S c o re s  o f  T o b in ’s  Q,, N M B E  -  N o rm a l S c o re s  o f  M a rk et to  B ook Value o f  E quity, NM BA -  N o rm a l S c o re s  o f  M a rk e t to  B ook
Value o f  A ssets, NRO A  -  N o rm a l S c o re s  o f  R etu rn  on A ssets, N R O E  = N o rm a l S c o re s  o f  R etu rn  on E quity, N R O I = N o rm a l S c o re s  o f  R etu rn  on
1 In vestm en t a n d  N E A R P  -  N o rm a l S c o re s  o f  E arn in gs P e r  S h a re / P rice , 02  = Year 2002 , 03 = Y ear 2003, 0 4  ~ Y ear 2 0 0 4
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Table 6.10: Pearson Correlation Analysis of Firm Performance Measures (Year 2002 -2004)
(Notes: TOBQ =  Tobin s Q , MBE Market to Book Value o f  Equity, MBA Market to Book Value o f  Assets, ROA Return on Assets, ROE -- Return on Equity, ROl =  Return on Investment and EARP = Earnings 
Per Share/ Price, 02 = Year 2002, 03 ~ Year 2003. 04 ~ Year 2004: Figures in Italics represent p-value o f  the variables' correlation )
TOBQQ2 TOBQQ3 TQBQ04 MBE02 MBE03 MBE04 MBA02 MBA03 MBA04 ROE02 ROE03 ROE04 ROA02 ROA03 ROA04 ROI02 ROW3 ROI04 EARP02 EARP03 EARP04
TOBQ02 1 000 0 853 0 806 0 111 0 572 0 208 0 909 0 808 0 793 -0 019 0 1 10 0 01 1 -0 005 0 111 -0 0 2 6 -0 029 0 0 3 7 0 0 1 6 -0 0 3 7 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 0
0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 002 0 000 0 0 0 0 0.000 0 7X1 0 104 0X 75 0 935 0 /0 0 0  600 0 670 0 5X4 0X11 0 5X4 0 3 5 7 0 0 0 4
TOBQ03 0 853 1 000 0 802 0 677 0 635 0 260 0 763 0 855 0 769 0.112 0 0 2 4 -0 004 0 259 0 079 0.005 0 142 0 067 00 6 9 0 0 4 8 -0 027 0.018
0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 6 0.725 0.94X 0 000 0 242 0 037 0 0 3 4 0 3 / 0 0 .3 /7 0 4 7 5 0.6<V<V 0.704
TOBQ04 0 806 0 802 1 000 0 576 0.533 0 254 0 766 0 751 0 927 00 0 3 0 028 0 004 0 103 0 056 -0 200 0 009 0 095 0.000 0 045 0 0 1 7 0.010
0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0.000 0 966 0.6X5 0.94X 0.133 0 414 0 003 0X 99 0 / 6 5 0 0 0 6 0 5 / 4 0X01 0.XX5
MBE02 0 777 0 677 0 576 1 000 0 770 0 185 0 667 0.570 0 556 -0 040 -0 0 3 2 0 049 -0 037 0 031 0 0 2 3 -0055 0 046 0 0 9 6 0 0 7 6 -0 016 0 028
0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 006 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 000 OSSX 0 633 0.477 0 5X5 0 649 0 735 0  4 /2 0 5 0 0 0 / 6 0 0 260 OX IX 0.67X
MBE03 0 572 0 635 0 533 0 770 1 000 0 333 0 4 7 3 0 526 0 534 -0 042 -0083 -0 0 5 6 0 023 0 030 0 0 5 0 -0 0 3 0 -0 106 0 0 9 8 0 0 2 8 -0 042 -0.024
0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 536 0 2 1 7 0 413 0. 735 0.65X 0 404 0 6 5 3 0 117 0 /53 0 6X0 0.537 0.72X
MBE04 0 208 0 260 0 254 0 185 0 333 1 000 0 144 0 171 0.210 -0 358 -0 055 -0.746 -0 114 -0 007 -0 0 1 6 -0 290 -0 028 -0 302 0 049 -0 265 -0 165
0 002 0 000 0 000 0 006 0(100 0 035 0 012 0 002 0 000 0 421 0.000 0.094 0 923 OX 17 0 0 0 0 0.6X3 0 0 0 0 0 47X 0 000 0 0 1 6
MBA02 0 909 0 763 0 766 0 667 0 473 0 144 1 000 0 905 0.856 0 0 2 9 -0 035 0.067 0 0 6 6 0 101 -0 006 0 0 6 0 -0 0 1 9 0,020 0.091 0 0 0 3 -0.022
0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 035 0 000 0 000 0 671 0 609 0 329 0.331 0.133 0 0 3 / 0.373 0.775 0 760 0 / 7 6 0 0 6 0 0.745
MBA03 0 808 0 855 0 751 0 570 0 526 0 171 0 905 1 000 0 855 0.110 -0 015 0 0 7 6 0 188 0.159 0 0 4 9 0 149 -0 011 0 0 8 2 0.111 0.004 -0 019
0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 0 1 2 0 000 0 000 0.103 OX 2X 0 269 0 005 0.0IX 0 473 0 0 2 6 0X 75 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 0.7X4
MBA04 0 793 0 769 0 927 0 556 0 534 0 210 0 856 0 855 1.000 0 0 4 5 -0 014 0.062 0.183 0.127 -0 0 2 6 0 0 6 5 -0.022 0 009 0 101 0 0 2 3 -0.025
0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0 002 0 000 0 000 0 506 0X 33 0 363 0 007 0 061 0 699 0 3 3 0 0. 747 0 901 0.I3X 0  74/ 0 .7 U
ROE02 -0 019 0 112 0 003 -0 040 -0 0 4 2 -0 358 0 029 0 110 0 045 1 000 0 0 4 5 0 299 0 6 7 9 0 213 0061 0 9 2 5 -0 076 0 071 0 131 0.079 -0.071
0 7X1 0 096 0 966 0 55X 0 536 0 000 0 671 0 103 0 506 0 505 0.000 0.000 0 001 0.373 0 0 0 0 0.25X 0 3 0 3 0 0 5 1 0 2 4 3 0 2 0 6
ROE03 0 110 0 024 0 0 2 8 -0032 -0083 -0 055 -0 035 -0 015 -0.014 0 0 4 5 1 000 0021 0.126 0 640 0 100 -0 0 5 9 0 406 0 123 -0,261 0 648 0.126
0 104 0 725 0 6X5 0 633 0 217 0 421 0 609 0.X2X 0X 33 0 505 0.761 0 061 0 000 0 / 4 4 0.370 0 00(1 0 0 7 3 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 064
ROE04 0 01 1 -0 004 0 004 0 049 -0 056 -0 746 0 067 0 076 0 062 0 299 0 021 1 000 0 160 0 044 0 092 0.224 0 027 0 863 0 074 0.244 0.375
O S75 0.94X 0 94X 0.477 0 413 0 000 0 329 0 269 0 363 0 0 0 0 0 761 0 0 1 9 0.51X 0 M 0 0 001 0 694 0 000 0 2X0 0 0 0 0 0.000
ROA02 -0 005 0 259 0 103 -0 037 0 023 -0 114 0 066 0 188 0 183 0 679 0 126 0 160 1.000 0 357 0 159 0 714 0 027 0 151 0 340 0 0 8 4 -0.023
0.935 0 000 0 133 0.5X5 0 735 0 094 0 331 0 0 0 5 0 007 0 000 0 061 0 019 0 000 0 0 / 0 0 0 0 0 0 602 0.026 0 0 0 0 0 2 / 6 0.742
ROA03 0.111 0.079 0 0 5 6 0 031 0 030 -0 007 0 101 0 159 0 127 0 213 0 640 0.044 0 357 1.000 0 267 0 165 0 053 0 133 0.024 0 4 5 8 -0 001
o to o 0 242 0 414 0 649 0 65X 0 923 0 133 0 0 IX 0 061 0 001 0 0 0 0 0.5 IX 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 / 4 0.433 0 051 0.727 0.000 0.9X7
ROA04 -0 026 0 0 0 5 -0 200 0 023 0 050 -0 016 -0 006 0 049 -0 026 0061 0 100 0 092 0.159 0.267 1.000 0 035 -0 064 0 113 0.033 0.025 0,229
0 699 0.937 0 003 0 735 0 464 0 X 1 7 0 931 0 473 0 699 0 3 7 3 0.144 0 1X0 0 019 0 000 0 6 0 0 0 3 5 / 0 0 0 0 0.620 0 7 / 5 0 001
ROI02 -0.029 0 142 0 009 -0 055 -0 030 -0 290 0 060 0 149 0 065 0 9 2 5 -0 0 5 9 0.224 0 714 0.165 0 035 1 000 -0 0 5 2 0.042 0.241 -0.015 -0.032
0.670 0 034 0 X 99 0 412 0 653 0 000 0.373 0 026 0 339 0 000 0 379 0 001 0 000 0 014 0 0 0 6 0  430 0 541 0.000 0.X27 0 643
ROI03 0 0 3 7 0.067 0 095 0 046 -0 106 -0 028 -0 019 -0 011 -0022 -0.076 0 406 0 0 2 7 0 0 2 7 0 053 -0064 -0.052 1 000 0 111 0.077 0 237 0 365
0 5X4 0 319 0 165 0 500 0 117 0.6X3 0 775 0X 75 0 747 0.25X 0 000 0 694 0.692 0 433 0 351 0 4 3 0 0 / 0 4 0 2 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 000
ROI04 0 016 0.069 0 000 0 096 0 098 -0 302 0.020 0 0 8 2 0 009 0071 0 123 0 863 0 151 0.133 0 113 0 042 0.111 1 000 0 073 0.142 0 447
OX 11 0 317 0 996 0 160 0 153 0 000 0 769 0 230 0 901 0 303 0 073 0.000 0 026 0 051 0 000 0 541 0.104 0 2 « « 0.03X 0.000
EARP02 -0.037 0 048 0 045 0 076 0.028 0 049 0 091 0 111 0 101 0 131 -0 261 0 0 7 4 0 340 0 024 0 033 0241 0 077 0 073 1.000 0.189 0 4 2 0
0.5X4 0 475 0 514 0 260 0 6X0 0 47X 0 176 0 099 0.13X 0 051 0 000 0.2X0 0 000 0.727 0 629 0 000 0 255 0.2XX 0.005 0.000
EARP03 0 062 -0 027 0 0 1 7 -0 016 -0 042 -0 265 0 003 0 004 0 023 0 079 0 648 0.244 0.084 0.458 0.025 -0.015 0 237 0 142 0 1 89 1 000 0.543
0.357 0.6XX 0X01 0 XIX 0.537 0 000 0 969 0.953 0. 741 0 243 0 000 0.000 0.216 0 000 0 7 /5 0X 27 0.000 0.03X 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
EARP04 0 000 0 018 0 0 1 0 0 028 -0 024 -0 165 -0 022 -0 019 -0.025 -0.071 0 126 0.375 -0.023 -0 001 0 229 -0 032 0 365 0.447 0.420 0.543 1 000
0 994 0 794 0.XX5 0 67X 0 72X 0 016 0 745 0. 7X4 0.711 0 296 0 064 0 000 0 742 0.9X7 0 0 0 / 0.643 0 000 0 000 0  000 0 0 0 0
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(iii) To reduce a large number of variables to a smaller number of factors for modelling 
purposes
[See further, for instance, Lawley and Maxwell, 1971; Kim and Mueller, 1978(a)(b); Field, 
2005]
In the case of the current research, factor analysis was performed on the seven measures of firm 
performance as in 2002, 2003 and 2004 to reduce related variables into one common factor 
(Hair et al., 1998; Pallant, 2005). This data reduction technique is also useful to solve the 
multicollinearity problem in multiple regression where it combines variables that are collinear 
(Field, 2005: 619). In particular the principal component analysis (PCA) method of factor 
analysis is used to extract the factor from respective data sets. Specifically, this extraction 
method identifies a linear combination of variables such that maximum variance is extracted 
from the variables. Subsequently, it removes this variance and seeks a second linear 
combination which explains the maximum proportion of the remaining variance. The same 
process is carried out for the other variables in the data sets.
Specifically, factor analysis results, such as correlation matrix, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy (KMO) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (see Table 6.11) indicated the 
suitability of factor analysis as a method of data reduction for the seven firm performance 
variables. Moreover, according to Hair et al., (1998) and Pallant (2005), the factor analysis data 
reduction technique is applicable when there is a presence of values of correlation coefficients 
values of 0.3 and above (see Table 6.10), a KMO value of 0.6 and above, and Bartlett’s Test 
significant value of 0.05 and below. By employing principal component analysis as the
2 1 2
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extraction method of principal factors of the seven firm performance measures, a Kaiser-Meyer 
Olkin Measure (KMO) value of 0.620 was obtained (see Table 6.11).
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure o f  Sampling Adequacy 0.620
Bartlett's Test o f Sphericity
Approx. Chi- square 
df 
Sig
1250.085
21
0.000
Further, due to the high correlation amongst some of the variables, firm performance variables 
were separated into market value measures (namely, the TOBQ, MBE, MBA) and accounting- 
based measures of firm performance (namely ROA, ROE, ROI and EARP) [see Table 6.10]. 
According to Pallant (2005), a factor analysis should be carried out on a set of variables with 
high correlation amongst them. In addition, factor analysis is suitable for data sets that give a 
KMO value higher than 0.6 (Hair et al., 1998; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2006). Respectively, 
principal component analysis of market value and accounting based measure of firm 
performance produced a KMO value of 0.648 and 0.636, higher than 0.62. As shown in Tables 
6.12 and 6.13, Tobin’s Q and ROE produced the highest eigenvalue and percentage of total 
variance than other performance measures in the three years observed [i.e. greater than 54%]. 
Based on this statistical result, Tobin’s Q and ROE were appropriate component solutions for 
the respective market value and accounting based measures of firm performance and were used 
as firm performance measures in the current research models.
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Components
Initial Eigenvalues E xtraction Sums o f Squared Loadings
Total Total % o fV ariance
C um ulative
%
Yr 2002 Tobin’s Q 2.5726 2.5726 85.7522 85.7522
MBE 0.3531 11.7702 97.5224
MBA 0.0743 2.4476 100
Yr 2003 Tobin's Q 2.3539 2.3539 78.4623 78.4623
MBE 0.5134 17.1142 95.5765
MBA 0.1327 4.4236 100
Yr 2004 Tobin's Q 2.0315 2.0315 67.7178 67.7178
MBE 0.8966 29.886 97.6038
MBA 0.0719 2.3962 100
Components
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Total Total
% o f
V ariance
Cum ulative
%
Y r2002 ROE 2.6511 2.6511 66.2778 66.2778
ROA 0.9430 23.5743 89.8521
ROI 0.3380 8.4510 98.3031
EARP 0.0679 1.6970 100
Yr 2003 ROE 2.3008 2.3008 57..5200 57.5200
ROA 0.9575 23.9367 81.4567
ROI 0.5109 12.7719 94.2286
EARP 0.2309 5.7713 100
Y r2004 ROE 2.2009 2.2009 55.0235 55.0235
ROA 0.9171 25.4278 80.4513
ROI 0.5490 16.2250 98.6763
EARP 0.1330 3.3238 100
6.5.2 Explanatory Variables
In this section the discussion of the explanatory variables is divided into 4 parts, namely, board 
of directors’, audit committee, nomination committee and remuneration committee corporate 
governance variables. In each section, the variable’s descriptive statistic and correlation analysis 
are examined.
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6.5.2.1 Board of Director’s Corporate Governance Variables
(I) Board o f  Director Independence and Variables Characteristics
Each listed company was required to identify its independent director in accordance to MB SB 
and MCCG (2001) definition (see further section 2.3.4.1). Such independent director definition 
is consistent with Cotter et al., (1997) who exclude a director who is currently or in the past an 
employee of the firm or having business or family ties with management. The proportion of 
independent director (INED) was calculated as the number of independent director to board size. 
This proxy is consistent with the measure used by Zajac and Westphal (1994) and Carcello et 
al., [2002(a)] in computing independent director percentage on the firm’s board.
On average, the boards of the sampled firms comprised 39% (see Table 6.16) of independent 
directors which was slightly higher than the one-third minimum requirement of the MBSB37. As 
shown in Table 6.16, there had been an increase in the proportion of independent director 
(INED) membership in 2003, such that there were more companies appointing more than one- 
third independent directors to the board. Also, the highest presence of independent directors on 
the board had increased from 83% to 88% (see Table 6.16). Subsequently, this variable was 
also transformed to normal scores to be consistent with the employment of normal scores in the 
dependent variables (i.e. firm performance measures, the Tobin’s Q and ROE in Table 6.9). 
According to Cooke (1998), the transformation of both the continuous and discrete data of 
dependent and independent variables will assist in the interpretation of the regression results of 
the relationship between independent and dependent variables.
57 M alaysia  B ourse  S ecu rities L im ited
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The variable domination of independent directors (DOINED), was calculated as the binary 
variable 1 when the firm’s board comprised of more than 50% of independent directors. This 
proxy was consistent with Kesner et al.’s (1986) measure of domination of independent directors 
on the board. As shown in Table 6.14, there were 56 companies in 2003 with majority or more 
independent directors on their board in comparison to 47 companies in 2002. From observations 
of the 221 firms’ corporate governance statements (in their annual reports 2002 and 2003), 
generally, most of the companies agreed that an improvement in the firm’s corporate governance 
practice was important to protect shareholders’ interests, enhance shareholders’ value, improve 
the firm’s reputation and attract further investment into the firm.
On the other hand, domination of independent and non-executive directors was computed as a 
binary variable 1 when there existed more than 50% of total independent and non-executive 
director on the board. This proxy was similar to Lee et al.’s (1992) measure of domination of 
independent and affiliated directors. Further, Table 6.14 showed that in 2002 (2003), there was 
22% (16%) of the 221 companies had not fulfilled the MBSB minimum requirement for one- 
third independent director presence on their board. In their corporate governance statement, 
these companies explained that they had fulfilled the MBSB’s requirement for one-third 
independent director presence with the appointment of non-executive directors such that the 
total of their independent and non-executive directors made up the one-third requirement. These 
companies also stated that the appointment of non-executive directors would ensure the 
establishment of independent views and judgement in board decisions.
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1Year 2002 Y ear 2003
INED NED ED INED NED ED
0 0 38 12 0 45 14
Less than 1/3 48 89 89 36 85 95
1/3 56 19 15 50 23 15
More than 1/3 but less than 50% 70 30 36 79 35 34
50% to less than two-thirds 42 41 68 27 31 58
Two- thirds or more 5 4 1 29 31 5
Total Firms 221 221 221 221 221 221
Table 6.15 provides information about the age groups of the board of directors’ members in the 
221 companies in 2002 and 2003. Many of the firms’ board members were within the age range 
of 40 and above. The highest number of board members in firms was aged 50 to 59.
N um ber of D irector
Y ear 2002 Y ear 2003
Below 30 16 6
30 to 39 126 113
40 to 49 467 396
50 to 59 636 618
60 to 69 400 445
70 and above 130 122
Total Number o f Directors 1775 1770
In addition, Table 6.16 presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables of the 
research model OLS 1, which examined the impact of board independence on firm performance. 
As shown in Table 6.16, the continuous and discrete data of board independence variables were 
transformed to normal scores. The transformation improved the skewness and kurtosis level of 
the proportion of independent directors (INED), proportion of INED on the board with 
accounting and finance background (INACF), percentage of independent directors’ shareholding
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Table 6.16: Descriptive Statistics of Board of Directors’ Independence Variables for the Year 2002 and 2003
[Notes: BOD = Board o f  Directors, INED ' Proportion o f  independent directors on BOD, DO M  IN ED = Domination o f  BOD o f  51%  or more by INED, DOMNEDI =  
Domination o f  BOD o f  51% or more o f  the Combination o f  Independent and Non Executive Directors, INACF -  The proportion o f  INED on the board with accounting and  
finance background, SRINED : the presence o f  senior independent director on the BOD , EXCEO  =  the absence o f  CEO on BOD, CHINED = the present o f  independent BOD  
chairman, FOUD  =  The presence offounder on the BOD, FAMDI= the presence o ffam ily  member on BOD , INSDG  = the percentage o f  independent directors  ’ shareholding in 
the firm , NINED02  =  Normal Scores o f  Proportion o f  INED in 2002, NINACF02 Normal scores o f  INACF in 2002, NFAM DI02=Normal Scores o f  NFAMDI in 2002, 
NINDSG02 Normal Scores o f  INDSG in 2002, NINED03 = Normal Scores o f  Proportion o f  INED in 2003, NINACF03= Normal scores o f  INACF in 2003, NFAMDI03 =Normal 
Scores o f  NFAMDI in 2003, NINDSG03 -  Normal Scores o f  INDSG in 2003 (i.e. All Normal scores were calculated using the Van der Waerden approach)]
f m
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ INED DOMINED DOMNEDI INACF SRINED EXCEO CHINED FOUD FAMDI INSDG
Mean 0.3909 0.2127 0.8190 0.4156 0.4434 0.2308 0.2353 0.3303 0.1710 0.0023
Std Dev. 0.1113 0.4101 0.3859 0.4085 0.4979 0.4223 0.4252 0.4714 0.2047 0.0112
Skewness 0.991 1.414 -1.668 1.277 0.229 1.287 1.257 0.7265 0.73 10.416
Kurtosis 1.914 -0.001 0.791 2.415 -1.965 -0.347 -0.425 -1 .4857 -0.815 128.09
Min 0.13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000 0 0
Max 0.83 1 1 2 1 1 1 1.0000 0.71 0.15
J
INED DOMINED DOMNEDI INACF SRINED EXCEO CHINED FOUD FAMDI INSDG
Mean 0.4145 0.2354 0.81 0.4224 0.4796 0.2896 0.2443 0.3122 0.1618 0.0016
Std Dev. 0.145 0.4359 0.3932 0.353 0.5007 0.4546 0.43067 0.4644 1984 0.0057
Skewness 1.094 1.142 -1.591 3.081 0.082 0.934 1.198 0.8160 0.811 0.164
Kurtosis 1.317 -0.703 0.536 -1.067 -2.012 -1.138 -0.57 -1 .3464 -0.627 29.967
Min 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0000 0 0
Max 0.88 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0000 0.67 0.04
N IN E D 02 N IN A C F 02 N F A M D I02 N IN S D G 02 N IN E D 0 3 j N IN A C F 03 N F A M D I03 N IN S D G 03
M ean 0.0007 0.0336 0.0605 0.0499 0.0031 0.0317 0.0605 0.0553
Std. Dev. 0.9688 0.9014 0.8262 0.8636 0.9672 0.9018 0.8197 0.8481
Skew ness 0.0004 0.4291 0.8357 0.6425 0.0242 0.4021 0.8341 0.7286
K urtosis -0.1481 -0 .6289 -0.3911 -0 .5570 -0 .1962 -0 .6710 -0 .4690 -0.4895
M inim um -2.6117 -1 .0230 -0 .6257 -0 .7850 -2 .4699 -1 .0422 -0 .6120 -0 .7104
M axim um 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117 2.3652 2.2111 2.6117
| N = 221
218
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Table 6.17: Spearman's Correlation Analysis of Board Independence Variables (Year 2002) [2-tailed test]
[Notes:, NINED03  r Normal Scores o f  Proportion o f  INED in 2003, NINACE03 Normal scores o f  INACF in 2003, NFAM DI03=Normal Scores o f  NFAMDI in 2003, NINDSG03 
~ Normal Scores o f  INDSG in 2003 (i.e. All normal scores were calculated using the Van der Waerden approach)', Figures in italics represent the p  value o f  the correlation]
NINED02 DOINED02 DONEDI02 NINACF02 SRI02 EXCEO02 CHIN02 FOUD02 NFAMDI02 NINSDG02
NINED02 1.0000 0.7163 0.2060 0.1964 -0.0107 0.1422 0.0894 -0.0613 -0.1315 0.0562
0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 1 0.0034 0.8746 0.0346 0.1855 0.3647 0.0509 0.4059
DOINED02 0.7163 1.0000 0.2443 0.1069 0.0258 0.1615 0.0767 -0.0594 -0.1504 -0.0181
0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 2 0.1131 0.7031 0.0163 0.2564 0.3798 0.0253 0.7894
DONEDI02 0.2060 0.2443 1.0000 -0.0561 0.0411 0.1180 -0.0994 -0.0447 -0.1677 -0.0100
0 . 0 0 2 1 0 . 0 0 0 2 0.4063 0.5433 0.0800 0.1407 0.5089 0.0126 0.8827
NINACF02 0.1964 0.1069 -0.0561 1.0000 0.0825 0.0640 -0.1715 0.0427 -0.0233 -0.0432
0.0034 0.1131 0.4063 0.2218 0.3433 0.0107 0.5281 0.7304 0.5230
SRI02 -0.0107 0.0258 0.0411 0.0825 1.0000 -0.1862 -0.1301 0.1090 0.0347 0.0868
0.8746 0.7031 0.5433 0.2218 0.0055 0.0534 0.1061 0.6082 0.1989
EXCEO02 0.1422 0.1615 0.1180 0.0640 -0.1862 1.0000 -0.0320 -0.1335 -0.1924 -0.1232
0.0346 0.0163 0.0800 0.3433 0.0055 0.5640 0.0475 0.0041 0.0676
CHIN02 0.0894 0.0767 -0.0994 -0.1715 -0.1301 -0.0320 1.0000 -0.3442 -0.0986 0.0762
0.1855 0.2564 0.1407 0.0107 0.0534 0.5640 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1439 0.2596
FOUD02 -0.0613 -0.0594 -0.0447 0.0427 0.1090 -0.1335 -0.3442 1.0000 0.5905 0.0314
0.3647 0.3798 0.5089 0.5281 0.1061 0.0475 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.6421
NFAMDI02 -0.1315 -0.1504 -0.1677 -0.0233 0.0347 -0.1924 -0.0986 0.5905 1.0000 0.1748
0.0509 0.0253 0.0126 0.7304 0.6082 0.0041 0.1439 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0092
NINSDG02 0.0562 -0.0181 -0.0100 -0.0432 0.0868 -0.1232 0.0762 0.0314 0.1748 1.0000
0.4059 0.7894 0.8827 0.5230 0.1989 0.0676 0.2596 0.6421 0.0092
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Table 6.18: Spearman’s Correlation Analysis of Board Independence Variables (Year 2003) [2-tailed test]
[Notes: NINED03 ~  Normal scores o f  Proportion o f  INED in 2003, NINACE03 Normal scores o f  INACF in 2003, NFAM D I03-N orm al Scores o f  NFAMDI in 2003, NINDSG03 
= Normal Scores o f  INDSG in 2003 (i.e. A ll norma! scores were calculated using the Van der Waerden approach ; Figures in italics represent the p  value o f  the correlation ]
NINED03 DOINED03 DONEDI03 NINACF03 SRI03 EXCEO03 CHIN03 FOUD03 NFAMDI03 NINSDG03
NINED03 1.0000 0.4010 0.3274 0.2055 0.0009 0.1306 0.2194 -0.2159 -0.1989 0.0420
0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 1 0.9890 0.0526 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 0.0030 0.5350
DOINED03 0.4010 1.0000 0.1807 0.0588 0.0567 0.1578 0.0773 -0.1321 -0.0116 -0.0795
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0071 0.3845 0.4017 0.0189 0.2527 0.0499 0.8643 0.2390
DONEDI03 0.3274 0.1807 1.0000 0.1040 0.0033 0.1567 0.0070 -0.1714 -0.1901 0.0670
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0071 0.1232 0.9606 0.0198 0.9171 0.0107 0.0046 0.3217
NINACF03 0.2055 0.0588 0.1040 1.0000 -0.0057 0.0167 -0.0351 -0.0558 -0.0755 -0.0496
0 . 0 0 2 1 0.3845 0.1232 0.9330 0.8046 0.6039 0.4088 0.2640 0.4631
SRI03 0.0009 0.0567 0.0033 -0.0057 1.0000 -0.0738 -0.0611 0.0568 0.0320 -0.0042
0.9890 0.4017 0.9606 0.9330 0.2745 0.3657 0.4009 0.6361 0.9504
EXCEO03 0.1306 0.1578 0.1567 0.0167 -0.0738 1.0000 -0.0380 -0.0857 -0.1661 -0.0182
0.0526 0.0189 0.0198 0.8046 0.2745 0.5739 0.2043 0.0134 0.7878
CHIN03 0.2194 0.0773 0.0070 -0.0351 -0.0611 -0.0380 1.0000 -0.3604 -0.1016 0.0968
0 . 0 0 1 0 0.2527 0.9171 0.6039 0.3657 0.5739 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1323 0.1516
FOUD03 -0.2159 -0.1321 -0.1714 -0.0558 0.0568 -0.0857 -0.3604 1.0000 0.5839 0.0729
0 . 0 0 1 2 0.0499 0.0107 0.4088 0.4009 0.2043 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.2806
NFAMDI03 -0.1989 -0.0116 -0.1901 -0.0755 0.0320 -0.1661 -0.1016 0.5839 1.0000 0.1263
0.0030 0.8643 0.0046 0.2640 0.6361 0.0134 0.1323 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0610
NINSDG03 0.0420 -0.0795 0.0670 -0.0496 -0.0042 -0.0182 0.0968 0.0729 0.1263 1.0000
0.5350 0.2390 0.3217 0.4631 0.9504 0.7878 0.1516 0.2806 0.0610
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in the firm (INSDG), and proportion of family-member directors (FAMDI) in year 2002 and 
2003. Further, Tables 6.17 and 6.18 present the correlation analysis of board independence 
variables in 2002 and 2003 respectively. The analysis indicated that all the board independence 
variables had a low correlation (i.e. r less than 0.6) with respective observed variables (i.e. as 
identified in Chapter 5).
(II) B oard  o f  D irectors  ’ L eadersh ip  a n d  Variables C haracteristics
As reported in Table 6.19, leadership of the Board of Directors of the 221 sampled firms varied 
in terms of the chairman’s independence. Also, year 2003 results pointed that that a slight 
increase in the number of companies appointing an independent director as the board’s 
chairman. In addition, many companies had adopted a separate position for their CEO and 
board’s chairman. At the same time, companies which were controlled by family members had 
gradually reduced their family members’ appointment as the board chairman.
In addition, Table 6.20 below presents the correlation analysis of the board leadership variables 
for the year 2002 and 2003. The correlation between the board leadership variables is less than 
0 .6 .
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Table 6.19:Descriptive Statistics of Board of Director Leadership Variables (Yr 2002-2003)
(Notes: CHINED = B oard 's Chairman is independent director, CHSINED  =  B oard's Chairman is senior independent director, 
CHFOUND  =  B oard's Chairman is foun der , CH NOM  =  B o a rd ’s Chairman is non executive d irector an d  CHFAM = Board's 
Chairman is fa m ily  member, SE PC E O = Separate b o ard  chairm an and  CEO position)
Year
2002
Year
2003
Descrp.
Stat. C H IN ED C H SIN ED CHFOUND C H N O M CHFA M SEPCEO
Mean 0.2353 0.0136 0.099 0.4253 0.3303 0.8914
Std Dev. 0.4252 0.1160 0.3001 0.4955 0.4714 0.3118
Skewness 1.257 8.465 2.693 0.304 0.726 -2.533
Kurtosis -0.425 70.288 5.302 -1.925 -1.486 4.457
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1 1 1 1
52 3 22 94 73 197^ F r e c | ^ ^ ^
Descrp. b h m i
Stat. C H IN E D C H SIN ED CHFO UN D C H N O M CHFA M SEPCEO
Mean 0.2443 0.0181 0.0995 0.3529 0.3122 0.914
Std Dev. 0.4307 0.1336 0.3001 0.479 0.4644 0.281
Skewness 1.198 7.279 2.693 0.62 0.816 -2.974
Kurtosis -0.57 51.45 5.302 -1.631 -1.346 6.908
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1 1 1 1
Freq 54 4 22 78 69 202
Hoard of D irectors S tru c tu re
I Yr 2002 !I Yr 2003
BOD Chairman INED NED ED INED NED ED
54 82 85 54 78 85
Descrp. Stat Yr 2002 Yr 2003
Max 16 14
Min 4 3
Mean 7.9729 7.968
Std Dev 2.0648 1.9912
N = 221 firms
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Table 6.20: Spearman’s Correlation Analysis of Board Leadership Variables (Yr 2002- 
2003) [2-tailed test]
(Notes: CHINED  =  B oard's Chairman is independent director, CHSINED  =  B o a rd ’s Chairman is senior independent director, 
CHFOUND  =  B oard's Chairman is foun der , C H N O M  =  B o a rd ’s Chairman is non executive d irector and CHFAM = B oard's 
Chairman is fa m ily  member, SE PC E O = Separate board 's chairman and CEO position; 02  =  Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003; 
Figures in italic represent the p -  value o f  variables ’ correlation)
CHIN02 CHSIN02 CHFOU02 CHNED02 CHFAM02 SEPCEO02
CHIN02 1.0000 0.2115 -0.1488 -0.3262 -0.3442 0.1593
0.0016 0.0270 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0178
CHSIN02 0.2115 1.0000 -0.0390 -0.1009 -0.0824 0.0409
0.0016 0.5641 0.1347 0.2225 0.5448
CHFOU02 -0.1488 -0.0390 1.0000 -0.1943 0.4734 -0.2725
0.0270 0.5641 0.0037 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
CHNED02 -0.3262 -0.1009 -0.1943 1.0000 -0.1761 0.2415
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1347 0.0037 0.0087 0.0003
CHFAM02 -0.3442 -0.0824 0.4734 -0.1761 1.0000 -0.3424
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.2225 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0087 0 . 0 0 0 0
SEPCEO02 0.1593 0.0409 -0.2725 0.2415 -0.3424 1.0000
0.0178 0.5448 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0003 0 . 0 0 0 0
CHIN03 CHSIN03 CHFOU03 CHNED03 CHFAM03 SEPCEO03
CHIN03 1.0000 0.1598 -0.1891 -0.4200 -0.3604 0.1744
0.0175 0.0048 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0094
CHSIN03 0.1598 1.0000 -0.0451 -0.0292 -0.0915 0.0416
0.0175 0.5044 0.6655 0.1754 0.5380
CHFOU03 -0.1891 -0.0451 1.0000 -0.1191 0.4935 -0.1137
0.0048 0.5044 0.0774 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0918
CHNED03 -0.4200 -0.0292 -0.1191 1.0000 -0.1502 0.2265
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.6655 0.0774 0.0255 0.0007
CHFAM03 -0.3604 -0.0915 0.4935 -0.1502 1.0000 -0.2114
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1754 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0255 0.0016
SEPCEO03 0.1744 0.0416 -0.1137 0.2265 -0.2114 1.0000
0.0094 0.5380 0.0918 0.0007 0.0016
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(III) Board o f Directors’ Competency and Variables Characteristics
Table 6.21 presents the descriptive statistics for board of directors’ educational level and areas 
of expertise. As shown in Table 6.21 many of the 221 sampled firms’ board of directors’ 
members were degree holders. From companies’ annual reports, the study gathered that 
engineer, doctor, accountant and lawyer (which included advocate and solicitor) were common 
groups of professionals being appointed to firms’ board. It was also observed that, directors with 
accounting background comprised of the largest group of experts being appointed to the firm’s 
board in comparison to directors with a finance, law and business background (see Table 6.21).
Further, in measuring board of directors’ educational level, a score of 2, 4, 6 and 8 was 
respectively allocated to board members who had a Bachelor degree, Master’s, Professional 
qualification and Doctor of Philosophy. The impact of proportion of director in the board with 
Bachelor degree (DEG), Master’s (MASK), Professional qualification (PROFL) and Doctor of 
Philosophy (PHD) on firm performance was measured by their respective total scores. 
Subsequently, the scores of directors’ educational level were transformed to normal scores using 
the Van der Waerden approach to be consistent with dependent variable measurement (see 
Cooke, 1998).
Board members’ areas of expertise were also examined in terms of the proportion of directors 
with an accounting (ACTG), finance (FIN), business (BUS) and law (LAW) qualification, and 
who had attended an executive management programme (EXEP), and had a company secretary 
experience [i.e. Number of directors with respective expertise to board size] . Directors with an 
accounting qualification represented individuals with accounting/auditing knowledge and
2 2 4
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experience where the knowledge had been acquired through degree, master, PhD, and/or 
professional accounting qualification, such as the FCCA, IPA (Singapore), ASCPA, ICPA,
5 8CPA, AIA, CA, CIMA, MACPA , in-house experience (such as being an accountant by 
training), and membership of a related accounting organisations such as the AIT, MASB, IIA, 
MIT, MICPA and MIA59.
With respect to director, with a finance qualification, they included directors with a professional 
qualification such as the Certified Financial Analyst, Certified Financial Planner, Certificate 
from the Institute of Bankers, London, bankers, chief financial officer, CEO, insurer, financial 
advisor, and members of banking and financial organisations (such as the Institute of Canadian 
Bankers, the Malaysia Fellowship Institute of Bankers, and so on).
In addition directors with a legal background were described as those with law degree (i.e. 
bachelor, master’s and/or PhD), or by occupation were mostly barristers, lawyers, advocates, 
solicitors and legal advisors. Directors’ enrolment in an executive management programme 
indicated their participation in an Advanced Management Programme (AMP), Senior 
Management Programme (SMP) and Executive Management Programme (EMP) as conducted 
by top business schools such as Harvard University, Stanford University, INSEAD University, 
Wharton University, London Business School, etc.
58 Malaysia Association o f  Chartered Public Accountants.
59 Australia Institute o f Taxation. Malaysia Accounting Standards Board. Malaysia Institute o f Internal Auditors. Malaysia 
Institute o f Taxation, Malaysia Institute o f Certified Public Accountants. Malaysia Institute o f Accountants.
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Table 6.21: Descriptive Statistics of Board of Director Competency Variables (Yr 2002- 2003
[N o te s :  D E G  =  P r o p o r tio n  o f  d ir e c to r s  w ith  b a c h e lo r  d e g re e , M A S K  =  P ro p o r tio n  o f  d ir e c to r s  w ith  M a s te r ’s  d eg ree ,  
P h D =  P ro p o r tio n  o f  d ir e c to r s  w ith  D o c to r  o f  P h ilo s o p h y  d e g re e , P R O F L  =  P ro p o r tio n  o f  d ir e c to r  w ith  p ro fe ss io n a l  
q u a lif ica tio n , A C T G K  — P r o p o r tio n  o f  d ir e c to r s  w ith  a c co u n tin g  r e la te d  q u a lif ica tio n , F IN K  =  p ro p o r tio n  o f  d ire c to rs  
w ith  f in a n c e  r e la te d  q u a lif ic a tio n , B U S K  =  P ro p o r tio n  o f  d ir e c to r s  w ith  b u s in ess  r e la te d  q u a lifica tio n , L A W  =  
P ro p o r tio n  o f  d ir e c to r s  w ith  la w  r e la te d  q u a lif ic a tio n , E X E P R O G  =  P ro p o r tio n  o f  d ir e c to r s  w h o  h a d  a t te n d e d  
e x ec u tive  r e la te d  m a n a g e m e n t p r o g r a m  o r  a d v a n c e d  m a n a g e m e n t p ro g r a m m e  o r  s e n io r  ex ecu tive  p ro g ra m m e,  
C H A S E C  =  P ro p o r tio n  o f  d ir e c to r s  w ith  c o m p a n y  s e c r e ta r y  e x p er ie n c e  a n d /o r  ICSA (In stitu te  o f  C h a r te re d  
S e c r e ta r ia l  a n d  A d m in is tra to r  ) ] ____________________________________________________________________________________________
Descrp.
Stat DEG MASK PHD PROFL ACTGK FINK BUSK LAWK EXEPROG CHASEC
Mean 8.4706 6.0814 18.2443 2.0995 0.1436 0.2634 0.0608 0.0908 0.0246 0.0151
Median 8 4 18 0 2.0769 0.4796 1.1358 0.7376 0.1946 0.1222
Std Dev 4.3521 5.2926 9.5095 4.4731 0.1379 0.1493 0.1078 0.1136 0.0732 0.0575
Skewness 0.5332 1.1378 0.6653 2.5153 0.936 0.651 2.146 1.413 3.515 5.365
Kurtosis -0.029 1.529 0.155 7.373 0.89 0.939 5.136 2.712 13.111 37.406
Min 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 22 28 48 24 0.67 0.86 0.6 0.63 0.44 0.55
Total number of board of director members with Respective Knowledge and Skills in Year 2002
DEG MASK PHD PROFL ACTGK FINK BUSK LAWK EXEPROG CHASEC
Sum 936 336 58 672 459 106 251 163 43 27
Descrp.
Stat DEG MASK PHD PROFL ACTGK FINK BUSK LAWK EXEPROG CHASEC
Mean 8.8959 5.7376 17.5113 1.8824 0.2545 0.0682 0.1506 0.0949 0.0207 0.0104
Median 8 4 18 0 1.9231 0.5294 1.1267 0.7285 0.1674 0.0814
Std Dev 4.3247 4.7505 9.4569 4.3069 0.1411 0.10798 0.1328 0.1209 0.0612 0.0384
Skewness 0.5330 0.9790 0.8595 2.9429 0.872 1.873 0.480 1.508 3.270 4.015
Kurtosis 0.0432 0.9495 0.9802 12.0785 1.245 4.139 -0.691 3.07 11.148 16.997
Min 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 22 24 54 32 0.86 0.57 0.50 0.67 0.38 0.25
J  Total number of board of director members with Respective Knowledge and Skills in Year 2003
DEG MASK PHD PROFL ACTGK FINK BUSK LAWK EXEPROG CHASEC
Sum 983 317 52 645 425 117 249 161 37 18
I (i) Educational Background 2002 2003
[
Lower 30 28
| Undergraduate
Postgraduate
Professional
70
50
40
72
58
45
Others 31 18
(ii) Experience
Private Sector 149 134
Public Sector 72 87
N = 221 firms I
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Table 6.22: Descriptive Statistics of Normal Scores of Board of Directors Competency Variables (Yr 2002-2003)
[N otes: N D E G  =  N o rm a l sc o re s  o f  p ro p o r tio n  o f  d ire c to rs  w ith  b a c h e lo r  d eg ree , N M A SK  =  N o rm a l s c o re s  o f  p r o p o r tio n  o f  d ire c to rs  w ith  M a s te r 's  deg ree , N P h D -  
N o rm a l s c o re s  o f  p ro p o r tio n  o f  d ire c to rs  w ith  D o c to r  o f  P h ilo so p h y  d eg ree , N P R O F L  ~ N o rm a l sc o re s  o f  p ro p o r tio n  o f  d ire c to rs  w ith  p ro fe ss io n a l qualifica tion , 
N A C T G K  =  N o rm a l s c o re s  o f  p ro p o r tio n  o f  d ire c to rs  w ith  a cco u n tin g  r e la te d  q u a lifica tio n , N F IN K  =  N o rm a l s c o re s  o f  p ro p o r tio n  o f  d ire c to rs  w ith  f in a n c e  r e la te d  
q u a lifica tio n , N B U S K  =  N o rm a l s c o re s  o f  p ro p o r tio n  o f  d ire c to rs  w ith  b u s in ess r e la te d  q u a lifica tio n , NLA W  =  N o rm a l s c o re s  o f  p ro p o r tio n  o f  d ire c to rs  w ith  la w  re la te d  
q u a lifica tio n , N E X E P R O G  =  N o rm a l s c o re s  o f  p ro p o r tio n  o f  d ire c to rs  w h o  h a d  a tte n d e d  e x ecu tive  r e la te d  m a n a g em en t p ro g ra m  o r  a d v a n c e d  m a n a g em en t p ro g ra m m e  
o r  se n io r  ex ecu tive  p ro g ra m m e, N C H A S E C  =  N o rm a l sc o re s  o f  p ro p o r tio n  o f  d ire c to rs  w ith  co m p a n y  se c re ta r y  e x p er ie n c e  a n d /o r  1CSA (In stitu te  o f  C h a r te re d  
S e c re ta r ia l a n d  A d m in is tra to r); 02  =  Year 2002 , 03  = Y ear 2 0 0 3 ]
NDEG02 NMASK02 NPHD02 NPROFL02 NACTGK02 NFINK02 NBUSK02 NLAWK02 NEXEP02 NCHASEC02
Mean
Median
Std Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Min
Max
0.0068
0.0113
0.9523
0.0881
-0.3292
-2.6117
2.4699
0.0224
-0.2568
0.8995
0.3178
-0.4506
-1.2128
2.6117
0.0653
-0.2744
0.6675
1.6760
1.5205
-0.2744
2.3652
0.0107
0.0905
0.9356
0.1238
-0.2795
-2.4699
2.4699
0.0042
0.0395
0.9651
0.0760
-0.3864
-1.8279
2.6117
0.0728
-0.4122
0.7601
1.2574
0.3477
-0.4122
2.6117
0.0370
0.0056
0.8908
0.4730
-0.6334
-0.9584
2.6117
0.0587
-0.6534
0.8333
0.7988
-0.4220
-0.6534
2.6117
0.0655
-0.1645
0.6088
2.4515
4.6304
-0.1645
2.6117
0.0547
-0.1075
0.5391
3.1710
8.6680
-0.1075
2.6117
NDEG03 NMASK03 NPHD03 NPROFL03 NACTGK03 NFINK03 NBUSK03 NLAWK03 NEXEP03 NCHASEC03
Mean
Median
Std Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Min
Max
0.0047
-0.1075
0.9573
0.0607
-0.2835
-2.6117
2.6117
0.0216
-0.2220
0.8957
0.3043
-0.3942
-1.2489
2.6117
0.0656
-0.2452
0.6525
1.8263
2.0146
-0.2452
2.6117
0.0085
0.1989
0.9395
0.0842
-0.1770
-2.2111
2.6117
0.0028
-0.0848
0.9686
0.0520
-0.3335
-1.9638
2.6117
0.0701
-0.4745
0.7827
1.1086
0.0412
-0.4745
2.6117
0.0348
0.0452
0.8963
0.4424
-0.6512
-0.9948
2.4699
0.0586
-0.6534
0.8332
0.7998
-0.4155
-0.6534
2.6117
0.0638
-0.1530
0.5971
2.5650
5.1954
-0.1530
2.6117
0.0514
-0.0961
0.5197
3.3702
9.9268
-0.0961
2.4699
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Table 6.23: Spearman’s Correlation Analysis of Board of Directors’ Competency Variables (Year 2002) [2-tailed test]
[Notes: NDEG = Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with bachelor degree, NMASK -  Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with Master’s degree, NPHD= 
Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with Doctor o f Philosophy degree, NPROFL = Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with professional qualification, 
NACTGK =  Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with accounting related qualification, NFINK =  Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with finance related 
qualification, NBUSK =  Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with business related qualification, NLA W =  Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with law related 
qualification, NEXEPROG -  Normal scores o f proportion o f directors who had attended executive related management programme or advanced management 
programme or senior executive program, NCHASEC = Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with company secretary experience and/or ICSA (Institute o f Chartered 
Secretarial and Administrator, 02 = Year 2002, Figures in italics represent the p-value o f the variables’ correlation]
NDEG02 NMASK02 NPHD02 NPROFL02 NACTGK02 NFINK02 NBUSK02 NLAWK02 NEXEP02 NCHASEC02
NDEG02 1.0000 0.4772 0.2530 0.1956 -0.1678 -0.0074 0.0773 0.2266 0.0840 -0.0879
0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0035 0.0125 0.9125 0.2523 0.0007 0.2135 0.1929
NMASK02 0.4772 1.0000 0.1806 0.1724 0.0674 0.1047 0.2692 0.0639 0.1708 -0.0742
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0071 0 . 0 1 0 2 0.3185 0.1208 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.3448 0 . 0 1 1 0 0.2721
NPHD02 0.2530 0.1806 1.0000 0.1455 0.1193 0.0772 -0.0273 0.2520 -0.0016 -0.0134
0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0071 0.0306 0.0768 0.2534 0.6862 0 . 0 0 0 2 0.9816 0.8424
NPROFL02 0.1956 0.1724 0.1455 1.0000 -0.0444 0.1204 -0.0057 0.0619 -0.0076 -0.0885
0.0035 0 . 0 1 0 2 0.0306 0.5119 0.0741 0.9324 0.3601 0.9109 0.1897
NACTGK02 -0.1678 0.0674 0.1193 -0.0444 1.0000 0.2199 0.0483 -0.2096 -0.0121 -0.0259
0.0125 0.3185 0.0768 0.5119 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.4751 0.0017 0.8584 0.7018
NFINK02 -0.0074 0.1047 0.0772 0.1204 0.2199 1.0000 0.0709 0.0131 -0.0874 0.0428
0.9125 0.1208 0.2534 0.0741 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.2937 0.8470 0.1954 0.5270
NBUSK02 0.0773 0.2692 -0.0273 -0.0057 0.0483 0.0709 1.0000 0.0676 0.1095 0.0402
0.2523 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.6862 0.9324 0.4751 0.2937 0.3172 0.1044 0.5522
NLAWK02 0.2266 0.0639 0.2520 0.0619 -0.2096 0.0131 0.0676 1.0000 0.0334 -0.0793
0.0007 0.3448 0 . 0 0 0 2 0.3601 0.0017 0.8470 0.3172 0.6211 0.2402
NEXEP02 0.0840 0.1708 -0.0016 -0.0076 -0.0121 -0.0874 0.1095 0.0334 1.0000 -0.0767
0.2135 0 . 0 1 1 0 0.9816 0.9109 0.8584 0.1954 0.1044 0.6211 0.2562
NCHASEC02 -0.0879 -0.0742 -0.0134 -0.0885 -0.0259 0.0428 0.0402 -0.0793 -0.0767 1.0000
0.1929 0.2721 0.8424 0.1897 0.7018 0.5270 0.5522 0.2402 0.2562
228
CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Table 6.24: Spearman's Correlation Analysis of Board of Director’s Competency Variables (Year 2003) [2-tailed test]
[Notes: NDEG =  Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with bachelor degree, NMASK = Normal scores o f proportion o f director with masters degree, NPHD= 
Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with Doctor o f Philosophy degree, NPROFL = Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with professional qualification, 
NACTGK =  Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with accounting related qualification, NFINK -  Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with finance related 
qualification, NBUSK = Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with business related qualification, NLAW = Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with law related 
qualification, NEXEPROG =  Normal scores o f proportion o f directors who had attended executive related management programme or advanced management 
programme or senior executive programme, NCHASEC =  Normal scores o f proportion o f directors with company secretary experience and/or ICSA (Institute o f 
Chartered Secretarial and Administrator, 03 =  Year 2003, Figures in italics represent the p- value of the correlation]
NDEG03 NMASK03 NPHD03 NPROFL03 NACTGK03 NFINK03 NBUSK03 NLAWK03 NEXEP03 NCHASEC03
NDEG03 1.0000 0.3011 0.1981 0.1478 -0.2673 -0.0433 0.0879 0.3553 0.1203 -0.1756
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0031 0.0280 0.0001 0.5217 0.1928 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0743 0.0089
NMASK03 0.3011 1.0000 0.2214 -0.0587 -0.0363 0.0596 0.2790 0.0206 0.0646 -0.0240
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0009 0.3853 0.5915 0.3780 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.7602 0.3390 0.7230
NPHD03 0.1981 0.2214 1.0000 0.0256 -0.1026 0.1930 -0.0367 0.0224 0.0909 -0.0973
0.0031 0.0009 0.7054 0.1282 0.0040 0.5876 0.7402 0.1782 0.1495
NPROFL03 0.1478 -0.0587 0.0256 1.0000 0.2525 0.1180 -0.0566 0.2302 0.0125 -0.0823
0.0280 0.3853 0.7054 0.0001 0.0802 0.4022 0.0006 0.8533 0.2231
NACTGK03 -0.2673 -0.0363 -0.1026 0.2525 1.0000 0.0997 0.0032 -0.1203 -0.1232 -0.0510
0.0001 0.5915 0.1282 0.0001 0.1394 0.9628 0.0742 0.0675 0.4510
NFINK03 -0.0433 0.0596 0.1930 0.1180 0.0997 1.0000 -0.0155 0.0592 -0.0195 -0.0327
0.5217 0.3780 0.0040 0.0802 0.1394 0.8192 0.3811 0.7731 0.6287
NBUSK03 0.0879 0.2790 -0.0367 -0.0566 0.0032 -0.0155 1.0000 0.0007 0.0012 -0.0017
0.1928 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.5876 0.4022 0.9628 0.8192 0.9920 0.9863 0.9799
NLAWK03 0.3553 0.0206 0.0224 0.2302 -0.1203 0.0592 0.0007 1.0000 0.0088 -0.1377
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.7602 0.7402 0.0006 0.0742 0.3811 0.9920 0.8961 0.0409
NEXEP03 0.1203 0.0646 0.0909 0.0125 -0.1232 -0.0195 0.0012 0.0088 1.0000 0.0954
0.0743 0.3390 0.1782 0.8533 0.0675 0.7731 0.9863 0.8961 0.1575
NCHASEC03 -0.1756 -0.0240 -0.0973 -0.0823 -0.0510 -0.0327 -0.0017 -0.1377 0.0954 1.0000
0.0089 0.7230 0.1495 0.2231 0.4510 0.6287 0.9799 0.0409 0.1575
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Table 6.22 presents the descriptive statistics of the normal scores of board of directors’ educational 
level and areas of expertise. In addition, Tables 6.23 and 6.24 report the correlation analysis of 
board of directors’ competency variables. The results of the analysis indicated that the correlation 
amongst board competency variables was low (i.e. r less than 0.4)
6.5.2.2 Audit Committee Corporate Governance Variables
(I) Audit Committee Independence and Variables Characteristics
With respect to the independence of the audit committee (AC) of the 221 Malaysian firms, there had 
been an improvement in the composition of independent directors on these committees (see Tables 
6.25 and 6.27). For instance in 2003, almost 100% of the sampled firms had 50% or higher 
independent directors (INED) on their AC.
Table 6.25: Audit Committee and Independence Characteristics (Yr 2002-2003)
Yr 2002
........ "
Yr 2003
Audit Committee Members 100% Independent Director 
(AUDF) 22(10%) 20 (9%)
Audit Committee Members 50% or more Independent 
Director (AUDMJ) 207 (94%) 219(99%)
Audit Committee Members More than 50% Independent 
Director (AUGMJ) 202 (91%) 213 (96%)
The presence of a Senior Independent Director on AC 
(ACSIN) 88 (40%) 93 (42%)
CEO is not AC member (AXCEO) 189 (86%) 214(97%)
The presence of independent audit committee member who 
has working experience as an accountant (ACPI) 134 (61%) 132(60%)
The presence of at least one AC member who has working 
experience as an accountant (ACPACT) 197 (89%) 205 (93%)
The Chairman of AC has working experience as an 
accountant (APACH) 75 (34%) 71 (32%)
The presence of family member director on AC (ACFAM) 57 (26%) 55 (25%)
The convening of meeting between AC independent 
director with auditor without executives presence (MTEXT) 155 (70%) 155 (70%)
AC is authorised to report breach of rules to the Exchange 
(RBRE) 76 (34%) 79 (35%)
Figures in brackest represent the percentage o f firms to total sample size o f 221 \
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Also, there had been a growth in the number of firms with greater than 50% of INED on their AC. 
This could imply an improvement in the firms ‘corporate governance practice (see Sommer, 1991), 
due to greater awareness of audit committees’ important role in governing firms’ financial reporting 
practice and internal control (see Abbott et al., 2004, BRC, 1999; Klein 2002) and protecting 
shareholders’ interests in the presence of controlling owner-managers on the board of firms (see 
Jaggi and Leung, 2007). In addition, Table 6.26 presents the descriptive statistics of audit 
committee independence variables. Moreover, Tables 6.28 and 6.29 present the correlation analysis 
of audit committee independence variables. The correlation amongst audit committee independence 
variables is low (i.e. r less than 0.5)
Table 6.26: Descriptive Statistics Analysis of Audit Committee Independence Variables 
(Yr 2002-2003)
(Note: AC = Audit Committee, INED = Independent director, AUDF = Wholly composed of AC by INED, AUGMJ = 
More than majority of AC members was INED, AUDMJ = Majority of AC members was INED, ACSIN = Senior INED 
was AC member, AXCEO = Exclusion of CEO, CFO and/or managing director from AC membership, ACPI = At least 
one independent AC’s member has practical accountant experience, ACPACT = At least one AC member has practising 
accountant experience, APACH = AC’s chairman has practising accountant experience, ACFAM = The presence of 
family-member director in AC, MTEXT = The convening of separate meeting between AC members and external 
auditor without an executive member, RBRE = The transparency of the AC’s authority to report to the MBSB the firm’s 
breach of MBSB listing rulings where a firm’s board has not appropriately resolved the matter raised by the AC.
Descrp. Stat A UDF A U G M J A U D M J ACSIN AX C EO A CPI A C PA C T A PA CH ACFAM M TEXT RBRE
Max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 0.0995 0.9140 0.9367 0.3982 0.8552 0.6878 0.8959 0.3394 0.2579 0.7014 0.3439
Median 0.000 1 1 0.000 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Std Dev 0.3008 0.2810 2.4414 0.4906 0.3527 0.6233 0.3060 0.4746 0.4385 0.4587 0.4761
Skewness 2.693 -2.974 -3.610 0.419 -2.033 0.45 -2.611 0.683 1.114 -0.886 0.662
kurtosis 5.302 6.908 11.131 -1.841 2.151 -0.051 4.861 -1.547 -0.765 -1.226 -1.576
Sum 22 202 207 88 189 152 198 75 57 155 76
Descrp. Stat AUDF A U D M J A U D M J ACSIN A X C EO A CPI A C PA C T A PA CH ACFAM MTEXT RBRE
Max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 0.0905 0.9367 0.9910 0.4208 0.9683 0.6833 0.9276 0.3213 0.2489 0.7014 0.3575
Median 0.00 1 1 0.00 1 1 1 0.00 0 1 0
Std Dev 0.2875 2.4414 0.0949 0.4948 0.1753 0.6390 0.2597 0.468 0.4333 0.4587 0.4803
Skewness 2.874 -3.610 -10.440 -5 -5.385 0.604 -3.323 0.771 1.170 -0.886 0.599
kurtosis 6.319 11.131 107.963 23.21 27.24 0.412 9.123 -1.419 -6.38 -1.226 -1.656
Sum 20 207 219 93 214 160 205 71 55 155 79
.V = 221 firms
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Table 6.27: Distribution of INED, NED and ED on the Audit Committee (Yr 2002-2003)
_______(Note: INED = Independent Director, NED = Non-Executive director, ED = Executive Director)_______
Yr 2002 Yr 2003
INED NED ED INED NED ED
Less than 50% 13 25 221 3 220 220
50% 7 0 0 6 0 0
Greater than 50% but less than 2/3 116 6 0 130 1 1
2/3 and higher but less 100% 63 0 0 62 0 0
100% 22 0 0 20 0 0
Max 44 2 2 4 3 2
Min 1 0 0 1 0 0
Mean 2.4571 0.4570 0.6471 2.4977 0.3891 0.6697
Median 2 0 1 2 0 1
Size o f  A udit C om m ittee
2002 2003
Max 6 7
Min 3 2
Mean 3.5792 3.5566
Median 3 3
| Yr 2002 Yr 2003
INED NED ED INED NED ED
i. Chairman of AC 121 0 0 121 0 0
ii. The presence of firm’s CEO/MD, 
Finance Director, CFO and/or 
Financial Controller
R espectively in 2002 and 2003 there were 32 and 7 o f  the 
respective executives on the audit committee.
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Table 6.28: Spearman’s Correlation Analysis of Audit Committee Independence’s Variables (Year 2002) [2-tailed test]
(Note: AC = Audit Committee, INED = Independent director, AUDF = Wholly composed of AC by INED, AUGMJ = More than majority of AC members was 
INED, AUDMJ = Majority of AC members was INED, ACSIN = Senior INED was AC member, ACPI = At least one independent AC member has practising 
accountant experience, ACPACT = At least one AC’s members has practising accountant experience, APACH = AC’s chairman has practising accountant 
experience, AXCEO = Exclusion of CEO, CFO and/or managing director from AC membership, ACFAM = The presence of family-member director on AC, 
MTEXT = The convening of separate meeting between AC members and external auditor without executive member presence, RBRE = The transparency of 
AC’s authority to report to the MBSB the firm’s breach of MBSB listing rulings where the firm’s board has not appropriately resolved the matter raised by the 
AC, 02 = Year 2002, Figures in Italics represent the p-value of the variables’ correlation).
AUDF02 AUDMJ02 AUGMJ02 ACSIN02 ACPI02 ACPACT02 APACH02 AXCEO02 ACFAM02 MTEXT02 RBRE02
AUDF02 1.0000 0.0865 0.1020 0.0074 0.1319 -0.0352 0.0170 0.1368 -0.1960 -0.0802 -0.0498
0.2003 0.1307 0.9128 0.0502 0.6031 0.8011 0.0422 0.0034 0.2348 0.4613
AUDMJ02 0.0865 1.0000 0.8480 0.0598 0.2070 0.2764 0.1079 0.1041 -0.0165 -0.0073 0.0319
0.2003 0.0000 0.3767 0.0020 0.0000 0.1096 0.1227 0.8070 0.9135 0.6377
AUGMJ02 0.1020 0.8480 1.0000 0.0187 0.1982 0.2126 0.0835 0.1490 -0.0037 -0.0238 0.0181
0.1307 0.0000 0.7828 0.0031 0.0015 0.2166 0.0267 0.9567 0.7252 0.7885
ACSIN02 0.0074 0.0598 0.0187 1.0000 0.0689 0.0351 -0.0169 -0.0330 0.0275 0.0259 0.0727
0.9128 0.3767 0.7828 0.3076 0.6041 0.8030 0.6252 0.6840 0.7022 0.2817
ACPI02 0.1319 0.2070 0.1982 0.0689 1.0000 0.4026 0.5999 -0.0287 0.1252 -0.0169 0.1041
0.0502 0.0020 0.0031 0.3076 0.0000 0.0000 0.6715 0.0632 0.8026 0.1230
ACPACT02 -0.0352 0.2764 0.2126 0.0351 0.4026 1.0000 0.2443 -0.0139 -0.0362 -0.0605 0.1532
0.6031 0.0000 0.0015 0.6041 0.0000 0.0002 0.8371 0.5928 0.3707 0.0228
APACH02 0.0170 0.1079 0.0835 -0.0169 0.5999 0.2443 1.0000 -0.0581 0.1891 0.0710 0.0847
0.8011 0.1096 0.2166 0.8030 0.0000 0.0002 0.3899 0.0048 0.2936 0.2100
AXCEO 0.1368 0.1041 0.1490 -0.0330 -0.0287 -0.0139 -0.0581 1.0000 -0.1101 -0.1561 -0.0540
0.0422 0.1227 0.0267 0.6252 0.6715 0.8371 0.3899 0.1025 0.0202 0.4242
ACFAM02 -0.1960 -0.0165 -0.0037 0.0275 0.1252 -0.0362 0.1891 -0.1101 1.0000 0.0457 -0.0131
0.0034 0.8070 0.9567 0.6840 0.0632 0.5928 0.0048 0.1025 0.4990 0.8464
MTEXT02 -0.0802 -0.0073 -0.0238 0.0259 -0.0169 -0.0605 0.0710 -0.1561 0.0457 1.0000 0.3059
0.2348 0.9135 0.7252 0.7022 0.8026 0.3707 0.2936 0.0202 0.4990 0.0000
RBRE02 -0.0498 0.0319 0.0181 0.0727 0.1041 0.1532 0.0847 -0.0540 -0.0131 0.3059 1.0000
0.4613 0.6377 0.7885 0.2817 0.1230 0.0228 0.2100 0.4242 0.8464 0.0000
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Table 6.29: Spearman’s Correlation Analysis of Audit Committee Independence’s Variables (Year 2003) [2-tailed test]
(Note: AC = Audit Committee, INED = Independent director, AUDF = Wholly composed of AC by INED, AUGMJ = More than majority of AC members was 
INED, AUDMJ = Majority of AC members was INED, ACSIN = Senior INED was AC member, ACPI = At least one independent AC member has practising 
accountant experience, ACPACT = At least one AC’s members has practising accountant experience, APACH = AC’s chairman has practising accountant 
experience, AXCEO = Exclusion of CEO, CFO and/or managing director from AC membership, ACFAM = The presence of family-member director on AC, 
MTEXT = The convening of separate meeting between AC members and external auditor without executive member presence, RBRE = The transparency of 
AC’s authority to report to the MBSB the firm’s breach of MBSB listing rulings where the firm’s board has not appropriately resolved the matter raised by the 
AC, 03 = Year 2003, Figures in Italics represent the p-value of the variables’ correlation).
AUDF03 AUDMJ03 AUGMJ03 ACSIN03 ACPI03 ACPACT03 APACH03 AXCEO03 ACFAM03 MTEXT03 RBRE03
AUDF03 1.0000 0.0301 0.0611 -0.0772 0.1480 -0.0945 0.0194 0.0571 -0.1451 -0.0009 -0.0707
0.6558 0.3657 0.2531 0.0278 0.1617 0.7742 0.3987 0.0311 0.9890 0.2952
AUDMJ03 0.0301 1.0000 0.4931 0.0815 0.0256 0.1577 -0.0366 -0.0173 0.0550 0.0420 -0.0284
0.6558 0.0000 0.2278 0.7052 0.0190 0.5886 0.7983 0.4158 0.5341 0.6743
AUGMJ03 0.0611 0.4931 1.0000 -0.0311 -0.0344 0.0393 0.0296 -0.0351 -0.1126 0.0323 0.0435
0.3657 0.0000 0.6458 0.6105 0.5608 0.6619 0.6043 0.0951 0.6326 0.5204
ACSIN03 -0.0772 0.0815 -0.0311 1.0000 0.0010 0.1320 -0.0761 0.1018 0.0605 0.0555 0.0909
0.2531 0.2278 0.6458 0.9886 0.0500 0.2599 0.1313 0.3705 0.4112 0.1779
ACPI03 0.1480 0.0256 -0.0344 0.0010 1.0000 0.3237 0.5790 0.0714 0.1144 0.0689 0.0883
0.0278 0.7052 0.6105 0.9886 0.0000 0.0000 0.2903 0.0898 0.3078 0.1911
ACPACT03 -0.0945 0.1577 0.0393 0.1320 0.3237 1.0000 0.1922 -0.0505 -0.0007 0.0466 0.1355
0.1617 0.0190 0.5608 0.0500 0.0000 0.0041 0.4548 0.9914 0.4906 0.0442
APACH03 0.0194 -0.0366 0.0296 -0.0761 0.5790 0.1922 1.0000 0.0138 0.0746 0.0467 0.1541
0.7742 0.5886 0.6619 0.2599 0.0000 0.0041 0.8387 0.2692 0.4902 0.0220
AXCEO03 0.0571 -0.0173 -0.0351 0.1018 0.0714 -0.0505 0.0138 1.0000 0.0443 0.0513 0.0271
0.3987 0.7983 0.6043 0.1313 0.2903 0.4548 0.8387 0.5119 0.4476 0.6889
ACFAM03 -0.1451 0.0550 -0.1126 0.0605 0.1144 -0.0007 0.0746 0.0443 1.0000 0.0555 -0.0799
0.0311 0.4158 0.0951 0.3705 0.0898 0.9914 0.2692 0.5119 0.4120 0.2366
MTEXT03 -0.0009 0.0420 0.0323 0.0555 0.0689 0.0466 0.0467 0.0513 0.0555 1.0000 0.2598
0.9890 0.5341 0.6326 0.4112 0.3078 0.4906 0.4902 0.4476 0.4120 0.0001
RBRE03 -0.0707 -0.0284 0.0435 0.0909 0.0883 0.1355 0.1541 0.0271 -0.0799 0.2598 1.0000
0.2952 0.6743 0.5204 0.1779 0.1911 0.0442 0.0220 0.6889 0.2366 0.0001
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(II) Audit Committee’s Leadership and Variables Characteristics s
The MBSB listing rulings (see Para 15.10) require companies to appoint their audit committee’s 
chairman from amongst their independent director members. As shown in Table 6.30, more than 
30% of the companies in the sample had extended the quality of the independence of their AC 
chairman by appointing an experienced independent director (i.e. senior independent director) to the 
chairmanship position. In addition, the number of audit committee chairman with accounting and 
finance knowledge and experience had also increased (see Table 6.31). Given that the committee’s 
chairman has greater authorities than other committee members (namely, having the second casting 
vote at the committee’s meeting and in the appointment of committee members, and having direct 
contact with the board’s chairman and top management executive)60, his/her corporate governance 
experience and accounting knowledge and skills will be valuable in providing effective leadership to 
audit committee members and enhancing the credibility of firm’s financial reporting practice.
Table 630: Audit Committee Leadership Characteristics (Yr 2002-2003)
Yr 2002 Yr 2003
Audit Committee Chairman is Senior Independent Director 
(ACHSIN) 68 (31%) 71 (32%)
Audit Committee Chairman has accounting and finance 
Knowledge and Experience (ACHACF) 112(51%) 125 (57%)
Audit Committee Chairman has business and/or 
management related knowledge and experience 
( ACHBUS)
34 (15%) 38(17%)
Audit Committee Chairman with accounting and finance 
knowledge but has no working experience as accountant 
(ACHOAF)
43 (19%) 58 (26%)
Audit Committee Chairman who has worked as accountant 
(ACHP)
75 (34%) 71 (32%)
The senior independent audit committee chairman has 
working experience as accountant (ACHSINP) 23 (10%) 18 (8%)
Figures in brackets represent the percentage o f firms |
60 This information was gathered from the sampled companies Audit Committee Report
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Table 6.31: Descriptive Statistics Analysis of Audit Committee Leadership Variables 
(Yr 2002-2003)
(Note: AC = Audit Committee, ACHSIN = A C’s chairman is senior independent director, ACHACF = A C 's chairman possesses 
accounting and Finance knowledge and skills, ACHBUS = A C ’s chairman has business/management related knowledge and 
experience. ACHP = A C ’s chairman has practising accountant experience. ACHSINP = AC’s chairman is senior independent director 
who has practising accountant experience)
Descrp. Stat ACHSIN02 ACHACF02 ACHBUS02 ACHP02 ACHSIP02
Mean 0.3077 0.5068 0.1538 0.3394 0.1041
Median 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Std. Dev. 0.4626 0.5011 0.3616 0.4746 0.3060
Skewness 0.8390 -0.0273 1.9319 0.6831 2.6110
Kurtosis -1.3079 -2.0176 1.7481 -1.5474 4.8612
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1
Sum 68 112 34 75 23
Descrp. Stat ACHSIN03 ACHACF03 ACHBUS03 ACHP03 ACHSIP03
Mean 0.3213 0.5656 0.1719 0.3213 0.0814
Median 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Std. Dev. 0.4680 0.4968 0.3782 0.4680 0.2741
Skewness 0.7708 -0.2665 1.7507 0.7708 3.0814
Kurtosis -1.4189 -1.9467 1.0746 -1.4189 7.5635
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1
Sum 71 125 38 71 18
Table 6.32 presents the correlation analysis of audit committee leadership variables. The analysis 
indicated a low correlation amongst audit committee leadership variables (i.e. r less than 0.6)
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Table 6.32: Spearman’s Correlation Analysis of Audit Committee Leadership Variables 
(Yr 2002-2003) [2-tailed test]
(Note: AC = Audit Committee, ACHSIN = AC’s chairman is senior independent director, ACHACF = AC's chairman possesses 
accounting and finance knowledge and skills, ACHBUS = AC’s chairman has business/management related knowledge and 
experience. ACHP = AC’s chairman has practising accountant experience, ACHSINP = AC’s chairman is senior independent director 
who has practising accountant experience. 02 = Year 2002. 03 = Year 2003, Figures in Italics represent the p-value of the 
variables’ correlation)
ACHSIN02 ACHACF02 ACHBUS02 ACHP02 ACHSIP02
ACHSIN02 1.0000 -0.0287 0.0690 -0.0016 0.5112
0.6718 0.3073 0.9812 0.0000
ACHACF02 -0.0287 1.0000 -0.4322 0.5924 0.2769
0.6718 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ACHBUS02 0.0690 -0.4322 1.0000 -0.2791 -0.1453
0.3073 0.0000 0.0000 0.0308
ACHP02 -0.0016 0.5924 -0.2791 1.0000 0.4755
0.9812 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ACHSIP02 0.5112 0.2769 -0.1453 0.4755 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0308 0.0000
ACHSIN03 ACHACF03 ACHBUS03 ACHP03 ACHSIP03
ACHSIN03 1.0000 -0.0813 0.0974 -0.0998 0.4328
0.2287 0.1491 0.1391 0.0000
ACHACF03 -0.0813 1.0000 -0.5200 0.5247 0.2276
0.2287 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007
ACHBUS03 0.0974 -0.5200 1.0000 -0.2621 -0.0919
0.1491 0.0000 0.0001 0.1736
ACHP03 -0.0998 0.5247 -0.2621 1.0000 0.4328
0.1391 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
ACHSIP03 0.4328 0.2276 -0.0919 0.4328 1.0000
0.0000 0.0007 0.1736 0.0000
(III) A  udit C om m ittee C om petency an d  Variables C haracteristics
Specifically, audit committee members’ knowledge and experience in accounting and finance are 
critical when evaluating the firm’s financial and auditing process (DeZoort, 1998; Tan and Kao, 
1999). The results in Table 6.33 indicate that, listed firms in Malaysia were becoming increasingly 
aware of the importance of financial experts in accounting and finance on their audit committee. On 
the other hand, the MBSB’s specific requirements for a qualified financial expert to be appointed in 
the firm’s AC also influenced the increase in the employment of director with accounting and 
finance experience. The results presented in Table 6.33 also show a mix of skills amongst audit
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committee composition (i.e. business, law and secretarial background). Table 6.34 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the proportion of audit committee member with accounting and finance 
knowledge (AUACF), practising accountant experience (APACT), business/management related 
knowledge and experience (see Abbott et al., 2006), law background and company secretary 
experience (ACSEC).
Table 6.33: Range of Knowledge and Skills of Audit Committee Members (Yr 2002, 2003)
No of persons 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Freq Year 2002 85 88 28 10 1 202
(N = 221 firms) 2003 75 90 47 6 1 219
No of persons 1 2 3 4 Total
Freq Year 2002 157 38 3 0 198
(N = 221 firms) 2003 161 39 3 2 205
i No of persons 1 2 3 Total
Freq Year 2002 72 17 3 92
(N = 221 firms) 2003 94 30 1 125
No of persons 1 2 3 Total
Freq Year 2002 64 11 1 76
(N = 221 firms) 2003 60 10 0 70
N u m ber o f  AC M em b ers w ith  ch artered  secretaria l and a d m in istra tor  q u a lifica tion  (A C S E C )
i1 No of persons 1 Total
Freq Year 2002 6 6
(N = 221 firms) 2003 10 10
Variables were subsequently transformed to normal scores to be consistent with the dependent 
variable measurement and assist interpretation of hypothesis testing of the impact of audit 
committee competencies on firm performance (see Table 6.35). Table 6.36 reports the correlation 
analysis of audit committee competency variables. The correlation amongst audit committee 
variables was low (i.e. r less than 0.5)
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Table 6.34: Descriptive Statistics of Audit Committee Knowledge & Skills Variables
(Yr 2002, 2003) [AC -  A udit Committee. AUACF = Proportion o f  AC members with accounting and finance knowledge. 
APACT= Proportion o f AC members with practising accountant experience. ACBUS = Proportion o f AC members with 
business/management related knowledge and experience , ACLAW = Proportion o f AC members with law background. ACSEC = 
Proportion o f  AC members with company secretary experience ACSEC, N = 221 firms],_______
Descrp. Stat AUACF APACT ACBUS ACLAW ACSEC
Mean 0.4973 0.3144 0.1461 0.1133 0.0180
Median 0.5000 0.3333 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Std. Dev. 0.2374 0.1689 0.1967 0.1757 0.0746
Skewness 0.2292 0.3316 1.2476 1.6029 4.1994
Kurtosis -0.2877 0.4088 1.3075 2.9570 17.2056
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 1.0000 0.6667 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000■■m
Descrp. Stat AUACF APACT ACBUS ACLAW ACSEC
Mean 0.5458 0.3329 0.1996 0.1014 0.0130
Median 0.5000 0.3333 0.2000 0.0000 0.0000
Std. Dev. 0.2275 0.1699 0.2074 0.1608 0.0606
Skewness 0.3030 0.7070 0.7162 1.3455 4.6079
Kurtosis -0.6098 1.4200 -0.3297 0.9153 19.9736
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Max 1.0000 1.0000 0.6667 0.6667 0.3333
Table 6.35: Descriptive Statistics of the Normal Scores of Audit Committee Competency
Variables (Yr 2002, 2003) [AC = Audit Committee. NAUACF = Normal scores o f proportion o f AC members with 
accounting and finance knowledge. NAPACT= Normal scores o f  proportion o f AC members w ith practising accountant experience. 
NACBUS = Normal scores o f  proportion o f  AC members with business/management related knowledge and experience. NACLAW = 
Normal scores o f  proportion o f  AC members with law; background. NACSEC = Normal scores o f  proportion o f AC members with 
company secretary experience ACSEC. N -  221 firms].________________________________________________________________
Descrp. Stat NAUACF02 NAPACT02 NACBUS02 NACLAW02 NACSEC02
Mean -0.0034 -0.0026 0.0613 0.0678 0.0435
Median 0.0395 0.3038 -0.5452 -0.4431 -0.0735
Std. Dev. 0.9389 0.9092 0.7925 0.7619 0.4734
Skewness -0.0500 -0.0085 0.9352 1.1556 1.9019
Kurtosis -0.4333 -0.5782 -0.2748 0.1323 6.7647
Min -2.0042 -1.6068 -0.5452 -0.4431 -0.0735
Max 1.7709 1.6276 2.6117 2.6117 2.6117
Descp. Stat NAUACF03 NAPACT03 NACBUS03 NACLAW03 NACSEC03
Mean -0.0028 -0.0008 0.0413 0.0684 0.0368
Median -0.1018 0.2162 -0.0678 -0.4061 -0.0565
Std. Dev. 0.9368 0.9243 0.8362 0.7450 0.4320
Skewness -0.0806 0.0480 0.5319 1.2352 1.4814
Kurtosis -0.3899 -0.1783 -0.9106 0.2663 7.4833
Min -2.4699 -1.7709 -0.7774 -0.4061 -0.0565
Max 1.6716 2.6117 1.7444 2.3652 2.2111
2 3 9
CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Table 6.36: Spearman’s Correlation Analysis of Audit Committee Competency Variables 
(Yr 2002 and 2003) [2-tailed test]
(AC = Audit Committee, NAUACF = Normal scores o f the proportion o f AC members with accounting and finance knowledge, 
NAPACT= Normal scores o f  the proportion o f AC members with practising accountant experience. NACBUS = Normal scores o f 
the proportion o f  AC members with business/management related knowledge and experience. NACLAW = Normal scores o f the 
proportion o f  AC members with law background. NACSEC = Normal scores o f the proportion o f AC members with company 
secretary experience ACSEC. Figures in Italics represent the p-value o f  the variables’ correlation).
NAUACF02 NAPACT02 NACBUS02 NACLAW02 NACSEC02
NAUACF02 1.0000 0.4486 -0.2994 -0.1054 -0.0010
0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1181 0.9887
NAPACT02 0.4486 1.0000 -0.1366 -0.1849 0.1093
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0425 0.0058 0.1051
NACBUS02 -0.2994 -0.1366 1.0000 -0.0671 0.0179
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0425 0.3208 0.7912
NACLAW02 -0.1054 -0.1849 -0.0671 1.0000 -0.1323
0.1181 0.0058 0.3208 0.0496
NACSEC02 -0.0010 0.1093 0.0179 -0.1323 1.0000
0.9887 0.1051 0.7912 0.0496
NAUACF03 NAPACT03 NACBUS03 NACLAW03 NACSEC03
NAUACF03 1.0000 0.3448 -0.4142 -0.1125 0.0969
0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0954 0.1509
NAPACT03 0.3448 1.0000 -0.0975 -0.1423 -0.0641
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1487 0.0345 0.3426
NACBUS03 -0.4142 -0.0975 1.0000 -0.0335 0.0141
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1487 0.6207 0.8350
NACLAW03 -0.1125 -0.1423 -0.0335 1.0000 0.0012
0.0954 0.0345 0.6207 0.9856
NACSEC03 0.0969 -0.0641 0.0141 0.0012 1.0000
0.1509 0.3426 0.8350 0.9856
6.5.2.3 Nomination Committee Corporate Governance Variables
In terms of the establishment of a nomination committee in the 221 sampled firms, more than 82% 
of the companies had set up a nomination committee61 (see Table 6.37). Further, most of the 
companies with nomination committee had a high proportion of independent directors on the 
committee and this practice had extended with the increased appointment of independent director as 
chairman of the committee. In addition, the presence of a dominating figure such as the CEO, CFO 
managing director and Executive Board Chairman on the nomination committee had been reduced
61 Respectively in 2002 and 2003, 41 and 40 companies have not yet formed Nomination Committee
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in 2003. The increase in companies’ pursuits of establishing appropriate governance at board level 
may have indicated their support and commitment of practising good corporate governance. Further, 
when such pursuit is appropriately and continually practised in the long term, it will ensure a fair 
and objective selection of prospective board members (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1996), effective 
assessment of current board members’ contribution, appointment of competent directors, and better 
organisation of the firm’s human resources and skills (Gregory, 2001; Vafeas, 1999). Table 6.38 
presents the descriptive statistics of nomination committee corporate governance variable.
Table 6.37: Distribution of INED, NED and ED on the Nomination Committee (NC) 
(Yr 2002-2003)
(Note: INED = Independent Director, NED = Non-Executive director, ED = Executive Director)
Yr 2002 I Yr 2003 1
INED NED ED INED NED ED
Less than 1/3 4 83 169 2 105 167
1/3 7 78 9 5 62 11
Greater than 1/3 but less than §0% 0 5 0 3 3 0
§0% but less than 100% 111 11 2 103 9 3
100% 58 3 0 68 2 0
Max 4 3 2 4 3 2
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 2.3073 0.7333 2.3297 2.3297 0.6022 0.1484
Median 2 1 2 2 1 0
2002 2003
Max 6 6
Min 2 2
Mean 3.1167 3.1381
Median 3 3
1 Yr 2002 Yr 2003 |
INED NED ED INED NED ED
i. Chairman ofN C 134 45 1 143 36 2
ii. The presence of CEO, CFO, MD 
and or Executive Board Chairman 
on NC
Respectively in 2002 and 2003 there were 10 and 8 of the respective 
executives on the NC.
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Table 6.38: Descriptive Statistics of Nomination Committee Corporate Governance Variables for the Year 2002 and 2003
(N ote: N C = N om ination  C om m ittee , N C E X IST  = T he estab lishm en t o f  nom ination  com m ittee  (N C ) in the com pany, N C IN E D  = P roportion  o f  IN ED  on the 
N C, N N C IN E D  = N orm al scores o f  the proportion  o f  IN ED  on the N C , N C E X C E O  = T he absence o f  C EO  on nom ination  com m ittee  com position , N C FA M  = 
The presence o f  fam ily m em ber on N C, N C H IN E D  = T he appoin tm ent o f  independent d irec to r as the C hairm an o f  N C, N C H S IN E D  = T he appo in tm en t o f  
S en io r independent d irecto r as NC chairm an , N C SIN E D  = T he p resence o f  Senior independent d irec to r on N C )
Descrp. mm im i
Stat NCEXIST NCINED NCEXCEO NNCFAM NCHINED NCHSINED NCSINED NNCINED
Mean 0.8190 0.6127 0.7964 0.0905 0.5882 0.1403 0.3258 -0.0082
Std Dev. 0.3859 0.3460 0.4036 0.2875 0.4933 0.3481 0.4697 0.8457
Skewness -1.668 -0.735 -1.482 2.874 -0.361 2.086 0.749 -0.1050
Kurtosis 0.791 -0.610 0.198 6.319 -1.887 2.373 -1.453 -1.1150
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.2867
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.1024
Sum 181 135.42 176 20 130 31 72 -1.8192
Descrp. mmB B mmm u
Stat NCEXIST NCINED NCEXCEO NNCFAM NCHINED NCHSINED NCSINED NNCINED
Mean 0.8371 0.6167 0.8047 0.0995 0.6742 0.1493 0.3484 -0.0111
Std Dev. 0.3701 0.3568 0.3974 0.3149 0.4697 0.3572 0.4776 0.8383
Skewness -1.838 -0.704 -1.548 3.125 -0.749 1.981 0.641 -0.1382
Kurtosis 1.392 -0.740 0.399 9.417 -1.453 1.943 -1.604 -1.2154
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.2613
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.0326
Sum 185 136.30 173 22 149 33 77 -2.4596
N = 221 firms
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Table 6.39 identifies the correlation amongst nomination committee corporate governance variables. 
The correlation between nomination committee composition and structure variables was low (i.e. r 
less than 0.7)
Table 6.39: Spearman’s Correlation Analysis of Nomination Committee Corporate 
Governance Variables (Yr 2002-2003) [2-tailed test]
(N ote: N C E X IS T  =  T he e s tab lish m en t o f  nom ination  com m ittee  (N C ) in th e  co m pany , N N C IN E D  = N orm al scores o f  
th e  p ropo rtion  o f  IN E D  on  th e  N C , N C E X C E O  = T he absen ce  o f  C E O  in n o m in a tio n  com m ittee  com position , N C FA M  
= T he p resence  o f  fam ily  m em b er on N C , N C H IN E D  = T he appo in tm en t o f  independen t d irec to r as the C hairm an o f  
N C , N C H S IN E D  = T h e  ap p o in tm en t o f  S en io r independen t d irec to r as N C  cha irm an , N C S IN E D  = The presence o f  
S en io r independen t d irec to r in N C , 02 =  Y ear 2002 , 03 =  y ea r 2003 , F igu res in Ita lics rep resen t p -value o f  th e  v ariab les’ 
co rre la tion )
NCEXIS02 NNCINED02 NCXCEO02 NCFAM02 NCHIN02 NCHSIN02 NCSIN02
NCEXIS02 1.0000 0 .6589 0 .8713 0 .1073 0 .5380 0.1899 0.3268
0.0000 0.0000 0 .1 1 1 6 0.0000 0 .0 0 4 6 0.0000
NNCINED02 0 .6589 1.0000 0 .6479 0 .0374 0 .6332 0.1068 0 .2862
0.0000 0.0000 0 .5 8 0 2 0.0000 0 .1 1 3 5 0.0000
NCXCEO02 0.8713 0 .6479 1.0000 0.1203 0 .4902 0.1719 0.3275
0.0000 0.0000 0 .0 7 4 2 0.0000 0 .0 1 0 5 0.0000
NCFAM02 0 .1073 0 .0374 0 .1203 1.0000 -0 .0566 0.0543 -0 .0510
0 .1 1 1 6 0 .5 8 0 2 0 .0 7 4 2 0 .4 0 2 8 0 .4 2 2 2 0 .4 5 0 5
NCHIN02 0 .5380 0 .6332 0 .4902 -0 .0566 1.0000 0.2585 0.2873
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .4 0 2 8 0 .0 0 0 1 0.0000
NCHSIN02 0 .1899 0 .1068 0 .1719 0.0543 0 .2585 1.0000 0.5811
0 .0 0 4 6 0 .1 1 3 5 0 .0 1 0 5 0 .4 2 2 2 0 .0 0 0 1 0.0000
NCSIN02 0 .3268 0 .2862 0.3275 -0 .0510 0 .2873 0.5811 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .4 5 0 5 0.0000 0.0000
NCEXIS03 NNCINED03 NCXCEO03 NCFAM03 NCHIN03 NCHSIN03 NCS1N03
NCEXIS03 1.0000 0 .6325 0.8375 0 .1429 0 .6346 0 .1848 0.3226
0.0000 0.0000 0 .0 3 3 7 0.0000 0 .0 0 5 9 0.0000
NNCINED03 0 .6325 1.0000 0.6315 -0 .0453 0 .5827 0.2033 0.3164
0.0000 0.0000 0 .5 0 3 0 0.0000 0 .0 0 2 4 0.0000
NCXCEO03 0 .8375 0 .6315 1.0000 0 .0962 0 .5002 0.1283 0.2470
0.0000 0.0000 0 .1 5 4 3 0.0000 0 .0 5 6 8 0 .0 0 0 2
NCFAM03 0 .1429 -0 .0453 0 .0962 1.0000 0 .0614 0 .0366 0.0854
0 .0 3 3 7 0 .5 0 3 0 0 .1 5 4 3 0 .3 6 3 9 0 .5 8 8 1 0 .2 0 5 9
NCHIN03 0 .6346 0 .5827 0 .5002 0 .0614 1.0000 0.2642 0 .2246
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .3 6 3 9 0 .0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 8
NCHSIN03 0.1848 0.2033 0 .1283 0 .0366 0 .2642 1.0000 0 .5729
0 .0 0 5 9 0 .0 0 2 4 0 .0 5 6 8 0 .5 8 8 1 0 .0 0 0 1 0.0000
NCSIN03 0 .3226 0 .3164 0 .2470 0 .0854 0 .2246 0 .5729 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0 .0 0 0 2 0 .2 0 5 9 0 .0 0 0 8 0.0000
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6 . 5 . 2 . 4 Remuneration Committee Corporate Governance Variables
Similar to the practices found in relation to Nomination Committee, there had been an increase in 
the number of firms establishing a remuneration committee (RC) in their company (see Table 6.40). 
Result also indicated a higher presence of family member directors on the remuneration committee 
than nomination committee. Particularly in 2003, there had been a slight increase in the number of 
family director members on the remuneration committee. Nevertheless, the influence of family 
members on the remuneration committee was monitored by the high presence of independent 
directors on the committee. On average companies had more than a 50% presence of independent 
directors on the committee (see Table 6.40).
Moreover, many companies had appointed independent director as the RC chairman which further 
enhanced the objectivity and impartiality of remuneration committee judgements. Also the high 
proportion of independent directors and the appointment of an independent chairman to the 
remuneration committee would provide strong independent influence when the CEO or CFO is part 
of the committee member (see Table 6.41). Table 6.42 presents the correlation analysis of the 
corporate governance variables of the remuneration committee. The correlation amongst the 
remuneration committee variables was low (i.e. r less than 0.6).
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Table 6.40: Descriptive Statistics of Remuneration Committee Corporate Governance Variables for the Year 2002 and 2003
(Note: The Table describes RCEXIST - The establishment o f remuneration committee (RC) in the company, RCINED = The proportion o f INED on the RC, NRCINED = The 
normal scores o f proportion o f INED on the RC RCEXCEO = The absence o f CEO on the remuneration committee composition, RCFAM = The presence o f family member on 
RC, RCHINED = The appointment o f independent director as the Chairman o f RC, RCHSINED = The appointment o f Senior independent director as RC chairman, RCSINED = 
The presence o f Senior independent director on RC)
Descrp. Mail BBI
Stat. RCEXIST RCINED RCEXCEO RCFAM RCHINED RCHSINED RCSINED NRCINED
Mean 0.8326 0.5069 0.5566 0.2036 0.5928 0.1267 0.2941 0.0063
Std Dev. 0.3742 0.3100 0.4979 0.414 7 0.4924 0.3334 0.4567 0.8829
Skewness -1.794 -0.478 -0.229 1.673 -0.38 2.26 0.910 0.1287
Kurtosis 1.229 0.800 -1.965 1.383 -1.872 3.135 -1.183 -0.7609
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.2489
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.6492
Sum 184 112.2 123 45 131 28 65 1.3838
Descrp. ■ ■
Stat. RCEXIST RCINED RCEXCEO RCFAM RCHINED RCHSINED RCSINED NRCINED
Mean 0.8552 0.5456 0.5882 0.2489 0.6471 0.1538 0.3348 -0.0003
Std Dev. 0.3527 0.3123 0.4933 0.4538 0.4790 0.3616 0.4730 0.8784
Skewness -2.033 -0.544 -0.361 1.461 -0.620 1.932 0.705 0.0302
Kurtosis 2.151 -0.599 -1.887 0.888 -1.631 1.748 -1.517 -0.8211
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.3265
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.4605
Sum 189 120.57 130 55 143 34 74 -0.0744
N = 221 firms
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Table 6.41: The Distribution of INED, NED and ED on the Remuneration Committee 
(RC) [Yr 2002-2003]
(Note: INED = Independent Director, NED = Non-Executive director. ED = Executive Director)
Yr 2002 Yr 2003 1
INED NED ED INED NED ED
Less than 1/3 13 98 122 10 96 123
1/3 20 52 58 19 56 59
Greater than 1/3 but les than 50% 3 4 3 3 2 1
50% but les than 100% 126 22 0 122 17 3
100% 21 7 0 3 5 0
Max 4 4 2 4 4 2
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 2 0 .7923 0 .4918 2.0321 0 .6684 0.4886
Median 2 1 0 2 1 0
Size of Remuneration Committee
2002 2003
Max 5 7
Min 2 2
Mean 3.2951 3.2043
Median 3 3
Structure of Remuneration Committee
Yr 2002 Yr 2003
INED NED ED INED NED ED
i. Chairman ofRC 131 46 6 139 37 10
ii. The presence of CEO, CFO, 
MD and or Executive Board 
Chairman in RC
R espective ly  in 2002 and 2003 there  w ere  51 and 42 o f  the  respective 
execu tives  on the  RC.
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Table 6.42: Spearman’s Correlation of Remuneration Committee Corporate Governance 
Variables (Yr 2002-2003) [2-tailed test]
(Note: The Table describes RCEXIST = The establishment o f  remuneration committee (RC) in the company. RCINED = The 
proportion o f  INED in the RC. NRCINED = The normal scores o f  proportion o f INED in the RC RCEXCEO = The absence o f 
CEO in the remuneration committee composition. RCFAM = The presence o f family member in RC. RCHINED = The 
appointment o f  independent director as the Chairman o f  RC. RCHSINED = The appointment o f  Senior independent director as 
RC chairman. RCSINED = The presence o f Senior independent director in RC. 02 = Year 2002. 03 = Year 2003. Figures in 
Italics represent p-value o f  the variables* correlation)
RCEXIS02 RCINED02 RCXCEO02 RCFAM02 RCHIN02 RCHSIN02 RCSIN02
RCEXIS02 1.0000 0.6309 0.5024 0.1933 0.5410 0.1708 0.2895
0.0000 0.0000 0.0039 0.0000 0 . 0 1 1 0 0.0000
RCINED02 0.6309 1.0000 0.3792 0.1333 0.6717 0.2213 0.2945
0.0000 0.0000 0.0479 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000
RCXCEO02 0.5024 0.3792 1.0000 -0.1044 0.2056 0.0935 0.1364
0.0000 0.0000 0.1218 0 . 0 0 2 1 0.1658 0.0428
RCFAM02 0.1933 0.1333 -0.1044 1.0000 0.1331 0.0475 0.1237
0.0039 0.0479 0.1218 0.0481 0.4828 0.0664
RCHIN02 0.5410 0.6717 0.2056 0.1331 1.0000 0.2603 0.2723
0.0000 0.0000 0 . 0 0 2 1 0.0481 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0000
RCHSIN02 0.1708 0.2213 0.0935 0.0475 0.2603 1.0000 0.5901
0 . 0 1 1 0 0.0009 0.1658 0.4828 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0000
RCSIN02 0.2895 0.2945 0.1364 0.1237 0.2723 0.5901 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0428 0.0664 0.0000 0.0000
RCEXIS03 RCINED03 RCXCEO03 RCFAM03 RCHIN03 RCHSIN03 RCSIN03
RCEXIS03 1.0000 0.6084 0.4918 0.2308 0.5302 0.1755 0.2919
0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0090 0.0000
RCINED03 0.6084 1.0000 0.4264 0.0710 0.5902 0.1924 0.2968
0.0000 0.0000 0.2932 0.0000 0.0041 0.0000
RCXCEO03 0.4918 0.4264 1.0000 -0.1700 0.2863 0.0255 0.1066
0.0000 0.0000 0.0114 0.0000 0.7064 0.1141
RCFAM03 0.2308 0.0710 -0.1700 1.0000 0.1456 0.1096 0.1630
0.0005 0.2932 0.0114 0.0305 0.1041 0.0153
RCHIN03 0.5302 0.5902 0.2863 0.1456 1.0000 0.2362 0.2030
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0305 0.0004 0.0024
RCHSIN03 0.1755 0.1924 0.0255 0.1096 0.2362 1.0000 0.6010
0.0090 0.0041 0.7064 0.1041 0.0004 0.0000
RCSIN03 0.2919 0.2968 0.1066 0.1630 0.2030 0.6010 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.1141 0.0153 0.0024 0.0000
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6 .5 .3  Control Variables Characteristics
(I) Descriptive Statistics o f Control Variables
In data analysis modelling, control variables are identified as “the variables that are not 
changed throughout the trials in an experiment because the experimenter is not interested in the 
effect o f that variable being changed for that particular experiment” [Wikipedia (a)]. 
Specifically, they are extraneous factors that can possibly have an effect on observations, 
however, they are kept constant to minimise their impact on outcomes. Respectively, Tables 
6.43 and 6.44 present the descriptive statistics of the research control variables before and after 
normal scores transformation. The total assets (ASET) represent Datastream item (02999AQ). In 
addition, debt to equity ratio (DEQ) was computed as total debt divided by common equity 
using Datastream items long term debt (wc03251), current liabilities (wc03101) and common 
equity (wc03501).
On the other hand, proportion of specific foreign director (FORS) was computed as total foreign 
directors from countries with strong corporate governance system62 divided by board of director 
size; Non-Executive Directors’ Remuneration (NREMU) was obtained from the sampled firms’ 
annual report in the corporate governance statement or notes of account for operating expenses 
sections; Proportion of family-member directors with Accounting & Finance background 
(NFACF) was calculated as total number of family-member directors with Accounting & 
Finance background divided by board sizeSize of board of directors (BDSZ) was calculated as
6: T h is ca tegory  w as d ev e lo p ed  in considera tion  o f  th e  co rp o ra te  governance  standard  rank ing  o f  the  respective 
coun tries, n am ely , E u ropean  co u n trie s  (i.e. U K , F rance, G erm any , D enm ark  and Sw itzerland), US, A ustralia  and 
S ingapo re  as repo rted  by C orne liu s  (2005) and FT SE  (2005 )
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Table 6.43: Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables for Year 2002 and 2003 (before data transformation)
(Notes; 02= Year 2002; 03 = Year 2003; RM = Malaysian Ringgit; ASET -  Total Assets; DEQ -  Debt to equity Ratio; FORS= Proportion of Specific Foreign 
Directors; NREMU= Non-Executive Directors' Remuneration; FACF = Proportion of family-member directors with accounting and finance background; AUF5 
= Firm’s External Auditor is one of the Big 5 Audit Firms; INDPV = Total Proportion of Individuals' and/or Private Companies ’ Substantial Equity Holdings; 
1NSTL = Total Proportion of Government Agencies', Public Limited Companies'/Corporations' and/or Other Institutions’ Substantial Equity Holdings; BDSZ= 
Size of Board of Directors)
ASET02
(RM‘000) DEQ02 FORS02
NREMU02
(RM‘000) FACF02
AUF502 INDPV02 INSTL02 BDSZ02
Mean 2889800.61 2.03 0.06 229.32 0.03 0.73 0.26 0.25 8.01
Std. Dev. 12297998.53 5.16 0.12 286.18 0.09 0.45 0.22 0.28 2.06
Skewness 8.96 6.36 2.36 4.08 3.78 -1.04 0.26 0.71 0.48
Kurtosis 96.36 54.56 5.11 23.16 17.80 -0.94 -1.06 -1.05 0.63
Min 4626.00 -4.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00
Max 149663840.00 55.17 0.60 2433.00 0.67 1.00 0.81 0.83 16.00
ASET03
(RM‘000) DEQ03 FORS03
NREMU03
(RM‘000) FACF03 AUF503 INDPV03 INSTL03 BDSZ03
Mean 3041629.82 1.99 0.05 238.24 0.03 0.71 0.24 0.26 7.70
Std. Dev. 13040441.41 3.94 0.12 257.53 0.09 0.45 0.21 0.29 1.99
Skewness 9.08 3.59 2.77 3.06 4.10 -0.93 0.37 0.75 0.35
Kurtosis 98.97 14.87 8.55 13.74 21.11 -1.14 -0.94 -0.88 0.10
Min 4982.00 -5.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
Max 159844528.00 26.72 0.73 2022.00 0.67 1.00 0.89 1.00 14.00
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Table 6.44: Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables for Year 2002 and 2003 (After Normal Scores Transformation)
(Notes: 02= Year 2002; 03 = Year 2003; ASET -Total Assets; DEQ = Debt to equity Ratio; FORS- Proportion of Specific Foreign Directors; NREMU= Non- 
Executive Directors' Remuneration; FACF= Family-member Directors with Accounting & Finance Background; INDPV= Total Proportion of Individuals’ 
and/or Private Companies’ Substantial Equity Holdings; INSTL = Total Proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Limited Companies’/Corporations’ and/or 
Other Institutions ’ Substantial Equity Holdings; BDSZ- Size of Board of Directors, A letter N was inserted at the front of each control variable’s acronym to 
identify the variables that had been transformed to normal score using Van der Waerden approach)
NASET02 NDEQ02 NFORS02 NNREMU02 NFACF02 NINDPV02 NINSTL02 NBDSZ02
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Min
Max
0.0000
0.9813
0.0000
-0.2179
-2.6117
2.6117
0.0004
0.9804
0.0053
-0.2276
-2.6117
2.7117
0.0745 
0.7104 
1.6060 
1.2643 
-0.3038 
2.6117
0.0000
0.9812
0.0002
-0.2181
-2.6117
2.6117
0.0719
0.6631
1.9795
2.5675
-0.2278
2.6117
0.0316
0.9081
0.4029
-0.6311
-1.0619
2.6117
0.0438
0.8766
0.5512
-0.6473
-0.8644
2.3652
0.0027
0.9568
0.0486
-0.2536
-2.0482
2.6117
NASET03 NDEQ03 NFORS03 NNREMU03 NFACF03 NINDPV03 NINSTL03 NBDSZ03
Mean
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Min
Max
0.0000
0.9813
0.0000
-0.2179
-2.6117
2.6117
0.0004
0.9804
0.0055
-0.2285
-2.6117
2.6117
0.0742
0.6972
1.7074
1.5917
-0.2803
2.6117
0.0000
0.9812
0.0001
-0.2179
-2.6117
2.6117
0.0711
0.6544
2.0515
2.8533
-0.2162
2.6117
0.0334
0.9043
0.4240
-0.6313
-1.0326
2.6117
0.0443
0.8780
0.5620
-0.6025
-0.8644
2.6117
0.0019
0.9573
0.0278
-0.2170
-2.6117
2.6117
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the total number of directors in the board of director; The name of the big 5 audit firms (i.e. 
PwC, KPMG, Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen and Deloitte) [AUDF5] was obtained from the 
firm’s annual report’s section of corporate information.
On the other hand, substantial shareholders’ equity holding in the company was obtained from 
the company’s annual report’s section of Analysis of Shareholdings, [i.e. INDPVC= Total 
proportion of Individuals’ and/or Private Companies’ substantial equity holdings; INSTL = 
Total proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Limited Companies’/Corporations’ and/or 
Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings]
Subsequently, the correlation analysis of the control variables is presented in Tables 6.45 and 
6.46. The results indicated that the correlation amongst the control variables was less than 0.7.
With respect to board of directors’ meeting frequency, the results in Table 6.47 indicated that 
more than 97% of the 221 firms conducted board meeting at least four times a year. These 
meetings may have coincided with the preparation of an interim report (i.e. every quarter of the 
year). In addition, some firms held 5 or more meetings in a year. The frequency of board 
meeting is one of the indicators of board commitment to perform their duties appropriately and 
in the best interests of shareholders (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). On the other hand poor firm 
performance may have influenced the board to convene more meetings namely to plans for 
remedy of the situation (Vafeas, 1999). Moreover, particular event such as firm restructuring, 
merger and acquisition may also influence the number of board meetings (Johnson et al., 1993).
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Table 6.45: Spearman Correlation Analysis of Control Variables for Year 2002 (2-tailed test)
/ N o tes 02  Year 2002; AST. I D u a l Assets; 1)1-0 D ebt to eq u ity  Ratio: T O R S P ro portion  o f  S p ec ific  T o re ig n  D irectors; N R  I: h i  I / N o n-E xecu tive  D ire c to r s ' R em unera tion : F A C E  Ea mi ly-m em b er D irecto rs  w ith  A cco u n tin g  
F inance B ackground; A U E 5 F ir m s  E x tern a l A a u d ilo r  is one o f  the R ig  5 A u d it F irm s; IN D I’V Tota l P ro portion  o f  In d iv id u a ls ’ a n d  o r  P riva te  C o m p a n ie s ' S u b sta n tia l E q u ity  H old ings; IN STL  T otal P ro portion  o f  O overnm ent  
A g en c ie s  ’, P ub lic  l .im ite d  ( 'o m p a m es ‘ ( 'o rporations ' a n d  o r  ( ) th er  In s t i tu t io n s ' S u b s ta n tia l E q u ity  H old ings; H D SZ S u e  o f  H o ard  o f  D irectors, M A I N R  M a in  H oard  firm s; T R A IX !  T rading a n d  se rv ices  industry; P L A N T  P la n ta tion  
industry; F IN  F inance; (F IN ),C O N S T R  C on stru ctio n  industry: C O N  P R O  C o n su m er p ro d u c ts  in d u stry : P R O P  P ro p erty  industry; M l  SC I. M isce lla n eo u s in d u str ies  (i.e. w hich  inclu d es  in frastruc ture  p ro je c t com panies, the h o tel  
industry, a n d  m in in g  A le tter  N  was in se r ted  a t the fro n t o f  each  co n tro l variable  '.v a cro n ym  to iden tify  the variab les that h a d  been  tra n sfo rm ed  to n o rm a l score  u sing  Van d e r  W aerden approach; F igures m  Ita lics rep resen t the p -va lu e  o f  
v a r ia b le s ' c o r re la tio n f
NASET02 NDEQ02 NFORS02 NNREMC02 NFACF02 AUF502 NINDPV02 NINSTL02 NBDSZ02 MAINB TRADG PROP PLANT CONSTR CONPRO FIN M ISCEL
NASET02 1.0000 0.1837 0.1038 0.5846 0 1154 0.2056 -0.3229 0.3430 0.3091 0.6483 0.1624 0.1548 0.0285 -0.0266 -0.1163 0.2963 0.1016
0 .0062 0 .1239 0 .0000 0.0X69 0.0021 0 0000 0 .0000 0 .0000 0 .0000 0 .0157 0.0213 0 .6737 0 .6939 0.0X45 0 .0000 0.1321
NDF.Q02 0.1837 1.0000 -0.1081 0.0558 0.0257 -0.0944 00670 -0.1297 -0.0186 -0.0785 0.1645 -0.0743 -0.3197 0.1966 0.0107 0.1487 0.0665
0 0062 0.1092 0 4094 0 .7037 0.1619 0.3217 0.0541 0.7X33 0 .2449 0 .0144 0.2713 0 .0000 0.0033 0.X745 0.0271 0.3250
NFORS02 0.1038 -0.1081 1.0000 0 0100 -0.032 1 0.2465 -0.2755 0 3622 0.1057 0.1578 -0.0247 -0.0956 0.0734 -0.1157 0.1019 0.0106 -0.0089
0.1239 0 1092 0.HH24 0  6347 0 0002 0 .0000 0.0000 0.1173 0.01X9 0.7146 0 .1567 0.2772 0.0X61 0.1310 0.X750 0.X955
NNREMU02 0.5846 0.0558 0.0100 1 0000 0.0184 0.0369 -0.1675 0.2445 0.3667 0.4055 0.0673 0.0400 0.0800 -0.0310 -0.0577 0.2443 0.1056
0.0000 0.4094 0.XX24 0.7X54 0.5X51 0.0127 0.0002 0.0000 0 .0000 0.3191 0 5541 0.2363 0.6466 0.3929 0.0002 0.1175
NFACF02 0.1154 0.0257 -0.032 1 0 0184 1.0000 -0.0784 0.1189 -0.1707 -0.0122 -0.0030 -0.0386 -0.0136 -0.0402 -0.0571 -0.0224 0.2049 0.0234
0.0X69 0 .7037 0 6347 0 .7R54 0.2457 0.0777 0 .0 110 0.X572 0 9652 0.56X1 OX 4 OX 0.5517 0.39X2 0. 7409 0.0022 0.7296
AUF502 0.2056 -0.0944 0.2465 0.0369 -0.0784 1.0000 -0.1573 0.2492 0.0725 0.1693 0.0034 -0.0485 0.0617 -0.0911 -0.1247 0.0057 0.0829
0.0021 0.1619 0.0002 0.5X51 0.2457 0.0193 0.0002 0.2X30 0 .0117 0.9595 0 .4729 0 .3615 0 .1774 0.0643 0.9323 0 .2197
NINDPV02 -0.3229 0.0670 -0.2755 -0.1675 0.1189 -0.1573 1.0000 -0.7157 -0.1195 -0.3425 -0.0349 -0.0106 -0.1628 0.1190 -0.0299 -0.0657 0.0528
0 .0000 0.3217 0 .0000 0.0127 0.0777 0.0193 0.0000 0.0763 0 .0000 0 .6059 0.X754 0.0154 0 .0774 0.65X7 0 3312 0.4351
N1NSTL02 0 3430 -0.1297 0.3622 0.2445 -0 1707 0.2492 -0.7157 1.0000 0.2018 0.3456 -0.0386 0.0432 0.1642 -0.1791 0.0379 0.0941 -0.0455
0 .0000 0.0541 0 .0000 0.0002 o.o  n o 0 .0002 0 .0000 0.0026 0 .0000 0.56X0 0 .5229 0.0145 0 .0076 0.5754 0.1635 0.5012
NBDSZ02 0.3091 -0.0186 0.1057 0 3667 -0.0122 0.0725 -0.1195 0.2018 1.0000 0.1737 -0.0043 -0.0055 -0.0150 0.0322 0.0980 -0.0220 -0.0154
0 .0000 0 .7H33 0.1173 0 .0000 O.X572 0.2X30 0.0763 0.0026 0 .0097 0.94XX 0.9347 0.X249 0.633X 0.1465 0 .7445 0.X204
MAINB 0.6483 -0.0785 0.1578 0.4055 -0.0030 0.1693 -0.3425 0.3456 0.1737 1.0000 0.0603 0.2155 0.1782 -0.1256 -0.0623 0.1894 0.0838
0 .0000 0 .2449 0.0 IR9 0.0000 0.9652 0 .0 117 0 .0000 0.0000 0 .0097 0.3721 0.0013 0 .0079 0.0622 0.3563 0 .0047 0.2145
TRADG 0.1624 0.1645 -0.0247 0 0673 -0.0386 0.0034 -0.0349 -0.0386 -0.0043 0.0603 1.0000 -0.1666 -0.1378 -0.1378 -0.1964 -0.1464 -0.0648
0 .0157 0.0144 0.7146 0 3191 0.56X1 0.9595 0 .6059 0.56X0 0.94XX 0.3721 0.0131 0.0 4 0 7 0 .0407 0.0034 0 .0296 0.3376
PROP 0.1548 -0.0743 -0.0956 0.0400 -0.0136 -0.0485 -0.0106 0.0432 -0.0055 0.2155 -0.1666 1.0000 -0.1008 -0.1008 -0.1436 -0.1070 -0.0474
0.0213 0.2713 0 .1567 0.5541 0.X40X 0 .4729 0.X754 0.5229 0.9347 0.0013 0.0131 0.1354 0 .1354 0.032X 0.1125 0.4X34
PLANT 0.0285 -0 3197 0.0734 0.0800 -0.0402 0.0617 -0.1628 0.1642 -0.0150 0.1782 -0.1378 -0.1008 1.0000 -0.0833 -0.1188 -0.0885 -0.0392
0 .6737 0.0000 0.2772 0.2363 0.5517 0.3615 0.0154 0 0145 0.X249 0.0079 0.0407 0.1354 0.2172 0.07X1 0. IX9X 0.5622
CONSTR -0 0266 0.1966 -0 1157 -0.0310 -0.0571 -0.0911 0.1190 -0.1791 0.0322 -0.1256 -0.1378 -0.1008 -0.0833 1.0000 -0.1188 -0.0885 -0.0392
0 .6939 0.0033 0.0X61 0 6466 0.39X2 0 .1774 0 .0774 0.0076 0 .6 3 3X 0.0622 0 .0407 0.1354 0.2172 0.07X1 0.IX9X 0.5622
CONPRO -0.1163 0.0107 0.1019 -0.0577 -0.0224 -0.1247 -0.0299 0.0379 0.0980 -0.0623 -0.1964 -0.1436 -0.1188 -0.1188 1.0000 -0.1262 -0.0559
0.0X45 0.X745 0 .1310 0 .3929 0.7409 0.0643 0.65X7 0.5754 0.1465 0.3563 0 .0034 0.032X 0.07X1 0.07X1 0.0611 0.40X6
FIN 0 2963 0.1487 0.0106 0.2443 0.2049 0.0057 -0.0657 0.0941 -0.0220 0.1894 -0.1464 -0.1070 -0.0885 -0.0885 -0.1262 1.0000 -0.0416
0.0000 0.0271 0.R750 0 0002 0.0022 0.9323 0.3312 0.1635 0.7445 0.0047 0 .0296 0.1125 0 .1X9X 0 .1X9X 0.0611 0.53X0
M ISCEL 0 1016 0.0665 -0.0089 0.1056 0.0234 0.0829 0.0528 -0 0455 -0.0154 0.0838 -0.0648 -0.0474 -0.0392 -0.0392 -0.0559 -0.0416 1.0000
0.1321 0 .3250 0.X955 0.1175 0.7296 0 .2197 0.4351 0.5012 0.X204 0.2145 0.3376 0.4X34 0 .5622 0.5622 0.40X6 0.53X0
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Table 6.46: Spearman Correlation Analysis of Control Variables for Year 2003 (2-tailed test)
/N o tes:  03 Year 2003: A S L 'I lo ta l  Assets. / ) / : ( )  D eb t to eq u ity  Ratio: F O R S  P ro portion  o f  S p ec ific  F o re ign  D irectors: N R F M U  N on-F xecu tive  D ire c to rs ' R em unera tion: F A C F  F a m ily-m em b er D irectors with
A cco u n tin g  <K- b in a n ce  Background . A111)1-5 P resence o f  B ig  5 A u d it F trm .IN D P V  Total P ro portion  o f  In d iv id u a ls ' a n d  o r  P riva te  ( 'o m p a n ies ' S u b sta n tia l F q u ity  H old ings: 1NSTI. TolaI P ro p o rtio n  o f  ( lo v e rn m e n t A g en c ies  ’, 
P ublic  L im ite d  ( 'om pan ies ’ ( 'o rpora iions ' a n d  o r  ( ) ther In s t i tu t io n s ' S u b s ta n tia l F q u ity  H old ings: B D S Z  S ize  o f  B o a rd  o f  D irectors, M A IN B  M a m  B o a rd  f i r m s , T R A IX i T rading  a n d  serv ices  industry: P L A N T  P lan ta tion  
industry: L IN  fin a n c e :  (L IN ),C O N S T R  C on stru ctio n  industry: C O N P R O  C o n su m er p ro d u c ts  in d u stry . P R O P  P ro p erty  industry: M ISC L  M isce lla n eo u s in d u str ies  (i.e. w hich includes in fra stru c tu re  p ro je c t com panies, 
the h o tel industry, a n d  m in ing  A le tter N  was in ser ted  a t the fro n t  o f  each  co n tro l v a r ia b le 's  acro n ym  to iden tify  the va ria b les  that h a d  been  tra n sfo rm ed  to n o rm a l sco re  u sin g  Van d er  W aerden a pproach: F igures in I ta lics  
rep resen t the p -va lu e  o f  v a r ia b le s ' c o rre la tio n /
NASET03 NDEQ03 NFORS03 NNREMU03 NFACF03 AUF503 NINDPV03 NINSTL03 NBDSZ03 MAINB TRADG PROP PLANT CONSTR CONPRO FIN M ISCEL
NASET03 1 0000 0 1523 0 1762 0.5895 0.0645 0.2460 -0.3840 0.3908 0.3011 0.6558 0.1642 0.1580 0.0415 -0.0492 -0.1227 0.2943 0.1016
0 0236 0.00X7 0.0000 0 .3400 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0145 0.01 XX 0.5392 0 .4664 0.06X6 0.0000 0.1321
NDEQ03 0.1523 1.0000 -0.0767 -0.0706 -0.0066 -0.0818 -0.0345 -0.1258 -0.0862 -0.0648 0.1529 -0.1109 -0.2609 0.2668 0.0232 0.1077 0.0662
0.0236 0.2562 0.2962 0.92 IX 0.2259 0.6099 0 .0620 0.20  IX 0.3375 0.0230 0.1001 0.0001 0.0001 0.73  IX 0.1105 0 .3270
NFORS03 0.1762 -0.0767 1.0000 0.0710 -0.0864 0.2207 -0.2679 0.3403 0.0757 0.2298 0.0011 -0.0508 0.0816 -0.1100 0.0578 -0.0191 -0.0033
0.00X7 0 2562 0.2934 0.2006 0.0010 0.0001 0.0000 0 .2627 0.0006 0.9X67 0.4524 0.2267 0.102X 0 .3924 0.7772 0.9612
NNREMU03 0.5895 -0 0706 00710 1.0000 -0.0307 0.1284 -0.3140 0.3574 0.3992 0.4 III 0.0661 0.0357 0.0893 -0 0439 -0.0478 0.2076 0.0708
0.0000 0.2962 0.2934 0.6503 0.0567 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3284 0.5978 0.1X59 0 .5160 0 .4799 0.0019 0.2950
NFACF03 0.0645 -0.0066 -0 0864 -00307 1.0000 -0.0184 0.1000 -0.1804 0.0706 -0.0307 -0.0311 0.0014 -0.1308 0.0302 -0.0250 0.1324 0.0283
0 .3400 0.92 IX 0.2006 0.6503 0.7X52 0.13X6 0 .0072 0.2960 0.6504 0.645X 0.9X36 0 .0522 0.6556 0.71 IX 0.0493 0.6754
AUF503 0.2460 -0.0818 0.2207 0.1284 -0.0184 1.0000 -0.2390 0.2783 0.0920 0.1637 0.0224 -0.0337 0.0720 -0.1152 -0.1625 0.0179 0.0867
0.0002 0 .2259 0 0010 0 .0567 0.7X52 0.0003 0.0000 0 .1729 0 .0 14X 0.7404 0.61X7 0.2X66 0.0X76 0 .0156 0.7916 0.1992
NINDPV03 -0.3840 -0.0345 -0.2679 -0.3140 0.1000 -0.2390 1.0000 -0.7196 -0.1101 -0.3520 -0.0390 0.0349 -0.1375 0.0699 -0.0309 -0.1022 0.0402
0 .0000 0 .6099 0.0001 0.0000 0.13X6 0.0003 0.0000 0.1026 0.0000 0.5639 0.6059 0.0412 0 .3010 0.64X3 0 .1 29X 0.5524
NINSTL03 0.3908 -0 1258 0.3403 0 3574 -0.1804 0.2783 -0.7196 1.0000 0.2280 0.3746 -0.0552 0.0176 0.1608 -0.1172 0.0781 0.1268 -0.0490
0.0000 0 .0620 0.0000 0.0000 0.0072 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0 .4 13X 0.7947 0 .0 16X 0.0X22 0.2473 0 .0599 0.46X3
NBDSZ03 0.3011 -00862 0.0757 0.3992 0.0706 0.0920 -0.1101 0.2280 1.0000 0.1578 -0.0353 0.0226 0.0125 0.0262 0.0826 0.0167 0.0119
0.0000 0.20  IX 0 .2627 0 0000 0 .2960 0.1729 0.1026 0.0006 0.01X9 0.6015 0.737X 0.X529 0.69X9 0.2211 0.X054 0.X608
MAINB 0.6558 -0 0648 0 2298 0.4111 -0.0307 0.1637 -0.3520 0.3746 0.1578 1.0000 0.0603 0.2155 0.1782 -0.1256 -0.0623 0.1894 0.0838
0.0000 0.3375 0 0006 0.0000 0 .6504 0 .0  M X 0.0000 0.0000 0.01X9 0.3721 0.0013 0 .0079 0.0622 0.3563 0 .0047 0.2145
TRADG 0.1642 0.1529 0 0011 0.0661 -0.0311 0.0224 -0.0390 -0.0552 -0.0353 0.0603 1.0000 -0.1666 -0.1378 -0.1378 -0.1964 -0.1464 -0.0648
0.0145 0 .0230 0.9X67 0.32X4 0 .6458 0 .7404 0.5639 0 .4 13X 0.6015 0.3721 0.0131 0 .0407 0 .0407 0 .0034 0 .0296 0.3376
PROP 0.1580 -0 1109 -00508 0.0357 0.0014 -0.0337 0.0349 0.0176 0.0226 0.2155 -0.1666 1.0000 -0.1008 -0.1008 -0.1436 -0.1070 -0.0474
0.01 XX 0.1001 0.4524 0.597X 0.9X36 0.61X7 0 .6059 0.7947 0 .737X 0.0013 0.0131 0.1354 0 .1354 0 .0328 0.1125 0.4X34
PLANT 0.0415 -0.2609 0.0816 0.0893 -0.1308 0.0720 -0.1375 0.1608 0.0125 0.1782 -0.1378 -0.1008 1.0000 -0.0833 -0.1188 -0.0885 -0.0392
0.5392 0.0001 0.2267 0.1X59 0.0522 0.2X66 0.0412 0 .0 /68 0.8529 0.0079 0.0407 0.1354 0.2172 0.07X1 0.1X9X 0.5622
CONSTR -0.0492 0.2668 -0 1100 -0 0439 0.0302 -0.1 152 0.0699 -0.1 172 0.0262 -0.1256 -0.1378 -0.1008 -0.0833 1.0000 -0.1188 -0.0885 -0.0392
0 4664 0.0001 0.1028 0 .5160 0.6556 0.0X76 0 .3010 0.0X22 0.69X9 0.0622 0.0407 0.1354 0.2172 0.07X1 0.189X 0.5622
CONPRO -0.1227 00232 0 0578 -0.0478 -0.0250 -0.1625 -0.0309 0.0781 0.0826 -0.0623 -0.1964 -0.1436 -0.1188 -0.1188 1.0000 -0.1262 -0.0559
0.06X6 0 .7 3 IX 0 3924 0 .4799 0.71 IX 0.0156 0.64X3 0.2473 0.2211 0.3563 0 .0034 0.032X 0.07X1 0.07X1 0.0611 0.40X6
FIN 0.2943 0.1077 -0.0191 0.2076 0.1324 0.0179 -0.1022 0.1268 0.0167 0.1894 -0.1464 -0.1070 -0.0885 -0.0885 -0.1262 1.0000 -0.0416
0.0000 0.1105 0.7772 0 .0019 0.0493 0.7916 0.1298 0 .0599 0.8054 0.0047 0.0296 0.1125 0.1X9X 0 .1X9X 0.0611 0.53X0
M ISCEL 0.1016 0 0662 -0 0033 0.0708 0.0283 0.0867 0.0402 -0.0490 0.0119 0.0838 -0.0648 -0.0474 -0.0392 -0.0392 -0.0559 -0.0416 1.0000
0.1321 0.3270 0.9612 0 .2950 0.6754 0.1992 0.5524 0.46X3 0.X60X 0.2145 0.3376 0.4X34 0.5622 0.5622 0.40X6 0.53X0
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Table 6.47: Board of Director Attendance and Frequency of Meetings in Year 2002 and 2003
( N o t e :  B A T E N D  =  A v e r a g e  R a t e  o f  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r ’ s  A t t e n d a n c e  i n  B o a r d ’ s  M e e t i n g ;  N B A T E N D  =  N o r m a l  S c o r e s  o f  A v e r a g e  R a t e  o f  
B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r ’ s  A t t e n d a n c e  i n  B o a r d ’ s  M e e t i n g ;  B D M T 4  =  F r e q u e n c y  o f  B o a r d  M e e t i n g  o f  4  o r  m o r e ,  B D M T G 4  =  F r e q u e n c y  o f  B o a r d  
M e e t i n g  o f  5  o r  m o r e ) ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
^ ■ m i i i n i i i n n n
I Descriptive Statistics Max Min Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis Sum
BATEND Yr 2002 1 0.73 0.9153 0.0585 -0.5866 0.0873 NAPP
Yr 2003 1 0.75 0.9254 0.0565 -0.7515 0.2499 NAPP
NBATEND Yr 2002 1.5116 -2.6117 -0.0118 0.9504 -0.1727 -0.5054 NAPP
Yr 2003 1.4285 -2.4699 -0.0142 0.9433 -0.1989 0.5556 NAPP
| Descriptive Statistics | Max Min Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis Sum
Yr 2002 BDMT4 1 0 0.9729 0.1629 -5.859 32.622 215
BDMTG4 1 0 0.6833 0.4663 -0.793 -1.383 151
Yr 2003 BDMT4 1 0 0.9729 0.1629 -5.859 32.622 215BDMTG4 1 0 0.6552 0.4730 -0.705 -1.517 147
| A’ = 221 firms \
Nevertheless board members attendance at meetings had been encouraging with a mean of 0.90 
in 2002 and 2003.
Table 6.48: Audit Committee Attendance and Frequency of Meetings in Year 2002 and 2003
( N o t e  A T E N D  =  A v e r a g e  R a t e  o f  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  M e m b e r ’ s  A t t e n d a n c e  i n  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  M e e t i n g s ,  N A T E N D  =  N o r m a l  S c o r e s  o f  
A v e r a g e  R a t e  o f  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  M e m b e r ’ s  A t t e n d a n c e  i n  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  M e e t i n g s ,  A C M E T 4  =  F r e q u e n c y  o f  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  M e e t i n g  o f  
4  o r  m o r e ,  A M E T G 4  =  F r e q u e n c y  o f  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  M e e t i n g  o f  5  o r  m o r e ) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Descriptive Statistics Max Min Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis Sum
Yr 2002 1 0.67 0.9433 0.0682 -1.2697 1.479 NAPPA I tINU
Yr 2003 1 0.7 0.97 0.0639 -1.4810 2.0219 NAPP
NATEND Yr 2002 -2.6117 0.725 -0.0536 0.8495
-0.7056 -0.5165 NAPP
Yr 2003 -2.6117 0.6745 -0.0573 0.8384 0.7695 -0.4593 NAPP■■
1 Descriptive Statistics Max Min Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis Sum
Yr 2002 ACMET4 1 0 0.9819
0.1336 -7.279 51.452 217
AMETG4 1 0 0.5928 0.4924 -0.38 -1.872 131
Yr 2003 ACMET4 1 0 0.982 0.1333
-7.296 51.702 218
AMETG4 1 0 0.6199 0.4861 -0.497 -1.769 137
1 A- = 221 firms 1
In reference to Table 6.48, the result indicated a percentage of more than 98% of the 221 firms 
convening audit committee meeting at least 4 times a year. Again this may coincide with interim 
report preparation (as stated in most of the companies audit committee report). Also there has
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been an increased in the number of audit committee conducting more than quarterly meeting. 
According to Scarbrough et al., (1998) the frequency of audit committee may relate to the 
performance of task such as the evaluation of firm’s internal audit program and process. 
Furthermore, the commitment of audit committee in performing oversight duties has a potential 
linked with the number of meetings it held with the internal auditor, external auditor and counsel 
(Menon and William, 1994). Audit committee members commitment in fulfilling their oversight 
duties further indicated by their attendance at meeting (PwC, 2003). Results in Table 6.48 
present, on average the attendance rate of audit committee member at meeting in 2002 and 2003 
had been high with less than 10% members’ absenteeism.
6.6 Preliminary Regression Analysis
The ordinary least square models in Chapter 5 were analysed using multiple regression analysis. 
There were several assumptions that needed to be taken into account before proceeding with the 
analysis. Pallant (2005: 142-143) identified seven assumptions of regression analysis. The first 
is the size of the sample. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001:117) suggest a formula of 50 + 8m to 
determine the appropriate size of the sample (where m is the number of independent variables to 
be used in the regression models). In the case of the current research the highest number of 
independent variables examined was 21 (i.e. see Chapter 5, regression model OLS 1). This gives 
an estimated sample size of 114. Based on this guideline the research sample, which was 221 
satisfied the generalisability issue of the output that would be produced from the regression 
analysis.
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The second assumption requires the evaluation of multicollinearity problems amongst 
independent variables. In particular, Field (2005) identifies a case of multicollinearity when the 
correlation between the independent variables is high (i.e. r = 0.7 or above). To further assess 
the multicollinearity condition amongst independent variables, Hair et al., (1998:221) contend 
that independent variables that produced a variance-inflation factor (i.e. VIF) level below 10, 
condition index less than 15, and a regression coefficient variance-decomposition matrix below 
0.9 indicate no multicollinearity problem amongst the variables. These analyses were performed 
on the independent variables and the results indicate no multicollinearity. Hence, the 
independent variables of the OLS models were free from multicollinearity.
On the other hand, the predictive value of the regression model could also be affected by the 
present of outliers or extreme value in the data sets. In particular, when there are distinctive 
characteristics amongst the variables in a data set, the inclusion of these variables in the analysis 
may affect the predictive value of the model (Hair et al., 1998). To overcome this problem, the 
data set can either be transformed to reduce the large differences amongst its values or the 
extreme values cases can be deleted from the observation.
For the current research, a normal scores data transformation technique using the Van der 
Waerden approach63 was employed. This approach was undertaken in consideration of Cooke’s 
(1998) support of the ability of this technique to avoid data deletion due to negative value and/or
63 Van der Waerden approach is one o f  the methods o f rank transformation. Rank transformation using the Van der Waerden
r j
approach transforms the data by dividing the rank o f each data (r,) with the total o f size o f sample (i.e. n) plus 1 [i.e. ( -------- )].
n +  1
I r jOn the other hand. Van der W aerden scores corresponding to the observation with rank r(i) is measured as O ( --------) where O
n +  1
is the normal cumulative distribution function.
2 5 6
CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
extreme value problems. In particular the normal scores were calculated using SPSS 12 rank 
cases function, with further adoption of Van der Waerden normal scores estimation. According 
to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), it is preferable to choose a method of data improvement which 
avoids further deletion on the research data that has been collected. They argue that given the 
time consumption of some data collection process, the data collected should be retained 
whenever possible. Furthermore, Hair et al., (1998) indicated that as long as the extreme values 
in the sample data are not due to unexplained or extraordinary events, the data should not be 
excluded from the sample as they still represent most of the characteristics of the data group. In 
addition, a studentized residuals test64, Mahalonobis distance and Cook distance methods can 
also be used to identify outliers in the sample data. However, following Cooke’s (1998) 
suggestion, normal scores were calculated for all continuous and interval data of the dependent 
and independent variables. He emphasises this procedure is important to ensure consistency in 
the interpretation of the results.
Also, multiple regression analysis is based on the assumptions that the variables tested are 
normally distributed. In particular, the analysis assumes that the residuals65 should be normally 
distributed about the predicted dependent variables’ value (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001:119). 
This also implies that a linear relationship should exist between the explanatory variables and 
the predicted dependent variables’ value (Hair et al., 1998). This relationship can be observed 
from the analysis of the normal probability plot (i.e. Normal Q-Q) of the regression standardised 
residuals. When the points lie along the straight line in the plot, this suggests a normal 
distribution. In addition, a special case of White Test for heteroskedasticity (see Wooldridge,
64 For instance, this method excludes data which gives a residual value o f higher than +/- 1.96 (See Hair et al.. 1998:223)
65 This value represents the difference between the obtained and predicted dependent variable scores (see Pallant. 2005:143)
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2000:259-260) can be carried out by regressing the squared of the regression standardised 
residuals (u2) against the regression standardised predicted value (y) and squared of regression 
standardised predicted value (y2) [i.e. u2 = S0 + 3, y, + S2 y  2 + error\. The p-value of F66 or 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistics67 from this regression will provide evidence of whether the 
regression results of the research models violated the OLS homoscedasticity assumption [i.e. the 
variance of the error terms (i.e. residual) should remain constant over the range of independent 
variables (Hair et al., 1998: 144)]
In further evaluating that the errors of prediction are independent of one another, the Durbin 
Watson statistic can be used to identify the autocorrelation amongst the errors. A Durbin- 
Watson statistic (d) value of less than the Durbin-Watson derived lower limit (dO implies that 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation should be rejected (Maddala, 2005:229), whilst a 
Durbin Watson statistic of greater than the Durbin-Watson derived upper limit (du) implies that, 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation should not be rejected (Maddala, 2005:229).
For the current research hypotheses testing using multiple regression analysis, the characteristics 
of the dependent, explanatory and control variables fulfilled the analysis's assumptions. In 
particular the transformation of the research variables to normal scores have improved their 
normality, skewness and kurtosis level (see sections 6.5.1, 6.5.2 and 6.5.3).
66 T he p -va lue  o f  F d is trib u tio n  is co m pu ted  using F 2,n- i  d is tribu tion  (see W oold ridge, 2001:260)
e’7 Lagrange Multiplier (LM ) value is calculated by multiplying the R-squared o f the residuals regression with sample size. N and
its p-value is computed using x \  distribution (see  W oold ridge , 20 0 1 :260).
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6.7 Further Specification on Research Models Observations
According to Bhagat and Black (2002), it is difficult to assess board members’ contribution 
when they are likely to be replaced in a short time period. They further argue that to assess 
board of directors’ performance in the year they were appointed may not fully capture their 
potential and contribution to the firm’s value. In consideration of this argument, the current 
research models observed the impact of board of directors’ and board subcommittees attributes’ 
in 2002 with firm performance in 2002 and 2003 and, correspondingly corporate governance 
practice in 2003 with firm performance 2003 and 2004. Importantly, Jaggi and Leung (2007:47) 
noted the potential of heterocedasticity problems and contemporaneous correlations of residuals 
when two years data were pooled. Their research had used two years corporate governance data 
due to the availability of such information only in Hong Kong listed companies’ annual reports. 
Accordingly, this argument further justified the current study’s approach to examine the impact 
of firm corporate governance practice on firm performance based on individual year 
observation.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter began with the discussion of the rationales for undertaking cross-sectional research. 
Later it elaborated the sampling procedures performed for identifying the suitable number of 
firms to be researched. Then it progressed with discussion of the sources of the data used in 
gathering the required information for examining the research hypotheses and developing the 
described in Chapter 5. Subsequently, the chapter described the parameters of the dependent, 
explanatory and control variables of the research models in Chapter 5. Further, the chapter 
discussed the multiple regression analysis assumptions and implementation for the testing of the
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research hypothesis. The next chapter 7 will analyse and discuss the multiple regression results 
of board of directors’ attributes models (see Chapter 5 for OLS 1, 2 and 3 research models).
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Chapter 7
~Anahses of Resnhs and Discussion I ~
The Impact o f (Board of (Directors ’A ttriButes on ‘Firm (Performance
7.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the multiple regression analysis of the board of directors 
research models identified earlier in Section 5.1. The results are evaluated by linking the 
findings with the research hypotheses presented in Section 5.1. Subsequently, the results derived 
from the testing of hypotheses and data derived from the OLS 1 research model (i.e. the impact 
of board of directors’ independence on firm performance), OLS 2 research model (i.e. the 
impact of board of directors’ leadership on firm performance) and OLS 3 research model (i.e. 
the impact of board of directors’ competency on firm performance) are respectively analysed 
and discussed.
7.1 Regression Models and Empirical Results
The empirical results derived from the multiple regression models are discussed in relation to 
board of directors’ attributes, namely, independence, leadership and competency, and firm 
performance. Since the research is designed to evaluate the impact of firm corporate governance 
practice on firm performance in the years 2002, 2003 and 2004, the notation (a) and (b) 
represent the observation of independent variables in the years 2002 and 2003 respectively.
7.2 Board of Directors’ Attributes and Firm Performance
This section examines the influence of board of directors’ independence, leadership and 
competency on firm performance.
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7.2.1 Board o f  Directors 9 Independence and Firm Performance -  OLS 1
The impact of board of directors’ independence on firm performance was examined by research 
models OLS l(i), OLS 1 (ii) and OLS l(iii) [See Chapter 5, sub-section 5.1.1]. Specifically, each 
model respectively examined the impact of certain compositions of independent directors on the 
board, namely, the proportion of independent directors (NINED), domination of the board by 
independent directors (DOINED), and domination of the board by independent and non­
executive directors (DONEDI), on firm performance. Such investigations was undertaken by 
evaluating together in each model other factors that may have influenced independent directors’ 
effectiveness, namely, their financial knowledge (INACF), the presence of a senior independent 
director on the firm’s board (SRI), the exclusion of the CEO from board membership (EXCEO), 
the appointment of an independent board chairman (CHINED), the presence of a founder on the 
firm’s board (FOUD), the proportion of family-member directors on the board (NFAMDI), and 
the proportion of independent directors’ share ownership in the firm (NINSDG). The following 
subsections will discuss the three OLS 1 model in turn.
I) Proportion of Independent Directors and Firm Performance (NINED) -  O L S  1 ( i )
Table 7.1 and 7.2 respectively present the regression results derived from the OLS 1 (i)(a) 
research model [i.e. regression of NINED and specified board independence variables in 2002 
with respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and from the OLS l(i)(b) research model [i.e. 
regression of NINED and specified board independence variables in 2003 with respective firm 
performance 2003 and 2004].
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Table 7 .1 : Board Independence and Firm Perfo rm ance —  OLS l(i)(a)
The Examination of P ropo rtion  of Independent D irectors on the Board (NINED) in 2002 w ith R espective Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of I1BIND1 w ith If BIND 4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9  and  10)
BOD = Board of Directors, NROE - Return on Equity, NINED * Proportion o f Independent Directors, NINACF -  Proportion o f INEDs with accounting and finance background, SRI « Senior Independent Director appointment on BOD, EXCEO = Exclusion o f CEO, CFO, 
COO and Managing Director, CHIN = Board's Chairman INED, FOUD -  Founder presence on BOD, NFAMDI ~ Proportion of family-member directors, NINSDG ~ Equity holdings of INED, NASET = Total Assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NINSTL= Total 
proportion of Government Agencies’, Public l-isted Companies’/Corporations' and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, PROP » Property industry, CONSTR - Construction industry, FIN -  Finance industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter N at the front 
of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ Note tv / 'or the test of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated V II• ten! below I, condition index less than 1 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); io r  the test of 
autocorrelation of errors the significance leiel for Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson denied upper limit (dv); Statistical significance leiel: 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A l l  /■ statistical values were 
significant at 0.001 leiel/
A d j K 2 0.2192 0.1448 0.2076 0.1510
K 2 0.2937 0.2265 0.2833 0.2320
F 3.9413 2.7742 3.7451 2.8630
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-sta t C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.0060 -0.0322 -0.1649 -0.8472 -0.1422 -0.7594 -0.1580 -0.8150
Explanatory Variables 0 )
NINED02 0.0025 0.0389 -0.0823 -1.2184 0.0216 0.3321 -0.1132 -1.6808*
NINACF02 -0.0230 -0.3303 0.0755 1.0347 -0.0299 -0.4254 0.0148 0.2040
SRI02 -0.1834 -1.4311 0.1879 1.4009 -0.1054 -0.8161 0.3061 2.2898**
EXCEO02 0.1366 0.8677 0.2093 1.2704 0.1366 0.8614 0.1666 1.0153
CHIN02 -0.0514 -0.3235 0.0697 0.4188 -0.1014 -0.6330 -0.0760 -0.4585
FOUD02 0.1665 1.0263 0.0952 0.5603 0.1581 0.9672 0.0181 0.1067
NFAMDI02 -0.1846 -1.9698* 0.0173 0.1759 -0.0915 -0.9698 0.0081 0.0832
NINSDG02 -0.0444 -0.6181 -0.0457 -0.6085 -0.0438 -0.6059 0.1241 1.6577*
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.2536 -2.5923** 0.4112 4.0169*** -0.2531 -2.5683** 0.3050 2.9896***
NDEQ02 0.1573 2.1844** 0.3081 4.2464*** 0.1293 1.7219*
NINSTL02 0.2099 2.0867**
Industry Dummy
P R O P -0.9347 -4.1736*** -0.8150 -3.6122***
CONSTR 0.4292 1.7007* 0.5019 1.9745**
FIN -0.6185 -2.3655**
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Table 7 .2 : Board Independence and Firm Perfo rm ance — OLS l(i)(b)
The Examination of P ropo rtion  of Independent D irectors on the Board (NINED) in 2003 w ith R espective Firm P erfo rm ance 2003 and  2004
(The Testing of IIBIND 1 w ith IIBIND 4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 and 10)
BOD = Board of Directors, NROE - Return on Equity, NINED = Proportion of Independent Directors, NINACF - Proportion of INEDs with accounting and finance background, SRI = Senior Independent Director appointment on BOD, EXCEO = Exclusion o f CEO, CFO, COO and 
Managing Director, CHIN = Board’s Chairman INED, FOUD - Founder presence on BOD, NFAMDI -  Proportion of family-member directors, NINSDG = Equity holdings o f INED, NASET = Total Assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NINSTL = Total proportion o f Government 
Agencies’, Public Listed Companies'/Corporations’ and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, PROP * Property industry, FIN - Finance industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been 
transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ Notes: I‘or tlx test of multicollinearity, all independent variables iniiicated VH ‘ leiel below J, condition index less than t 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); I‘or the test of autocorrelation of 
errors tlx significance leiel for Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than tlx Durbin Watson deriied upper limit (du); Statistical significance leiel: 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll  I'statistical values were significant at 0.05 letxlf
A d jR 2 0.2466 0.2081 0.0694 0.1182
K2 0.3185 0.2837 0.1603 0.2043
F 4.4288 3.7527 1.7640 2.3723
C oefficient t-sfat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.1650 -0.8544 -0.0550 -0.2777 -0.0410 -0.1890 -0.1928 -0.9130
Explanatory Variables (ft)
N IN E D 0 3 0.1051 1.5539 -0.1986 -2.8645*** 0.1010 1.3285 -0.0800 -1.0826
N IN A C F 0 3 0.0552 0.7877 0.0674 0.9376 0.0115 0.1463 0.0809 1.0564
SR I03 -0.0887 -0.7373 0.3152 2.5548** 0.0513 0.3795 0.0266 0.2025
E X C E O 0 3 0.1222 0.8815 0.2562 1.8020* 0.0474 0.3041 0.2006 1.3232
C H IN 0 3 0.0992 0.6373 -0.1790 -1.1217 0.0421 0.2406 0.3204 1.8825*
F O U D 0 3 0.1833 1.0762 -0.1261 -0.7222 0.2222 1.1608 0.0520 0.2795
N F A M D I0 3 -0.0268 -0.2920 -0.0396 -0.4208 -0.0593 -0.5753 0.0022 0.0215
N IN S D G 0 3 -0.0700 -0.9781 0.0400 0.5449 -0.1465 -1.8227* 0.0511 0.6531
Control Variables
N A S E T 0 3 -0.3391 -3.3756*** 0.4571 4.4375*** -0.2319 -2.0539** 0.2544 2.3168**
N D E Q 0 3 0.3283 4.6740*** 0.1570 2.0440**
N IN S T L 0 3 0.3067 30737**+ 0.2359 2.1626**
Industry Dummy
P R O P -0.7219 -3.2637*** -0.4032 -1.7780* 1 -0.5220 ■2.0998**
F IN -0.4867 -1 .8955 ' | -0.4885 -1.8558* | -0.5159 -1.7877* |
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Specifically OLS l(i) investigated the impact of the proportion of independent directors 
(NINED: HBIND 1), the proportion of independent directors with accounting and finance 
knowledge and skills (NINACF: HBIND 4), the presence of a senior independent outside 
director (SRI: HBIND 5), the exclusion of the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer 
or Managing Director from membership of board of directors (ECXEO: HBIND 6), the 
appointment of an independent director as board of director’s chairman (CHINED: HBIND 7), 
the presence of a founder on the firm’s board (FOUD: HBIND 8), the proportion of family 
directors on the board (NFAMDI: HBIND 9) and the proportion of independent directors’ 
shares ownership (NINDSG: HBIND 10), on firm performance.
Chapter 5 section 5.1.1 hypothesised that the proportion of independent directors (NINED) has a 
positive impact on firm performance (i.e. HBIND 1). OLS 1 (i)(a) and OLS 1 (i)(b) model results 
pointed to the contrary (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2). In most of the cases observed, the results 
indicated that the relationship between NINED in 2002 and firm performance in 2002 and 2003, 
and between NINED in 2003 and firm performance in 2003 and 2004 was not statistically 
significant, both in terms of the market value measure (NTobin’s Q) and the accounting-based 
measure (NROE) of firm performance. Notably, the hypothesised positive relationship between 
NINED and firm performance was statistically rejected by two of the cases observed, indicated 
by a significant negative relationship between NINED in 2002 and NROE in 2003 (fi= -0.1 \ ; p  
= 0.1) [see Table 7.1], and between NINED in 2003 and NROE in 2003 (fi= -0.20; p  = 0.01) 
[See Table 7.2].
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With respect to HBIND 5 testing, the results in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicated that given the 
proportion of independent directors on the firm’s board (NINED), the relationship between the 
presence of a senior independent director (SRI) and firm performance was not statistically 
significant in most of the cases observed. Only in two of the cases observed was the 
hypothesised positive relationship between SRI and firm performance statistically supported. 
Specifically, there existed a significant positive relationship between SRI in 2002 and 
subsequent year firm performance, namely, NROE in 2003 (fi= 0.31;/? = 0.05) [see Table 7.1], 
and between SRI in 2003 and current year firm performance, namely, NROE in 2003 (p= 0.32; 
p  = 0.05) [See Table 7.2].
In addition, HBIND 6 testing results (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2) indicated that, given the proportion 
of independent directors on the firm’s board (NINED), the relationship between the non­
presence of Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer or Managing Director on the firm’s 
board (EXCEO) and firm performance was not statistically significant in most of the cases 
observed. Only in one case was HBIND 6 statistically supported, where there existed a 
significant positive relationship between EXCEO in 2003 with NROE in 2003 (/? = 0.26; p  = 
0 . 1).
As regards to the results derived from testing HBIND 7 (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2), given the 
proportion of independent directors on the firm’s board (NINED), most of the cases observed 
revealed that the relationship between the presence of an independent board chairman 
(CHINED) and firm performance was not statistically significant. However, there existed a
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significant positive relationship between CHINED in 2003 with subsequent year firm 
performance, namely, NROE in 2004 (fi= 0.32; p  = 0.1).
On the other hand, HBIND 9 testing results (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2) revealed that, given the 
proportion of independent directors on the firm’s board (NINED), there existed significant 
negative relationship between the proportion of family-member directors on the board 
(NFAMDI) in 2002 and firm performance in terms of market value measure (NTobin’s Q) in 
2002 (fi= -0.18; p  = 0.1).
Furthermore, the results of HBIND 10 testing (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2) indicated that, given the 
proportion of independent directors on the firm’s board (NINED), the relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors shareholdings in the firm (NINSDG) and firm performance 
was not statistically significant in most of the cases observed. In particular, the two cases which 
showed significant results revealed inconsistent relationship between NINSDG and firm 
performance. Notably there existed significant positive relationship between NINSDG in 2002 
and NROE in 2003 (/? = 0.12; /? = 0.1) [see Table 7.1], whilst the relationship between NINSDG 
in 2003 and NTobin’s Q in 2004 was significantly negative (fi= -0.15;/? = 0.1) [See Table 7.2].
For the testing of HBIND 4 and 8, OLS 1 (i)(a) and OLS 1 (i)(b) model results indicated that the 
respective hypothesised relationships were not statistically significant.
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II) Domination of Independent Directors and Firm Performance (DOINED) - O L S  l ( i i )
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 respectively present the regression results of the research model OLS 1 (ii)(a) 
[i.e. regression of DOINED and specified board independence variables in 2002 with respective 
firm performance 2002 and 2003] and the research model OLS 1 (ii)(b) [i.e. regression of 
DOINED and specified board independence variables in 2003 with respective firm performance 
2003 and 2004].
In Chapter 5, section 5.1.1, HBIND 2 predicted that the domination of board of director 
composition by independent directors (DOINED) would have a positive impact on firm 
performance. OLS 1 (ii)(a) and OLS 1 (ii)(b) model results pointed to the contrary (see Tables 7.3 
and 7.4). The relationship between DOINED in 2002 and firm performance in 2002 and 2003, 
and between DOINED in 2003 and firm performance in 2003 and 2004 was not statistically 
significant in most of the cases observed. Specifically, the hypothesised positive relationship 
between DOINED and firm performance was statistically rejected by one of the cases observed, 
indicated by a significant negative relationship between DOINED in 2003 and NROE in 2003 (J3 
= -0.42; p  = 0.05) [See Table 7.4].
With respect to HBIND 5 testing, the results in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 indicated that, when the board 
of director composition was dominated by independent directors (DOINED), the relationship 
between the presence of a senior independent director (SRI) and firm performance was not 
statistically significant in most of the cases observed. However, HBIND 5 was supported in two 
of the cases observed where there existed significant positive relationship between SRI in 2002
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Table 7 .3 : Board Independence  and  Firm P erfo rm an ce  -  OLS 1 (ii)(a)
The Exam ination of D om ination of Independen t D irectors on the  Board (DOINED) in 2002 w ith K espective Firm P erfo rm an ce  2002 and  2003
(The Testing  of IIBIND 2 w ilh IIBIND I , .1,6 .7 .8 , 9 and  10)
HOI) '  Hoard of Directors. NROI Return on 1 quits, DOINT I) Domination of Independent Directors. NINAf 1 ~ Proportion of INI Ds with accounting and Finance background, SRI ~ Senior lndc|>cndcnt Director appointment on HOI), F.X( 1.0 * F.xcTusion o f f  P.O. f FO. ( OO 
and Managing Director. ( TUN - Hoatd % ( hatrman INI D, MH t) - f oundct presence on HOI). Nl AMDI - Proportion of family-mcmber directed*. NINSDO -  Fqmfv holding* of INI I), NA SPI ~ Total Asset*. NDI () ~ Debt to equity ratio. NINST!,~ Total proportion of 
(rovctnmcnt Agencies . Public I i*ted ( ompamcs ( «*poratu»n* and Other ln*t»tution% »ub«tantial equity holding*. PROP -  Property industry. ( O N SIR  -  Construction industry, H N  -  Finance industry. 02 - Year 2002. 0) -  Year 200), A letter N at the front of respective variable * 
acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal %c<»re* using Van der Waerden approach
/  Kota: 1 or the ta t of muhti o/lmrant). all mdepeiulent ianal>Jt< indi.ated 1 II It i t  I he/ou C eondilion nntex !r\< thin 1 ■> anil not mote than one tana/nr proportion etralet than 0. in their rr<pfi/nr dt men a on (run); 1 or the ta t of au/onimlalion of 
r /7  wm the Mtni/hanit leiel /or 1 >mhin II atom  < latnti, (J) inputted a lalnr etralei th,m the 1 )mlnn 11 atom denied tippet limit (dt ■), \  tali dual aynijraihe leiel: d.t (*j. 0 ( / ,i(**), tl.fll (***}, / \ll i  dull dual ra/ua uerr ayni/nanf at <)d)<)l leiel j
A d / R- 0.2200 0.1473 0.2077 0.1455
R- 0.2945 0.2287 0.28.33 0.2271
l ; 3.9550 2.8097 3.7460 2.7838
L o e f f i e i e i i t Lsiai CoA’Iikstiii Lstal C i i d T i a c m  l s i m Coefficient Lsiai
Intercept (a) (10032 0017.3 0.1286 0.6578 0.1363 0.7233 0.1241 0.6.342
\ixplanalory I 'aridities (jl)
DOINED02 0.0692 0.4524 0.2299 -1.4372 0.0.541 0.3508 0.1980 -1.2.368
NINACF02 0.0202 0.2942 0.0674 0.9370 0.0239 0.3451 -0.0003 -0.0040
SR102 0.1797 1.3993 0.2001 1.4906 0.1023 0.7909 0.3164 2.3541'**
EXCEO02 0.1440 0.9137 0,2179 1.3221 0.1459 0.9183 0.1666 1.0095
CHIN02 0.0441 0.2779 0.0680 0.4101 0.0899 0.5630 0.0898 0.5410
FOUD02 0.1692 1.0432 0.0965 0.5688 0.1618 0.9899 0.0157 0.0922
NFAMDI02 0.1895 2.0264* * 0.0166 0.1694 0.0988 1.0481 0.0148 0.1516
NINSDG02 ■0.0445 -0.6208 0.0498 0.6647 0.04.31 0.5969 0.1189 1.5836
Control I 'aridities
NASET02 -0.2549 2.6058*** 0.4062 .3.9720*** -0.2540 2.5761** 0.3003 2.9334***
NDEQ02 0.1629 2.2415** 0.3144 4.2910* ** 0.1338 1.7581*
NINSTL02 0.2058 2.0588**
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.9330 4.1678*** 0.8146 .3.6107***
CONSTR 0.4276 1.6965* 0.4978 1.9596*
FIN 0.6212 -2.3765**
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Table 7. I: Board Independence  and  Firm P erfo rm an ce  - -  OLS l(ii)(b)
The Fxam inalion of Dom ination of Independen t D irectors on the Board (DOINFD) in 2003 with Itespective Firm P erfo rm ance 2003 and 2001
(The T esting  of IIBIND 2 w ith IIBIND 1 ,5 ,6 .7, B, 9 and  10)
HOI) - Hoaid of Directors. NROI Return on I quits. DOINI I) - Domination of Independent Directors. NINACI -  Proportion of INI-1)« with accounting and finance background. SRI - Senior Independent Duector appointment on HOI), I X( l-.O -  Kxcluston o f CKO, CKO, COO and 
Managing Director. CHIN Hoatd s ( hanman INI I) IO C I) - founder presence on HOI). Nl AMDI - 1‘iopotlion of family member directors. NINSIKi - Iquity  holdings of INI-f), NASI-I - Total Assets. NDI () -  Debt to equity ratio. NNRKMIJ '  Non-Kxccutivc Directors' 
Rcninneiation. NINDPV lotal pioportion of Individuals and or Private ( ompamcs substantial equity holdings. N INS 11 lotal propotlion of (loveinmcnt Agencies', Public Listed Com panies'/Corporations' and Othct Institutions substantial equity holdings. PROP - Properly industry, 
I IN - finance industry. 01 Vcar ’00! 04 Year ?0<>4, A letter N at the front of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ < \W o I or the ted «/ multhollinrant); all independent i an ah It < nnlu ated I II leiel he low f. , audition index / m  than I ■> and not mure fhi/n one laname proportion pnater than 0. St) m then irfpetlnr dimension (row); I or the ted of autiknrreLition of erron the 
dpm/iuinie trie/ jot I h i  Inn Walton dahdr (d) nnlu ated a mine piratei thin the I hirlnn U a/ton denied upper limit (dr); \ tat id  lu ll  i icni/iuimr leiel <). I (*), 0 .0 ! (***); /M l / '  datidhal in/wet u rn  atm /ran t at 0,0 i  leielj____________________________
A dj R‘ 0.2374 0.1936 0.0702 0.1232
R- 0.3102 0.2705 0.1610 0.2089
/'• 4.2621 3.514.5 1.7729 2.4388
L<j£lGi;jKni LSI iVl L y d iiaeu i UUU t SOU (Coefficient
In tercept (a) 0.1993 1.0.321 0.0124 0.0624 0.0758 0.3517 -0.1647 -0.7874
Explanatory I artabks ((i)
D O IN E D 03 ■0.0050 ■0.0259 0.4209 2.1153“ 0.2996 1.3868 0.3173 -1.5135
N IN A C F03 0.0809 1.1791 0.0261 0.3703 0.0310 0.4050 0.0668 0.8989
SRI03 -0.0817 0.6696 0.3357 2.6767*** 0.0342 0.2511 0.0465 0.3519
EXCEO03 0.1409 1.0042 0.26.37 1.8273* 0.0350 0.2236 0.2183 1.4358
C H IN 03 0.1436 0.9303 -0.2408 1.5176 0.0691 0.4012 0.3030 1.8123*
FOUD03 0.1748 1.0131 0.1554 0.8759 0.2461 1.2778 0.0247 0.1319
N FAM DI03 ■0.0385 -0.4151 0.0098 0.1022 0.0898 0.8669 00314 0.3120
N IN SD G 03 -0.0635 -0.8827 0.0188 0.25.36 0.1339 1.6673* 0.0394 0.5059
Control I 'aridities
NASET03 -0.3373 3.3.316*“ 0.4.399 4.2248*** -0.2204 -1.9498* 0.2428 2.2133“
N D E Q 03 0.3359 4.7634* ** 0.1541 2.0165“
N N R E M U 03 0.1551 1.7390*
N IN D PV 03 0.1666 1.6627*
N IN STL03 0.2974 2.9283* ** 0.2706 2.4593**
Industry Dummy
PR O P 0.7126 3.2013*** 0.4385 1.9156* 0.1551 1.7390**
FIN ■0.4775 1.8461* -0.4747 1.7846* 0.5291 1.8321*
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and NROE in 2003 (J3 = 0.32 ; p  = 0.05) and between SRI in 2003 and NROE in 2003 (ft = 0.34 
; p  = 0.01). These results were consistent with the respective findings of OLS 1.
HBIND 6 testing results (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4) also showed that, when the board of director 
composition was dominated by independent directors (DOINED), there were two cases where 
the hypothesised positive relationship between the non-presence of Chief Executive Officer. 
Chief Financial Officer or Managing Director on the firm’s board (EXCEO) and firm 
performance was supported. In particular, there existed a significant positive relationship 
between EXCEO in 2003 and NROE in 2003 {fi= 0.26; p  = 0.1). This result was consistent with 
OLS l(iXb) finding on the relationship between EXCEO and firm performance.
For HBIND 7 testing, when the board of director composition was dominated by independent 
directors (DOINED). there existed a significant positive relationship between the presence of an 
independent board's chairman (CHINED) in 2003 and NROE in 2004 (/?= 0.30: p = 0.1). This 
result supported the respective finding of OLS (i)(b).
HBIND 9 results indicated that when the board of director composition was dominated by 
independent director (DOINED) [see Table 7.3] there existed a significant negative relationship 
between NFAMDI in 2002 with NTobin's Q in 2002 (/?= -0.20: p  = 0.05). This result was 
consistent with the previous OLS l(i)(a) finding, where a significant negative relationship was 
found between NFAMDI and firm performance.
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In accordance with OLS l(i)(b) significant finding on the relationship between NINSDG and 
firm performance, the results of OLS l(ii)(b) on HBIND 10 testing also showed that, when the 
board of director composition was dominated by independent director (DOINED). there existed 
a significant negative relationship between NINSDG in 2003 and NTobin's Q in 2004 (/? = - 
0.13;/? = 0.1).
Similar to results derived from previous OLS l(i)(a) and (b) results. OLS 1 (ii)(a) and OLS 
l(ii)(b) model testing o f HBIND 4 and 8 indicated that, in all the cases observed the respective 
hypothesised relationships were not statistically significant.
ID) Domination of Independent and Non-Executive Director and Firm Performance (DONEDD -  O L S  l ( i i i )
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 respectively present the regression results derived from the OLS l(iii)(a) [i.e. 
regression o f DONEDI and specified board independence variables in 2002 with respective firm 
performance 2002 and 2003] and the OLS l(iii)(b) research model [i.e. regression of DONEDI 
and specified board independence variables in 2003 with respective firm performance 2003 and 
2004], Specifically, OLS l(iii) investigated the impact of domination of board of director 
combination by the sum of independent directors and non-executive directors (DONEDI: 
HBIND 3). proportion of independent directors with accounting and finance knowledge and 
skills (NINACF: HBIND 4). presence of a senior independent outside director (SRI: HBIND 5). 
the exclusion o f Chief Executive Officer. Chief Financial Officer or Managing Director from 
membership of the board of directors (ECXEO: HBIND 6). the appointment of an independent 
director as the board of directors' chairman (CHINED: HBIND 7). the presence of a founder on 
the firm's board (FOUD: HBIND 8)? the proportion of family directors on the board (NFAMDI:
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HBIND 9) and the proportion o f independent directors’ shares’ ownership (NINDSG: HBIND 
10), on firm performance.
In Chapter 5. section 5.1.1, HBIND 3 proposed that the domination of board of director’s 
composition by independent directors and non-executive directors (DONEDI) would have an 
impact on firm performance. OLS l(iii)(a) and OLS 1 (iii)(b) model results revealed no 
significant relationship between DONEDI and both market value and accounting-based 
performance measures.
For HBIND 5 testing, the results o f OLS l(iii)(a) and OLS l(iii)(b) results [see Tables 7.5 and 
7.6] indicated that, when board of director composition was dominated by independent directors 
and non-executive directors (DONEDI). the hypothesised relationship between the presence of a 
senior independent director (SRI) and firm performance held for two specific cases observed. 
However, there existed a significant positive relationship between SRI in 2002 and NROE in 
2003 (/? = 0.31: p  = 0.05). and between SRI in 2003 and NROE in 2003 (/?= 0.30: p  = 0.05). 
These results were similar to those found in OLS l(i)(a) and (b). and OLS 1 (ii)(a) and (b) 
models where a significant positive relationship existed between SRI and firm performance.
In addition. OLS l(iii)(a) and (b) results derived from testing HBIND 7 (see Tables 7.5 and 7.6) 
indicated that, when the board of director composition was dominated by independent directors 
and non-executive directors (DONEDI). the hypothesised positive impact of the presence of an 
independent chairman o f the board (CHINED) on firm performance was supported by one 
particular case observed. Notably, there existed a significant positive relationship between
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Table 7 .5 : Board Independence  and  Firm P erfo rm an ce  — OLS )
The Exam ination of n o m ina tion  o l In d ep en d en t and  Son-Executive D irectors on the  Board (DOSEDI) in 2002 w ith R espective Firm P erfo rm an ce  2002 and  2003
(The T esting ot IIBIM) 3 w ith IIHIVD 1,5,6,7,8,9 and  10)
HOI) -  Hoard ol Director*. NROI -  Return on I quilv IK)N'I Dl - lam in atio n  of Independent and Non I aecutive Director*. NINA( I -  Proportion of INI I), with accounting and finance background, SRI * Seniot Independent Director appointment on HOI). liXTI O -  l.*clu*iun of 
(T O . (T O , COO and M inuting Ducctoi. ( IIIN Hoard t ( hairman INTO. lO t 'D  - I oundct pre*ence on HOI). Nl AMDI -  Proportion of family member director*. NINSIXi -  Iquity  holding* of INI I). NASIT - total A**et*. ND I<) -  Dcht to equity tatio. NINSTI. Total 
proportion of (rovctnment Agencie* . I’ublii f it te d  ( Umpame* ( orporationt and Othet Inalitulion*' tubttannal equity holding*. PROP -  Property induitiy. C O N SIR  -  ( im*tructmn induttry. I IN -  finance induattv. 02 -  Year 2002. 0 ) - Yea/ 2003. A letter N at the front of 
retpective variable* acronym identified the variable that had heen tramformed to normal *core* uung  Yan der Waerden approach
/ i\’«/ei. I or the (nl «/ mullhollinrant). al! tmtrptniirnl lanal’ltt iniLalnl I II In ti M ow  J. . imditum im itv leu l/um I '  ami tm! man I Kin out rananit proportion I'nalti /Km 0. '0  in ihnr tnprJnr dimtnaon (row), l or the Ini oj auhknm Litton of 
tiron thr urnifiaimr It i t  I /or / )nrbm Mahon < tain It. hi) m.ii. altd a mint trtalrr I Ur n  thr I )mi inn Mahon iterant npprr limit (<h j ;  Stain hull geni/namr Inrl: 0 . 1 (*) ,  I t . DSf **) ,  O d !  ( * * * ) ;  A H  /■ Uatntual lalutf urn uenijnanl a! OJ XI l  leirlj_______
A d j R 0 2194 0.1391 0.2072 0.1.398
R- 0.2939 0.221.3 0.2829 0.2219
1‘ 3.9437 2.69.31 3.7.383 2.7019
Coclfiacni Lk?c.ffiacjii Cyvffiami LSlill CycQkiuil LSlal Cocfficicn1 t
Intercept (a) 0.0288 0.1308 0.1103 0.4771 0.13.30 -0.5994 0.0969 0.4189
1 ixplanatory I 'unablea (ji)
DONEDI02 0.0318 0.1918 0.0692 0.3975 0.0148 0.0888 0.0758 -0.4355
NINACF02 0.021.3 0.3124 0.0574 0.7942 -0.0262 -0.3780 -0.0094 0.1303
SRI02 0.1844 1.4373 0.1896 1.4075 -0.1049 -0.8113 0.3078 2.2858**
EXCEO02 0.1364 0.8692 0.1958 1.1879 0.1407 0.8894 0.1478 0.8970
CHIN02 0.0475 -0.2995 0.0.390 0.2.337 0.0966 -0.6040 0.1164 0.6982
FOUD02 0.1661 1.024.3 0.0896 0.5261 0.1602 0.9800 0.0101 0.0591
NFAMDI02 0.1829 -1.9529* 0.0269 0.27.39 0.0963 1.0198 j 0.0227 0.2310
NINSDG02 0.0449 0.6249 0.0477 0.6328 -0.0427 -0.5897 1 0.1210 1.6051
Control I 'unable s
NASET02 0.2494 2.4905* * 0.4016 3.8184* * * 0.2549 -2.5251** 0.2942 2.7986**
NDEQ02 0.1555 2.1411** 0.3112 4.2532***
NINSTL02 0.2066 2.06.37**
Industry Dummy
PROP 0.9360 4.1788*** 0.8156 3.6131 * * *
CONSTR 0.4.3.34 1.7111* 0.4966 1.9459*
FIN 0.6213 -2.3761**
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Table 7 .6 : Board Independence  and  Firm P erfo rm an ce  -  OLS I (iii)(b)
The Exam ination of D om ination of Independen t and  Non-Executive D irectors on the  Board (DONEDI) in 2003 w ith R espective Firm P erfo rm an ce  2003 and 2004
(The T esting  of IIBIND 3 w ith IIBIND 4 , 5 , 6 ,7. 8,9 and  10)
HOI) Mould of Duectrits. NROI - Return on I quits. 1X)NI D! -  Domination of Independent and Non executive Directors. NINACf -  Proportion of INI.IH with accounting and finance hack|(iotind. SRI -  Scniot Independent Dnectot appointment on HOI), f'XC'fiO * H.xclusion of ('HO. 
CM). COO and Managing Dnectot, ( IUN - Hoatd s ( hairman IN H ). I Ol I) - founder present e on HOI). Nl AMDI -  Proportion ol family member directors. NINSIXi - I.quity ho ld in g  of IN! I). NASH I _ lolal Assets. NDMJ * Debt to equity tatio. NINDPV - Total proportion of 
Individuals and/ot Private Companies' vibstantial equity holding*. N IN SII - total propottion of (loveinment Agencies'. Public I isted ( ompamcs ' / ( orporatiotis and Other Institutions' substantial c(|uilv holding*. PROP - Property indu*trv, HIN - f  inance industry. " Year 2001. 04 - 
Year 21X14. A letter N at the fiont of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal score* using Van der Waerden approach
/ W n .  I or the test of rnuih, tdhneant), all iniiefemlent tanaldes in. It, ated I II leiel he lou f. , ondihon index let* tfkin I ) and not more tlkin one taname proportion tie ate r than 0. ">0 in their rr (perlite dimen non (mu); lo r  the test of autoronelahon of errors the 
sitntficance leiel jot I furhin \\ at son stall she (d) indirated a talue m a in  if kin lf>e I lurhtn \l at ton dented upper limit (d t); Statistical (ienifiran<r leiel: 0 .1 (*), >(**). 0 .0 1 (***); A l l  / ' statistical ra/ues urn significant at 0.0  ^  letelj______________________
Performance Measure TO BIN 'S Q 2003 ROE 2003 T O B IN ’S Q 2004_____________________ ROE 2004
Ad) R- 0.2377 0.1820 0.0700 0.1177
R: 0.3103 0.2601 0.1608 0.2039
E 4.2670 3.331.3 1.7702 2.3660
CodHami Litilt Cocfficien 1 i -.slat Cocfficien i t-stat Coefficient t-stat
In tercept (a) 0.2293 1.0238 0.1378 0.6812 0.2464 -0.9869 -0.2934 -1.2070
lixplanatory I 'anables (pi)
D O N E D I03 0.0441 0.2663 0.2171 -1.2669 0.2.330 1.3692 0.1857 1.0329
N IN A CF03 0.078.3 1.1.3.30 0.0311 0.4349 0.0219 0.2839 0.0510 0.6786
SRI03 0.0813 0.6718 0.2988 2.3841** 0.0621 0.4395 0.0248 0.1882
EXCEO03 0.138.3 0.9933 0.2.312 1.6039 0.0.339 0.3467 0.1787 1.1810
C H IN 03 0.1433 0.9.318 0.2631 1.6498 0.0834 0.4964 0.2875 1.7174*
FO UD03 0.1780 1.0.377 0.124.3 0.7004 0.2.302 1.2016 0.0697 0.3738
| N FA M D I03 0.0.383 0.4188 0.0184 0.1930 -0.0691 0.6724 0.0127 0.1266
N IN SD G 03 0.06.33 0.9047 1 0.0.369 0.4932 -0.1310 -1.8740* 0.0381 0.4857
Control Variables
N ASET03 0.332.3 .3.24.37* * * 0.4306 4.0.346*** -0.2033 -1.7771* 0.2724 2.4442**
N D E Q 03 0.3.330 4.7466*** 0.1474 1.9212*
N IN D PV 03 0.1668 1.6597*
N IN ST L 03 0.2937 2.9112*** 0.2296 2.0938**
Industry Dummy
PR O P 0.7144 -3.2101*** 0.4113 -1.7849* -0.3243 -2.1091**
F IN 0.48.39 1.8690* -0.46.36 -1.7291 * 0.333.3 ■1.9062*
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CHINED in 2003 and NROE in 2004 (f$= 0.29; p  = 0.1), similar to the OLS 1 (i)(b) and (ii)(b) 
models finding of a significant positive relationship between the presence of an independent 
chairman of the board (CHINED) and firm performance.
On the other hand, when board of director composition was dominated by independent directors 
and non-executive directors (DONEDI), OLS l(iii)(a) results derived from testing HBIND 9 
(see Table 7.6) revealed a significant negative relationship between the proportion of family- 
member directors (NFAMDI) in 2002 and NTobin’s Q in 2002 (fi = -0.18; p  = 0.1). This result 
was similar to significant findings of previous OLS 1 (i)(a) and OLS 1 (ii)(a) models, estimating 
the relationship between NFAMDI and firm performance.
With respect to HBIND 10 testing, the results of OLS l(iii)(b) revealed that, when board o f  
director composition was dominated by independent directors and non-executive directors 
(DONEDI), there existed significant negative relationship between NINSDG in 2003 and 
NTobin’s Q in 2004 (fi -  -0.15; p  = 0.1). This result was consistent with respective significant 
finding gathered by OLS 1 (i)(b) and OLS 1 (ii)(b) models earlier.
Furthermore, OLS l(iii)(a) and OLS l(iii)(b) results derived from testing HBIND 4, 6 and 8 
indicated that, in all cases observed, the respective hypothesised relationships were not 
statistically significant. Similar findings were obtained by OLS l(i) and OLS 1 (ii) models for 
the testing of HBIND 4 and 8 relationships with firm performance.
In adherence, Table 7.7 summarises the findings derived from examining the impact of board 
independence on firm performance.
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Table 7.7: Summary of Findings of the Impact of Board Independence on Firm Performance
Bourd o f  Director's Independence and Firm Performance  —  OLS 1
Proportion o f Independent Director Domination o f Independent Director Domination o f Independent and Non-Executive Director
O L S  U i l Postulated
Relationship
Result O L S  Mi) PostulatedRelationship Result O L S  1 ( i i )
Postulated
Relationship
Result
IIBIN D  1: Proportion of 
IN E D s [NINED] + N ot Supported
H BIND 2: Domination of 
IN E D s [DOINED] + N ot Supported
I IBIND 3: Domination of IN E D s  
and N E D s [DONEDI] p N ot Supported
I IBIND 4: Proportion of 
IN E D s with A C F  
[NINACFJ
+ N ot Supported
I IBIND 4: Proportion of 
IN E D s with A C F  
[NINACFJ
+ N ot Supported I IBIND 4: Proportion of IN EDs with A C F  [NINACF] + N ot Supported
IIBIND 5: Presence of 
SR IN E D  [SRI] ?
Positive
Relationship
I IBIND 5: Presence of 
SR IN E D  [SRI] ?
Positive
Relationship
I IBIND 5: Presence of SR IN E D  
[SRI]
p Positive
Relationship
I IBIND 6: Exclusion of 
CEO, CFO, COO and M D  
[EXCEO]
+ Supported
I IBIND 6: Exclusion of 
CEO, CFO, COO and 
M D  [EXCEO]
+ Supported I IBIND 6: Exclusion of CEO, 
CFO, COO and M D  [EXCEO] +
N ot Supported
I IBIND 7: Presence of 
Independent Board Chairman 
[CHIN]
+ Supported
IIBIND 7: Presence of 
Independent Board 
Chairman [ CHIN]
+ Supported I IBIND 7: Presence of Independent 
Board Chairman [ CHIN] +
Supported
I IBIND 8: Presence of 
founder [FOUD] ? ?
I IBIND 8: Presence of 
founder [FOUD]
? ? I IBIND 8: Presence of founder 
[FOUD]
? ?
I IBIND 9 : Proportion of 
FAM DIs [NFAMDI] ?
Negative
Relationship
I IBIND 9 : Proportion of 
FAM DIs [NFAMDI]
? Negative
Relationship
I IBIND 9 : Proportion of FAM DIs 
[NFAMDI]
? Negative
Relationship
IIBIN D  10: Proportion of 
IN E D s’ shares ownership 
[NINSDG]
?
Positive/
Negative
Relationship
I IBIND 10: Proportion of 
IN E D s ’ shares ownership 
[NINSDG]
? Negative
Relationship
IIBIND 10: Proportion of IN E D s’ 
shares ownership [NINSDG]
? Negative
Relationship
Notes: INED  =  Independent Director; NED  =  Non Executive Director; ACE = Accounting and Finance Knowledge and Skills, SRINED 'Senior INED; CEO  =  Chief Executive Director; CFO  =  Chief Financial
Officer, COO  =  Chief Operating Officer; MD  =  Managing Director; FOUD  =  Founder; FAMDI =Family-Member Director; BOD  =  Board o f  Directors
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7.2.1.1 Discussions of the Impact of Board Independence on Firm Performance — OLS l(i), 
OLS Hii) and OLS l(iii) Results
(I) Proportion of Independent Directors (NINED), Domination of kdependent Directors (DOINED) and 
Domination of Independent and Non-Executive Directors (DONEDI).
As indicated in OLS l(i), OLS(ii) and OLS (iii) regression results (see Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4,
7.5 and 7.6], there was no significant relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors, the domination of independent directors and the domination of independent and non­
executive directors and firm performance, in most of the cases observed. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Abdullah (2004) and Chang Aik Leng and Abu Mansor (2005) who found 
no significant relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and firm 
performance. Moreover, changes in independent director composition on firms’ board were 
mainly driven by MBSB Listing Requirements 2001 (see KLSE and PwC, 2002) which require 
the presence of minimum of 2 or one-third independent directors (whichever gives the highest 
number) on firm’s board. Furthermore, when firms’ Tobin’s Q and ROE values were examined, 
there was a high percentage of firms with a Tobin’s Q below 1 and a negative ROE between the 
period 2001 to 2004 (see Table 7.8).
Table 7.8:The Percentage of Firms with a Tobin’s Q less than 1 and a Negative ROE Value
| Year
2001 2002 2003 2004
T he percentage o f firm's with a 
T obin 's Q less than 1 71.90%
69.20% 76.00% 63.40%
T he percentage o f firms with a 
negative RO E value 18.60%
7
20.80%
1
20.40% 16.20%
iY — 221 firms |
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Notably, the practice of some firms to increase their board’s independence with the appointment 
of more non-executive director68 rather than independent directors should be questioned by the 
MBSB, since non-executive director can encompass family member, current or former 
employees and/or affiliated directors (see Bhagat and Black, 1999). Companies’ assertions in 
their corporate governance statement in 2002 and 2003 that such action had led to the 
appropriate establishment of independent views and a fair representation of shareholders’ 
interest on firms’ board were misguided. Namely, Chang Aik Leng and Abu Mansor (2005) 
argued that, their lack of finding of a significant link between proportion of non-executive 
directors and return on equity was due to the lack of independence and hence monitoring 
commitment of non executive directors in Malaysian firms.
However in two observed cases, significant negative relationship were found between the 
respective proportion of independent directors in 2002 and 2003, and return on equity in 2003 
[see OLS 1 (i)(a) and (b), and OLS 1 (ii)(a) results in respective Table 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3]. This 
finding was consistent with that reported by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Yermack (1996) 
who found a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and firm 
performance. Further examination of firms’ appointment of independent directors in 2003 (see 
Chapter 6, Table 6.14) indicated an increase in the proportion of independent directors on boards 
in 2003. The cited result seemingly implies that the higher presence of independent directors had 
not contributed to higher firms’ earnings. In addition, when firms’ ROE growth and ROE values 
were referred (see Graphs 7.1 and 7.2 respectively), there were high percentage of the sampled 
firms that had experienced negative ROE growth and value.
68 As indicated by some o f  the sample companies in their corporate governance statement, specifically when they were 
discussing about their board’s independence composition and establishment o f appropriate impartial views in the board o f 
director.
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Graph 7.1: Percentage of Firms with Negative Return on Equity Growth (MROE) between the 
Period 2001 to 2004
(Notts: MROEG12= Firms with negative ROE Growth between Year 2001 and 2002; MROEG23= Firms with negative ROE Growth between Year 2002 and 
2003; MROEG34= Firms with negative ROE Growth between Year 2002 and 2004)
5 9 .3 0 %
M R O E G 34
M R O E G 23
M R O EG 12
Graph 7.2: Percentage of Firms with Negative Return on Equity Value between the Period 
2001 to 2004.
(Notes: MROE01= Firms with negative ROE in 2001; MROE02= Firms with negative ROE in 2002; MROE03= Firms with negative ROE in 2003; MROE04= 
Firms with negative ROE in 2004)
25 .00%
2 0 .0 0 %
15.00%
1 6 .2 0 %
; 10.00%
5.00%
0 .00 %
MROEOl
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Possibly the negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors in 2002 
and 2003, and NROE in 2003 respectively were due to companies having had a series of 
negative earnings in past years. A potentially positive relationship between proportion of
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independent directors and return on equity would have been observed if respective firms’ 
earnings had been positive and been growing steadily over a period of time. The negative 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors and firm performance could also 
signify that executive directors’ depth of knowledge of firms’ internal operations, and 
independent directors access to firms’ current operating information, and board members 
possession of relevant technical expertise [Muth and Donaldson, 1998; KLSE and PwC, 2002; 
McKinsey 2002 (i)] had a potentially greater influence on firm performance. Moreover, 
according to Burkart et al., (1999) high monitoring imposition on managerial discretion may be 
costly when such practice constraint managers’ initiatives on firm specific investment, namely in 
searching new investment project.
Besides that, underlying the link between the proportion or higher influence of independent 
directors on the board and firm value is the assumption that independent directors will perform 
their oversight duties objectively and impartially (Beasley, 1996). However, the extent of the 
appropriate performance of their monitoring and controlling duties, namely their evaluation of 
company and CEO performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001) and reviewing of management 
succession planning (Walsh and Seward, 1990) are not known by investors and are also difficult 
to quantify in terms of the extent of their impact on firm performance. For non-board members 
to directly observe how independent directors conducted their monitoring, controlling, advisory 
and strategic decision-making duties, namely, by attending board of director meetings may not 
have been allowed by firms due to the confidentiality of their business information (see Spira, 
1998).
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Thus, the use of the proportion of independent directors or their domination on the board in 
regression models may not be able to accurately convey such directors’ performance of 
oversight duties and this may explain the non-existent link between the proportion of 
independent directors and firm performance. Bhagat and Black (1999) in their study examining 
the impact of board independence composition on the performance of directorial tasks, namely 
CEO replacement or acquisition of a company, gathered that such independence composition 
may not be able to capture directors’ oversight influence on overall organisational performance.
In addition, according to Robinson Jr. (1992), board members’ active involvement in the firm’s 
strategic decisions will enhance company and management credibility. Consequently, when 
independent directors do not participate actively in the firm’s strategic planning and investment 
setting, their conduct would not contribute to fair representation and protection of shareholders’ 
interest and hence better firm performance (Ireland and Hitt, 2005). Namely, the lack of 
significant relationship observed between board independence composition (i.e. NINED, 
DOINED and DONEDI) and firm performance, may also due to inappropriate measure use to 
examine independent director participation in the firm’s strategic decision-making process.
Moreover, the findings of KLSE and PwC 2002 survey indicated that, the independent director 
effectiveness is affected by their ease of access to the firm’s internal information. Given the 
separation of independent directors’ duties from day to day or operational responsibilities [see 
Fama and Jensen 1983 (a); Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990], their ability to appropriately assess 
and advise the firm about its current state of operational or financial circumstances requires the 
availability of relevant information and consultation with external independent professional
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advisors. MB SB Listing Rulings require firms to ensure that their board members have access to 
internal sources of information, including firms’ employees co-operation, as well as the means 
for obtaining external professional advice, since these will enhance board members’ 
accountability when performing their oversight duties. From the review of firms’ corporate 
governance statements in this study, some companies restricted their board members from 
obtaining outside consultation advice since they argued their internal human resources were 
sufficient to assist their board members.
On the other hand, some companies set the amount of funds that could be spent on the services 
of external professional advisors (as stated in some of the companies’ corporate governance 
statement). Firms’ restriction of funds available to obtain outside experts’ advice, is another 
obstacle to independent directors’ effectiveness in making informed economic judgements, 
given their limited skills and knowledge of the firm’ risks and operations. Board members’ sole 
reliance on the firm’s internal sources and assistance may affect the quality of their oversight, 
namely, their assessment of management’s strategic investment planning proposals. Ezammel 
and Watson (1998) raised the issue of the accountability of management information supply 
since they argued that the internally supplied information could be biased and likely to support 
management discretion.
Further, in most companies’ corporate governance statement in this study, companies indicated 
their preference to establish a board of directors comprising a variety of human capital 
knowledge and skills, namely, a mix of directors with financial and non-financial skills. Studies 
by Kirk and Siegel (1996) indicated that the influence of audit committee opinion on the firm’s
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financial reporting practice and circumstances will be stronger when there is the presence of at 
least one board member with financial background but not an audit committee member. 
Potentially, independent directors’ judgements of the firm’s financial position may be affected 
by the lack of financial experts’ presence on the firm’s board.
In Chapter 7 of MBSB Listing Requirements, board of directors and managing directors are 
required to retire at least once in every 3 years. It was noted from companies’ 2002 and 2003 
annual reports that, in most cases, the senior director of the company was the one re-elected or 
retired on a rotational basis. Potentially the dynamics of the board team may be affected by the 
changes in board composition especially in the case of newly appointed directors who may need 
the guidance of an experienced director to perform their job (see Baysinger and Butler, 1985).
In addition, the appointment of new independent directors may have an impact on the quality of 
oversight duties performed in the firm, as their understanding, experience and capability to 
perform their oversight responsibilities will take time to develop and subsequently influence 
firm performance (see Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Yermack, 
2004). Moreover, as Bhagat and Black (2002) pointed out, it was difficult to assess board 
members contribution when they were likely to be replaced within a short space of time. On the 
other hand, the need to educate and increase board members’ awareness of their responsibilities 
has been noted by the MBSB, since in its Listing Ruling 2001 it requires listed firms to send 
their directors to attend Mandatory Accreditation Programme (“MAP”)69 training [organised by 
the Research Institute of Investment Analysis of Malaysia (“RIIAM”)]. Even though
69 This requirement was not mandatory beginning 1st January 2005. where the board of director of firms are given full 
responsibility to ensure that their directors have obtained sufficient training required for the performance of their duties [see 
MBSB. 2004(iii)]
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examination of the impact of the proportion of independent directors or their high composition 
on firm performance has not produced a significant result, Barney et al., (2001) argued that 
implementation of the internal corporate governance mechanism should be undertaken 
appropriately to fully realise its benefit in governing firms’ resources and management. 
Similarly, Bhagat and Black (1999) pointed out that a firm’s competitive advantage is much 
affected by its identification of the appropriate board of director composition for its business.
The lack of significant result gathered on the relationship between high board independence and 
firm performance would appear to support Vance (1964) and Fama (1983) propositions. They 
posited that executive directors’ greater knowledge and experience of the firm operations than 
outside directors, allow them to make better informed strategic decision making for the firm and 
consequently this can result in better firm performance.
A more wholesome approach to examining independent board members’ effectiveness in 
performing their oversight duties and the subsequent contribution of it to firm performance 
could be undertaken with the investigation of their contribution and involvement in the advisory, 
strategic and monitoring duties (see Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004). In particular, this will require 
the identification of the tasks that they perform in each of these respective duties. Furthermore, 
the linking of the composition of independent directors on the board with firm performance may 
not be representative of their actual involvement in board activities. Notably, such relationship is 
based on the underlying assumption that given certain governance qualities of outside 
independent directors they should be able to monitor and control management activities that are 
detrimental to firm value.
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The background of an independent director as someone from outside the firm and who has no 
association with the firm’s management activities, underlie his/her suitability to conduct board 
decision-making objectively and hence his/her capability to fairly represent shareholders’ best 
interests. However, to what extent do the independent directors’ opinions and actions influence 
board decision-making so as to influence firm performance? Potentially, research should be 
undertaken to identify the responsibilities performed by the independent director on the board 
and subsequently to measure the extent and impact of such conduct on the firm strategic 
direction. This may provide a useful insight into outside independent directors’ contribution to 
firm value. In other words, as well as being independent from management, outside directors 
also need to possess good leadership, management and entrepreneurial knowledge and skills to 
positively influence firm value creation. According to Main et al., (1996) board decisions are 
made collectively and hence the involvement and cooperation of each board member are 
important to attain dynamic judgement.
On the other hand, the effectiveness of independent directors’ governance conduct may be 
compromised by their need to secure future employment in the company, and to ensure long­
term service, and for these reasons they may be pressured to approve certain management plans 
[see Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Cheah, 2003]. Namely, according to Mohamed Abdullah 
(2003), since independent directors are employed by the company they may not be entirely 
independent from management. Besides that, even though the directors’ appointment and choice 
of candidates have to meet with the approval of shareholders, the CEO’s choice of directors still 
presides [see Hermalin (1991); Bathala and Rao (1995)].
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In addition, firms need to be responsible for their implementation of regulatory requirements 
pertaining to corporate governance practice by enforcing them properly and not merely 
complying with the rules. In other words they need to recognise the significance of 
independents’ director human capital by utilising such directors’ external knowledge and skills 
efficiently to create firm value (see Fama and Jensen, 1983; Uzzi, 1996; Short et al., 1998). In 
addition, Schroeder et al., (1967) argue that a person’s educational level has an impact on their 
ability to process complex information. As indicated in Chapter 6 Table 6.21 many of the 221 
Malaysian firms’ board members possessed higher educational background. Also, many of the 
firms had appointed board members with public and private sector experience.
In addition, Fredrickson et al., (1988) noted that the independent director vigilance initiatives 
may be compromised by their personal ties with management. To ensure the reliability of 
independent director’s impartial opinions and judgments in the board, Mohammed Abdullah 
(2003) proposed for their appointment in the company to be administrated by a separate body 
other than the company. This practice would establish quality independent director where the 
director would not feel oblige to follow management command since their employment are not 
determined by them.
(II) Independent Directors’ Accounting and Financial Knowledge and Skills (INACF)
As regards to the impact of the proportion of independent directors with accounting and finance 
background on the firm performance it was not significant when analysed together with the 
proportion of independent directors, the domination of independent directors and the domination 
of independent and non-executive directors on the board. According to Castanias and Helfat
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(1991, 2001), entrepreneurship skill is one of several important human capital resources that can 
generate a firm’s rents. Potentially, independent directors’ accounting and financial skills may 
be relevant for their performance of monitoring and controlling duties, such as financial 
oversight and risk assessment. On the other hand, independent directors’ entrepreneurship skills 
will have more influence on the firm’s strategic decision-making and competitive advantage 
and, subsequently, performance when such directors participate actively in the strategic 
decision-making process (see Barney et al., 2001; KLSE and PwC, 2002).
(HI) Senior Independent Director (SRINED)
The appointment of a senior independent director on the board of the firm is one of the MCCG 
(2001) Best Practices guidelines and hence is a voluntary practice. From OLS (i), OLS (ii) and 
OLS (iii) results (see Tables 7.1 to 7.6 respectively), there existed significant positive 
relationship between the presence of a senior independent director (SRINED) and firm 
performance in all three cases of board independence observed (i.e. proportion of independent 
directors, the domination of independent directors and the domination of independent and non­
executive directors on the board). This finding supported Knapp (1987), Hampel Committee 
(1998), De Zoort and Salterio, (2001), MCCG (2001) and Higgs Report (2003) 
recommendations that a senior independent director be appointed to the firm’s board. Further 
analysis of the relationship between senior independent director appointment and proportion of 
independent directors on the board of director (see Table 7.9) revealed a high statistically 
significant association between the two respective variables. Pearson Chi-Square results further 
supported the significant relationship between senior independent director and firm performance 
in the three cases of board independence observed.
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Table 7.9: Pearson Chi-Square Estimates of the Degree of Association between Senior Independent 
Director (SINED) Appointment and Proportion of Independent Directors on the Board
(Notes: SINED =Senior Independent Director; I NED  =  Independent Director; INLSBD= INED proportion less than 1/3; INRDBD =  I NED 
proportion is 1/3; INGRDBD  =  INED proportion greater than 1/3 but less than 50%; IN50BD  =  INED proportion is 50%; ING50BD =  INED 
proportion greater than 50%; * * * ,  ** and * respectively represents the significance level o f0.001, 0.05 and 0.1) )
Pearson Chi-Square Value
Yr 2002 Yr 2003
SINED xINLSBD 29.125*** 21.260***
SINED x INRDBD 40.241*** 27.851***
SINED x INGRDBD 38.640*** 49.787***
SINED xINSOBD 17.336*** 17.459***
SINED xIG50BD 11.775** 13.766***
Number o f  Firms 98 106
Potentially, companies with a proportion of independent directors less than 50% were likely to 
appoint a senior independent director to enhance the quality of their board’s independence, 
credibility, and to strengthen the influence of independent directors’ views, decisions and their 
need for information, given their less than majority numbers on the board. Moreover, the 
minority proportion of independent directors on the board might further require the influence of 
a high reputation and competent independent director (i.e. the senior independent director) to 
establish and strengthen the materiality of their views. Furthermore, the appointment of a senior 
independent director on the board of firms which have not fulfilled the minimum requirement of 
independent director presence in the board was critical to protect the interests of shareholders. In 
addition, companies with less than one-third independent director presence responded in their 
corporate governance statement that the appointment of senior independent director to their 
board of directors would ensure reliability and sufficiency of independent views in the board 
decision making process.
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As regards to firms with an INED proportion of 50% or more, companies explained in their 
corporate governance statement that the appointment of a senior INED was due to their 
recognition of the value and contribution of this director in establishing appropriate and 
sufficient governance measures in their companies.
(IV) Exclusion of CEO, CFO, COO and/or Managing Director from Board's Membership (EXCEO)
The exclusion of top management officers (i.e. CEO, CFO, COO and/or managing director) 
from board membership in 2003 produced a significant positive relationship with return on 
equity 2003 and 2004 (see results in Tables 7.2 and 7.4). These findings were observed in the 
two cases of board independence examined (i.e. proportion of independent director and the 
domination of independent directors). In particular the findings supported the argument that the 
presence of the CEO on the board may limit independent directors’ freedom to express their 
independent view or challenge management decisions that are in conflict with shareholders’ 
interests (Kosnik, 1987). The findings were consistent with Walsh and Seward’s (1990) 
argument that high board independence will ensure independent director effectiveness in 
administrating the firm. Furthermore, CEO dominant influence on board members appointment, 
remuneration and term of office may constrain independent directors’ governing initiatives 
(Daily and Johnson, 1997; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). In addition, Ryan Jr. and Wiggins 
III (2004) argued that independent boards are more willing to monitor the CEO because the high 
presence of independent director on the board will reduce the CEO’s influence and ability to 
determine their term of service exclusively. However, the study finding was in contrary to
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Bhagat and Black’s (1999) observation of CalPERS70 identification of an ideal board of 
directors composition to include a CEO amongst other non-executive director board members.
(V) Independent Board’s Chairman (CHINED)
A significant positive relationship was found between the presence of an independent board 
chairman in 2003 and ROE 2004 (see OLS 1 results in Tables 7.2, 7.4 and 7.6]. Notably, the 
influence of independent directors (i.e. proportion of independent directors, the domination of 
independent directors and the domination of independent and non-executive directors on the 
board) will be enhanced when the board’s chairman is one of them. This result is consistent with 
the finding reported by Coles and Hesterly (2000) who found a positive relationship between the 
presence of an independent board chairman and market reaction to firm adoption of poison pill71 
which was measured by the firm’s cumulative abnormal return. An independent board chairman, 
as well as being the board’s leader, has control and authority to influence organisational 
processes (Eisenhardt and Schoonven, 1990).
Moreover, as the board’s leader, the independent board chairman has the capability to monitor, 
control and discipline management activities strategically on shareholders’ behalf (Kose and 
Senbet, 1998). In addition such board chairman’s duties include the setting of the board’s 
agenda, monitoring of board subcommittee’s and convening stockholders’ meetings 
(Sundaramurthy et .al., 1997:233).
70 The California Public Employees Retirement System
71 Mechanism that can be used by a target firm in a takeover contest to extract a larger premium from the bidding 
firm (Coles and Hesterly, 2000:197)
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Accordingly, Malaysian companies in their corporate governance identified the board 
chairman’s primary role to include:
(i) Ensuring orderly conduct and working of the Board,
(ii) Providing a broader view and independent judgement on issues of strategy, 
performance and resources, including key appointments and standards of conduct 
thus ensuring that the long-term interests of shareholders are being looked after,
(iii) Leading the Board and planning board meeting(s) agendas,
(iv) Providing clarification on issues raised by shareholders and investors at the 
company’s general meetings
(v) Ensuring the smooth running of the Board, such as the effective functioning of the 
Board, balance of membership on the Board, that all the relevant issues are on the 
board meeting agendas and all directors timely receive relevant information before 
deliberations at the board meetings.
(Source: The Malaysian Listed Companies' Annual Report o f2002 and 2003)
(VI) The Presence of Founder (FOUD)
As indicated by OLS 1 regression results (see Tables 7.1 to 7.6) there was no significant 
relationship between the presence of founder and firm performance when it was examined 
respectively with the proportion of independent directors, the domination of independent 
directors and the domination of independent and non-executive directors on the board. 
According to Villalonga and Amit (2006) founder presence on the board will add value to the 
firm when he/she holds the position of the firm’s CEO or board chairman where the CEO is not 
a family member of the founder. In the current sampled firms in this study, founder was rarely 
the firm’s CEO or board chairman (see Chapter 6, Table 6.18). These reasons may explain the 
non-significant results gathered between FOUD and firm performance.
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(VII) Proportion of Family-Member Directors (NFAMDI)
OLS l(i)(a), OLS 1 (ii)(a) and OLS l(iii)(a) results [see Tables 7.1, 7.3 and 7.5 respectively] 
indicated that there exists significant negative relationship between the proportion of family 
directors on the board and firm performance. According to Jaggi and Leung (2007), the higher 
presence of family-member directors on the firm’s board may affect the ease and ability of 
independent director to conduct their oversight duties objectively and impartially. In particular, 
they noted that family-member directors’ preference for their family members’ directorship on 
the firm’s board will influence the prospective appointment of independent director on the 
board. McConaughy et al., (1998) further gathered, family-members strengthen their dominant 
influence over board decisions by exercising their dominant voting rights (given their high 
ownership of the firm’s shares) to insist on the appointment of their family members to the 
board. Moreover, Claessens et al., (1999, 2000) and Mitton (2002) linked the presence of owner- 
managers to the greater potential of minority interests’ expropriation. Besides that, business 
culture being practised by family members has a potential impact on the reliability of firm 
performance (see Sorensen, 2002).
(Yffl) The Proportion of Independent Director Equity Shareholdings
In most of the cases observed, the results of OLS 1 (see Tables 7.1 to 7.6) indicated no 
significant relationship between independent directors’ equity holdings and firm performance. 
Specifically, a significant positive relationship was found between independent directors’ equity 
holdings in 2002 and return on equity in 2003 (see Table 7.1). On other the other hand, the 
results of OLS 1 (i)(b), OLS 1 (ii)(b) and OLS 1 (iii)(b) [ see Table 7.2, 7.4 and 7.6 respectively] 
revealed a significant negative relationship between independent directors’ equity holdings in
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2003 and Tobin’s Q 2004. Potentially, investors’ awareness of quality corporate governance will 
develop overtime and they may have certain expectations on independent directors’ contribution 
in monitoring and strengthening firm’s governance practice. In the case of the current study, the 
lack of performance of independent directors may have influenced investors, evaluation of the 
economic value of the firm shares in the later years.
In addition, according to Yermack (2004) equity holdings is one of the potential sources of 
motivation or discipline for an individual director. In particular, Malette and Fowler (1992) 
found that, the effectiveness of equity holdings as a monitoring incentive for independent 
directors depends on directors’ holdings of substantial shares in the firm. Similarly, Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1996) and Conyon and Peck (1998) noted an association between the low equity 
holdings of independent directors and independent directors lack of vigilance and monitoring 
capability and incentives. As shown in Table 7.10, most of the independent directors in the 
sampled firms owned less than 2% equity in the company.
Table 7.10: The Distribution of Independent Director Shareholdings in the Year 2002 
and 2003
Year 2002 95 119 3 3 1
Year 2003 105 111 2 3 0
N  = 221 firms
Evidence of lower amounts of equity holdings by independent directors has also been noted by 
Lee et al., (1992). In the case of Malaysia, the MBSB Listing Rulings stipulate that independent 
directors should not be a firm’s major shareholders and hence should not own 5% or more 
shareholdings in the firm (see MBSB Listing Requirements 2001: Para 1.01 on independent
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directors and major shareholders). Moreover, according to PwC (2005), stock options plans are 
still not a common remuneration payment offered to board members. Even though, some firms 
do remunerate their executive directors and managing directors in the form of stock options. 
Importantly, Malaysian listed companies need to establish other types of financial incentive 
scheme to motivate independent directors’ commitment to their oversight responsibilities’ 
performance.
(X) Control Variables
OLS 1 results in Tables 7.1 to 7.6 suggested, there were other factors that may have influenced 
the level of firm performance. This was consistent with Yermack’s (1996) argument that there 
are other corporate attributes that may affect firm value. Notably firm size such as measured by 
firm’s total assets (NASET) had a significant negative relationship (p = 0.01 or p  — 0.05) with 
Tobin’s Q in most of the cases observed. This finding was similar to that reported by Drobetz et 
al., (2004) and Black et al., (2006) who found a negative relationship between firm’s total assets 
and firm’s Tobin’s Q level. According to Conyon and Peck (1998), the relationship between 
firm size and firm performance reflects the extent of firms return given the complexity of their 
operations. In particular, the potential high growth rate of listed firms indicated their likelihood 
of acquiring more intangible assets [Drobetz et al., (2004:290)]. Further, Black et al., (2006) 
argued that due to the complexity of large firms’ operations and the correspondingly large 
number of business transactions they will have to deal with in the deployment of their assets, 
they need to conform to certain procedures, namely to obtain the board’s approval and other 
internal control procedures when undertaking their investment activities.
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The use of leverage ratio, namely, debt to equity ratio, as a control variable of firm performance 
was consistent with the approach of Drobetz et al., (2004) and Black et al., (2006). In terms of 
firms’ debt to equity ratio (NDEQ), in most cases the OLS 1 results indicated a significant 
positive relationship (i.e./? = 0.01 o rp  = 0.05) between firms’ leverage and firms’ performance 
(see Tables 7.1 to 7.6). In other words, the higher the firm’s debt financing the higher is the 
firm’s value. This could be explained by the effective monitoring by banks and/or financial 
institutions of firms’ activities, which may result in firms’ investment in value enhancement 
projects (Chang Aik Leng and Abu Mansor, 2005). Moreover, according to Friend and Lang 
(1998), the substantial investment of non-managerial principal shareholders in the firm will 
provide them with the appropriate incentive to monitor and influence management activities 
appropriately. In their view, the presence of substantial shareholdings of non-managerial 
principal shareholders provides a reliable governing mechanism. In addition, Friend and Lang 
(1998) indicated that, the influence of non-managerial investors may restrict managers’ ability to 
adjust the firm’s debt ratio and an anticipated high debt ratio will provide better governance of 
shareholders’ interests.
With respect to the impact of independent and non-executive directors’ total remuneration 
(NNREMU) on firm performance, OLS 1 results in Table 7.4 reported a significant positive 
relationship (p = 0.1) between the two variables. This finding suggested that the monitoring 
incentive of independent and non-executive directors can be enhanced with the setting of 
appropriate remuneration payments. In particular, Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994) and McKinsey 
[2002(i)j noted that directors’ incentive alignment has an impact on their performance. Main et 
al., (1996) found a strong association between boardroom pay and firm performance when board
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members’ compensation also encompassed share option schemes. In addition, KLSE and PwC’s 
2002 survey found that independent directors in Malaysian listed companies were concerned 
about their low remuneration payments. Companies’ revision of the directors’ compensation 
level in accordance with the market price for their service will provide an effective monitoring 
incentive, namely, independent directors’ vigilance in their oversight duties.
OLS 1 results further revealed a significant positive relationship {p = 0.01; p  = 0.05; p  = 0.1) 
between the presence of particular substantial shareholder groups in the firm and firm 
performance. Specifically, this relationship was observed for both the presences of individuals 
and/or private companies equity holders (NINDVL) [see Tables 7.4 and 7.6] and institutional 
investors, namely government agencies, public listed companies/corporations and other 
institutions such as trust funds agencies (NINSTL) [see Tables 7.1 to 7.6]. Given the respective 
shareholder groups substantial equity holdings in the firm they had the motivation to exert a 
certain degree of monitoring of the firm’s management and activities (see Friend and Lang, 
1998).
Moreover, the significance of institutional shareholders participation in firm’s economic 
decisions has been emphasised by MCCG (2001). Namely, firms are encouraged as part of best 
practices of corporate governance to establish appropriate channel to assist direct dialogue and 
communication between management, board of directors and the institutional investors. In terms 
of the responses of the companies, most of the sampled firms in this study supported the 
importance of institutional investors’ direct communication with them [see the corporate 
governance statement of the companies on the discussions of their relationship with
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shareholders]. It was further gathered that, some of the sampled companies have taken the 
initiatives to establish investors’ relations policy and report to enhance the integrity, conduct and 
transparency of their business.
On the other hand, the holding of large and diverse investment portfolios by government and 
institutional investors may also explain their equity holdings’ insignificant impact on firm 
performance in other cases observed (see Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Such circumstances may 
constrain government agencies’ and institutional investors’ abilities to inspect in detail and 
govern closely their investments in different companies.
In terms of the firm’s industry’s impact on firm performance, there existed significant negative 
relationship between the respective property (PROP) and finance (FIN) industry, and firm 
performance (p = 0.01; 0.05; p  = 0.1) [see Tables 7.1 to 7.6]. On the other hand, construction 
industry (CONSTR) [see Tables 7.1 to 7.6] had a significant positive relationship with firm 
performance (p = 0.01 or p  = 0.1). According to Bromiley (1991), industry performance has an 
impact on a firm’s risk and hence performance. Ryan Jr. and Wiggins III (2004) used industry 
dummy to ensure the robustness of their empirical study of the impact of directors’ 
compensation on their monitoring activity. Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) employed 
industry dummy to capture the factor that may not affect managerial performance. As indicated 
by OLS 1 results, firms in the property industry may be experiencing a decline in profit due to 
the slow growth of the industry (see Eight Malaysian Plan, 2001-2005). With respect to the 
finance industry, the unsustainable growth in loans level particularly from property and equity 
market may have exposed the banking institutions to certain credit risks (see Eight Malaysian
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Plan, 2001-2005). On the other hand, the high market value and earnings of firms in the 
construction industry could be due to it steady growth throughout a certain period of time (see 
Eight Malaysian Plan, 2001-2005). With respect to firms’ governance practice’s impact on firm 
performance, the decline or increase in the respective firms’ performance may be by the result of 
the circumstances affecting their industry.
7.2.2 Board Leadership and Firm Performance -  OLS 2
As discussed in Chapter 5, section 5.1.2, the impact of board of director leadership on firm 
performance was examined by OLS 2(i), OLS 2(ii), OLS 2(iii), OLS 2(iv), OLS 2(v) and OLS 
2(vi) research models. Specifically, each model examined the impact of the appointment of an 
independent and non-independent director as the board’s chairman and the separate appointment 
of the CEO and board’s chairman on firm performance. The main explanatory variables in the 
OLS 2 model were the presence of an independent director as the board’s chairman (CHINED), 
senior independent director as the board’s chairman (CHSINED), founder as the board’s 
chairman (CHFOUND), non-executive director as the board’s chairman (CHNED), family- 
member director as the board’s chairman (CHFAMDI) and separate appointment of the CEO 
and the board’s chairman (SEPCEO). The examination of the impact of CHFOUND and 
CHFAMDI on firm performance was extended with the observation of the impact of SEPCEO 
in each respective model. The following subsections discuss the six OLS 2 models.
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I) Independent Director as the Boards Chairman (CHINED) and Firm Performance -  O L S  2 ( i )
Tables 7.11 and 7.12 respectively present the regression results derived from the research model 
OLS 2(i)(a) [i.e. regression analysis of CHINED and specified board leadership independent 
variables in 2002 with respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and the research model OLS 
2(i)(b) [i.e. regression of CHINED and specified board leadership variables in 2003 with 
respective firm performance 2003 and 2004]. Specifically, OLS 2(i) investigated the impact of an 
independent director as the board’s chairman (CHINED: HBL 1) on firm performance.
In particular, HBL 1 proposed that the appointment of an independent director as the board’s 
chairman (CHINED) will have a positive impact on firm performance (See Chapter 5 section 
5.1.2). OLS 2(i)(a) and OLS 2(i)(b) results derived from testing HBL 1 indicated that, the 
hypothesis was supported by one specific observation. Namely, there existed a significant 
positive relationship between CHINED in 2003 and NROE in 2004 (ft = 0.28 \ p = 0.1).
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Table 7 .11 : Board Leadership and  Firm Perfo rm ance — OLS 2(i)(a)
The Appointm ent of an Independent D irector as the Board’s Chairman y , in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HBL 1)
CHINED = Board's chairman is independent director, NASET -  Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI - Proportion of Family-Member Directors, NFORS = Proportion o f specific foreign director, NINSTL = Total Proportion of Government Agencies', Public Listed 
Companies /Corporations and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, PROP = Property industry, CONSTR- Construction industry, FIN = Finance industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had 
been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ Notes: I ‘or the test of multicolhnearity, all independent variables indicated VI I' lerel below I, condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); I‘or the test of autocorrelation of errors 
the significance level for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson denied upper limit (di); Statistical significance leiel: 0.1 (*), 0.0 5(**), 0.01 (***); A l l  V  statistical values were significant at the 0.001 levell
A d jR 2 0.2346 0.1476 0.2273 0.1360
R2 0.2937 0.2135 0.2870 0.2028
F 4.9655 3.2415 4.8065 3.0377
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
In tercept (a) -0.0329 -0.2067 -0.0044 -0.0263 -0.1466 -0.9173 0.0203 0.1201
Explanatory Variables 0 )
C H IN E D 02 -0.1021 -0.7098 -0.0188 -0.1239 -0.1575 -1.0894 -0.0954 -0.6242
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.2975 -3.2758*** 0.3776 3.9405*** -0.2705 -2.9643*** 0.3287 3.4073***
N D EQ 02 0.2063 2.9631*** 0.3490 4.9895***
NFAM DI02 -0.1786 -2.2712**
NFORS2 0.2129 2.3142** 0.1880 2.0337**
N IN STL02 0.1844 1.8317*
Industry Dummy
PRO P -0.8862 -3.9483*** -0.7582 -3.3625***
C O N STR 0.4341 1.7551* 0.5024 2.0213**
F IN -0.5108 -1.9800**
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Table 7 .12: Board Leadership and Firm Perform ance — OLS 2(i)(b)
The Appointment of an Independent D irector as the Board's Chairman (CHINED) in 2003 and Firm Perform ance 2003 and 2004
(The Testing of HBL 1)
CHINED = Board’s chairman is independent director, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI = Proportion o f Family-Member Directors, NFORS = Proportion of specific foreign director, NINSTL = Total Proportion o f Government Agencies’, Public Listed 
Companies’/Corporations’ and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, PROP = Property industry, CONSTR= Construction Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been 
transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
[Notes: For the test of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated VII" level below 3, condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); For tlx test of autocorrelation of errors tlx 
significance level for tlx Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than tlx Durbin Watson derived upper limit (dkj); Statistical significance level: 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll  F statistical values were significant at the 0.05 level]
A d jR 2
R2
F
Intercept (a)
Coefficient
-0.1109
0.2641
0.3210
5.6443
t-stat
-0.7045
Coefficient
0.1122
0.1912
0.2537
4.0587
t-stat
0.6801
0.0580
0.1325
1.7792
Coefficient
0.0802
t-stat
0.4455
Coefficient
-0.1057
0.1242
0.1934
2.7934
t-stat
-0.6092
Explanatory Variables (j) 
C H INED03 -0.0043 -0.0299 -0.1795 -1.1997 -0.0509 -0.3116 0.2796 1.7778*
Control Variables
NASET03
NDEQ03
N IN ED 03
NFORS3
NINSTL03
-0.3471
0.3411
0.1465
0.1952
0.2676
-3.8751***
5.0278***
2.2314**
2.1801**
2.6617***
0.4098
-0.1493
4.3640***
-2.1696**
0.2229
0.1560
0.2337
1
2.2575**
2.0851**
2.1088**
Industry Dummy 
PROP 
CONSTR 
FIN
-0.6887 -3.1654*** -0.5246 
| -0.4957
2.1077**
-1.7430*
1
-0.4861 -1.8225*
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II) Senior Independent Director as the Boards Chairman (CHSINED) and Firm Performance -  O L S  2 ( i i )
Tables 7.13 and 7.14 respectively present the regression results derived from the research model 
OLS 2(ii)(a) [i.e. regression analysis of CHSINED and specified board leadership independent 
variables in 2002 with respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and the research model OLS 
2(ii)(b) [i.e. regression analysis of CHSINED and specified board leadership variables in 2003 
with respective firm performance 2003 and 2004], Specifically OLS 2(ii) investigated the impact 
of the appointment of a senior independent director as the board’s chairman (CHSINED: HBL 
2) on firm performance.
Namely, HBL 2 (see Chapter 5, section 5.1.2), hypothesised that the appointment of a senior 
independent director as the board’s chairman (CHSINED) will have a positive impact on firm 
performance. OLS 2(ii)(a) and (b) results pointed to the contrary. The relationship between 
CHSINED and firm performance was not statistically significant both in terms of market value 
(NTobin’s Q) and accounting-based measures (NROE) of firm performance.
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Table 7 .13 : Board Leadership and Firm Perfo rm ance -  OLS 2(ii)(a)
The A ppointm ent of a  S enior Independent D irector as the Board’s Chairman (CHSINED) in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HBL 2 )
CHSINED = Board’s chairman is senior independent director, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI = Proportion o f Family-Member Directors, NFORS = Proportion o f  specific foreign director, NINSTL = Total Proportion of Government Agencies’, Public 
Listed Companies’/Corporations’ and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, PROP - Property industry, CONSTR= Construction industry, FIN r Finance industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that 
had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ Note, tv I'or the lest oj multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated V II• lei el below I, condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0. 50 in their respective dimension (row); I ‘or I Ik test of autocorrelation of errors 
the significance leiel for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than tlx Durbin Watson derind upper limit (da); Statistical significance le iti 0 .1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A l l  l ; statistical values were significant at the 0.001 level]
A d jR 2
R2
F
In tercept (a)
Coefficient
-0.0394
0.2340
0.2932
4.9540
t-stat
-0.2492
0.1476
0.2135
3.2407
C oefficient t-stat 
-0.0061 -0.0367
Coefficient
-0.1595
0.2248
0.2847
4.7525
t-stat
-1.0020
0.1358
0.2026
3.0341
C oefficient t-stat 
0.0149 0.0889
Explanatory Variables 0 )  
C H SIN ED 02 -0.3104 -0.6045 -0.0390 -0.0720 -0.3755 -0.7268 -0.3183 -0.5835
Control Variables
NASET02
N D EQ 02
NFAM DI02
NFORS2
N IN STL02
-0.2879
0.2025
-0.1745
0.2101
-3.1862***
2.9250***
-2.2278**
2.2847**
0.3792 3.9779*** -0.2565
0.3425
0.1836
0.1705
-2.8220***
4.9170***
1.9854**
1.6673*
0.3378 3.5198***
Industry Dummy 
PRO P 
C O N STR 
F IN
-0.8744
0.4287
-3.8879***
1.7283*
-0.7430
0.4979
-0.4973
-3.2836***
1.9954**
-1.9285*
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Table 7 .14 : Board Leadership and Firm Perform ance — OLS 2(ii)(b)
The A ppointm ent of a  S enior Independent D irector as the Board's Chairman (CHSINED) in 2003 and Firm Perform ance 2003 and 2004
(The Testing of HBL 2)
CHSINED = Board’s chairman is senior independent director, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI = Proportion of Family-Member Directors, NFORS = Proportion of specific foreign director, NINSTL = Total Proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Listed 
Companies’/Corporations’ and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, PROP = Property industry, CONSTR= Construction Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 “ Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been 
transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
I Notes: l :or the test of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated V l \ : leiel below 1, condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion sreater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); I'or the test of autocorrelation of errors the 
simijicance lei elfor the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson denied upper limit (dv); Statistical significance leiel: 0. / (*L 0.05(**j, 0 .0 1 (***); A l l \ : statistical values were significant at the 0.05 leiel/_____________________
A d jR 2 0.2645 0.1867 0.0579 0.1108
R2 0.3213 0.2495 0.1324 0.1811
F 5.6543 3.9700 1.7775 2.5763
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
In tercept (a) -0.1110 -0.7174 0.0776 0.4767 0.0694 0.3920 -0.0507 -0.2947
Explanatory Variables (ft)
CH SIN ED 03 0.1518 0.3409 0.2591 0.5533 -0.1365 -0.2678 -0.1832 -0.3703
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.3464 -3.8882*** 0.4216 4 4991*** 0.2050 2.0710**
N D EQ 03 0.3422 5.0417*** j 0.1588 2.1060**
N IN E D 03 0.1446 2.2470** -0.1689 -2.4950**
NFORS3 0.1982 2.2042**
N IN STL03 0.2680 2.6824*** 0.2122 1.9112*
Industry Dummy
PRO P -0.6867 -3.1630*** -0.5211 -2.0971** -0.4098 -1.6989*
CO N STR -0.4976 -1.8492
F IN -0.4937 -1.7376*
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M) Founder as Board's Chairman (CHFOUND) and firm Performance -  O L S  2 ( i i i )
Tables 7.15 and 7.16 respectively present the regression results derived from the research model 
OLS 2(iii)(a) [i.e. regression analysis of CHFOUND and specified board leadership independent 
variables in 2002 with respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and the research model OLS 
2(iii)(b) [i.e. regression of CHFOUND and specified board leadership variables in 2003 with 
respective firm performance 2003 and 2004]. Specifically, OLS 2(iii) investigated the impact of 
the appointment of founder as board’s chairman (CHFOUND: HBL 3) on firm performance.
HBL 3 (see Chapter 5 section 5.1.2) hypothesised that the appointment of the founder as the 
board’s chairman (CHFOUND) will have an impact on firm performance. Specifically, the OLS 
2(iii)(a) results revealed a significant positive relationship between CHFOUND in 2002 and 
NROE in 2002 (fi = 0.52 ; p  = 0.05) and NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.47 ; p  = 0.05).
With respect to hypothesis HBL 6, it was hypothesised in Chapter 5 section 5.1.2 that the 
separate appointment of CEO and board’s chairman (SEPCEO) will have a positive impact on 
firm performance. OLS 2(iii)(a) results revealed when the founder of the firm was the board’s 
chairman, there existed significant positive relationship between SEPCEO in 2002 and NROE in 
2003 (fi = 0.46 ; p  = 0.05).
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Table 7 .15: Board Leadership and Firm P erfo rm ance —  OLS 2(iii)(a)
The A ppointm ent of Founder as Board’s Chairman (CHFOUND) in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HBL 3 )
CHFOUND = Board's chairman is founder, SEPCEO = Separate appointment of board's chairman and CKO, NASKT = Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI = Proportion o f Family-Member Directors, NFORS = Proportion o f specific foreign director, NINSTL = Total Proportion 
of Government Agencies’, Public Listed Companies'/Corporations' and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, PROP * Properly industry, CONSTR= Construction industry, FIN = Finance industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym 
identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/  Notes: I 'or the lest of mu/licol/inearity, all independent variables indicated V I] ’ lei el below I, condition index less than / 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); I 'or the test of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance leivl/or the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derited upper limit (di); Statistical significance leiel: 0. / (*), 0.05(**), 0 .0 1 (***); A l l  \ : statistical values were significant at the 0.(X)1 level]
A d jR 2 0.2336 0.1658 0.2194 0.1608
R2 0.2963 0.2341 0.2832 0.2295
F 4.7258 3.4296 4.4344 3.3423
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.1738 -0.7153 -0.3014 -1.1893 -0.2182 -0.8899 -0.4925 -1.9375*
Explanatory Variables 0 )
C H FO U N D 02 0.2424 1.1147 0.5218 2.3005** 0.0696 0.3172 0.4729 2.0785**
SEPCEO02 0.0783 0.3952 0.1972 0.9539 0.0372 0.1860 0.4604 2.2208**
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.2952 -3.2634*** 0.3688 3.9080*** -0.2607 -2.8552*** 0.3298 3.4842***
N D EQ 02 0.2067 2.9734*** 0.3414 4.8654***
NFAM DI02 -0.1850 -2.3290**
N FORS2 0.1968 2.1093** 0.1806 1.9181*
N IN STL02 0.1737 1.6588* 0.1828 1.8050*
Industry Dummy
PRO P -0.8942 -3.9787*** -0.7567 -3.3357***
CO N STR 0.4141 1.6614* 0.5030 1.9992**
FIN -0.4816 -1.8522*
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Table 7 .16 : Board Leadership and Firm Perfo rm ance — OLS 2(iii)(b)
The A ppointm ent of a  Senior Independent D irector as the  Board’s Chairman (C11SINED) in 2003 and Firm P erfo rm ance 2003 and 2004
(The Testing of HBL 3)
CHFOUND = Board's chairman is founder, SEPCEO = Separale appointment of board's chairman and CEO, NASET = Total assets, NDE 0  ~ Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI = Proportion o f  Family-Member Directors, NFORS = Proportion o f  specific foreign director, NINSTL = Total Proportion 
of Government Agencies’, Public Listed Companies'/Corporations' and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, PROP = Property industry, CONSTR= Construction Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym 
identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ Notes: fo r  the test of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated V l i  level below f  condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their re spec the dimension (row); fo r  the lest oj autocorrelation of errors the 
significance let el for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson denied upper limit (dr); Statistical significance lenl: 0 .1 (*), 0.0 5 (**), 0.01 (***); A l l  f  statistical values were significant at the 0.05 level)_____________________
A d jR 2
R 2
F
In tercept (a)
Coefficient
-0.0036
0.2621
0.3225
5.3416
t-stat
-0.0143
0.1846
0.2513
3.7662
Coefficient
-0.0585
t-stat
-0.2225
0.0564
0.1354
1.7142
Coefficient t-stat 
0.2487 0.8690
Coefficient
-0.3847
0.1181
0.1919
2.5996
t-stat
-1.3915
Explanatory Variables (ft)
CH FO U N D 03
SEPCEO03
0.0377
-0.1321
0.1842
-0.6290
0.1676
0.1075
0.7786
0.4869
0.0167 0.0714 
-0.2061 -0.8580
0.2495
0.3113
1.1030
1.3420
Control Variables
NASET03
N D EQ 03
N IN E D 03
NFORS3
N IN STL03
-0.3496
0.3396
0.1445
0.1925
0.2774
-3.9024***
4 .9 9 3 4***
2.2343**
2.1403**
2.7321***
0.4157
-0.1600
4.4141***
-2.3533**
0.1992
0.1674
2.0129**
2.2283**
Industry Dummy 
PR O P 
C O N STR 
F IN
-0.6838 -3.1291*** -0.5171 -2.0695** 
-0.4922 -1.7267*
-0.4932 -1.8188*
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IV) Non-Executive Director as Boards Chairman (CHNED) and Firm Performance - O L S  2 ( iv )
Table 7.17 and 7.18 respectively present the regression results derived from the research model 
OLS 2(iv)(a) [i.e. regression analysis of CHNED and specified board leadership independent 
variables in 2002 with respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and the research model OLS 
2(iv)(b) [i.e. regression of CHNED and specified board leadership variables in 2003 with 
respective firm performance 2003 and 2004]. Specifically, OLS 2(iv) investigated the impact of 
the appointment o f a non executive director as the board’s chairman (CHNED: HBL 4) on firm 
performance.
Hypothesis HBL 4 (see Chapter 5, section 5.1.2) proposed that, the appointment of a non­
executive director as the board’s chairman will have an impact on firm performance. OLS 
2(iv)(a) results (see Table 7.17) pointed to a significant positive relationship between CHNED in 
2002 and NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.27 ;p = 0A).
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Table 7 .17 : Board Leadership and Firm Perfo rm ance — OLS 2(iv)(a)
The Appointm ent ol a Non-Executive D irector as the Board’s Chairman v , n 2002 and  Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HBL 4 )
CHNED = Board's chairman is non-executive director, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI = Proportion of Family-Member Directors, NFORS = Proportion o f specific foreign director, NINSTL = Total Proportion o f Government Agencies’, Public Listed 
Companies’/Corporations’ and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, PROP = Property industry, CONSTR- Construction industry, FIN = Finance industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter N at the front o f respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been 
transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
I Notes: I'or the test of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated VII' level below I, condition index less than I 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in tfjeir respective dimension (row); I'or tlx lest of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance leiel for tlx Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than tlx Durbin Watson derind upper limit (dy); S tatistical significance lei el: 0. 1 (*), 0.0 5 (**), 0.0)f***); A l l  I' statistical values were significant at the 0.001 letel)____________________
--------------------------------------------------
A d j R ?
R 2
F
In tercept (a)
Coefficient
-0.0465
0.2327
0.2919
4.9237
t-stat
-0.2783
0.1539
0.2193
3.3534
Coefficient t-stat 
-0.0779 -0.4441
Coefficient
-0.1770
0.2228
0.2829
4.7105
t-stat
-1.0532
Coefficient
-0.1045
0.1498
0.2155
3.2807
t-stat
-0.5948
Explanatory Variables 0 )  
C H N ED 02 -0.0039 -0.0286 0.1749 1.2295 0.0174 0.1278 0.2739 1.9207*
Control Variables
NASET02
N D EQ 02
NFAM DI02
N FORS2
N IN STL02
-0.2904
0.2003
-0.1734
0.2097
-3.2127***
2.8950***
-2.1970**
2.2444**
i
0.3818 4.0227*** -0.2592
0.3399
0.1858
0.1811
-2.8490***
4.8804***
1.9764**
1.7719*
0.3399 3.5730***
Industry Dummy 
PRO P 
C O N STR 
F IN
-0.8832
0.4400
-3.9269***
1.7719*
-0.7519
0.5149
-0.4906
-3.3217***
2.0603**
-1.9007*
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Table 7 .18 : Board Leadership and Firm Perfo rm ance --  OLS 2(iv)(b)
The A ppointm ent of a Mon-Executive D irector as the Board’s Chairman v , in 2003 and  Firm Perfo rm ance 2003 and 2004
(The Testing of HBL 4)
CHNED = Board’s chairman is non-executive director, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI = Proportion of Family-Member Directors, NFORS = Proportion of specific foreign director, NINSTL= Total Proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Listed 
Companies’/Corporations’ and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, PROP = Property industry, CONSTR^ Construction Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 - Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been 
transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
I Notes: I'or the test of multtcolhneanty, all independent variables indicated V ll' level below 3, condition index less than / 5 and not more than one variance proportion ere ate r than 0. 50 in their respective dimension (row); Vor the test of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance leielfor the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value mater than the Durbin Watson dented upper limit (dv); S tatistical significance level: 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A l l  /*' statistical values were significant at the 0.05 level/
Perform ance M easure
A d jR 2
R2
F
In tercept (at)
Explanatory Variables (8) 
C H N ED 03
Control Variables
NASET03
N D EQ 03
N IN E D 03
NFORS3
N IN STL03
Industry Dummy 
PRO P 
CO N STR 
F IN
N T O B IN ’S Q 2003
0.2665
0.3232
5.7015
Coefficient
-0.1427
0.1100
-0.3402
0.3423
0.1558
0.2011
0.2448
-0.6939
t-stat
-0.8968
0.8133
-3.8074***
5.0550***
2.3884**
2.2436**
2.3587*
-3.1995*
N R O E  2003
0.1884
0.2511
4.0038
Coefficient
0.0419
0.1221
0.4283
-0.1556
t-stat
0.2504
0.8587
4.5572***
-2.2671**
N T O B IN ’S Q 2004
0.0647
0.1386
1.8743
Coefficient t-stat
0.0167 0.0921
0.1891
-0.5292
-0.5166
1.2247
-2.1370**
-1.8225*
N R O E  2004
0.1105
0.1809
2.5715
Coefficient t-stat
-0.0610 -0.3444
0.0397
0.2078
0.1607
0.2039
-0.4099
-0.4924
0.2636
2.0905**
2.1324**
1.7657*
-1.6985*
-1.8317*
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V) Familv-Member Director as Boards Chairman (CHFAM) and Firm Performance -  O L S  2 ( v )
Tables 7.19 and 7.20 respectively present the regression results derived from the research model 
OLS 2(v)(a) [i.e. regression analysis of CHFAM and specified board leadership independent 
variables in 2002 with respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and the research model OLS 
2(v)(b) [i.e. regression of CHFAM and specified board leadership variables in 2003 with 
respective firm performance 2003 and 2004]. Specifically, OLS 2(v) investigated the impact of 
the appointment of a family-member director as the board’s chairman (CHFAM: HBL 5) on 
firm performance.
Hypothesis HBL 5 postulated that the appointment of a family-member director as the board’s 
chairman will have an impact on firm performance. OLS 2(v)(a) and (b) results pointed to the 
contrary. The relationship between CHFAM and firm performance was not statistically 
significant, both in terms of market value (NTobin’s Q) and accounting-based measures (NROE) 
of firm performance.
On the other hand, when the family director was appointed as the board’s chairman, there 
existed a significant positive relationship between the separate appointment of CEO and board 
chairman (SEPCEO) in 2002 and NROE in 2003 {fi = 0.43; p = 0.05).
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Table 7 .19 : Board Leadership and Firm Perfo rm ance — OLS 2(v)(a)
The A ppointm ent of a Family-Member D irector as the B oard’s Chairman (CHFAM) in 2002 and Firm P erfo rm ance 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HBL 5 )
CHFAM = Board's chairman is family-member director, SEPCEO = Separate appointment of board's chairman and CEO, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI -- Proportion of Family-Member Directors, NFORS = Proportion of specific foreign director, NINSTL = Total 
Proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Listed Companies'/Corporations' and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, PROP “ Property industry, CONSTR- Construction industry, FIN = Finance industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s 
acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
I Notes: I 'or the lest of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated VII ■' level below I, condition index less than 1 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respecliie dimension (row); l :or the test of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance level for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson deriied upper limit (di); Statistical significance lei el: 0 .1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A l l  I' statistical values were significant at the 0.001 level)____________________
Perform ance M easure N T Q B IN ’S Q 2002 N R O E  2002 N T O B IN ’S Q 2003 N R O E  2003
A d jR 2 0.2307 0.1496 0.2217 0.1489
R2 0.2937 0.2192 0.2854 0.2186
F 4.6660 3.1504 4.4818 3.1391
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
In tercept (a) -0.1439 -0.5763 -0.2065 -0.7865 -0.2819 -1.1224 -0.4242 -1.6149
Explanatory Variables ((3)
CHFAM02 0.1111 0.6935 0.1950 1.1582 0.1360 0.8441 0.2022 1.2004
SEPCEO02 0.0670 0.3308 0.1552 0.7292 0.0754 0.3705 0.4326 2.0314**
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.2931 -3.2349*** 0.3744 3.9302*** -0.2630 -2.8852*** 0.3342 3.5063***
N D EQ 02 0.1963 2.8220*** 0.3351 4.7879***
NFAM DI02 -0.2048 -2.2357**
NFO RS2 0.1996 2.1213** 0.1705 1.8017*
N IN STL02 0.1833 1.8125*
Industry Dummy
PRO P -0.8850 -3.9339*** -0.7557 -3.3397***
C O N STR 0.4364 1.7538* 0.5080 2.0295**
F IN -0.4966 -1.9156*
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Table 7 .20 : Board Leadership and Firm P erform ance — OLS 2(v)(b)
The Appointm ent of a  Family-Member D irector as the Board’s Chairman (CHFAM) in 2003 and Firm Perform ance 2003 and 2004
(The Testing of HBL 5)
CHFAM = Board’s chairman is family-member director, SEPCF.0 = Separate appointment of board's chairman and CEO, NASET -  Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NFAMD1 = Proportion of Family-Member Directors, NFORS = Proportion o f specific foreign director, NINSTL= Total 
Proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Listed Companies'/Corporations' and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, PROP -  Property industry, CONSTR= Construction Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s 
acronyrh identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ Notes: i'or the test of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated V l i  lei el below 1, condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); i'or the test of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance leiel for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durlsin Watson denied upper limit (dv); Statistical significance letel: 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), 0.01 (***); A l l  1‘ statistical values were significant at tlx 0.05 letel}_____________________
Perform ance M easure N T O B IN ’S Q 2003 N R O E  2003 N T O B IN ’S Q 2004___________________ N R O E  2004
A d jR 2 0.2634 0.1821 0.0607 0.1128
R2 0.3236 0.2491 0.1393 0.1871
F 5.3697 3.7220 1.7714 2.5193
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
In tercept (a) -0.0527 -0.2017 0.0043 0.0156 0.1466 0.4918 -0.2825 -0.9756
Explanatory Variables (ft)
CHFAM03 0.0983 0.6142 -0.0150 -0.0892 0.1728 0.9455 -0.0364 -0.2053
SEPCEO03 -0.1119 -0.5265 0.0882 0.3941 -0.1659 -0.6836 0.2793 1.1852
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.3545 -3.9486*** 0.4229 4.4706*** 0.2108 2.1172**
N D EQ 03 0.3377 4.9705*** 0.1648 2.1871**
N IN E D 03 0.1481 2.2850** -0.1653 -2.4202**
NFORS3 0.1878 2.0885**
N IN STL03 0.2741 2.6995*** 0.1918 1.7033*
Industry Dummy
PRO P -0.6752 -3.0945*** -0.4967 -1.9936** -0.4135 -1.7090*
CO N STR 0.4154 1.6736* -0.5397 -1.9609*
FIN -0.4989 -1.7612*
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VI) The Separate Appointment of CEO and Boards Chairman (SEPCEO) and Firm Performance -  O L S  2 ( v i )
Table 7.21 and 7.22 respectively present the regression results obtained from the research model 
OLS 2(vi)(a) [i.e. regression analysis of SEPCEO and specified board leadership independent 
variables in 2002 with respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and the research model OLS 
2(vi)(b) [i.e. regression of SEPCEO and specified board leadership variables in 2003 with 
respective firm performance 2003 and 2004]. Specifically, OLS 2(vi) investigated the impact of 
the separate appointment of CEO and board chairman (SEPCEO) on firm performance.
Hypothesis HBL 6 proposed that the separate appointment of CEO and board chairman 
(SEPCEO) will have a positive impact on firm performance. OLS 2(vi)(a) results indicated a 
positive relationship between SEPCEO in 2002 and NROE in 2003 {fi = 0.35 \p  = 0.1).
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Table 7 . 21: Board Leadership and Firm Perfo rm ance —  OLS 2(vi)(a)
The S epara te  A ppointm ent of CEO and Board Chairman (SEPCEO) in 2002 and Firm P erfo rm ance 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HBL 6 )
SEPCEO = Separate appointment of board's chairman and CEO, NASET =  Total assets, NOEQ =  Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI =  Proportion of Family-Member Directors, NFORS *  Proportion of specific foreign director, N1NSTL =  Total Proportion o f Government Agencies’, Public Listed 
Conlpanies’/Corporations’ and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, NFACF= Proportion of family-member directors with accounting and finance background, PROP =  Property industry, CONSTR= Construction industry, FIN = Finance industry, 02 =  Year 2002, 03 =  Year 2003, A letter 
N at the front o f respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ Notes: I'or the test oj multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated 1 7 1 '  leitl below J ,  condition index less than 1 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in llseir respectiie dimension (row); I'or the test of autocorrelation ojerrors the 
significance level for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson denied upper limit (du); Statistical significance letel: 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll  I ' statistical values were significant at the 0.001 kvefi
A d jR 2 0.2327 0.1482 0.2228 0.1471
R2 0.2920 0.2140 0.2829 0.2130
F 4.9248 3.2513 4.7102 3.2320
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
In tercept (a) -0.0667 -0.2989 -0.0710 -0.3016 -0.1874 -0.8342 -0.2837 -1.2051
Explanatory Variables 0 )
SEPCEO02 0.0227 0.1183 0.0774 0.3830 0.0212 0.1099 0.3519 1.7398*
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.2900 -3.2087*** 0.3799 3.9888*** -0.2592 -2.8491*** 0.3398 3.5659***
N D EQ 02 0.1999 2.8849*** 0.3394 4.8671***
NFAM DI02 -0.1723 -2.1912**
N FORS2 0.2112 2.2846** 0.1847 1.9856**
N IN STL02 0.1825 1.8061*
Industry Dummy
PRO P -0.8832 -3.9310*** -0.7535 -3.3324***
CO N STR 0.4379 1.7622*
FIN -0.4872 -1.8826*
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Table 7 .22 : Board Leadership and Firm P erfo rm ance — OLS 2(vi)(b)
The Separa te  A ppointm ent of CEO and Board Chairman (SEPCEO) in 2003 and  Firm Perfo rm ance 2003 and 2004
(The Testing of HBL 6)
SEPCEO = Separate appointment of board's chairman and CEO, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ -  Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI - Proportion of Family-Member Directors, NFORS “  Proportion of specific foreign director, NINDPV = Total Proportion of Individuals’ and/or Private Companies’ 
substantial equity holdings, NINSTL = Total Proportion of Government Agencies', Public Listed Companies’/Corporations’ and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, NFACF= Proportion of family-member directors with accounting and finance background, PROP = Property industry, 
CONSTR= Construction Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the front o f respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/  Notes: \'or the test oj multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated U'll' lei el below t, condition index less than 1 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0. 50 in their respectiie dimension (row); I'or the test of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance leiel for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson denied upper limit (dv); Statistical significance level: 0. / (*), ().()5(**), 0 .0 1 (***); A ll  l : statistical values were significant at the 0.05 leiel]
A d jR 2 0.2656 0.1861 0.0612 0.1171
R2 0.3224 0.2490 0.1354 0.1869
F 5.6808 3.9598 1.8239 2.6780
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) 0.0085 0.0351 -0.0051 -0.0199 0.2540 0.9218 -0.3051 -1.1426
Explanatory Variables 0)
SEPCEO03 -0.1356 -0.6500 0.0919 0.4183 -0.2076 -0.8703 0.2881 1.2462
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.3482 -3.9101*** 0.4219 4.5004*** 0.1643 2.1867**
NDEQ03 0.3392 5.0020***
NINED03 0.1435 2.2320*" -0.1646 -2.4323**
NFORS3 0.1915 2.1379**
NINDPV03 0.1902 1.6972*
NINSTL03 0.2784 2.7528***
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.6879 -3.1714 -0.5189 -2.0926** -0.4088 -1.7013*
CONSTR -0.5287 -1.9629*
FIN -0.4941 -1.7452*
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Table 7.23 below summarises findings for the impact of board leadership on firm performance.
Table 7.23: Summary of Findings for the Impact of Board Leadership Impact on Firm 
Performance
H ypothesis Postulated
Relationship
Results
H B L  1: A ppo in tm en t o f  1 N E D  B oard’s Chairm an [ C H I N E D ] + Supported
H B L 2: A p p o in tm en t o f  S R I N E D  Board’s Chairm an [ C H S I N E D ] + N o tSupported
H B L 3: A ppo in tm en t o f  F O U D  B oard’s Chairm an [ C H F O U N D ] p PositiveRelationship
H B L  4: A p p o in tm en t o f  N E D  B oard’s Chairm an [ C H N E D ] p
Positive
Relationship
H B L  5: A p p o in tm en t o f  F A A 1 D I B oard’s C hairm an [C H F A M ] p p
H B L 6: Separate A ppo in tm en t o f  C E O  and B oard’s Chairman  
[ S E P C E O ]
+ Supported
7.2.2.1 Discussions of the Impact of Board Leadership on Firm Performance — OLS 2(T), 
OLS 2(ii), OLS 2(iii), OLS 2(iv) and OLS (v) Results
(I) Independent Director (CHINED) and Senior Independent Director (CHSINED) as the Board's Chairman
OLS 2(i)(b) result (see Table 7.12) showed that the chairing of the board of directors by 
independent director (CHINED) had a significant positive impact on firm performance. 
Namely, the finding supported Useem (1998) and Gregory (2001) propositions that independent 
board chairman is significant to establish impartiality, integrity and credibility in board 
judgements and conducts.
On the other hand, OLS 2(ii)(a) and (b) results (see Tables 7.13 and 7.14) showed no significant 
relationship between the chairing of a board of directors by senior independent director 
(CHSINED) and firm performance. Fama and Jensen, 1983(a); Anderson and Anthony, 1986; 
Daily and Dalton, 1993 contended, it is imperative for board chairman to spend constructive time
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in overseeing, directing and managing board members activities to ensure board efficiency and 
credibility in making firm decisions. Given that senior independent directors hold several 
directorships in other companies, his/her effectiveness as board’s chairman may have been 
affected by his/her abilities to allocate appropriate and sufficient time in monitoring 
organisational process (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990), setting relevant board agendas 
(Dayton, 1984) and disciplining management activities (Kose and Senbet, 1998).
Furthermore, according to Lee (1977), the influence and ability of a leader to initiate and 
undertake strategic changes in the organisation have an impact on firm management and 
potentially its performance. In particular, changes in the firm’s management will be carried out 
effectively when subordinates are confident of the superiority of the leader’s management plan 
(see Daily and Johnson, 1993). Vecchio (2003) also argued that the entrepreneurial skill of the 
firm’s leader has implications for his/her ability to identify business opportunities as well as 
propose profitable business plans. In addition, the motivation and commitment of the leader to 
achieve higher firm performance level further influences his/her effectiveness in managing the 
firm’s strategic direction (Begly and Boyd, 1987). Shamir et al., (1998) posited that charismatic 
quality is an important attribute of a leader, especially for encouraging cooperation amongst 
group members for the attainment of organisational tasks and goals.
Accordingly, senior independent directors need to enhance their leadership skills, pursue their 
leadership duty with full commitment, ensure their understanding of the business operation, and 
take the initiative to obtain relevant information required for better management of the firm’s 
board and hence performance. Hall (1992) further indicated that the reputation of the members
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of a group, namely, their managerial abilities and experience, have implications for group 
strategic decision-making.
Lipton and Lorsch (1992:62) noted Chancellor Allen72 views that the inability of board 
members, in this case, the independent chairman, to provide sufficient advice to the firm’s CEO 
during a crisis period, namely, emergency succession planning or threatened insolvency, may 
indicate director deficiency. Potentially, the attributes of the independent or senior independent 
director as board chairman on their own may not be sufficient to enhance the firm’s value when 
other board members do not possess the same qualities as him/her. In addition the CEO’s control 
of the quality and quantity of information supplied by management to the independent board’s 
chairman may also affect the chairman’s ability to make informed economic decision (Dalton et 
al., 1998).
D) Founder as Board’s Chairman (CHFOUND)
On the other hand the chairing of the board by a founder (CHFOUND) had a significant 
positive impact on firm performance (see Tables 7.15 and 7.16). This finding was consistent 
with that reported by Villalonga and Amit (2006), who found a positive impact on firm value 
when the board of directors was chaired by the founder and the firm’s CEO was not a family 
member. Founder leadership facilitates monitoring of non owner-manager actions, whilst, the 
appointment of a non-family member as CEO enhances the professionalism of the firm’s 
management. Specifically, the reliability of founder leadership will be established when there is 
no control enhancing mechanism that facilitates expropriation of non-family shareholders’
7‘ Chancellor. William T. Allen. Delaware Court o f Chancery. Redefining the Role o f  Outside Directors in An Age o f Global 
Competition, presented at the Ray Garrett Jr.. Corporate and Securities Law Institute. North Western University. Chicago (Apr. 
1992).
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interests, such as differential voting right and/or multiple share classes (see McConaughy et al., 
1998; Ho et al., 2004; Villalonga and Amit, 2006: 388).
ID) Non-Executive Director as Board’s Chairman (CHNED)
In terms of the impact of non-executive director chairman (CHNED) on firm performance, 
section 7.2.2 (IV) [see Table 7.17], a significant positive relationship (p = 0.1) was noted 
between the two variables. Non-executive directors include affiliated directors, nominee 
directors (i.e. representatives of institutional investors, government or corporations) and family 
member directors not holding a position in the firm’s management. The non-executive director’s 
equity interest in the firm or business association with the firm provides him/her better with 
understanding of the firm’s business operations, ease of communication with the firm’s 
management and personnel, and executives’ co-operation (see Finkelstein, 1992). In particular, 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) noted that the appointment of an institutional investor representative 
on the firm’s board ensures better communication and close monitoring of their investments. 
These factors may have contributed to the effectiveness of the non-executive chairman’s 
leadership of the firm’s board and hence better firm performance.
IV) Family-Member Director as Board's Chairman (CHFAM)
In section 7.2.2 (V), the insignificant impact of family-director chairman (CHFAM) on firm 
performance was identified. Potentially, the family-member chairman’s contribution to firm 
performance may not be carried out in line with maximisation of shareholders’ interests. 
According to Boeker (1992), family-member directors have the tendency to blame other 
managers for poor performance. Given their large ownership of shares in the firm, some family
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members will insist on their term of office being extended even though they are performing 
badly (Allen and Panian, 1982). Further, Allen and Panian argued that, family member presence 
in the board increases their domination of the internal political process. The appointment of a 
family-member director as the board’s chairman may not be undertaken due to his/her leadership 
quality but may be driven by the need of family-members to strengthen their control of the 
firm’s management (see McConaughy et al., and Morck and Yeung, 2003).
(T) The Separate Appointment of ( £ 0  and Board’s Chairman (SEPCEO)
The current study also found that separation of the appointment of board chairman and CEO 
(SEPCEO) has a significant positive (p = 0.1; p  = 0.05) impact on firm value (see Tables 7.21 
and 7.22). This finding supports Fama and Jensen’s [1983(a)] argument that the firm 
performance will be affected when the role of the board’s chairman and CEO is combined. 
Notably, they found that the firm will suffer in the competition for survival when the firm’s 
decision management and control are dominated by one person. In particular, the separation of 
board chairman and CEO roles signifies orderly management of organisational activities and 
facilitates a healthy relationship amongst board members (Anderson and Anthony, 1986).
(fl) Control Variable - The appointment of specific foreign directors (NFORS)
Furthermore, the appointment of specific foreign directors (NFORS) on the firm’s board, 
namely from countries with strong corporate governance system such as United States of 
America, European countries (i.e. United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland), 
Australia and Singapore revealed a significant positive relationship (p = 0.05) with market value 
measure of firm performance (Tobin’s Q) [see Tables 7.11 to 7.16]. The result supported
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Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) arguments that firms’ inclusion of foreign directors on their board 
of directors signified their willingness and commitment to enhance the transparency, integrity 
and credibility of the monitoring practices of their business activities. Given their knowledge 
and experience of corporate governance system of their countries, the foreign directors would 
likely employ the same vigilant procedures when evaluating management investment 
propositions (see Ramaswamy and Li, 2001).
7.2.3 Board o f  Director's Competency and Firm Performance -  OLS 3
As discussed in Chapter 5, section 5.1.3, the impact of board of directors’ competency on firm 
performance was examined by the research model OLS 3. Specifically, OLS 3 represented the 
model of the relationship between the proportion of board members with certain higher 
education levels (NDEG, NMASK, NPHD and NPROFL: HBKNOW 1) and acquirement of 
specified knowledge and skills (NACTGK, NFINK, NBUSK, NLAWK, NEXEPROG and 
NCHASEC: HBKNOW 2) respectively, and firm performance. Specifically, OLS 3(i) examined 
the impact of the proportion of directors with a degree (NDEG), Master degree (NMASK), 
doctorate (NPHD) and professional qualification (NPROFL) on firm performance. While, OLS 
3(ii) evaluated the impact of board of directors’ area of expertise, namely the proportion of 
directors with accounting (NACTGK), finance (NFINK), business (NBUSK), law (NLAWK) 
expertise, attending the executive management programme course (NEXEPROG) and company 
secretary experience (NCHASEC) on firm performance. The following subsections analyse the 
results derived from OLS 3(i) and OLS 3(ii) respectively.
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I) Board of Directors’ Educational Level and Firm Performance -  O L S  3 ( i )
Tables 7.24 and 7.25 present the regression results derived from the OLS 3(i)(a) [i.e. regression 
of specified board educational level variables in 2002 with respective firm performance 2002 
and 2003] and the OLS 1 (i)(b) model [i.e. regression of specified board educational level in 
2003 with respective firm performance 2003 and 2004].
In Chapter 5, section 5.1.3, hypothesis HBKNOW 1 proposed that the proportion of board of 
director members with a particular level of higher education will have an impact on firm 
performance [NDEG, NMASK, NPROFL and NPHD]. With respect to the impact of proportion 
of board members with Bachelor degree (NDEG) on firm performance, the OLS 3(i)(b) result 
revealed a significant negative relationship between NDEG in 2003 and NROE in 2004 (fi = - 
0.17 ; p = 0.1). In terms of board members with a Masters degree, OLS 3 (i)(a) and OLS 3(i)(b) 
results [see Tables 7.24 and 7.25] pointed to a significant negative relationship between the 
proportion of board members with a Masters degree (NMASK) in 2002 and NROE in 2002 (fi = 
-0.18; p  = 0.05) and NROE in 2003 (fi = -0.21 ; p  = 0.05), and between NMASK in 2003 and 
NROE in 2003 (fi = -0.19 ; p  = 0.05) and NROE in 2004 (fi = -0.18 ; p  = 0.05).
Further, there existed a significant positive relationship between board members with a 
professional qualification (NPROFL) in 2002 and NROE in 2002 (fi — 0.22; p -  0.01). On the 
other hand, the relationship between board members with a Doctor of Philosophy qualification 
(NPHD) and firm performance revealed mixed significant results. Namely, when NPHD in 2002 
was measured with respective NTobin’s Q and NROE in 2002 r, the results showed a significant 
positive (fi — 0.16; p  = 0.1) and negative {fi = -0.16; p  = 0.1) relationship.
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Table 7 .24 : Board Competency and Firm P erfo rm ance — OLS 3(i)(a)
The Exam ination of Board of D irectors1 Educational Level in 2002 and Firm P erfo rm ance in 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HBKNOW 1)
NDEG - Proportion of directors with Bachelor degree, NMASK » Proportion of directors with masters degree, NPROFE « Proportion of directors with professional qualification, NPHD * Proportion of directors with Doctor of Philosophy, NASET = 
Total assets, NDEQ - Debt to equity ratio, NEAMDI => Proportion of Family-Member Directors, NFORS ■ Proportion of specific foreign director, NINSTL •• Total Proportion of Government Agencies', Public Listed Companies'/Corporations' and 
Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, PROP " Property industry, FIN -  Finance Industry, 02 ” Year 2002, 03 -  Year 2003, A letter N at the front o f respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal 
scores using Van der Waerdcn approach
/ Note, c 1 ■or the test of multicollinearity, al! independent variables indicated VII • leiel below I, condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respectiie dimension (row); I :or the 
test of autocorrelation of errors the significance leiel for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson deriied upper limit (di); Statistical significance leieb 0 .1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A l l  I‘ 
statistical values were significant at 0.001 letelj
A d j R 2 0.2374 0.1987 0.2114 0.1558
R 2 0.3102 0.2752 0.2867 0.2364
F 4.2618 3.5982 3.8085 2.9334
C o e f f i c i e n t  t - s t a t C oefficient t-stat C o e f f i c i e n t  t - s t a t C o e f f i c i e n t  t - s t a t
Intercept (a) -0.2038 -1.0254 0.0350 0.1721 -0.2667 -1.3216 -0.0529 -0.2535
Explanatory Variables 0 )
NDEG02 0.0635 0.7219 0.0163 0.1868 -0.0118 -0.1368 0.0462 0.5165
NMASK02 -0.0131 -0.1545 -0.1799 -2.1668** -0.0092 -0.1115 -0.2092 -2.4542**
NPROFL02 -0.0207 -0.2754 0.2224 2.9956*** 0.0330 0.4477 0.1043 1.3688
NPHD02 0.1568 1.6759* -0.1599 -1.6627* 0.0419 0.4386 0.0971 0.9839
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.3229 -3.4608*** 0.3958 4.1465*** -0.2779 -2.9343*** 0.3237 3.3030
NDEQ02 0.1987 2.8415*** 0.3397 4.7837***
NFAMDI02 -0.2007 -2.3804**
NFORS02 0.2075 2.2131** -0.1864 -1.9395* 0.1690 1.7725*
NINSTL02 0.2470 2.3435** 0.1780 1.7027*
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.9410 -4.0958*"** -0.7319 -3.1451***
CONSTR 0.4631 1.8487* 0.5306 2.0663t+
FIN -0.4815 -1.8010*
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Table 7 .25 : Board Competency and Firm P erfo rm ance — OLS 3(i)(b)
The Exam ination of Board of D irectors’ Educational Level in 2003 and Firm P erfo rm ance  in 2003and 2004
(The Testing of HBKNOW 1)
NDEG ~ Proportion of directors with Bachelor degree. NMASK Proportion of directors with masters degree, NPROFL -  Proportion of directors with professional qualification, NPHD - Proportion of directors with Doctor o f  Philosophy, NASET -  
Total assets, NDEQ *■ Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI * Proportion o f Family-Member Directors, NFORS * Proportion o f specific foreign director, NINSTL ~ Total Proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Fisted Companies’/Corporations’ and 
Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings. AUFS - Firm 's external auditor is one of the big S audit firms, PROP * Property industry, CONSTR -  Construction industry, FIN ’ Finance Industry, 03 *= Year 2003, 04 * Year 2004, A letter N at the 
front of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerdcn approach
I Notec I or the test of multicollinearity. all independent rariables indicated I 'll' leiel below 5, condition index less than I 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0. 50 in their respectiie dimension (row); I‘or the 
test oj autocorrelation of errors the significance leiel for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson deriied upper limit (d\); Statistical significance leiel: 0 .1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll  I1 
statistical values were significant at 0.05 leiell
A d jR 2 0.2688 0.1986 0.0735 0.1270
R2 0.3386 0.2751 0.1640 0.2123
F 4.8522 3.5957 1.8124 2.4895
C oefficient t-stat C oeffic ien t t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.2733 -1.3988 0.0687 0.3359 -0.2223 -0.9993 -0.0404 -0.1871
Explanatory Variables (j)
NDEG03 -0.0911 -1.1166 -0.0002 -0.0019 -0.1655 -1.7822* 0.0532 0.5902
NMASK03 -0.0289 -0.3747 -0.1942 -2.4073** 0.0228 0.2605 -0.1830 -2.1513**
NPROFL03 0.0833 1.1517 0.0514 0.6787 0.0062 0.0751 0.1048 1.3116
NPHD03 -0.0092 -0.0953 0.0153 0.1510 0.0850 0.7711 -0.0328 -0.3065
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.3669 -4.0136*** 0.4263 4.4544*** -0.1745 -1.6770* 0.2015 1.9966**
NDEQ03 0.3392 4.9166*** 0.1370 1.7988*
NINED03 0.1438 2.2439** -0.1663 -2.4782**
NFORS03 0.1857 2.0644**
NINDPV03 0.1790 1.7866*
NINSTL03 0.2725 2.6608*** 0.2557 2.2614**
AUF503 0.3128 1.9811**
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.6600 -3.0038*** -0.4391 -1.7557* -0.4415 -1.8196*
CONSTR 0.4073 1.6577* -0.5707 -2.1039**
FIN -0.4838 -1.8310*
.
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II) Board of Directors’ Areas of Expertise and Firm Performance - O L S  3 ( i i )
Tables 7.26 and Table 7.27 present the regression results derived from the OLS 3(ii)(a) [i.e. 
regression of specified board’s members areas of expertise in 2002 with respective firm 
performance 2002 and 2003] and OLS 3(ii)(b) [i.e. regression of specified board members’ areas 
of expertise in 2003 with respective firm performance 2003 and 2004].
In Chapter 5, section 5.1.3, HBKNOW 2 hypothesised that the proportion of directors with an 
accounting, finance, business and/management, law, that had attended executive management 
programme and company secretary qualification will have an impact on firm performance 
[NACTGK, NFfNK, NBUSK, NLAWK, NEXEP and NCHASEC]. With respect to the impact 
of proportion of board members with finance qualification (NFINK), the OLS 3(ii)(b) results 
revealed a significant positive relationship between NFINK in 2003 and NTobin’s Q in 2003 (fi 
= 0.17;p  = 0. 05), and NROE in 2003 (/? = 0.14; /? = 0. 1) respectively.
In addition, OLS 3(ii)(a) results pointed to a significant negative relationship between the 
proportion of board members with a business qualification (NBUSK) in 2002 and Tobin’s Q in 
2002 (fi = -0.19;/? = 0.01), and NROE in 2002 (fi = -0.13; p  = 0. 1), and NTobin’s Q in 2003 (fi 
= -0.14; p  = 0.1) respectively. In terms of the relationship between proportion of board members 
with a law qualification (NLAWK) and firm performance, OLS 3(ii)(a) result revealed a 
significant positive relationship between NLAWK in 2002 and NROE in 2002 (fi = 0.18; p  = 
0.05). Furthermore, there existed a significant positive relationship between proportion of board 
members that had attended an executive management programme (NEXEP) in 2002 and NROE 
in 2002 (fi = 0A7;p = 0.1) [See OLS 3(i)(a)].
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Table 7 .26 : Board ( r lency and Firm P erfo rm ance --  OLS 3(ii)(a)
The Examination of Board of D irector Members* Areas of Expertise in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance in 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HBKNOW 2)
NACTGK - Proportion of directors with formal accounting education, NFINK Proportion of directors with formal finance education, NHUSK -  Proportion of directors with formal business/management education, NLAWK = Proportion o f directors 
with formal law education, NLXLP * Proportion of directors who attended executive management programme, NCHASKC -  Proportion o f directors with company secretary experience, NASET -  Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI 
= Proportion of Family-Member Director, AUF5 *= Firm 's external auditor is one of the Big 5 audit firms, MAINB -  Main Board firms, PROP ” Property industry, CONSTR “ Construction industry, FIN -  Finance Industry, 02 -• Year 2002, 03 = Year 
2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/  N  oles: I'or the led of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated I 11' leiel below 1, condition index le.ts than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0. if) in their re.spectiie dimension (row); l :or the 
test of autocorrelation of errors the significance leiel for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson denied upper limit (da); Statistical significance le n t 0 .1 (*), ().05(**), 0.01 (***); A l l  i  
statistical talues are significant at 0.001 letelj__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
A d jR 2 0.2359 0.1536 0.2060 0.1302
R2 0.3019 0.2267 0.2746 0.2054
F 4.5740 3.1008 4.0039 2.7340
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.2792 -1.4255 -0.0767 -0.3719 -0.3456 -1.7311* -0.1194 -0.5713
YLxplanatory Variables (ft)
NACTGK02 -0.0545 -0.8309 0.0791 1.1456 0.0038 0.0572 -0.0345 -0.4929
NFINK02 0.0366 0.4560 0.0143 0.1693 0.0218 0.2659 -0.0069 -0.0810
NBUSK02 -0.1924 -2.8444*** -0.1280 -1.7980* -0.1358 -1.9692* -0.0934 -1.2947
NLAWK02 -0.0760 -1.0159 0.1753 2.2254** 0.0549 0.7197 -0.0512 -0.6413
NEXEP02 0.0741 0.7445 0.0436 0.4164 0.1693 1.6694* -0.0529 -0.4979
NCHASEC02 0.1184 1.0420 0.1115 0.9324 -0.0050 -0.0432 0.1187 0.9794
Control Variables
NASET02
NDEQ02
NFAMDI02
AUF02
Industry Dummy
MAINB
PROP
CONSTR
FIN
-0.2719 -3.0346*** 
0.1889 2.7093*** 
-0.2504 -3.3250*** 
0.2622 1.8762*
-1.0123 -4.4605***
0.4000 4.2419*** -0.2546 -2.7877*** 
0.3411 4.7994***
0.3233 1.8210* 
-0.8711 -3.7653*** 
0.4124 1.6529* 
-0.5353 -1.9694*
0.3525 3.6873***
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Table 7 .27 : Board Competency and Firm P erfo rm ance —  OLS 3(ii)(b)
The Exam ination of Board of D irector’s Members Areas of Expertise in 2003 and Firm P erfo rm ance in 2003 and 2004
(The Testing of HBKNOW 2)
NACTGK Proportion of directors with formal accounting education, NFINK " Proportion of directors with formal finance education, NBUSK - Proportion of directors with formal business/management education, NLAWK =* Proportion o f directors 
with formal law education, NI-XLP » Proportion of directors who attended executive management programme, NCHASKC * Proportion o f directors with company secretary experience, NASLT = Total assets, NDKQ * Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI 
= Proportion of Family-Member Director, AUKS = Firm 's external auditor is one o f the Big S audit firms, BDSZ Size o f  Board of Director, PROP ” Properties industry, CONSTR = Construction industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 03 - Year 2003, 04 
= Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ Notes: I or the test of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated V l \ : leiel below f, condition index less than / 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respectiie dimension (row); I'or the 
test of autocorrelation of errors the significance leiel for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derited upper limit (dv); Statistical significance leiel 0. / (*), 0.05(**), 0 .0 1 (***); A l l  I' 
statistical values are significant al 0.! leielj
A d j R * 0.2157 0.1707 0.0476 0.1013
R 2 0.2834 0.2423 0.1318 0.1807
F 4.1841 3.3838 1.5658 2.2749
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
In tercept (a) -0.4177 -2.0773** 0.1458 0.7051 -0.2768 -1.2352 -0.0626 -0.2879
Fxplanatory Variables (fi)
NACTGK03 -0.0069 -0.1079 -0.0404 -0.6096 -0.0586 -0.8161 -0.0548 -0.7869
NFIN K 03 0.1713 2.1329+t 0.1447 1.7513* 0.0444 0.4962 0.1171 1.3472
NBUSK03 0.0591 0.8800 0.0100 0.1449 -0.0004 -0.0054 -0.0204 -0.2807
NLAWK03 0.0512 0.6857 0.0612 0.7972 -0.0132 -0.1590 0.0629 0.7787
N EX EP03 0.0045 0.0436 -0.0768 -0.7305 -0.0701 -0.6155 -0.0711 -0.6426
NCHASEC03 -0.0172 -0.1451 -0.0946 -0.7754 0.0466 0.3525 -0.0089 -0.0694
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.2748 -2.9285*** O.4547 4.7126*** 0.2371 2.3362**
N D EQ 03 0.3170 4.5088***
NFAM DI03
AUF503 0.3097 2.1986** 0.3853 2.4548**
BDSZ03 0.1213 1.6962*
Industry Dummy
PR O P -0.7846 -3.4768*** -0.4040 -1.7409* -0.5153 -2.0490** -0.4322 -1.7706*
C O N STR -0.4718 -1.6975*
FIN -0.5039 -1.9005** -0.5005 -1.8359*
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Table 7.28 below summarises the findings for the impact of board competency on firm 
performance.
Table 7.28: Summary of Findings of the Impact of Board Competency on Firm Performance
H ypothesis H B K N O W Postulated
Relationship Results
H B K N O W ' 1: B O D  H igher L evel o f  Education  
-  O L S  3(i)
+ Supported  for board  o f  d irector’s with 
Professional and P hD  qualification
H B K N O W ' 2  B O D  A re a s  o f  E xpertise  
-  O L S  3(H)
+
Supported  for board  o f  directors with 
finance qualification, law qualification 
and that had attended executive 
m anagem ent program
7.2.3.1 Discussions of the Impact of Board Competency on Firm Performance — OLS 3(0 
and OLS 3(ii) Results
(I) Board of Director Educational Level and Firm Performance
As indicated in section 7.2.3 (I), in most of the cases observed, examination of the impact of 
board of directors’ educational level on firm performance did not reveal a significant 
relationship between the respective variables. Notably, in one observed case, a significant 
negative relationship was found between the proportion of directors with a Bachelor degree 
(NDEG) in 2003 and Tobin’s Q in 2004 (see Table 7.25). A study by Schroeder et al., (1967) 
suggested that a person’s educational level has an impact on his/her ability to process complex 
information. In addition, Laing and Weir (1999) viewed a person’s investment in education and 
training as an initiative to gain future productivity benefits and attainment of future income. In 
particular, the knowledge and skills acquired through the formal educational process are 
recognisable and established the person’s quality of knowledge (Storey et al., 1995). In the case 
of the current study, directors’ educational background appeared not to be sufficient to assist
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them effectively when dealing with matters unique to firm’s business circumstances. However, 
the possession of a higher degree is important to enhance a person’s job opportunity in the 
labour market and attainment of better pay (Laing and Weir, 1999). On the other hand, Yermack 
(2004) argued that in order for newly appointed directors to contribute to organisational 
performance, they need time to develop their management skills and understanding of the firm’s 
business operation and their industry experience in past employment may not be applicable for 
their current job.
With respect to family-business companies, they will appoint their family members to the board 
of directors regardless of their educational level. Even though family-member directors may 
lack formal education, they have extensive knowledge and experience of the firm’s operations 
and management. The appointment of an outside director with high educational level in family- 
business firms can be perceived as the firm’s strategic investment in human capital.
OLS 3(i)(a) and (b) [see Tables 7.24 and 7.25] indicated a significant negative relationship 
between the proportion of directors with a Masters degree (NMASK) and firm performance. 
Potentially, directors with high qualifications may hold many directorship positions in several 
listed and private companies and/or have a permanent job in the public or private sector. MBSB 
Listing Ruling only limits directors’ board membership in listed firm to 15 companies, whereas 
no limit is imposed on directorship in private companies. Their various external responsibilities 
may have affected their commitment to allocate adequate time for effective board decision­
making (see Loderer and Peyer, 2002).
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On the other hand there existed a positive relationship between the proportion of directors with a 
professional (NPROFL) and Doctor of Philosophy qualification (NPHD) and firm performance 
[see Table 7.24]. According to Laing and Weir (1999), the acquirement of a professional 
qualification will enhance a person's productivity level given his/her higher ability to process 
complex information. In addition. Dionne and Triki (2005) identified the professional 
accountant as an important financial expert asset to the firm. In furtherance of this, Storey et al., 
(1995) found a positive relationship between professional qualification holders and high pay 
level. In the current study, there were not many academicians on firms’ board of directors. Many 
directors with a Doctor o f Philosophy qualification worked in the private sector or public sector 
rather than academic institutions. Castanias and Helfat (2001) posited that manager type and 
managerial experience and skills have implications for firm performance. Potentially, directors’ 
industry and management experience fulfils the firm’s resource needs for external environment 
knowledge (see KLSE and PwC. 2002).
(D) Board of Directors Areas of Expertise and Finn Performance
As reported in section 7.2.3 (II). there was no significant relationship between the proportion of 
board members possessing respective accounting (NACTG) and company secretary experience 
(NCHASEC). and firm performance (see Table 7.26 and 7.27). Lang and Weir (1999) noted 
that holders of a professional accounting qualification have a greater potential to earn a higher 
income in the labour market. Moreover, in the Higgs Report (2003), the importance ot a 
company secretary's knowledge of business procedures and corporate governance was 
emphasised. For effective and efficient management of a firm's complex operations, the firm 
has to delegate various operational and managerial functions to specific groups of people in the
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organisation. Given the size of the board of directors and board members’ knowledge and skills, 
on their own, they would not be able to cater for all responsibilities in the firm. Considerably, 
directors' relevant industry experience may have greater influence on the firm performance (see 
Taylor, 2001).
Furthermore. OLS 3(ii)(b) result [see Table 7.27] indicated that there existed significant positive 
relationship between the proportion of board members with finance qualification (NFINK) and 
firm performance. The value of a director with a financial background to the firm, namely, in 
ensuring access to financial markets has been noted by Lee et al.. (1999). Besides that, the 
financial expert directors' managerial experience in risk management and attitudes towards risk 
aversion have a potential impact on the board’s evaluation of the firm 's investment risks and 
risk policy setting (see Petersen and Thiagarajan. 2000). According to Lee et al.. (1999:423); 
directors with specific finance background such as commercial bankers, executives of insurance 
companies and investment bankers, will be able to provide the firm with specific information 
about the financial market condition as well as finance options advice. In addition, their 
expertise w ill enhance audit committee member and auditor assessment of the firm’s financial 
circumstances, namely, the firm 's business, financial activities and risks (see Booth and Deli. 
1999: the Smith Report. 2003: Para 5.4; PwC, 2003: O'Reilv et al.. 2004).
Accordingly, the relationship between the proportion of directors with higher education in 
business management (NBUSK) related subjects and firm performance was significantly 
negative (see Table 7.26). W hen directors' backgrounds were further investigated, it was found 
that some had several directorships in listed and/or private companies as well as owned their
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own business. Directors* various commitments may have affected their performance of duties in 
the firm, particularly the quality time they were able to allocate for the firm's monitoring (see Li 
and Ang. 2000).
In addition, a significant positive relationship was also found between the proportion of board 
members with law qualification (NLAWK) and firm performance [see Table 7.26 - OLS 
3(ii)(a)]. Notably, the importance of a legal expert advisory service to the board's management 
has been recognised by Verschoor (1993). Furthermore Elson (1996) revealed, the appointment 
of lawyer in the firm 's board was associated with the company's need for his/her professional 
service. Moreover, the presence of legal expertise on the board is important to reduce board 
members exposures to litigation suit due to their unfamiliarity with the law (Borsch and Huse. 
1993: Blum and Hoeffner. 2006).
Similarly, there existed a significant positive relationship between proportion of directors 
attending an executive management programme (NEXEP) and firm performance (see Table 
7.26). In particular the executive management programme was conducted by top business 
universities such as Harvard. Wharton. Stanford. INSEAD and the London Business School. 
Many o f the listed companies' board chairman and other board members without a formal 
education background in finance were enrolled into this financial education programme (see 
Dionne and Triki. 2005). The executive management programme provided directors with 
relevant technical and practical expertise for firm's financial management and in consideration 
of their firm 's industry. The financial knowledge acquired from this program enhanced
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directors' financial advisory skills and enabled them to act in the best interest of shareholders as 
a result o f their greater comprehension of the financial decisions they had to make.
In terms o f the impact of the firm 's appointment of big 5 audit firm as it external auditor 
(AUF5) on firm performance, the result of OLS 3(i)(b), 3(ii)(a) and 3(ii)(b) indicated a 
significant positive relationship between the two respective variables (p=0.05 or /?=0.1). 
Notably, the presence o f big 5 audit firm would enhance the quality and reliability of firm's 
financial reporting practice (McConnell. 1984; Beattie and Feamley, 1995; Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen. 2006). as well as board assessment of management's proposition on firm's 
financial and strategic investment planning (Eichenseher and Shields. 1985; Knapp. 1987).
W ith respect to the impact of board of director's size (NBDSZ) on firm performance, OLS 
3(ii)(b) result in Table 7.27 indicated a positive relationship between the two variables. This 
result suggests that the presence of a high number of board of director members will ensure the 
availability o f greater human capital knowledge and skills for making informed board decisions. 
The inputs from each director will be valuable for achieving better firm performance (see 
Goodstein et al.. 1994). In particular. Bimbaum (1994) noted that, firms operating in a business 
environment with a high level of uncertainty, due to lack of information or reliable resources, 
have a greater need for higher human capital knowledge in their board of directors.
OLS 3(ii)(a) result also indicated a significant positive relationship between main board firms 
(MAINB) and firm performance (p = 0.1). Namely, main board firms were companies with 
large paid-up capital [i.e. minimum of Malaysian Ringgit (RM) 60 million (i.e. USD 16.82
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billion7^ )]. Notably the higher the firm’s market capitalisation the higher its generation of firm 
value, given the availability of external funds to finance the firm's investment in assets (see 
Leftwich et al. 1981; Gray et al.. 1995). Growing firms with large needs for outside financing 
may adopt better governance practice to obtain low cost of capital (Klapper and Love, 2003). On 
the other hand, there was also a positive relationship between firm market value of equity and 
the growth of firm earnings [See Table 6.10, Chapter 6]. This indicated that the market 
estimation o f the firm value was parallel with the growth of firm earnings.
7J Conclusion
In this chapter the empirical findings relating to the research hypotheses proposed to examine 
the impact o f board o f directors' attributes, namely, independence, leadership structure and 
competency, on firm performance have been analysed and discussed. The presence of senior 
independent director on the firm's board was found to strengthen board's independence and had 
a significant positive impact on firm performance. Further, the director's years of experience as 
an independent director, his/her reputation and independence positively influenced the board's 
decision making.
Moreover, the presence of a senior independent director would ensure that newly appointed 
independent directors received adequate supervision in the performance of their oversight duties, 
which will further enhance new directors' abilities to conduct their responsibilities 
appropriately. On the other hand, the high presence of family-member directors on the firm's 
board was found detrimental to firm performance. Potentially their high presence may lead to
See ibid 50.
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greater expropriation o f minority interests and domination of the of firm’s board by their 
relatives.
On the other hand, this study found that board leadership enhanced firm performance when the 
independent director, founder or a non-executive director held the position as the board's 
chairman. Notably, independent board chairman ensures objectivity and credibility in board's 
judgements. In addition, the founder possesses the leadership and managerial skills given his/her 
experience and contribution in the setting up o f the business. Furthermore, a non-executive 
director's business association with the firm allows him/her better understanding of the firm’s 
business operation and to obtain cooperation and access to information from the firm’s 
employees.
Moreover, directors with a professional and Doctor of Philosophy qualification had a positive 
impact on firm performance. Their attainment of higher knowledge and skills as well as their 
relevant industry experience contributed to the better management of firm assets and hence 
performance. In addition, directors which possessed finance qualification, law qualification and 
had attended the executive management programme organised by top business schools (namely 
Harvard. Stanford. Wharton, INSEAD and the London Business School) were important sources 
of financial, business and legal advice in the firm.
In terms of research model fitness, the board corporate governance models that used market 
value as a firm performance measure (i.e. Tobin's Q) had a higher F statistical value in 
comparison to accounting-based measure of firm performance (ROE) in most of the cases
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observed. These observations have been widely recognised, namely by Morck et al., (1988), Bai 
et al., (2004) and Black et al., (2006), of Tobin’s Q more closely linked with a firm’s corporate 
governance practice than accounting rate o f return. In addition Murphy (1985) gathered, the 
company performance measured in terms of shareholders return provided a better link with 
managerial performance. The subsequent chapter will continue with the analyses and 
discussions o f the results o f the impact of board-subcommittees attributes on firm performance.
Discussion o f the current research findings has been restricted to significant results found in 
individual research model. With the collection of more corporate governance data in the future, 
the research could be examined as time series research and the data could be analysed using 
pooled regression approach. The next chapter 8 continues the analysis and discussion of the 
research models by focusing on the impact on firm performance of the board's subcommittees' 
attributes. In addition, chapter 8 will examine the robustness tests for board of directors' and 
board subcommittees research models.
Chapter 8
-Analyses of Resalts and Dbcbssob B -
The Impact of (BoardSubcommittees’ Attributes on Tim Performance
8.0 Introduction
In the preceding Chapter, the research hypotheses and models for board of directors’ 
composition (OLS 1). leadership (OLS 2) and competency (OLS 3) impact on firm performance 
were analysed and discussed. This chapter continues the analysis and discussion of the research 
hypotheses and models, focusing on the impact of board subcommittees’, namely, audit, 
nomination and remuneration committee attributes on firm performance. Chapter 8 begins, by 
analysing and discussing audit committee composition, leadership and competency influence on 
firm performance. Subsequently, the impact o f nomination and remuneration committees’ 
respective composition and structure on firm performance is analysed and discussed. In addition, 
the chapter discuses the robustness tests for findings derived from the board of directors and 
board subcommittees research model results.
8.1 Empirical Results of Board Sub-Committees9 Attribute Impact on Firm 
Performance
This section presents the results of the multiple regression analysis and discussion of the impact 
of audit, nomination and remuneration committees' attributes on firm performance. As indicated 
in Chapter 7. the research was designed to evaluate the impact of firm corporate governance 
practice in the years 2002 and 2003. and the notations (a) and (b) represent observation of 
independent variables in 2002 and 2003, respectively.
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8.2 Audit Committee and Firm Performance
The impact o f audit committee's attributes is examined by investigating the influence of audit 
committee independence, leadership and competency on firm performance. The following 
subsections respectively present the results of the analysis of the audit committee research model 
OLS 4 (i.e. audit committee independence). OLS 5 (i.e. audit committee leadership), and OLS 6 
(i.e. audit committee competency) [see Chapter 5, section 5.2.1.1]
8.2.1 A u d it  C o m m itte e  In d ep en d en ce  a n d  F irm  P erfo rm a n ce  -  O L S  4
The impact o f audit committee independence on firm performance was examined by the 
research models OLS 4(i). OLS 4(ii) and OLS 4(iii) [See Chapter 5, section 5.2.1.1]. 
Specifically, each model respectively examined the impact of certain compositions of 
independent directors on the board, namely the presence of wholly independent directors 
composition on the audit committee (AUDF), domination of independent director composition 
on the audit committee (AUGMJ). and majority independent director composition on the audit 
committee (AUDMJ). on firm performance. In particular, the investigations were undertaken by 
evaluating together in each model other factors that may have influenced the audit committee 
independent directors' effectiveness, namely, the presence of a senior independent director on 
the audit committee (ACSIN). the presence o f at least one independent audit committee member 
with practising accountant experience (ACPI), the presence of at least one audit committee 
member with practising accountant experience (ACPACT), the presence of an audit committee 
chairman with practising accountant experience (APACH), the exclusion of Chief Executive 
Director. Chief Financial Officer and Managing Director from audit committee membership 
(AXCEO). the presence o f a family-member director on the audit committee (ACFAM), the
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convening of a separate meeting between the audit committee’s independent outside directors 
and external auditor (MTEXT), and the transparency o f audit committee authority to report firm 
violation o f Securities Commission, Stock Exchange, and other regulatory rules (RBRE). The 
following sub-sections will discuss the results of the three OLS 4 models respectively.
(I) Presence of Wholly Independent Directors on Audit Committee (AUDF) and Firm Performance -  O L S  4 ( i )
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 respectively present the regression results derived from the OLS 4(i)(a) [i.e. 
regression o f AUDF and specified audit committee independence variables in 2002 with 
respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and the OLS 4(i)(b) model [i.e. regression of 
AUDF and specified audit committee independence variables in 2003 with respective firm 
performance 2003 and 2004].
Hypothesis HACIND 1 suggested that the whole composition o f audit committee by 
independent directors (AUDF) will have a positive impact on firm performance (see Chapter 5. 
section 5.2.1.1). OLS 4(i)(a) and OLS 4(ii)(b) results pointed to the contrary'. In most of the 
cases observed, the relationship between AUDF and firm performance was not statistically 
significant. However there existed a significant negative relationship between AUDF in 2002 
and NROE in 2002 (/?= -0.53; p  = 0.05).
With respect to HACIND 4, the research hypothesis proposed that the presence of a senior 
independent director on the audit committee (ACSIN) has a positive impact on firm 
performance. The results o f OLS 4(i)(a) and 4(i)(b) models revealed mixed significant 
relationships between the two respective variables [see Tables 8.1 and Table 8.2 respectively].
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Specifically, when the audit committee was comprised wholly o f independent directors, there 
existed a significant negative relationship between ACSIN in 2002 and NTobin's Q in 2002 (fi = 
-0.22; p  = 0. 1). On the other hand, there was a significant positive relationship between ACSIN 
in 2002 and NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.31; p  = 0.05). and between ACSIN in 2003 and NROE in 
2003 (fi = 0.30; p  = 0.05).
In addition. HACIND 5 testing results [see Table 8.2, OLS 4(i)(b)] showed that, when the audit 
committee was comprised wholly o f independent directors, there were four cases where the 
hypothesised positive relationship between the presence of at least one independent audit 
committee member with practising accountant experience (ACPI) and firm performance was 
supported. Specifically, there existed significant positive relationship between ACPI in 2003 and 
NTobin's Q in 2003 (fi = 0.13; p  = 0.1) and NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.14; p  = 0.1). and between 
ACPI in 2003 and NTobims Q in 2004 (fi = 0.17; p  = 0.1) and NROE in 2004 (fi = 0.23; p  = 
0 .01).
It was hypothesised by HACIND 10 that the convening of a meeting between audit committee 
independent members and the external auditor (MTEXT) without executive member present will 
have a positive impact on firm performance. On the contrary, OLS 4(i)(b) result indicated that, 
when the audit committee was comprised wholly of independent director, there was a significant 
negative relationship between MTEXT in 2003 and NROE in 2003 (fi = -0.31; p  = 0.05).
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Table 8.1: Audit Com m ittee Independence  and  Firm P erfo rm an ce  — OLS i(i)(a) 
The Exam ination of the P resence  of W holly Independen t D irectors on Audit Com m ittee (AUDF) in 2002 w ith R espective Firm P erfo rm an ce  2002 and  2003 
(The T esting of I w ith HACIND 4 ,5 ,7 ,1 0  and  I I )
AC • Audit committee. IN II)  -  Independent duectoi. AUDI -  AC i* wholly tompoyed of INI I), ACSIN -  Presence of senior independent director on AC. ACPI ~ At leant one INI I) on AC h u  practising accountant experience, APACH -  AC's Chairman ha* practising accountant 
experience, M l I: XI -  AC independent member* conduct meeting with auditor without management member pte*ent at leant once a year, RIIRI. -  Ttan*patency of AC authontv to repon firm'* breach of regulatory rule*. NATI.NI) -  Attendance rate of audit committee member* at the 
committee * meeting*. Nl ACf - Proportion of family member director* with accounting and finance background. NI AMDI -  Proportion of family member director, NASCI -  lotal a»»et«. NDI.Q -  Debt to equity ratio, MH -  Mam Hoard firm*, PROP Property industry, CONPRO " 
Consumct product industry. ITN - f inance Industry. 02 - Year 2002. Of - Year 200f, A letter N at the front of respective variable * acronym identified the variable that had been Iraniformed to normal score* using Van del Waerden approach
I W o .  I or the test oj mulhcoHineant), al! indepcmlenl lanahles initialed I II leirt helow I condition index less than I > and no! mote limn one rananr pmpoition yrraler limn 0 $0 in llieir respectue dimension (mu), I or tl* test of autoconre Litton of errors the 
ii^ni/tcamr leiel/or the Ihitbm U at son statistic (d) mdisaleda taint trealer limn the Ituriun Watson slenied upper limit (di'); Statistical sitnilicamr lent: 0 .1 (*), 0JA(**), 0,01 (***); A ll  V■statistical rallies urn significant at the 0.001 lent!
A dj  R* 0.2112 0.1664 0.1928 0.1750
R* 0.2865 0.2460 0.2698 0.2538
V 3.8046 3.0910 3.5017 3.2227
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Intercept («) 0.0075 0.0339 0.1824 -0.8061 -0.3287 -1.4761 0.0001 0.0002
Msplanatory I 'ariubles
AUDF02 0.1972 0.9142 0.5267 -2.3754** 0.3034 1.3904 -0.1474 -0.6683
ACSIN02 0.2154 1.6983* 0.1780 1.3648 -0.1042 -0.8123 0.3137 2.4183**
ACPI02 0.1990 1.4378 0.0358 0.2519 0.0612 -0.4373 -0.1818 -1.2845
APACH02 0.1110 0.6894 0.2025 1.2234 0.1555 0.9551 0.1989 1.2080
MTEXT02 0.1795 1.2942 -0.0612 -0.4288 0.2311 1.6467 -0.1742 -1.2278
RBRE02 0.0188 0.1365 0.0941 0.6629 0.0537 0.3848 0.2779 1.9689*
Control I'ariubles
NASET02 0.2260 2.619.3*** 0.4353 4.9085*** -0.1762 -2.0189** 0.3660 4.1488***
NDEQ02 0.1510 2.0814** 0.3090 4.2112*** 0.1319 1.7782*
NATEND02 -0.1223 -1.6545*
NFAMDI02 0.2250 2.5382**
NFACF02 -0.2386 -2.1448**
Industry Dummy
MB 0.36.31 1.9767*
PROP 0.9916 4.3947*** 0.8251 -3.6150***
CONPRO 0.3280 1.65.30*
FIN 0.5447 -2.0238**
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Table 8.2: Audit ( om m itlee  Independence  and  Firm P erfo rm an ce  — OLS t(i)(b)
The Exam ination of Ihe P resen ce  of W holly Independen t D irectors on Audit Com m ittee (AUDF) in 2003 w ith R espective Firm P erfo rm an ce  2003 and  2001
(The H ypothesis T esting  of HACIND 1 w ith HACIND L 5 ,7 ,1 0  and  11)
AC Audit committee. INI.I) - Independent directoi. A l'D I -  AC i* wholly composed of INI.I). AC SIN Pie*cnce o f senior independent difeclot on AC'. AC PI -  At least one INI.I) on AC ha* practising accountant experience. APACII -  AC"* Chairman ha« practising accountant 
experience, MTT.XT * AC independent member* conduct meeting with auditor without management membet pre*ent at least once a year. RIIRI: -  Transparency of AC authority to report firm'* breach of regulatory rule*. NINI D * Proportion of independent directors on Ihe Board. N A S tT  
-  Total asset*. NDI O ‘ Debt to equity ratio. MB - Mam Boaid film*. PROP - Property industry, C ONS1R - C (instruction induttiy. MN -  f  inance Industry. 01 - Year 2001. 04 -  Yeai 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been 
ttansfotmed to normal sente* using Van dei Waetden approach
I Noire lo r  iht in i  «/ muliuolhntanty. all tmltptmltnl lanabln ituL .ilai I II I titl Inlaw tombiion in<ltx lr<< 11 kin I S ami no! man llkin ant lartamr proportion jyr ait r than I). Si) in ihtir n p t ih i t  iltmtn arm (row); lo r  iht It it of autocomlatmn oj trrors iht 
•avnifuanit I tn ! for /hr I lurbin U'ahon t tain In (d) imlnaitd a lalnt rnairr l/kin iht I in Han Walton d tn itd  Hpptr limit (tit ■); \  lain log/ upni/itamr Irnl: 0.1 (*), O.QSf**), 0 .0 ! (***); A H  l-fta tn tn a l ralutt u rn  utnijicant at iht 0.1 Itn lj_______________
A d j  R- 0.19.38 0.2275 0.0518 0.1213
R: 0.2707 0.3012 0.1444 0.2071
/•' .3.5182 4.0846 1.5593 2.4131
Coefficient Lsiat C ocfficicn ! t stat Co.effiaent t stat Coefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.2575 1.1648 0.0212 0.0978 0.1007 -0.415.3 -0.0358 -0.1535
Mxplanatory I 'ariables (fi)
AUDF03 0.1842 -0.8025 0.0239 0.1062 -0.1495 -0.5938 0.1939 -0.8005
ACSIN03 -0.1133 -0.8957 0.2988 2.41.37** 0.0244 0.1758 0.0285 0.2137
ACPI03 0.1329 1.6958* 0.1412 1.8404* 0.1684 1.9584* 0.2293 2.7731***
APACH03 0.1548 ■0.9005 0.0666 -0.4549 0.0880 0.5363 -0.1423 -0.9012
MTEXT03 0.1070 0.76.30 0.3117 -2.2705** 0.0609 0.3962 0.1412 -0.9543
RBRE03 0.0878 0.6.388 0.2688 1.9978* 0.1729 -1.1470 -0.0082 -0.0566
Control I 'ariables
NASET03 0.2311 -2.6052* * 0.4182 4.8147*** 0.2588 2.7651**
NDEQ03 0.5026 4.2687*** 0.1242 1.6615*
NINED03 0.1196 1.6958* 0.1742 -2.5243**
Industry Dummy
MB 0.3222 1.7555*
PROP 0.8251 -3.6501 * ** 0.4005 -1.8099* 0.6148 2.4799** -0.4569 -1.9160*
CONSTR -0.4838 -1.7881*
FIN 0.4575 1.7233* -0.6029 2.0708**
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HACIND 11 hypothesised that when the firm discloses in its audit committee report that its 
audit committee has the authority to report to the Exchange in the event of a firm breaching the 
Exchange's ruling (RBRE). such conduct signifies firm 's transparency of corporate governance 
commitment and hence will have a positive impact on firm performance. OLS 4(i)(a) and 4(i)(b) 
results indicated that, when the audit committee was composed wholly o f independent director, 
there existed significant positive relationship between RBRE in 2002 and NROE in 2003 {fi = 
0.28; p  = 0 .1). and between RBRE in 2003 and NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.27; p  = 0.1).
On the other hand. OLS 4(i)(a) and OLS 4(i)(b) results were not statistically significant to 
support hypotheses HACIND 7.
(I )  Audit Committee Domination Composition of Independent Directors (AUCMJ) and Firm Performance 
- O L S  4 ( i i )
Tables 8.3 and 8.4 respectively presents the regression results for the OLS 4(ii)(a) model [i.e. 
regression o f AUGMJ and specified audit committee independence variables in 2002 with 
respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and the OLS 4(ii)(b) model [i.e. regression of 
AUGM J and specified audit committee independence variables in 2003 with respective firm 
performance 2003 and 2004].
It was hypothesised by HACIND 2 (see Chapter 5 section 5.2.1.1) that the domination of 
independent directors on the audit committee (AUGMJ) will have a positive impact on firm 
performance. However. OLS 4(ii)(a) result did not support this hypothesis. There existed
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significant negative relationship between AUGMJ in 2002 with NTobin’s Q in 2003 (fi =-0.71; p  
= 0.01).
With respect to HACIND 4 testing, OLS 4(ii)(a) and 4(ii)(b) results respectively revealed mixed 
significant relationships between the presence of a senior independent director on the audit 
committee (ACSIN) and firm performance. Namely, when the audit committee was dominated 
by independent directors there existed significant negative relationship between the presence of 
a senior independent director on the audit committee (ACSIN) in 2002 and NTobin’s Q in 2002 
(fi = -0.24 ; p  = 0.1). On the contrary, a significant positive relationship was found between 
ACSIN in 2002 and NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.31 ; p  = 0.05), and between ACSIN in 2003 and 
NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.30 ; p  = 0.05). These results were consistent with OLS 4(i)(a) and 4(i)(b) 
findings of mixed significant relationships between ACSIN and firm performance.
Moreover, according to the result derived from OLS 4(ii)(b), when the audit committee was 
dominated by independent directors, there existed significant positive relationship between the 
presence of at least one independent audit committee member with practising accountant 
experience (ACPI: HACIND 5) and firm performance. This relationship was found between 
ACPI in 2003 and NTobin's Q in 2003 (fi = 0.13 ; /? = 0.1) and NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.15 ; p = 
0.05), and between ACPI in 2003 and NROE in 2004 (fi = 0.20 ; p = 0.05). Similar findings 
were gathered from the results of OLS 4(i)(b) model of a significant positive relationship 
between ACPI and firm performance.
For the testing of HACIND 6, the result derived from OLS 4(ii)(b) [see Table 8.4] revealed that, 
when the audit committee was dominated by independent directors, a significant positive
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Table 8.3: Audit Committee Independence and  Firm P erfo rm ance ~  OLS 4(i)(a)
The Exam ination of A udit C om m ittee  D o m in a tio n  C om position  of In d e p e n d e n t  D ire c to rs  (AUGMJ) in 2002 w ith R espective Firm P erfo rm ance 2002 and 2003 
(The Testing of 2 w ith IIACIIMD 4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,1 0  and 11)
AC * Audit committee. INKD '  Independent director. AUGMJ * Presence of more th in  majority of INHI) on AC. ACSIN -  Preience o f  senior independent director on AC. ACPI -  At least one INED on AC has practising accountant experience. ACPACT = At least one AC member has 
practising accountant experience, APACH -  AC's Chairman has practising accountant experience. AXCEO ” Exclusion of CEO, CFO and/or managing director from AC, ACFAM -  Presence o f  family-member director on AC, MTEXT "  AC independent members conduct meeting with 
auditor without management member present at least once a year, RBRE - Transparency of AC authority to report firm’s breach of regulatory rules, NASET « Total assets, NDEQ -  Debt to equity ratio, PROP -  Property industry, CONSTR -  Construction industry, FIN * Finance Industry, 
02 -  Year 2002, OJ " Year 200}, A lelter N at the front of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach.
/  Notes: I' or the test of mullicolhneanty, all imlependent tanables indicated I ' l l '  leiel below I, condition index less than 12 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.10 in their respective dimension (row); I or the test o f autocorrelation o f errors tin  
significance lei el for the Duri>in Watson statistic (d) indicated a talue greater than the Durbin Watson dented upper limit (dt); Statistical significance le n t 0.1 (*), 0 .0 1(**), 0.01 (***); A l l  I'-statistical values were significant al the 0.001 leiell
A d jR 2 0.1927 0.1387 0.2139 0.1586
0.2698 0.2209 0.2890 0.2390
F 3.5009 2.6865 3.8513 2.9753
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
In tercept (a) 0.4278 1.1509 0.0695 0.1811 0.3220 0.8781 0.2219 0.5848
Explanatory Variables 0 )
AUGMJ02 -0.3804 -1.6126 -0.0759 -0.3115 -0.7106 -3 .0529*** -0.0184 -0.0764
ACSIN02 -0.2403 -1.8958* 0.1749 1.3362 -0.1293 -1.0342 0.3092 2.3902**
ACPI02 -0.1686 -1.2896 0.0637 0.4719 -0.0592 -0.4590 -0.0986 -0.7387
ACPACT02 0.1259 0.5651 -0.1653 -0.7185 0.0628 0.2856 -0.1748 -0.7687
APACH02 0.0408 0.2518 0.2131 1.2719 0.0854 0.5338 0.2171 1.3112
AXCEO02 -0.1676 -0.9381 -0.0843 -0.4567 -0.0352 -0.1997 -0.1254 -0.6878
ACFAM02 -0.0595 -0.4148 -0.0171 -0.1152 0.1058 0.7475 -0.0764 -0.5221
M TEXT02 0.1369 0.9641 -0.0823 -0.5613 0.1991 1.4218 -0.1877 -1.2953
RBRE02 0.0261 0.1878 0.1270 0.8833 0.1101 0.8018 0.2711 1.9074*
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.2226 -2.5392*** 0.4173 4.6075*** -0.1664 -1.9226* 0.3510 3.9212***
N D E Q 02 0.1408 1 9192++* 0.2999 4.1434*** 0.1333 1.7806*
Industry Dummy
PR O P -0.9897 -4 .3 3 6 0 *" -0.9095 -4 .0380*** -0.3929 -1.6862*
C O N STR 0.4779 1.9327*
F IN -0.5207 -2.0114**
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Table 8.4: Audit Committee Independence and Firm P erfo rm ance — OLS 4(ii)(b)
The Exam ination of A udit C om m ittee  D o m in atio n  C om position  of In d e p e n d e n t D ire c to rs  (AUGMJ) in 2003 w ith R espective Firm P erfo rm ance 2003 and 2004
(The Testing of 2 w ith 4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,1 0  and 11)
AC * Audit committee, INHD -  Independent director, AIJCiMJ » Presence of more than majority of INEl) on AC, ACSIN * Presence of senior independent director on AC, ACPI •  At least one INF.D on AC has practising accountant experience, ACPACT ”  At least one AC member has practising 
accountant experience, APACH - AC’s Chairman has practising accountant experience, AXCEO * Exclusion of CEO, CKO and/or managing director from AC, ACEAM * Presence of family-member director on AC, MTEXT * AC independent members conduct meeting with auditor without 
management member present at least once a year, RBRE Transparency o f AC authority to report firm 's breach o f  regulatory rules, NINE!) •* Proportion o f independent directors on the Board, MB -  Main Board firms, NASET T Total assets, NDEQ * Debt to equity ratio, PROP = Property industry, 
CONSTR » Construction industry, CONPRO ■* Consumer product industry, FIN *• Finance Industry, 01 «■ Year 2001, 04 -  Year 2004 , A letter N at the front o f  respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/  Notes: I or tlx test of muliicothncarity, all independen/ tunable s indicated I ' l i  let*/ below I, condition index less than I i  and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0. if) in their respectiie dimension (row); I or tlx test o f autocorrelation of errors tlx significance 
leiel for tlx Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than tlx Durbin Watson denied upper limit (da); Statistical significance leiel: 0 .1 (*), 0.0 0.01 (***); A l l \ :■statistical values were significant at tlx 0.05 leielj________________________________
A d jR 2 0.2144 0.2338 0.0673 0.1319
0.2894 0.3069 0.1584 0.2167
F 3.8586 4.1964 1.7386 2.5556
.Coefficient t~5tAt Coefficient t-5tAt Coefficient H tA t Coefficient t-stat
In tercept (a) 0.5969 1.0928 -0.3575 -0.6627 0.2538 0.4216 -0.2680 -0.4619
Explanatory Variables 0 )
AUGMJ03 -0.2482 -0.7618 0.4347 1.3510 -0.0808 -0.2250 -0.0269 -0.0776
ACSIN03 -0.0867 -0.6885 0.2996 2.4098** -0.0138 -0.0996 -0.0188 -0.1404
ACPI03 0.1318 1.7847+ 0.1523 2.0888** 0.1292 1.5882 0.2019 2.5736**
ACPACT03 0.1758 0.7212 -0.0295 -0.1227 0.4053 1.5088 0.4982 1.9235*
APACH03 -0.1387 -0.9618 -0.0578 -0.4061 0.0284 0.1786 -0.1781 -1.1622
AXCEO03 -0.8516 -2.4627** 0.0261 0.0765 -0.6360 -1.6692* -0.2131 -0.5802
ACFAM03 -0.0145 -0.1018 -0.1123 -0.7993 -0.0524 -0.3345 0.0946 0.6258
M TEXT03 0.1185 0.8574 -0.3245 -2.3770** -0.0808 -0.2250 -0.1553 -1.0579
RBRE03 0.0953 0.6988 0.2609 1.9372* -0.0138 -0.0996 -0.0095 -0.0652
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.2170 -2.5261** 0.4256 5.0183*** -0.6223 2.5250** 0.2556 2.8020***
N D EQ 03 0.3135 4.5039*** 0.1405 1.8997*
N IN E D 03 0.1422 2.1321** -0.1823 -2.7673***
Industry Dummy
MB 0.3361 1.8610*
PRO P -0.7948 -3.5535*** -0.4081 -1.8474* -0.5703 2.0089** -0.4796 -2.0185**
C O N PR O -0.5599 -2.0878**
C O N STR -0.3625 -1.7334*
FIN -0.4598 -1.7844*
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relationship was found between the presence of at least one audit committee member with 
practising accountant experience (ACPACT) in 2003 and NROE in 2004 (fi = 0.50 ; p  = 0.1).
With regard to testing of HACIND 8, the results derived from OLS 4(ii)(b) indicated that, when 
the audit committee was dominated by independent directors, there was a significant negative 
relationship respectively, between the exclusion of CEO, Chief Operating Officer and/or 
Managing Director from audit committee membership (AXCEO) in 2003 and NTobin’s Q in 
2003 (fi = -0.85; p  = 0.05), and NTobins’Q in 2004 (fi = -0.64; /7 = 0.1).
In addition, OLS 4(ii)(b) result indicated that, when the audit committee was composed of more 
than majority independent director, there existed significant negative relationship between the 
convening o f a meeting with only independent directors on the audit committee and the auditor 
as attendees (MTEXT: HACIND 10) in 2003 and NROE in 2003 (fi = -0.32; p = 0.05). This 
result failed to support the hypothesis of HACIND 10 which postulated positive relationship 
between the two respective variables. S imilar finding was also observed from earlier OLS 
4(i)(b) model result of the significant negative relationship between MTEXT and firm 
performance .
Further testing o f HACIND 11 [see result of OLS 4(ii)(b) in Table 8.4] indicated that, when the 
audit committee was composed of more than majority independent director, there was a 
significant positive relationship between the transparency of the audit committee’s authority to 
report firm violation of Exchange ruling to the Exchange (RBRE) in 2002 and NROE in 2003 (fi 
= 0.27; p  = 0.1), and between RBRE in 2003 and NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.26; p  = 0.1). These
3 4 9
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results were consistent with previous OLS 4(i)(a) and 4(i)(b) findings of a significant positive 
relationship between RBRE and firm performance.
On the other hand, OLS 4(ii)(a) and OLS 4(ii)(b) results were not statistically significant to 
support hypotheses HACIND 7 and 9. Similar finding was derived from OLS 4(i)(a) and (b) 
models testing of HACIND 7.
(B ) Audit Committee Majority Independent Composition (AUDMJ) and Firm Performance -  O L S  4 ( i i i )
Tables 8.5 and 8.6 respectively presents the regression results of model OLS 4(iii)(a) [i.e. 
regression of AUDMJ and specified audit committee independence variables in 2002 with 
respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and OLS 4(iii)(b) [i.e. regression of AUDMJ and 
specified audit committee independence variables in 2003 with respective firm performance 
2003 and 2004].
HACIND 3 (see Chapter 5 section 5.2.1.1) suggested that the majority composition of 
independent directors on the audit committee (AUDMJ) will have a positive impact on firm 
performance. OLS 4(iii)(a) result revealed a significant negative relationship between AUDMJ 
in 2002 and NTobin’s Q in 2003 (fi = -0.57; p  = 0.05) [see Table 8.5] which did not support the 
hypothesis.
OLS 4(iii)(a) and 4(iii)(b) results derived from testing HACIND 4 indicated that, when the audit 
committee was composed of majority independent directors, there existed mixed significant 
findings on the relationship between the presence of a senior independent director on the audit
3 5 0
i
CHAPTER 8: ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION II - BOARD SUBCOMMITTEES AND
FIRM PERFORMANCE
committee (ACSIN) and firm performance. Specifically, a significant negative relationship was 
found between ACSIN in 2002 and NTobin’s Q in 2002 (fi = -0.23 ; p  = 0.1). On the other hand, 
a significant positive relationship was observed between ACSIN in 2002 and NROE in 2003 (fi 
= 0.31; p  = 0.05), and between ACSIN in 2003 and NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.29 ; p  = 0.05). These 
results were consistent with the earlier OLS 4(i)(a) and (b), and 4(ii)(a) and (b) models findings 
of mixed significant relationship between ACSIN and firm performance.
Furthermore, the testing of HACIND 5 revealed that [see Table 8.6 of OLS 4(iii)(b) research 
model], when the audit committee was composed of majority independent director, a significant 
positive relationship was found between the presence of at least one independent audit 
committee member with practising accountant experience (ACPI) and firm performance. 
Namely, there existed a significant positive relationship between ACPI in 2003 and NTobin’s Q 
in 2003 (fi = 0.13 ; p  = 0.1), NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.15 ; p  = 0.05) and NROE in 2004 (fi = 0.20 ; 
p  = 0.05), respectively. Similar results were also gathered from previous OLS 4(i)(b) and 
4(ii)(b) models findings of respective variables.
In addition, the OLS 4(iii)(b) result derived from testing HACIND 6 indicated that when the 
audit committee was composed of majority independent director, there existed a significant 
positive relationship between the presence of at least one audit committee member with 
practising accountant experience (ACPACT) in 2003 and NROE in 2004 (fi = 0.51 , p  = 0.1). 
This result was consistent with OLS 4(ii)(b) model finding of ACPACT’s significant positive 
impact on firm performance.
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Accordingly, OLS 4(iii)(b) results showed that, when the audit committee was composed of 
majority independent director, there was a significant negative relationship between the 
exclusion of CEO, Chief Operating Officer and/or Managing Director from audit committee 
membership (AXCEO:HACIND 8) in 2003 and NTobin’s Q in 2003 (fi = -0.83; p  = 0.05). This 
finding was consistent with previous OLS 4(ii)(b) model finding of a significant negative 
relationship between AXCEO and firm performance.
OLS 4(iii)(b) model result [see Table 8.6 ] derived from testing HACIND 10 revealed that, when 
the audit committee was composed of majority independent director, there was significant 
negative relationship between the convening of a meeting with only independent directors on the 
audit committee and the auditor as attendees (MTEXT) in 2003 and NROE in 2003 (fi = -0.32; 
p  = 0.05). This result was consistent with OLS 4(i)(b) and OLS 4(ii)(b) models finding on 
MTEXT’s significant negative impact on firm performance.
With respect to HACIND 11 testing, OLS 4(iii)(a) and (b) model results indicated that, when the 
audit committee was composed o f majority independent directors, there existed a significant 
positive relationship between the transparency of the audit committee’s authority to report firm 
violation of Exchange rulings to the Exchange (RBRE) in 2002 and NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.27; p 
= 0.1) and between RBRE in 2003 and NROE in 2003 (fi -  0.27; p  = 0.1). These results were 
consistent with previous OLS 4(i)(a) and (b), and OLS 4(ii)(a) and (b) models findings of a 
significant relationship between RBRE and firm performance.
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Table 8.5: Audit Committee Independence and  Firm P erfo rm ance  —  OLS 4(iii)(a)
The Exam ination of Audit Com m ittee M ajority Independen t Composition (AUDMJ) in 2002 w ith R espective Firm P erfo rm ance 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HACIND 3 w ith HACIND 4 , 5 , 6 .7 ,8 ,9 ,1 0  and 11)
AC - Audit committee, INI-D * Independent director, AUDMJ -  Presence of msjoritv o f INF.D on AC, ACSIN -  Presence o f senior independent director on AC, ACPI -  At least one INF.D on AC has practising accountant experience, ACPACT * At least one AC member has practising 
accountant experience, APACH -  AC's Chairman has practising accountant experience, AXCF.O -  F.xclusion of CKO, CFO and/or managing director from AC, ACFAM -  Presence of family-member director on AC, MTF.XT " AC independent members conduct meeting with auditor without 
management member present at least once a year, RBRF. • Transparency of AC authority to report firm 's breach of regulatory rules, NINTH * Proportion of independent directors on the Board. MB * Main Board firms, NASFT *- Total assets, NDF.Q = Debt to equity ratio, MB = Main Board 
firms, PROP - Property industry, CONSTR Construction industry, FIN » Finance Industry, 02 « Year 2002, 0.1 *• Year 2003, A letter N at the fiont of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/  Notes: lo r  the test of multico/lineanty, all independent variables indicated 1 l i  leiel below 1, condition index less than 1 i  and not more than one ranance proportion greater than 0. iO in their respectiie dimension (row); l or the test of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance leiel for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson denied upper limit (dv); Statistical significance leiel: 0.1 (*), 0.0i(**), 0.01 (***); A l l  I ‘-statistical values were significant al the 0.001 leielf
A d jR 2 0.1894 0.1394 0.1943 0.1593
R2 0.2668 0.2216 0.2712 0.2395
F 3.4483 2.6970 3.5263 2.9847
C oefficient C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
In tercept (a) 0.4238 1.0884 -0.0999 -0.2489 0.2218 0.5713 0.1235 0.3115
lixplanatory Variables (ft)
AUDMJ02 -0.3687 -1.3353 0.1476 0.5186 -0.5669 -2.0595** 0.1109 0.3942
ACSIN02 -0.2337 -1.8380* 0.1710 1.3049 -0.1200 -0.9467 0.3065 2.3668**
ACPI02 -0.1746 -1.3352 0.0550 0.4084 -0.0746 -0.5725 -0.1032 -0.7747
ACPACT02 0.1337 0.5930 -0.2009 -0.8648 0.0569 0.2532 -0.1961 -0.8538
APACH02 0.0493 0.3038 0.2162 1.2919 0.1021 0.6305 0.2183 1.3201
AXCEO02 -0.1866 -1.0492 -0.1040 -0.5676 -0.0795 -0.4485 -0.1356 -0.7488
ACFAM02 -0.0641 -0.4463 -0.0157 -0.1064 0.0983 0.6861 -0.0753 -0.5148
M TEXT02 0.1386 0.9741 -0.0844 -0.5755 0.2010 1.4174 -0.1890 -1.3047
RBRE02 0.0258 0.1847 0.1252 0.8709 0.1085 0.7799 0.2700 1.9007*
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.2262 -2.5770** 0.4108 4.5419*** -0.1762 -2.0133** 0.3474 3.8867***
N D EQ 02
N IN E D 02
Industry Dummy
MB
0.1378 1.8717* 0.2966 4.0404*** 
0.3179 1.7306*
0.1356 1.8076* 
-0.1157 -1.6939*
PR O P
CO N STR
F IN
-0.9626 -4.2368*** -0.8507 -3.7557*** 
0.4706 1.8795* 
-0.5194 -1.9820*
-0.3830 -1.6554*
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Table 8.6: Audit Committee Independence and Firm P erfo rm ance  — OLS 4-(iii)(b)
The Exam ination of Audit Com m ittee M ajority Independen t Composition (AUDMJ) in 2003 w ith R espective Firm P erfo rm ance  2003 and 2004
(The Testing of IIACIiVD 3 w ith HACIND 4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,1 0  and 11)
AC • Audit committee, INHD * Independent director, AIJDMJ Presence o f majority o f INK!) in AC, ACSIN * Presence of senior independent director on AC, ACPI ~ At least one INF.D on AC has practising accountant experience, ACPACT = At least one AC member has practising 
accountant experience, APACII ’ AC's Chairman has practising accountant experience, AXCF.O • exclusion of CKO, CFO and/or managing director fiom AC, ACFAM •* Presence o f family-mcmbcr director on AC, MTHXT ~ AC independent members conduct meeting with auditor without 
management member present at least once a year, RBRF Tiansparcncy o f AC authority to report fnm 's breach of regulatory rules, NINFI) • Proportion of independent directors on the Board, MB -  Main Board firms, NASFT -  Total assets, NDF.Q " Debt to equity ratio, PROP - Property 
industry, CONSTR - Construction industry, CONPRO Consumer product industry, FIN -  Finance Industry, 02 -  Year 2002, 03 ” Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden 
approach
I Notes: I or the test of multicollinearity, all independent i unable > indicated I I I  leiel he low I  condition index lets than I 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0. 50 in their respectiie dimension (row); io r th e  test of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance leiel for the Durhin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the I )urhin Watson denied upper limit (dt •); Statistical significance leiel: 0 .1 (*), O.Oi'(**), 0.01 (***); A l l \ :-statistical talues were significant at the 0.05 letel]
A d j R ’ 0.2134 0.2282 0.0689 0.1325
Ry 0.2884 0.3019 0.1598 0.2172
F 3.8413 4.0978 1.7574 2.5632
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-St3t C oefficient t-sfat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.0016 -0.0021 -0.3118 -0.4104 -0.2518 -0.2985 -0.0531 -0.0652
lixplanatory Variables ((I)
AUDMJ03 0.3757 0.5665 0.4040 0.6149 0.4515 0.6188 -0.2556 -0.3632
ACSIN03 -0.0895 -0.7096 0.2933 2.3478+ + -0.0182 -0.1313 -0.0160 -0.1192
ACPI03 0.1341 1.8159* 0.1495 2.0438++ 0.1304 1.6045 0.2018 2.5745*+
ACPACT03 0.1516 0.6149 -0.0441 -0.1804 0.3798 1.4004 0.5114 1.9552+
APACH03 -0.1351 -0.9339 -0.0465 -0.3242 0.0350 0.2200 -0.1826 -1.1890
AXCEO03 -0.8287 -2.3952+ + 0.0130 0.0380 -0.6202 -1.6293 -0.2182 -0.5942
ACFAM03 -0.0116 -0.0813 -0.1377 -0.9767 -0.0578 -0.3689 0.1005 0.6658
MTEXT03 0.1111 0.8028 -0.3208 -2.3411 + + 0.0712 0.4679 -0.1535 -1.0459
RBRE03 0.0929 0.6809 0.2693 1.9936+ -0.1990 -1.3263 -0.0109 -0.0752
Control I'ariables
NASET03 -0.2119 -2.4659+* 0.4227 4.9665++ + 0.2545 2.7910++*
NDEQ03 0.3152 4.5133 +++ 0.1383 1.8665*
NINED03 0.1220 1.7936+ -0.1763 -2.6169++ +
Industry Dummy
MB 0.3332 1.8418 +
PROP -0.8053 -3.6014 + * + -0.3965 -1.7903+ -0.6278 - 2.5519++ -0.4788 -2.0178++
CONSTR -0.5562 .2.0739++
CONPRO I -0.3600 -1.7306*
FIN -0.4744 -1.8384+ -0.5821 -2.0504++
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Table 8.7: Summary of Findings of the Impact of Audit Committee Independence on 
Firm Performance
A udit Com m ittee Independence and Firm Performance  OLS 4
Wholly Independent Director Composition
(AUDF)
Mon than Majority I «.dependent Director Composition 
AUGMJ)
Majority Independent Director Composition 
(AIDMJ)
O L S  4 1  i I
P o s t u l a t e d
R e l a t i o n s h i p
( + / - / ? >
R e s u l t O L S  4 f i i )
P o s t u l a t e d
R e l a t i o n s h i p
(+ /-/? )
R e s u l t O L S  4 ( i i i )
P o s t u l a t e d
R e l a t i o n s h i p
( + / - / ! )
R e s u l t
H A C I N D  1 :  
Wkty INED on 
AC composition 
(AUDF
+ N o t
S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  2  
Domination of INED  
on A C  composition 
[AUGMJ]
+ N o t
S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  3 :  
Majority of 
INED in A C  
composition 
[AUDM J
+
N o t
S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  4 :  
huence of 
SHINED on A C  
ACSIN]
+ S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  4 :  
Presence of SRINED  
on A C  [ACSIN]
+ S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  4 :  
Presence of 
SRINED on 
A C  [ACSIN]
+ S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  5 :  
P r t* * .?  of at least 
m independent A C
member with PAE
ACPI
+ S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  5 :  
Presence of at hast one 
independent A C  
member with PAE  
[ACPI]
+ S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  5 :  
Presence of at 
least one 
independent A C  
member nith
PAE [ACPI]
+ S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  6 :  
Presence of at least one 
A C  member with 
PAE ACPACT
+ S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  6 :  
Presence of at 
least one A C  
member with
PAE
[ACPACT]
+ S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  7 :  
f t w a u r  of A C ’s 
Qmrmut nith
PAE [APACH
+
N o t
S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  7 :  
Presence of A C ’s 
Chairman with PAE  
[APACH]
+
N o t
S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  7 :  
Presence of A C ’s 
Chairman with 
PAE  
APACN]
+ N o t
S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  & 
Exclusion of CEO, 
CFO and MD from 
A C  [AXCEO]
+
N o t
S u p p o r t e d
I L A C I N D  &- 
Exclusion of 
CEO, CFO and 
AID from A C  
AXCEO
+ N o t
S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  9 :  
Presence of FAMDI 
on A C  
ACF A M
? f
H A C I N D  9 :  
Presence of 
FAMDI on A C  
ACF AM
? ?
H A C I N D  1 0 :  
AC's Independent 
Dmeton Conduct j  
metsny nth  
mddors without 
mmgment 
fnsence
MTEXT
+ N o t
S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  1 0 :  A C ’s
Independent Directors 
Conduct a meeting 
with auditors without 
management presence 
[MTEXT]
+
N o t
S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  1 0 :  
A C ’s 
Independent 
Directors 
Conduct a 
meeting with 
auditors without 
management 
presence 
MTEXT]
+ N o t
S u p p o r t e d
H A C I N D  1 1 :  
Tmnparency of 
AC Authonp to 
Report to Exchange 
tf Firm Violation 
•fRegniituns 
RBRE
?
P o s i t i v e
R e l a t i o n s h i p
H A C I N D  1 1 :  
Transparency of A C  
Authority to Report to 
Exchange of Firm 
Violation of 
Regulations 
[RBRE]
1
?
P o s i t i v e
R e l a t i o n s h i p
H A C I N D  1 1 :  
Transparency of 
A C  Authority to 
Report to 
Exchange of 
Firm Violation 
of Regulations 
RBRE
?
P o s i t i v e
R e l a t i o n s h i p
Mas: AC =  Audit Committee; INED  =  Independent Director; SRI NED  =  Senior Independent Director; CEO  =  C hief Executive Director: CFO = C hief 
■*UKKd Officer. COO  =  C hief Operating Officer: MD = Managing Director; ACF = Accounting and Finance: ACPACT =  Practising Accountant Experience
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On the other hand the results of OLS 4(iii)(a) and OLS 4(iii)(b) model results were not 
statistically significant to support hypotheses HACIND 7 and 9. These findings were also 
similar to the results gathered by OLS 4(i)(a) and (b) models when testing HACIND 7, and OLS 
4(ii)(a) and (b) models when testing HACIND 7 and HACIND 9.
Table 8.7 presents the summary of findings of the impact of audit committee independence on 
firm performance.
8.2.1.1 Discussions of the Impact of Audit Committee Independence on Firm Performance 
— OLS 4(i), 4(ii) and 4(iii) Results.
®  Independent Directors' Composition on Audit Committee (Le. AUDF, AUGMJ, AUDMJ)
As reported in section 8.2.1 (I), (II) and (III) the extent of audit committee independence, 
namely, the presence of wholly independent directors (AUDF), more than majority independent 
directors (AUGMJ) or majority independent directors (AUDMJ) on the committee had no 
significant impact on firm performance in most of the cases observed. The significant 
relationship found between AUDF, AUGMJ and AUDMJ and firm performance indicated their 
negative association (see OLS 4 results in Tables 8.1, 8.3 and 8.5 respectively).
The underlying purpose for the formation of an audit committee is to conduct focused reviews 
and detailed discussions of management’s financial activities, reporting practice and internal 
control procedures (see POB, 1993; Lublin and MacDonald, 1998; BRC, 1999; MCCG, 2001). 
The delegation of board of director financial oversight responsibilities to the audit committee 
(see POB, 1993) should ensure the effectiveness of board evaluations and decisions on firms’
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financial related issues. In particular, the committee should be able to allocate a specific amount 
of time and attention to perform its respective duties appropriately (MCCG, 2001).
Moreover, the governing of the firm’s activities against corporate fraud, namely, financial 
statement fraud, underscores the board’s fiduciary duty to safeguard shareholders’ investment in 
the firm (Uzun et al., 2004). As the financial oversight committee of the board, the audit 
committee has a critical role to protect shareholders’ interests against management’s 
misappropriation of firm’s asset through its evaluation of management’s financial transactions 
(Verschoor et al., 2002). Prowse (1998) noted that lack of accountability of firms’ owner- 
managers was one of the causes of financial problems in East Asian corporations during the 
1997 economic crisis.
In addition, studies by Claessens et al., (1998, 1999), Johnson et al., (2000) and Mitton (2002) 
studies on the corporate governance of East Asian corporations found that the presence of 
owner-managers/family-members controlling ownership in East Asian corporations increased 
the vulnerability of minority shareholders’ interests being expropriated by them. According to 
Johnson et al., (2000), even though the ownership and management of firms’ activities by the 
principal owners overcome the agency problem in separate owner and management firms, 
owner-managers may have their own personal motives and may undertake actions that are in the 
best interests of their family members but not shareholders of the firms as a whole. Hence, the 
independence of the audit committee in Malaysian corporations is crucial to counter the self­
motive activities of owner-managers and management in general.
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Further, Lublin and MacDonald (1998) noted that audit committee members’ ineffectiveness in 
conducting their duties may increase the propensity of corporate failure, subsequently causing 
loss in shareholders’ investments and confidence in the credibility of the board of director’s, 
particularly audit committee governing efforts. Also, the extent of influence of audit committee 
independent members’ views and opinions on the board’s decision, and hence firm performance, 
may be affected by their size (namely, the AUDF, AUGMJ and AUDMJ) [see, for instance the 
Smith Report, 2003], possession of relevant financial knowledge and skills (see Knapp, 1987) 
and the presence of other independent directors who are not audit committee members but 
possess financial knowledge and skills (see Kirk and Siegel, 1996).
Moreover, Klein (1998) argued that independent directors should be members of monitoring and 
controlling board subcommittees, such as audit, nomination and remuneration committees. In 
particular, she argued that executive directors’ membership of the remuneration committee 
would have less impact on firm performance in comparison to executives’ presence on the 
investment committee. This is because in the latter committee, executives are assigned to 
perform a duty that is relevant to their depth of knowledge of firm operations and business 
opportunities, whereas in the former committee, executives’ impartiality when evaluating 
executives' compensation scheme is less likely to be assured (Yermack, 1997) given their 
tendency to set high remunerations for themselves (see the Greenbury Report, 1995).
In addition, the productivity of the audit committee team is affected by the collective 
commitment of its members to fulfil their oversight duties responsibly and the sufficient co­
operation of management in supplying required information to ensure effective audit committee
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decision-making (DeZoort, 1998). Importantly, the presence of a higher proportion of 
independent director on the audit committee will facilitate the deliberation of objective and 
impartial evaluation of the firm’s business and financial risks and vigilance, namely, by 
challenging management’s unwarranted proposition on firms’ investment strategies (see Cohen 
and Hanno, 2000; Bedard et al., 2004).
Beasley (1996) and Carcello and Neal (2000) also found that the presence of a high proportion 
of affiliated directors on the audit committee will affect the auditor’s decision to issue a going 
concern report due to the respective committee members’ economic dependence or business 
dealings with the firm’s management. Furthermore, auditors’ independence and effectiveness 
will be impaired when their actions are dictated by management pressure, primarily on their fees 
and prospective employment with the firm (see Teoh, 1992; Geiger et al., 1998). In light of this, 
MCCG (2001) emphasised the importance of audit committee members having full access to the 
firm’s resources and information and external professional advice to allow the committee to 
conduct its duties appropriately.
Moreover, Daily and Schwenk (1996) stressed the imperativeness of CEO-board members’ 
cooperation in the firm's management, particularly in providing access to quality firm 
information (see Ezzamel and Watson, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998) and their goals’ congruence 
(see Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). As argued by Goodwin (2003) the effectiveness of the audit 
committee independent members’ oversights may be affected by their inability to gather relevant 
and sufficient information and lack of awareness of the impact of the firm’s business 
relationships on the firm’s financial performance.
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MCCG (2001) in its Best Practices guidelines for corporate governance indicated that the board 
of directors can decide whether to grant executive power to its subcommittee or not. Where such 
power is not granted, subcommittees’ authorities are restricted to the examination of particular 
issue and they must present their findings to the board for further actions. The non-granting of 
executive power to the audit committee to act on the board’s behalf was indicated in the audit 
committee report of some of the sampled companies in this study and may be one of the reasons 
for the non-significant relationship between audit committee independence and firm 
performance.
The effectiveness of the audit committee members, particularly independent director members 
could be enhanced with the implementation of on-going assessment and evaluation of committee 
members’ performance o f audit committee duties. With respect to the current study, respectively 
in year 2002 and 2003, 100 and 103 of the sampled companies indicated the exercised of such 
peer review practice on their audit committee members (see the companies’ Audit Committee 
Report 2002 and 2003). More importantly, since the evaluation was undertaken by the 
companies on average every three years, they need to replace poor performance member with 
new director who is competent and committed to do the audit committee job.
In addition, directors would undertake their responsibilities seriously when there is legal 
penalties for the consequence loss incurred by the vested parties as a result of their failure to 
fulfil assigned duties with due care (see Singh and Harianto, 1989; Higgs Report. 2003; 
MAICSA, 2004). In this case, further monitoring of companies directors performance of 
fiduciary duties and conducts by Malaysian Securities Commission, Malaysia Bourse Securities
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Limited, Companies Commission of Malaysia would ensure directors vigilance and active 
participation when undertaking their responsibilities and hence safeguarding shareholders 
interests in the firm.
(I)  Senior Independent Director Presence on Audit Committee (ACSIN)
As reported in section 8.2.1 (I), (II) and (III) [see OLS 4(i)(a) and (b), 4(ii)(a) and (b) and 
4(iii)(a) and (b) results in Tables 8.1 to 8.6 respectively] the presence of a senior independent 
director on the audit committee, whether composed of fully independent (AUDF), more than 
majority independent (AUGMJ), or majority independent (AUDMJ) directors had a significant 
negative and positive impact on firm performance. Specifically, when the impact of the presence 
of senior independent director on audit committee (ACSIN) was observed in the year he/she was 
appointed, the result indicated significant negative relationship between ACSIN and firm 
performance. On the hand, further investigation on ACSIN impact on subsequent year 
performance revealed a significant positive relationship between the two variables.
MCCG (2001: 35) identifies a senior independent director as someone who possesses the 
necessary calibre, experience and independence qualities to whom other independent directors 
may refer to express freely their concerns about the firm’s governance practices. Furthermore, 
the Higgs Report (2003) stated that, the establishment of a senior independent director role will 
enhance communication between the board and shareholders, such that the shareholders might 
directly approach the senior independent director to clarify issues pertaining to the firm. In the 
case of the current study, many of the firms which had appointed a senior independent director 
had enclosed in their corporate governance statement the contact number and address of the
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senior independent director, as part of their governance initiatives that aims to facilitate 
shareholders’ communication with the board of directors.
In addition, the appointment o f senior independent director on the firm’s board of directors was 
proposed by MCCG and imposed by MBSB’s listing requirement on January 2001. Eventually, 
as the investors’ and firms’ knowledge and awareness of the function and significance of 
governing mechanisms expanded, they would supported the imperativeness of senior 
independent director invaluable corporate governance experience on audit committee, notably in 
establishing relevant, reliable and fair representation of financial reporting information.
Specifically, DeZoort et al., (2001) found audit committee members’ corporate governance 
experience, namely years o f experience as independent directors (which applied to senior 
independent directors) had influenced on their exercise of independent judgements, particularly 
in resolving auditor-management disputes, given their extent of exposure and awareness of 
issues affecting auditor-management disagreement74. With respect to the current study, further 
examination on the profiles o f the respective senior independent director revealed that, majority 
of them were not from accounting and/or finance backgrounds. Even though, they were 
experienced independent director and recognised for their credibility. Hence their corporate 
governance experience is relevant and substantial in assisting their performance of oversight 
duties in the company with weak internal control (Millichamp, 2002).
74 For instance in relation to the assessm ent o f  management accounting treatment o f  assets, liabilities, expenses, profit and/or 
loss items (see Knapp. 1987: DeZoort and Salterio. 2001).
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Importantly, senior independent director contribution to the effectiveness of audit committee 
performance of tasks and subsequently quality of financial information and reporting produced, 
and hence firm performance, was signified by his/her suitability as negotiator and mediator in 
auditor-management disputes concerning audit planning or evaluation of audit results, as well as 
improving and facilitating auditor-management cooperation and relationship.
Nevertheless, without clear comprehension of the accounting issues at hand (due to his/her lack 
of knowledge on this area), the senior independent director may not be able to provide critical 
evaluation on firm’s accounting practice (see for instance Bonner, 1990; Bonner and Lewis, 
1990; Libby and Luft, 1993; DeZoort, 1998; McDaniel et al., 2002). Unless the auditor is 
required to be presence in each of the audit committee meeting, the decisions on firm financial 
position and reporting practice are made by the audit committee members including the senior 
independent director member. In particular, their decision will be influenced by the information 
they have gathered and their extent of understanding and experience of accounting procedures.
Also, OLS 4(i), (ii) and (iii) results further explain the significant contribution of senior 
independent director at board level [see section 7.2.1.1 (III)], since there, he/she would be 
dealing with broader corporate governance issues affecting the company (see Bonner and Lewis, 
1990; Uzzi, 1996; Higgs Report, 2003). Nonetheless, since companies remunerated their 
directors based on their corporate experience (see companies corporate governance statement on 
remuneration committee activities)73 the shareholders should insist their companies to provide
75 Firms which did not appoint senior independent director in their board are required to disclose valid justification for their 
action.
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appropriate and adequate accounting training to senior independent director to fully utilise their 
potential.
Moreover, discussion on the contribution of directors with corporate governance experience, for 
instance by Libby (1985), has continued to acknowledge their capability and prospect as 
valuable human capital to the company. At the same time, people at the corporate ladder need to 
be motivated and inspired to achieve certain corporate goals, and compensated appropriately to 
boost their morale and self-actualisation about their responsibilities in the firm (see Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991; Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Bennis and Thomas, 2002; McGregor, 2002; 
Sonnenfeld, 2002; Helland and Skyuta, 2005). Potentially, such initiatives may encourage senior 
independent director to be critical when undertaking his/her audit committee responsibilities.
Besides that, Bhagat and Black (2002) and Yermack (2004) contended, directors’ contribution to 
firm performance would also depend on their extent of understanding of the management, 
operations and activities of the companies. However, these skills take time to develop and to 
subsequently influence the directors’ board decisions. Respectively, senior independent 
director’s contribution in audit committee’s decisions and ultimately firm performance would 
progress with his/her better understanding of his/her roles, functions and scope of financial 
reporting and auditing procedures.
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(ID) The Presence of Financial Experts with Practising Accountant Experience in Audit Committee (ACPI and (ACPACT)
The significance of audit committee members’ financial knowledge and skills, in particular 
accounting practitioners’ experience, has been linked with their greater capability to 
comprehend and perform financial oversight duties effectively, given their relevant working 
experience [See Libby and Luft, 1993; DeZoort (1997, 1998); McDaniel et al., 2002; Carcello et 
al., 2006]. With respect to market reaction on companies’ appointment of financial expert on 
their audit committee, Davidson et al., (2004:291) gathered that, investors have greater 
preference for the presence of individual with auditing and audit experience compared to 
corporate financial management and financial statement analysis experience.
In addition, Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) contended, a high proportion of independent 
directors on the audit committee and the presence of committee member(s) with accounting, 
auditing and/or finance experience will mitigate the incidence of suspicious auditor switching 
due to company's opinion shopping76. Supporting the corresponding studies, OLS 4(i), 4(ii) and 
4(iii) results revealed significant positive relationship between the presence of at least one 
independent director (ACPI) and audit committee member (ACPACT) with practising 
accountant experience and firm performance (see OLS 4 model results in Tables 8.1 to Table 
8.6).
In the case of Malaysia listed firms, the requirement for firms to appoint at least one audit 
committee member with accounting and finance experience was mandated by MBSB in its 2001
76 "..the prac tice  o f  seeking an auditor w illing  to support p ro p o sed  accounting treatm ent that helps a  company achieves its 
reporting objectives, even though such conduct m ay im pair re liab le  reporting  (US Securities Exchange and Commission in 
Archambeault and DeZoort. 2001. pg. 34).
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Listing Requirements (see Chapter 15: Para 15.10 and MBSB Practice Note 13/2002: Para 7.0). 
Moreover, MCCG (2001) emphasised, the audit committee’s financial oversight role is a 
demanding task that requires commitment, training and skill and understanding of the issues that 
it deals with on the part of its members in order for them to take an active part in its proceedings.
The implications of audit committee effectiveness has been examined, namely, in terms of the 
incidence of financial misstatement (Abbott et al., 2004), corporate fraud (Uzun et al., 2004), 
auditor independence and effectiveness (Carcello and Neal, 2000), and quality of internal 
control assessment (DeZoort, 1998; Krishnan, 2005). In particular, the committee needs to be 
diligent in its performance of its financial oversight role of the firm’s financial activities and 
reporting practice to ensure that shareholders’ interests are properly protected (see Archambeault 
and DeZoort, 2001).
Moreover, the scope of audit committee duties and with further assistance from members with 
accounting, auditing and/or finance experience provides the committee with greater knowledge 
and awareness77 of the state of management’s administration of the firm’s internal control, 
reporting practice and financial activities in comparison to other board's members’ knowledge 
on the same subject (see, for instance, the Smith Report, 2003: Para 5.5).
Given the committee’s members’ exposure to their financial oversight duties and the 
involvement of its financial expert members in the review of the firm’s internal activities and 
processes, their active participation in the board’s evaluation and decision of firm risk policies
77 A ccording to  M C C G  (2 0 0 1 ) th e  fo rm ation  o f  an aud it co m m itte e  w ill a llow  be tte r a llocation  o f  quality  tim e in 
the assessm ent o f  th e  f i rm ’s f inanc ia l rep o rtin g  p ro cess . In ad d itio n , M B SB  listing  ru lings requ ire  firm s to  ensure 
audit com m ittee  has a cc e ss  to  f i rm s ’ resou rces and in fo rm a tio n , nam ely , d ocum en ts  and  personnel.
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(see, for instance, Froot et al., 1993) and management’s investment planning (see Woolridge and 
Snow, 1990) will be valuable and significant in ensuring proper management and deployment of 
the firm’s assets and hence safeguarding vested parties’ investment.
Further, experience as independent directors on the audit committee of public firms will provide 
such directors with greater exposure to issues affecting auditor independence and effectiveness, 
namely, the potential of management to pressure auditors to change their qualified opinions (see 
Knapp, 1987; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Carcello and Neal, 2003). In addition, directors’ 
experience as outside director in several public firms signifies their familiarity and 
understanding of the demand of their oversight role in the firm as well as their ability to perform 
the required duties appropriately (Yermack and Shivdasani,1997). These facts further emphasise 
the imperativeness for firm to appoint independent financial expert in the audit committee.
Moreover, DeZoort and Salterio (2001) argue that, audit committee members with corporate 
governance experience will be suitable mediators in the auditor-client disputes, given their 
experience working with the auditor and knowledge of the scope of their financial oversight 
duties. They also will be able to acknowledge the auditor’s justification for issuing certain audit 
opinions (see Mutchler, 1985; Groveman, 1995). In addition, audit committee members’ 
corporate governance experience will establish quality independent judgement in audit 
committee decisions, namely, in resisting managerial attempt to dismiss the auditor for issuing a 
going concern report (Carcello and Neal, 2003). Particularly, this experience will be useful when 
the audit committee is required to assess the corporate governance statement of the firm in
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relation to the audit and risk assessment performed by the committee in the firm (see Smith 
Report, 2003: Para 5.4)
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) and Carcello and Neal (2003) indicated that the quality of 
firms' financial reporting practice and internal control evaluation can be enhanced with greater 
auditor involvement in the firm’s corporate governance activities and more effective interaction 
between auditor and audit committee. In particular DeZoort et al., (1998) and Caplan (1999) 
contended, the audit committee members’ experience in evaluating the firm’s internal control 
system will allow them to contribute productively in discussions with the auditor relating to the 
amount of audit work that needs to be carried out in the firm and, more importantly, such audit 
work as is able to uncover errors and fraud practice in the firm. Besides that, audit committee 
independent members’ and primarily the committee’s chairman’s (see Higgs Report, 2003) 
direct communication with other board members and involvement in the board decision-making 
process, establishes them as representative of the auditor on the board (see Kirk and Siegel, 
2000).
(IV) The Presence of an Audit Committee Chairman with Practicing Accountant Experience (APACH)
With respect to the impact of an audit committee chairman with practising accountant 
experience (APACH) on firm performance, section 8.2.1 reported an insignificant relationship 
[See OLS 4(i),(ii) and (iii) model results in Tables 8.1 to 8.6]. Notably, the audit committee 
chairman has higher authority than other audit committee members. For instance, the Smith 
Report (2003) identified the role of the audit committee’s chairman as including appointing 
audit committee members, setting the agenda for the committee’s meeting(s) and attending the
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company’s annual general meeting to clarify matters regarding the audit committee’s scope and 
fulfilment of duties. From observations of the audit committee report of Malaysian listed 
companies in this study, some firms indicated the audit committee’s chairman’s authority to 
include having an additional casting vote in the event of equality of votes in audit committee 
decisions and presenting the report of the committee’s meeting(s) to the firm’s board on a 
regular basis. Also, some companies reported in their corporate governance statement that the 
audit committee chairman’s presence at the annual general meeting is one of the company’s 
initiatives to enhance shareholders’ communication with the firm. However, according to Smith 
Report 2003 (see Para 6.3), communication between the audit committee’s chairman and 
shareholders during the annual meeting is made through the board’s chairman.
Given the greater authority and responsibilities of the audit committee‘s chairman than other 
audit committee members, his/her practising accountant experience will contribute to the 
effectiveness of audit committee financial oversight management and implementation, 
particularly in relation to the evaluation of the firm’s reporting and internal control practice (see 
DeZoort, 1998). The influence of the audit committee chairman and his/her accounting expertise 
will also facilitate effective communication with the external auditor on matters relating to audit 
planning, audit tasks and audit findings, and hence the auditor productivity (Boner and Lewis, 
1990).
However, the limitation of audit committee executive power and correspondingly of its 
chairman, may explain the insignificant impact of the audit committee chairman with practising 
accountant experience in the three audit committee independence observations (i.e. AUDF,
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AUGMJ and AUDMJ) on firm performance. Moreover, at the board level, board members will 
collectively examine how the quality of the firm’s reporting practice, internal control 
procedures, and potential for corporate fraud will affect investors’ perceptions of the firm’s 
corporate governance practice and board accountability. Accordingly, board members’ group 
decision will have greater influence on board decisions than the audit committee chairman’s 
individual judgements.
(V) The Exclusion of Firm’s CEO, (JO or Managing Director from Audit Committee Membership (AXCEO)
OLS 4 (ii)(b) and (iii)(b) model results (see Tables 8.3 and 8.5 respectively) revealed a 
significant negative impact of the non-presence of top executive management (i.e. CEO, CFO or 
Managing Director) [AXCEO] on firm performance in some of the cases observed. Generally, 
when top executives are not audit committee members they will be invited to attend the audit 
committee meeting (see companies Audit Committee Report). In the current study, it was 
observed that the appointment of CEO, CFO or managing director to the sampled companies’ 
audit committee was undertaken to fulfil the MBSB requirement for financial expert presence on 
the audit committee and minimum numbers of members on the committee. Further observations 
on the respective executives backgrounds indicated that, these executives possessed practising 
accountant experience and hence fulfilled the MBSB financial expert requirement of Para 15.10 
(l)(c)(i) and l(c)(ii).
Specifically, in the case where companies are not able to obtain the service of professional 
accountant, Para 15.10 l(c)(iii) of Chapter 15 of the MBSB listing rulings and Para 7.1 (b) of the 
MBSB Practice Note 13/2002 allow the company to fulfil the Exchange requirement with the
3 7 0
CHAPTER 8: ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION II - BOARD SUBCOMMITTEES AND
FIRM PERFORMANCE
employment of an individual with at least seven years experience as a CFO of a corporation or 
having a function in the firm with primary responsibilities for the management of the entity’s 
financial affairs. The appointment of individuals with CEO related experience as financial expert 
on the audit committee was also observed by Carcello et al., (2006). From the managerial skills 
point of view, the employment of individuals with the management experience of overseeing a 
firm’s financial undertakings will enhance audit committee effectiveness since they are likely to 
be proactive in the committee’s discussions given the importance of communication and 
management skills in their other job, namely, in their dealings with company personnel, 
customers, suppliers and financiers (see DeZoort, 1998). Importantly, the MBSB’s listing 
rulings and Practice Note do not specify whether the financial expert has to be someone from 
outside the firm or an independent director and hence companies may decide to appoint their 
executive members to the position.
Given the importance of objective and independent evaluation of the firm’s financial reporting 
practice and processes which is mainly prepared by the management, and the importance of 
financial expert views and judgements on the audit committee on respective matters, the 
appointment of CEO, CFO or managing director as financial expert may undermine the audit 
committee’s independence, purpose and oversight function. Also, the CEO’s influence on the 
selection process and tenure of board of director members (see Westphal and Zajac, 1995; 
Shivdasani and Yermack, 1997) may restrict independent members of the audit committee from 
performing their duties with vigilance and diligence, which are critical to their effectiveness 
(Verschoor, 1993).
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Moreover, the companies transparency about the appointment of respective top management 
executive on their audit committee (as disclosed in the companies’ Corporate Governance 
Statement and Audit Committee Report) further informed the investors, regulators and other 
vested parties of the executives potential impairment on audit committee judgements and 
accordingly, they would monitor the director’s conduct appropriately. In addition, the 
companies’ allocation of funds for audit committee members to obtain independent outside 
professional advice (see companies’ Corporate Governance Statement and Audit Committee 
Report), allow them to obtain additional financial consultation before making the final decision. 
Thus, the presence of top management executives in the current study would not be detrimental 
to audit committee effectiveness due to the establishment of appropriate governing measures to 
oversee their undue influence on the audit committee decision making.
(VI) The Presence of Family-Member Director on the Audit Committee (ACFAM)
As regards to the impact of the presence of family director on the audit committee (ACFAM) on 
the firm performance, the results of OLS 4(i), 4(ii) and 4(iii) model [see Tables 8.1 to 8.5 
respectively] indicated an insignificant relationship. Namely, there was no statistical evidence to 
support Jaggi and Leung’s (2007) argument that the presence of the firm’s controlling interest, 
notably the family member director, may impose undue pressure on the ability of audit 
committee independent members to conduct their financial oversight duties objectively and 
impartially. Further, some companies enclosed an additional stipulation in their audit committee 
report (i.e. audit committee terms of reference) of the restriction from committee membership of 
family member(s) and/or relatives of management. In addition, the number of companies which
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appointed family members on their audit committee was small, less than 26% of the total 
sampled companies (see Chapter 6, Table 6.26).
On the other hand, the appointment of family members or relatives to some companies’ audit 
committee was made in consideration of their financial knowledge and skills. The importance of 
financial expert judgements on audit committee oversight duties, and hence effectiveness, have 
been emphasised by many, namely, BRC (1999), DeZoort (2001), Bedard et al., (2004) and 
Carcello et al., (2006). Even though the independence of audit committee judgements may be 
affected by the presence of family-member director, the family member’s membership of 
accounting and/or finance professional bodies may influence them to perform their oversight 
function in the audit committee professionally. Also, the majority presence of independent 
directors on the audit committee provides further governance of family-member directors’ 
conduct on the committee. Moreover, according to McConaughy et al., (1998), family member 
motivation to preserve the legacy of the business will ensure his/her monitoring attitude aligns 
with firm value enhancement. Further, Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that family members’ 
sense of family loyalty can induce them to take action that enhances the firm’s business 
prosperity.
m The Convening of an Audit Committee’s Meeting with only the Presence of Independent Members of the 
Committee and External Auditor (MTEXT)
As reported in section 8.2.1, the convening of a separate meeting between independent members 
of the audit committee and the external auditor without the presence of executive members 
(MTEXT) had a significant negative impact on firm performance [See the results of OLS 4(i)(b),
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4(ii)(b) and 4(iii)(b) in Tables 8.2, 8.4 and 8.6 respectively]. The requirement for this separate 
meeting is stipulated in MBSB listing ruling Para 15.18(f) on the rights of audit committee, and 
MCCG (2001). Study results indicated that the effectiveness of the collaboration between 
independent audit committee members and external auditor will depend on the productivity and 
team working skills of both parties (see DeZoort, 1998; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). According to 
Kirk (2000), the close working relationship between independent directors and the external 
auditor is significant to establish strong corporate governance practice in the firm as well as 
enhance auditor's accountability and professionalism. Furthermore, effective audit committee 
and auditor communication and judgements would ensure reliable and credible firm financial 
reporting practices and hence appropriately safeguarding of shareholders’ interests [see MCCG 
(2001), MBSB listing ruling, Higgs Report (2003) and Smith Report (2003)].
Corporate litigation cases of Enron in USA and its external auditor’s firm, Arthur Andersen (see 
further Powers, 2002) validates the finding of the present study and provide support for the 
argument presented in the above paragraph. Arthur Andersen was one of the big 5 audit firms 
and majority of the firms in the current study had employed big 5 audit firms as their external 
auditor in 2002 and 2003 (see Table 6.43). Considering these circumstances, the extent of 
investor's trust on external auditor’s commitment to co-operate with the independent members 
of audit committee in assuring the production of true and fair financial reporting may have 
influenced their low opinions of auditor’s credibility and integrity. Even though, there was no 
significant result found on MTEXT impact on subsequent year performance. Thus, it is 
imperative for firm to implement responsible governing practices (Parker, 2005) to secure their 
long term performance.
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(Vm) The Transparency of Audit Committee Authority to Report Firm Violation of Exchange Rules (RBRE)
The MBSB listing ruling in Para 15.17 of Chapter 15 grants an authority to the audit committee 
to supersede board of director decision by reporting to the Exchange when the board of directors 
has failed to resolve satisfactorily the issues raised by the committee, which has resulted in the 
firm’s breaching of the MBSB rules. OLS 4(i), 4(ii) and 4(iii) model results [see Tables 8.1 to 
8.6 respectively] indicated that when firms disclosed the audit committee’s authority to report its 
violation of Exchange ruling to the Exchange there was a significant positive impact on firm 
performance in all three categories of audit committee independence examined (p = 0.1 ). The 
importance of such authority to the audit committee has been noted by the Smith Report (2003: 
Para 4.4). In particular, it proposed that the audit committee be given the right to report to 
shareholders about board failure to resolve appropriately the issues raised by the audit 
committee as part of director’s report.
The link between audit committee independence and incidence of financial reporting and 
regulatory fraud has been examined by Uzun et al., (2004). Their findings indicated that the 
audit committee’s formation and independence were important elements of the firm’s governing 
mechanisms against corporate fraud.
(X) The Attendance Rate of Audit Committee Member in the Meedng(s) [NATEND]
OLS 4(i)(a) model result [see Table 8.1] revealed a significant negative relationship between the 
average rate of audit committee members’ attendance at the committee’s meeting in 2002 
[NATEND] and firm performance in 2003 (p = 0.1). According to PwC (2003), the attendance
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of audit committee members at the committee’s meetings is one of the indicators of their 
commitment to dedicate a significant amount of time and effort to the committee’s activities.
In Chapter 6 (see Table 6.48), the descriptive statistics for audit members attendance rate at 
meetings revealed an improvement in their attendance rate in 2003. It is imperative for each 
audit committee member to actively participate in the committee’s discussions (Bedard et al., 
2004), as the more quality information that can be gathered from members, the greater the 
ability of the committee to make effective informed decision-making (see PwC, 2003). In this 
study, the lack of effectiveness of audit committee members’ performance of duties might 
explains the significant negative association between their attendance rate and firm performance.
Further examination o f the sampled companies’ audit committee activities from their audit 
committee report showed, many of them had convened at least four meetings in a year or every 
quarter in preparation of the firm’s interim financial report. The specific purpose of the meeting 
and the MBSB requirement for the production of an interim report may have influenced 
committee members’ effectiveness. Moreover, members’ familiarity with the procedures and 
clear regulatory guidance on the information to be disseminated for public usage may have 
contributed to the effective implementation of their oversight duties. PwC (2003) noted in many 
European companies that their audit committee was convened on average three to four times in a 
year. PwC discerned that, in order for audit committee meetings to produce targeted results, 
audit committee members (as well as being independent of management and having financial 
expertise) needed to conduct such meetings at a relevant time, and the agendas of the meetings 
needed to be well-prepared to ensure that important and material oversight issues and procedures
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were appropriately examined at that time. Moreover, PwC indicated that audit committee 
effectiveness is enhanced when the number of meetings and the length of time spent in such 
meetings contribute to the effective accomplishment of meetings’ stated objective.
According to the Smith Report (2003), the effectiveness of audit committee members will 
depend on the willingness of members to commit sufficient time and effort to the performance 
of their oversight duties. In the case of the current study, the time constraint on audit committee 
members due to their directorships in other companies may have affected their commitment to 
perform audit committee activities (see Morck et al., 1988; PwC, 2003), and prevented them 
from fully utilising the quarterly meetings to underlying issues pertaining to their oversight of 
the procedures and preparation of the firm’s annual report with auditors and management. The 
absence of some of the committee members, particularly those with financial expertise may have 
affected the productivity of audit committee as a whole and hence their decisions.
In light of the shareholders’ greater need for transparency of and quality financial reporting 
information, Verschoor et al., (2002) contended that the frequency of audit committee meetings 
indicates the committee’s commitment to undertake it oversight duties seriously since the 
allocation of substantial time to gather sufficient information will ensure better informed 
judgement about the firm’s business, risks and control circumstances. Further, according to 
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996), regular audit committee meetings will ensure the financial 
reporting process is functioning properly and enable committee members to keep abreast of 
accounting and internal control related issues.
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Moreover, an effective audit committee will convene a meeting before the board of directors’ 
meeting to ensure the important issues that the committee wants to raise at board discussions are 
properly presented to facilitate appropriate evaluation of such issues by board members. Also, an 
effective audit committee will undertake in-depth discussions with management, external 
auditors and internal auditors regarding the firm’s financial reporting and internal control 
procedures. However, meeting frequency may not reflect the effectiveness of audit committee 
members if they do not participate actively in discussions with management and auditors 
(Gendron et al., 2004). Audit committee members’ vigilant attitudes will ensure transparency, 
integrity and accountability in the firm’s activities, proper monitoring of the firm’s assets’ 
deployment, and supply of quality information by management, hence safeguard the rights and 
interests of shareholders (Ezammel and Watson, 1997; Kirk, 2000; Turley and Zaman, 2004).
(XI) The Proportion of Family Directors with Accounting and Finance Skills (NFACF)
OLS 4(i)(a) result also revealed a significant negative relationship (p = 0.05) between the 
proportion of family directors with accounting and finance skills (NFACF) and firm 
performance. This result supported Johnson et al., (2000) argument that executive directors who 
are family members may act in the best interest of their family rather than shareholders interests 
as a whole. Furthermore, family-owned and controlled firms have been found to dominate the 
internal political processes of large corporations in the case of managerial succession plans 
(Allen and Panian, 1982). Specifically, the CEO who is related to family members on the board 
of directors and also owns shares in the firm has immunity or can demand longer tenure than a 
non-family related CEO would be able to do. For instance, Boeker (1992) found family-related 
CEOs who retained their posts, tended to place the blame on the top managers when the firm
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performed poorly, despite the key role that he/she played in making the business decisions. 
Similarly, Volpin (2002) in his study on executive turnover in Italy, observed that companies 
were more likely to replace non-family managers than family managers when facing financial 
difficulties.
On the other hand, family-member directors’ financial background may assist the board in its 
performance of risk assessment and investment planning (see Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Lee et. 
al., 1999; Kale et. al., 2003; Guner et. al. 2004). Further, given family-member directors’ direct 
management of the firm’s operation, their financial knowledge and skills could have been 
acquired to meet the lack in specific financial expertise such as risk, investment and financial 
management. Moreover, family-member directors’ involvement in the day- to- day operations of 
the business provides them with the opportunity to develop their financial skills and experience, 
in line with demands from the family business for their expertise (see Pye and Pettigrew, 2005).
8.2.2 Audit Committee Leadership and Firm Performance -  OLS 5
Chapter 5, section 5.2.1.2 indicated that, the impact of audit committee leadership on firm 
performance was examined by research models OLS 5(i), OLS 5(ii), OLS 5(iii), OLS 5(iv) and 
OLS 5(v). Specifically, each model examined the chairing of the audit committee by a senior 
independent director (ACHSIN), independent director with an accounting and finance 
background (ACHACF), independent director with a business and/or management related 
background (ACBUS), independent director with practising accountant experience (ACHP), and 
senior independent director with practising accountant experience (ACHSINP). The following 
subsections will respectively discuss the five OLS 5 models.
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fl) Senior Independent Director Appointment as Audit Committee's Chairman (ACHSIN) and Firm Performance 
-  O L S  5 ( i )
Tables 8.8 and 8.9 respectively present the regression results for model OLS 5(i)(a) [i.e. 
regression of ACHSIN and specified audit committee leadership variables in 2002 with 
respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and model OLS 5(i)(b) [i.e. regression of ACHSIN 
and specified audit committee leadership variables in 2003 with respective firm performance 
2003 and 2004].
In section 5.2.1.2 of Chapter 5, HACL 1 hypothesised that the appointment of a senior 
independent director as audit committee chairman (ACHSIN) will have a positive impact on 
firm performance. OLS 5(i)(a) model results pointed to the contrary since there was a significant 
negative relationship between ACHSIN in 2002 and NTobin’s Q in 2002 (ft = -0.31; p  = 0.05).
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Table 8 .8 : Audit Committee Leadership and Firm Perfo rm ance ~  OLS 5(i)(a)
The A ppointm ent of S enior Independent D irector as Audit Committee Chairman (ACIISIN) in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of IIACL 1)
AC = Audit Committee, INF.D * Independent director, ACHSIN - AC chairman is senior independent director, NASET “ Total assets, NDF.Q -  Debt to equity ratio, ACFAM = Presence of family member director on AC, NFAMDI =» Proportion of family-member directors, Total 
proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Listed Companies'/Corporations' and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, MAINB - Main Board firms, PROP -  Property industry, CONSTR -  Construction industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 02 - Year 2002, 03 = Year 
2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Wacrden approach
I Notes: I 'or tlx test of multicollineanty, all independent tariables indicated VII • lerel below i, condition index less than 15 and not more than one rariance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respectin dimension (row); I ‘or tlx lest of autocorrelation of 
errors tlx significance lei el for tlx I turbin Wat son statistic (d) indicated a i alue greater than the Durbin Watson denied upper limit (da); Statistical significance leitl: 0. 1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll  I '-statistical values are significant at tlx 0.001 kiell
A d j R 2 0.2491 0.1374 0.2364 0.1234
R 2 0.3174 0.2158 0.3058 0.2031
F 4.6499 2.7521 4.4047 2.5484
Coefficient Coefficient t-^t^t Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
In tercep t (a) -0.1510 -0.7049 -0.1276 -0.5557 -0.3120 -1.4439 -0.0320 -0.1382
Explanatory Variables (ft)
ACHSIN02 -0.3148 -2.4200** 0.1312 0.9409 -0.1747 -1.3312 0.1409 1.0026
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.3163 -3.6656*** 0.3908 4.2250*** -0.2819 -3.2398*** 0.3637 3.9007***
N D EQ 02 0.1938 2.7911*'* 0.3432 4.9002***
ACFAM02 0.3796 2.1006**
NFAM DI02 -0.2088 -2.0954** -0.1843 -1.8340*
N IN STL02 0.1986 2.0092*
Industry Dummy
M AINB 0.2994 1.6753*
PRO P -0.9124 -4.0621*** -0.8182 -3.6119***
CO N STR 0.4664 1.8804* 1 0.5502 2.1995**
FIN i -0.5290 -2.0709**
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Table 8 .9 : Audit Committee Leadership and  Firm Perfo rm ance --  OLS 
The A ppointm ent of S en io r Independent D irector as Audit Committee Chairman (ACHSliV) in 2003 and Firm P erfo rm ance 2003 and 2004
(The Testing of HACL 1)
AC ~ Audit Committee, ACHSIN * AC chairman is senior independent director, NASET - Total assets, NDEQ ~ Debt to equity ratio, NINED - Proportion of independent directors on the Board, CHIN -  Board’s chairman is independent director, NINSTL = Total proportion of 
Government Agencies', Public Listed Companies’/Corporations' and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, AUKS ~ Firm’s external auditor is one of the big 5 audit firms, PROP -  Property industry, CONSTR - Construction industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter 
N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerdcn approach
/ Notes: I'orthe test of multicollineanty, all independent variables indicated 17/• level below 5. condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0. 50 in tfxir respective dimension (row); 1 or the test of autocorrelation of errors 
the significance leielfor the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson denied upper limit (dv); Statistical significance letel: 0. 1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll l ‘-statistical values are significant at the 0.05 letelj
A d jR 2 0.2520 0.1789 0.0634 0.1232
R2 0.3200 0.2535 0.1505 0.2048
F 4.7053 3.3959 1.7278 2.5109
C o e f f i c i e n t t - s t a t C o e f f i c i e n t  t - s t a t C o e f f i c i e n t  t - s t a t C o e f f i c i e n t  t - s t a t
In tercept (a) -0.3317 -1.5406 0.0453 0.2006 -0.1981 -0.8130 -0.2940 -1.2482
Explanatory Variables 0 )
ACHSIN03 -0.0719 -0.5455 0.2004 1.4509 -0.0750 -0.5024 0.0517 0.3584
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.3239 -3.6800*** 0.4663 5.0564*** -0.1850 -1.8570* 0.2412 2.5047**
N D EQ 03 0.3451 5.0202*** 0.1608 2.1388**
N IN E D 03 -0.1839 -2.6061***
C H IN 03 0.3304 2.0483**
N IN STL03 0.2861 2.8505*** 0.1752 1.7521*
AUF503 0.2583 1.8428*** 0.3235 2.0399** 0.2441 2.2228**
Industry Dummy
P R O P -0.7370 -3.3314*** -0.5029 -2.0088**
CO N STR 0.4082 1.6577*
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(II) Audit Committee Chairman with Accounting and Finance Background (ACHACF) and Firm Performance 
- OLS 5(ii)
Tables 8.10 and 8.11 respectively present the regression results for model OLS 5(ii)(a) [i.e. 
regression of ACHACF and specified audit committee leadership variables in 2002 with 
respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and model OLS 5(ii)(b) [i.e. regression of 
ACHACF and specified audit committee leadership variables in 2003 with respective firm 
performance 2003 and 2004].
Namely, HACL 2 predicted that the appointment of audit committee chairman with accounting 
and financial background (ACHACF) will have a positive impact on firm performance. OLS 
5(ii)(a) model results revealed a significant positive relationship between ACHACF in 2002 and 
NTobin’s Q in 2003 (fi = 0.29; p  = 0.05).
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Table 8 .10 : Audit Committee Leadership and Firm Perfo rm ance — OLS 5(ii)(a)
The A ppointm ent of Audit Com m ittee's Chairman w ith A ccounting and Finance B ackground (ACHACF) in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HACL 2)
AC = Audit Committee, ACHACF = AC chairman possesses accounting and finance background, NASET -  Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, ACFAM - Presence o f  family member director on AC, NFAMDI = Proportion of family-member directors, NINSTL = Total 
proportion o f  Government Agencies', Public Listed Companies'/Corporations' and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, PROP - Property industry, CONSTR = Construction industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter N at the front of 
respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ Notes: I ‘or the test of multicollineanty, all independent variables indicated VII" leiel below 1, condition index less than 1S and not more than one rariance proportion greater than ft SO in their respedue dimension (row); I "or the test oj autocorrelation of 
errors the significance len l for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derind upper limit (dv); Statistical significance lenl: ft / (*), 0.0 S(**), 0 .0 1 (***); A l l  1;-statistical values are significant at the 0.001 letelj
A d jK 2 0.2353 0.1337 0.2494 0.1192
R 2 0.3048 0.2125 0.3176 0.1993
F 4.3846 2.6979 4.6545 2.4893
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.3520 -1.6021 -0.0692 -0.2958 -0.5129 -2.3559** 0.0023 0.0095
Explanatory Variables (ft)
ACHACF02 0.1831 1.4589 -0.0241 -0.1808 0.2854 2.2961** 0.0327 0.2428
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.3230 -3.7071 +++ 0.3971 4.2821**+ -0.2731 -3.1630*** 0.3745 4.0052***
N D EQ 02 0.2127 3.0482++* 0.3562 5.1529***
ACFAM02 0.3985 2.2349**
NFAM DI02 -0.2410 -2.4092++ -0.2074 -2.0932**
N IN STL02 0.2054 2.1033**
Industry Dummy
PR O P -0.9293 -4.1021+*+ -0.8117 -3.6166***
C O N STR 0.5098 2.0228++ 0.6175 2.4726**
F IN ; -0.5023 -1.9839**
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Table 8.11: Audit Committee Leadership and Firm P erfo rm ance — OLS 5(ii)(b)
The A ppointm ent of Audit Committees Chairman w ith A ccounting and Finance B ackground (ACHACF) in 2003 and Firm P erfo rm ance 2003 and 2004
(The Testing of HACL 2)
AC = Audit Committee, ACHACF = AC chairman possesses accounting and finance background, NASET ~ Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, CHIN = Board's chairman is independent director, NINDPV= Total Proportion o f  Individuals' and/or Private Companies' Substantial 
Equity Holdings, NINSTL = Total proportion of Government Agencies', Public Listed Companies’/Corporations' and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, AUF5 = Firm's external auditor is one o f the big 5 audit firms, PROP = Property industry, CONSTR = Construction 
industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ Notes: I "or the test ojmullicollinearity, all independent variables indicated VI I '  lent below 1, condition index less than 1 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); 1 'or the test of autocorrelation of errors tlx 
significance len l for tlx Durian Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than tlx Durbin Watson denied upper limit (da); Statistical significance lenl: 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A l l  I'-statistical values an  significant at tlx 0.05 lenl]
A d jR 2 0.2525 0.1810 0.0622 0.1346
R2 0.3204 0.2554 0.1494 0.2151
F 4.7155 3.4303 1.7130 2.6726
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.3071 -1.3739 -0.3071 -1.3739 -0.2294 -0.9059 -0.1351 -0.5558
Explanatory Variables 0 )
ACHACF03 -0.0827 -0.6615 -0.3071 -1.3739 0.0050 0.0352 -0.2234 -1.6436
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.3253 -3.7025*** -0.3253 -3.7025*** -0.1880 -1.8886* 0.2470 2.5850**
N D EQ 03 0.3419 4.9695*** 0.3419 4.9695*** 0.1547 2.0682**
CH IN 03 0.3248 2.0514**
N IN D PV 03 0.1754 1.7655*
N IN STL03 0.2920 2.8958*** 0.2920 2.8958*** 0.2628 2.3965**
AUF503 0.2561 1.8272* 0.2561 1.8272* 0.3254 2.0491**
Industry Dummy
PR O P -0.7566 -3.3887 -0.7566 -3.3887*** -0.5009 -1.9809**
C O N STR 0.4248 1.7311 0.4248 1.7311*
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(HI) Audit Committee Chairman with Business and Management Related Background (ACHBUS) and Firm 
Performance -  O L S  5 ( i i i )
Tables 8.12 and 8.13 respectively present the regression results for model OLS 5(iii)(a) [i.e. 
regression of ACHBUS and specified audit committee leadership variables in 2002 with 
respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and model OLS 5(iii)(b) [i.e. regression of 
ACHBUS and specified audit committee leadership variables in 2003 with respective firm 
performance 2003 and 2004].
HACL 3 hypothesised that the appointment of an audit committee chairman with a business 
and/or management related background (ACHBUS) will have an impact on firm performance. 
OLS 5(iii)(a) model results pointed to a significant negative relationship between ACHBUS in 
2002 and NTobin’s Q in 2002 (/? = - 0.30; p  = 0.1).
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Table 8 .12 : Audit Committee Leadership and Firm Perfo rm ance —  OLS 5(iii)(a)
The A ppointm ent of Audit Committee Chairman w ith Business and M anagem ent Related B ackground (ACHBUS) in 2002 and  Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and  2003
(The Testing of HACL 3)
AC = Audit Committee, ACHBUS = AC chairman possess business/management related background, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, ACFAM -  Presence o f family member director on AC, NFAMDI = Proportion of family-member directors, NINSTL = 
Total proportion of Government Agencies', Public Listed Companies'/Corporations' and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, MAINB = Main Board firms, PROP = Property industry, CONSTR = Construction industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = 
Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/  Notes: iortbe lest of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated VII' lenl below I, condition index less than 1 5 and not mote than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in tljeir respective dimension (row); I'ortlje test of autocorrelation of 
errors the significance k n l for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derived upper limit (di); Statistical significance level: 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll I'-statistical values are significant at the 0.001 
lenl]
■ ■
A d j R 2 0.2392 0.1345 0.2350 0.1199
R 2 0.3084 0.2132 0.3046 0.1999
F 4.4585 2.7092 4.3799 2.4987
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.2192 -1.0342 -0.0689 -0.3046 -0.3446 -1.6214 0.0302 0.1327
Explanatory Variables 0 )
ACHBUS02 -0.2987 -1.7798* -0.0822 -0.4593 -0.2009 -1.1937 -0.0825 -0.4571
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.3193 -3.6708*** 0.4033 4.3473*** -0.2816 -3.2296*** 0.3768 4.0282***
NDEQ02 0.2065 2.9669*** 0.3498 5.0118***
ACFAM02 0.4011 2.2285**
NFAMDI02 -0.2481 -2.4821** -0.2075 -2.0711**
NINSTL02 0.2170 2.1958**
Industry Dummy
MAINB 0.3004 1.6793*
PROP -0.9350 -4.1417*** -0.8296 -3.6644***
CONSTR 0.4727 1.8930** 0.5544 2.2141**
FIN -0.5465 -2.1294**
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Table 8.13: Audit Committee Leadership and Firm P erfo rm ance — OLS 5 "*'"f " .)
The A ppointm ent of Audit Committee Chairman with Business and M anagem ent R elated B ackground (ACHBUS) in 2003 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2003 and  2004
(The Testing of HACL 3)
AC = Audit Committee, ACHBUS = AC chairman possess business/management related background, NASET -1 Total assets, NDEQ -  Debt to equity ratio, NINED - Proportion o f  independent directors on the Board, CHIN = Board's chairman is independent director, NINDPV= 
Total Proportion of Individuals' and/or Private Companies’ Substantial Equity Holdings, N1NSTL = Total proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Listed Companies’/Corporations’ and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, AUF5 = Firm’s external auditor is one of the 
big 5 audit firms, PROP = Property industry, CONSTR = Construction industry, 03 * Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the front o f respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/  Notes: I'or the test of multicollineanty, all independent variables indicated I 'll' leiel below 5, condition index less than / 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); l :or the test of autocorrelation of 
errors tl>e significance lenl for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value mater than the Durbin Watson deriied upper limit (dv); Statistical significance kiel: 0.1 (*), 0.0.5(**), 0.01 (***); A ll l ‘-statistical values are significant at the 0.05 leielj
A d jR 2 0.2548 0.1702 0.0638 0.1227
R2 0.3226 0.2457 0.1509 0.2043
F 4.7616 3.2566 1.7326 2.5032
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.3816 -1.8145 0.1192 0.5374 -0.2408 -1.0101 -0.2764 -1.1989
Explanatory Variables (f)
ACHBUS03 0.1710 1.0318 0.0102 0.0583 0.1087 0.5784 0.0140 0.0772
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.3213 -3.6564*** 0.4745 5.1171*** -0.1844 -1.8517* 0.2437 2.5292**
NDEQ03 0.3396 4.9396*** 0.1610 2.1353**
NINED03 -0.1766 -2.4967**
CHIN03 0.3212 2.0149**
NINDPV03 0.1762 1.7611*
NINSTL03 0.3022 2.911V** 0.2461 2.2110**
AUF503 0.2480 1.7672* 0.3176 1.9969**
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.7534 -3.4026*** -0.5130 -2.0440**
CONSTR 0.4652 1.8694*
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(IV) Audit Committee Chairman with Practicing Accountant Experience (ACHP) and Firm Performance 
- OLS 5(iv)
Tables 8.14 and 8.15 respectively present the regression results for model OLS 5(iv)(a) [i.e. 
regression of ACHP and specified audit committee leadership variables in 2002 with respective 
firm performance 2002 and 2003] and model OLS 5(iv)(b) [i.e. regression of ACHP and 
specified audit committee leadership variables in 2003 with respective firm performance 2003 
and 2004].
Specifically, HACL 4 predicted that the appointment of an audit committee chairman with a 
practising accountant background (ACHP) will have a positive impact on firm performance. The 
results of OLS 5(iv)(a) and OLS 5(iv)(b) models pointed to the contrary. The relationship 
between ACHP and firm performance was not statistically significant, both in terms of the 
market value (NTobin’s Q) and accounting-based measure (NROE) of performance.
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Table 8 .14 : Audit Committee Leadership and Firm P erfo rm ance — OLS 5(iv)(a)
The A ppointm ent of Audit Committee Chairm an w ith P ractic ing  A ccountant Experience (ACHP) in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HACL 4)
AC = Audit Committee, ACHP = AC chairman possess practising accountant experience, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, ACFAM = Presence o f family member director on AC, NFAMDI = Proportion of family-member directors, NINSTL = Total 
proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Listed Companies'/Corporations’ and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, MAINB - Main Board firms, PROP = Property industry, CONSTR = Construction industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = 
Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
I Notes: I ;or the test of multicollineanty, all independent variables indicated VII' leiel below I, condition index less than 1S and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0. SO in their respective dimension (row); I'or the test of 
autocorrelation of errors the significance lenl for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derind upper limit (da); Statistical significance lent 0. 1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll \:-statistical values an 
significant at the 0.001 lenlj ________________________________________________________
A d jR 2 0.2283 0.1441 0.2369 0.1228
R2 0.2984 0.2219 0.3063 0.2026
F 4.2538 2.8525 4.4155 2.5403
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.2891 -1.3291 -0.1608 -0.7022 -0.4407 -2.0378** -0.0300 -0.1296
Explanatory Variables (ft)
ACHP02 0.0792 0.5392 0.2430 1.5711 0.2026 1.3868 0.1466 0.9359
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.3355 -3.8518*** 0.3989 4.3485*** -0.2925 -3.3771*** 0.3724 4.0097***
NDEQ02 0.2141 3.0386*** 0.3623 5.1717***
ACFAM02 0.3780 2.0915**
NFAMDI02 -0.2379 -2.3674** -0.2048 -2.0499**
NINSTL02 0.2024 2.0526**
Industry Dummy
0.3113 1.7402*
PROP -0.9410 -4.1373*** -0.8260 -3.6522***
CONSTR 0.4677 1.8599* 0.5526 2.2098**
FIN -0.4982 -1.9490*
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Table 8.15: Audil Committee Leadership and Firm Perfo rm ance — OLS ]
The A ppointm ent of Audit Committee Chairman w ith P ractic ing  A ccountant Experience (ACHP) in 2003 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2003 and  2004
(The Testing of HACL 4)
AC = Audit Committee, ACHP = AC chairman possess practising accountant experience, NASF.T = Total assets, NDEQ -  Debt to equity ratio, NINHD -  Proportion o f  independent directors on the board, CHIN = Board's chairman is independent director, INDPV= Total Proportion of 
Individuals’ and/or Private Companies’ Substantial Equity Holdings, NINSTL = Total proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Listed Companies’/Corporations’ and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, AUF5 = Firm’s external auditor is one of the big 5 audit firms, PROP 
= Property industry, CONSTR = Construction industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach.
/  Notes: l ‘or the test of multicollineanty, all independent variables indicated I II' lenl below 1, condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (new); l :or the test of autocorrelation of errors 
the significance lenl for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derind upper limit (di); Statistical significance lenl: 0.1 (*), 0.05(**i 0.01 (***); A ll l ‘-statistical values an significant at the 0.05 levelj
A d jR 2 0.2518 0.1703 0.0721 0.1233
R2 0.3198 0.2457 0.1584 0.2049
F 4.7022 3.2570 1.8354 2.5122
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.3905 -1.7852* 0.1139 0.4943 -0.3282 -1.3324 -0.2480 -1.0367
Explanatory Variables 0 )
ACHP03 0.0738 0.5059 0.0157 0.1020 0.2373 1.4434 -0.0617 -0.3866
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.3321 -3.7515**+ 0.4730 5.0733*** -0.2052 -2.0585** 0.2477 2.5582**
NDEQ03 0.3473 5.0349*** 0.1589 2.1067**
NINED03 -0.1771 -2.4986**
CHIN03 0.3165 1.9799**
NINDPV03 0.1815 1.7971*
NINSTL03 0.2835 2.8224*** 0.2462 2.2410**
AUF503 0.2629 1.8742* 0.3349 2.1202**
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.7324 -3.3079*** -0.4894 -1.9630
CONSTR 0.4295 1.7449*
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(V) Audit Committee Senior Independent Chairman with Practicing Accountant Experience (ACHSINP) and Firm 
Performance -  O L S  5 ( v )
Tables 8.16 and 8.17 respectively presents the regression results for model OLS 5(v)(a) [i.e. 
regression of ACHSINP and specified audit committee leadership variables in 2002 with 
respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and model OLS 5(v)(b) [i.e. regression of specified 
ACHSINP and audit committee leadership variables in 2003 with respective firm performance 
2003 and 2004].
Hypothesis HACL 5 posited that the appointment of a senior independent director with 
practising accountant experience (ACHSINP) as audit committee chairman will have a positive 
impact on firm performance. OLS 5(v)(a) model results pointed to the contrary since there 
existed a significant negative relationship between ACHSINP in 2002 and NTobin’s Q in 2002 
(fi = -0.47; p  = 0.05).
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Table 8 .16 : Audit Committee Leadership and Firm P erfo rm ance — OLS 5(v)(a)
The A ppointm ent o! S enior Independent Audit Com m ittee's Chairman with P rac tic ing  A ccountant Experience (ACHSI1VP) in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HACL 5)
AC = Audit Committee, ACHSINP = Senior independent director AC chairman possesses practising accountant experience, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ -  Debt to equity ratio, ACFAM = Presence of family member director on AC, NFAMDI = Proportion o f family-member directors, NINSTL 
= Total proportion o f Government Agencies’, Public Listed Companies'/Corporations’ and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, MAINB = Main Board firms, PROP = Property industry, CONSTR -  Construction industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter 
N at the front o f respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
I Note, iv I‘or the lest oj multicolhnearity, all independent mriahles indicated V ll' lenl below 5, condition index less than 15 and not more than one rariance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); I'or the lest of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance lenl for tlx Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derind upper limit (dv); Statistical significance lenl: 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll I ‘-statistical values an significant at the 0.001 level7
A d jR 2
R2
F
Intercept (a)
C oefficient
-0.2253
0.2456
0.3142
4.5819
t-stat
-1.0713
0.1397
0.2179
2.7860
C oefficient t-stat 
-0.1026 -0.4566
C oefficient
-0.3619
0.2315
0.3014
4.3143
t-stat
-1.7045*
0.1254
0.2049
2.5770
C oefficient t-stat 
-0.0040 -0.0177
Explanatory Variables 0 )  
ACHSINP02 -0.4639 -2.2139** 0.2666 1.1916 -0.1505 -0.7115 0.2730 1.2099
Control Variables
NASET02
NDEQ02
ACFAM02
NFAMDI02
NINSTL02
-0.3389
0.2058
-0.2121
-3.9344***
2.9693***
-2.1241**
0.4007 4.3562*** -0.2937
0.3509
0.4002
-0.1916
0.2096
-3.3782***
5.0152***
2.2174**
-1.9010*
2.1207**
0.3743 4.0353***
Industry Dummy
PROP
CONSTR
FIN
-0.9688
0.4497
-4.3058***
1.8078*
0.3077
-0.8440
0.5449
-0.5304
1.7120*
-3.7164***
2.1704**
-2.0661**
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Table 8.17: Audil Committee Leadership and Firm Perfo rm ance — OLS 
The A ppointm ent of S enior Independent Audit Com m ittee’s Chairman w ith P ractic ing  A ccountant Experience (ACHSINP) in 2003 and  Firm Perfo rm ance 2003 and 2004
(The Testing of HACL 5)
AC = Audit Committee, ACHSINP = Senior independent director AC chairman possesses practising accountant experience, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NINED = Proportion of independent directors on the Board, CHIN = Board’s chairman is independent director, INDPV= 
Total Proportion o f Individuals’ and/or Private Companies' Substantial Equity Holdings, NINSTL = Total proportion o f Government Agencies’, Public Listed Companies’/Corporations’ and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, AUF5 = Firm’s external auditor is one of the big 5 audit firms, 
PROP = Property industry, CONSTR = Construction industry, FIN ~ Finance Industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach.
I Notes: I 'or the test of multicolhnearity, all independent variables indicated V II' level below I, condition inilex less than I 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0. 50 in their respectiie dimension (row); I‘or the test of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance lenl for the Durbin If7utson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derived upper limit (dt); Statistical significance lenl: 0. / (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); AllI'-statistical values are significant at the 0.05 lenlf
A d jR 2 0.2509 0.1807 0.0625 0.1302
R2 0.3190 0.2552 0.1497 0.2111
F 4.6834 3.4258 1.7170 2.6097
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.3593 -1.7025 0.1604 0.7269 -0.2192 -0.9182 -0.2407 -1.0478
Explanatory Variables (ft)
ACHSINP03 0.0050 0.0223 -0.3768 -1.5989 -0.0668 -0.2622 -0.3199 -1.3041
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.3269 -3.7090*** 0.4836 5.2479*** -0.1862 -1.8677* 0.2513 2.6189***
NDEQ03 0.3443 5.0031*** 0.1648 2.1998**
NINED03 -0.1656 -2.3444**
CHIN03 0.2981 1.8664*
NINDPV03 0.1961 1.9457*
NINSTL03 0.2852 2.8311*** 0.2554 2.3285**
AUF503 0.2597 1.8492* 0.3274 2.0608**
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.7362 -3.3238*** -0.5040 -2.0116**
CONSTR 0.4203 1.7026*
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Table 8.18 summarises findings for the impact of audit committee leadership on firm 
performance.
Table 8.18: Summary of Findings for the Impact of Audit Committee Leadership on 
Firm Performance
H ypothesis H A C L
Postulated
Relationship
(+ /- /? )
Results
H A C L 1: Chairing of A C  by S R IN E D  [A C H SIN ] + N o t
Supported
H A C L 2: Chairing of A C  by IK E D  with A C F  background [AC AC Fj + Supported
H A C L 3: Chairing of A C  by IK E D  with business 1 management related background [A C H B U S] p Negative
Relationship
H A C L 4: Chairing of A C  by IK E D  with P A E  [ACH P] + N ot
Supported
H A C L 5: Chairing of A C  by S R I K E D  with P A E  [A C H SIN P ] + N o t
Supported
Xotes: AC = Audit Committee: IXED  =  Independent Director: SRI NED  =  Senior Independent Director: ACF  =  Accounting and Finance: PAE  =  
Practising Accountant Experience
8.2.2.1 Discussions of the Impact of Audit Committee Leadership on Firm Performance — 
OLS 5(iL OLS 5(iiL OLS 5(ii0. OLS 5(iv) and OLS 5(v) Results
Notably, the chairman of the audit committee assumes greater responsibilities than other audit 
committee members and hence needs to allocate a significant amount of time to leading and 
ensuring the effectiveness of the committee (Smith Report, 2003). The chairman’s duties include 
setting up audit committee meetings and meeting agendas, appointing audit committee 
members, establishing regular contact with the firm’s board of directors (particularly the board’s 
chairman), CEO, finance director, audit lead partner and chief internal auditor (see MCCG, 
2001; Higgs Report, 2003; Smith Report, 2003)
395
CHAPTER 8: ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION II - BOARD SUBCOMMITTEES AND
FIRM PERFORMANCE
Findings for the impact of audit committee leadership on firm performance indicated that, an 
audit committee chairman with an accounting and finance background (ACHACF) will 
contribute to the enhancement of firm performance. This result further established the 
significance of accounting and finance related experience in ensuring the effectiveness of audit 
committee management. OLS 5 results, however, revealed an insignificant impact of an audit 
committee chairman with practising accountant (ACHP) on firm performance and a significant 
negative relationship between the chairing of the audit committee by a senior independent 
director (ACHSIN), senior independent director with practising accountant experience 
(ACHSINP) and an independent director with a business and/or management background 
(ACHBUS). According to Wofford and Liska (1993), leaders’ behaviours psychologically have 
a psychological impact on the motivation of subordinates to accomplish targeted outcomes. 
Stinson and Johnson (1975) found that, the audit committee chairman’s less directive behaviour 
and awareness of external auditors’ statutory auditing duties will enhance the auditor’s morale to 
work productively.
Potentially, the audit committee chairman’s communication and management skills can have an 
impact on his/her abilities to direct audit committee members and interact effectively with the 
firm’s board chairman, audit lead partner, chief internal auditor and CEO. The chairman’s direct 
dealings with these people has been noted by the Smith Report (2003) as part of his/her crucial 
function to establish effective relationships and cooperation between the committee and the 
board, top management, executive members and external auditor for better audit committee 
performance. Moreover, audit committee members and external auditors require access to the 
firm’s internal information and resources to perform their oversight responsibilities
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appropriately. The cooperation and accountability of members of management are crucial in the 
supply of quality information to audit committee members and the auditor (see Ezammel and 
Watson, 1997). In this case, the audit committee’s chairman’s influence and reputation will 
facilitate the acquirement of necessary resources from management, particularly when the two 
parties have a mutual understanding and good relationship (see Westphal, 1999). Further, 
according to Wofford and Liska (1993), a leader’s supportive and co-operative behaviours are 
crucial in an environment where subordinates’ performance of duties are restricted by the 
availability of and access to information due to the control of the resources by other entities.
8.2.3 Audit Committee Competency and Firm Performance -  OLS 6
The impact of audit committee competency on firm performance was examined by the research 
model OLS 6. The research model investigated the relationship between the proportion of audit 
committee members with accounting and/or finance knowledge and skills (NAUACF), 
practising accountant experience (NAPACT), business and management knowledge and skills 
(NACBUS), law qualification (NACLAW), and company secretary experience (NACSEC) on 
firm performance.
Tables 8.19 and 8.20 respectively presents the regression results for model OLS 6(a) [i.e. 
regression of specified audit committee competency variables in 2002 with respective firm 
performance 2002 and 2003] and model OLS 5(v)(b) [i.e. regression of specified audit 
committee competency variables in 2003 with respective firm performance 2003 and 2004].
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HACKNOW 2 proposed that the proportion of audit committee members with practising 
accountant experience (NAPACT) will have a positive impact on firm performance. On the 
other hand OLS 6(a) and 6(b) reported mixed findings for the relationship between NAPACT 
and firm performance. Specifically, OLS 6(a) indicated a significant negative relationship 
between NAPACT in 2002 and NTobin’s Q in 2003 (0 = -0.15\ p  = 0.1). Whilst, OLS 6(b) 
result revealed a significant positive relationship between NAPACT in 2003 and NROE in 2004 
(0 = 0.18; p  = 0.05).
With respect to testing of HACKNOW 4, OLS 6(b) model result revealed a significant positive 
relationship between the proportion of audit committee members with a law background 
(NACLAW) in 2003 and NROE in 2004 = 0.15;p  = 0.1).
On the other hand, OLS 6(a) and OLS 6(b) model results were not statistically significant to 
support hypotheses HACKNOW 1 [the proportion of audit committee members with accounting 
and finance background (NAUACF)], HACKNOW 3 [the proportion of audit committee 
members with business and/or management experience (NACBUS)] and HACKNOW 5 [the 
proportion of audit committee members with company secretary experience (NACSEC)].
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Table 8 .1 9 :  Audit Committee Competency and Firm Perfo rm ance —  OLS 6(a)
The Examination of Audit Committee Competency in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance in 2002 and 2003
(The Testing of HACKNOW 1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,  and 5)
AC = Audit Committee, NAUACF = Proportion of AC members with accounting and finance background, NAPACT * Proportion o f AC members with practising accountant experience, NACBUS = Proportion o f  AC members with business/management related background, NACLAW = 
Proportion of audit committee members with a law background, NACSEC = Proportion o f AC members with company secretary experience, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI = Proportion of family-member directors, NBDSZ = Size o f Board of directors, 
PROP = Property industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/  Notes: I 'or the test of multicollineanty, all independent rariables indicated VII ‘ lenl below I, condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); I 'or tlx test of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance lenl for tlx Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than tlx Durbin Watson derind upper limit (da); Statistical significance lent 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll {‘-statistical values were significant at the 0.001 lenl]
■
A d jR 2 0.2060 0.1291 0.1892 0.1225
R2 0.2781 0.2083 0.2630 0.2023
F 3.8531 2.6307 3.5677 2.5359
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.1886 -0.9200 -0.1667 -0.7767 -0.2652 -1.2807 -0.1062 -0.4929
Explanatory Variables 0 )
NAUACF02 0.0390 0.4978 -0.0196 -0.2394 0.0549 0.6944 -0.0017 -0.0202
NAPACT02 -0.1324 -1.5263 0.0265 0.2913 -0.1474 -1.6821* -0.0200 -0.2191
NACBUS02 0.0305 0.3749 0.0728 0.8537 -0.0098 -0.1187 0.1265 1.4786
NACLAW02 -0.0863 -1.0139 0.0868 0.9743 0.0040 0.0463 0.0126 0.1410
NACSEC02 -0.0650 -0.4858 0.1833 1.3080 -0.0625 -0.4618 -0.0715 -0.5081
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.2789 -3.0682*** 0.3945 4.1440*** -0.2333 -2.5398** 0.3222 3.3714***
N D EQ 02 0.2020 2.8141*** 0.3399 4.6863***
N FAM DI02 -0.1854 -2.4453**
NBDSZ02 0.1319 1.8239*
Industry Dummy
P R O P -0.9781 -4.1941 -0.8864 -3.7616***
F IN -0.5135 -1.8918*
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Table 8 .20 : Audit Committee Competency and  Firm P erfo rm ance —  OLS 6(b)
The Exam ination of Audit Committee Competency in 2003 and  Firm P erfo rm ance in 2003 and 2004
(The Testing of HACKNOW 1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,  and 5)
AC = Audit Committee, NAUACF = Proportion of AC members with accounting and finance background, NAPACT = Proportion of AC members with practising accountant experience, NACBUS = Proportion o f  AC members with business/management related background, NACLAW = 
Proportion o f audit committee members with a law background, NACSEC = Proportion of AC members with company secretary experience, NASET = Total assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NFAMDI = Proportion of family-member directors, NBDSZ = Size o f Board of directors, 
NFINK = Proportion o f directors with finance background, NBDSZ = Size o f  Board o f directors, MAINB = Main Board firms, PROP = Property industry, CONSTR = Construction industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective 
variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach.
/  Notes: I'or the test oj multicollineanty, all independent variables indicated V II ' leiel below I, condition index less than / 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); for the lest of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance lenl for tlx Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derind upper limit (dt i); Statistical significance lenl: 0 .1 (*), 0.0 5(**), 0.01 (***); A ll I;-statistical values were significant at the 0. /  lenl/
A d jR 2 0.2259 0.1741 0.0529 0.1220
R2 0.2963 0.2492 0.1410 0.2037
F 4.2100 3.3193 1.6006 2.4935
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-sfat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.4178 -2.1327** 0.0844 0.4170 -0.2772 -1.2650 -0.0999 -0.4737
Explanatory Variables ((3)
NAUACF03 0.1056 1.2614 -0.1137 -1.3158 -0.0006 -0.0065 -0.0591 -0.6562
NAPACT03 -0.0928 -1.1556 0.0803 0.9674 -0.0185 -0.2054 0.1776 2.0548**
NACBUS03 0.0595 0.7297 -0.0512 -0.6076 0.0834 0.9146 0.0107 0.1224
NACLAW03 0.1007 1.2120 0.0155 0.1800 -0.0444 -0.4770 0.1529 1.7095*
NACSEC03 -0.1818 -1.2651 -0.1435 -0.9667 -0.1713 -1.0660 0.0269 0.1737
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.2949 -3.1781*** 0.4479 4.6742*** 0.2520 2.5241**
N D EQ 03 0.3252 4.6715***
N FIN K 03 0.1529 1.8717* 0.1655 1.9609*
NFAM DI03
NBDSZ03 0.1184 1.6615*
AUD503 0.3093 2.1945** 0.3855 2.4453**
Industry Dummy
M AINB 0.2982 1.6704*
PRO P -0.8172 -3.6169*** -0.4113 -1.7623* -0.5449 -2.1562** -0.4062 -1.6708*
CO N STR -0.4825 -1.7539*
FIN -0.5245 -1.9802** -0.5171 -1.8904*
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Table 8.21 presents a summary of the findings for the impact of audit committee competency on 
firm performance
Table 8.21: Summary of Findings for the Impact of Audit Committee’s Competency on 
Firm Performance
H ypothesis H A C K N O W
Postulated
Relationship
(+ /- /? )
Results
H A C K N O W  1: Proportion o f  A C  members with A C F  background 
( N A U A C F )
+ N ot
Supported
H A C K N O W 7 2: Proportion o f A C  members with P A E  ( N A C P A C T ) + Supported
H A C K N O W 7 3: Proportion o f A C  members with business / management 
related background ( N A C B U S )
p p
H A C K N O W 7 4: Proportion o f A C  members with law background 
( N A C L A W )
p Positive
Relationship
H A C K N O W 7 5: Proportion o f A C  members with company secretary 
experience ( N A C S E C )
p p
A C  = A udit Com m ittee; A C F  =  Accounting and Finance; PAE = P ractising Accountant Experience
8.2.3.1 Discussions of the Impact of Audit Committee Competency on Firm Performance 
— OLS 6 Results
As reported in section 8.2.3, the contribution of audit committee members’ competencies on 
firm performance was observed with respect to audit committee members possessing accounting 
practising accountant experience (NAPACT) and legal background (NACLAW). The results 
provided empirical evidence of the importance of aforementioned expertise in enhancing audit 
committee oversight responsibilities.
On the other hand, this result was in contrary to Elson (1996) argument that the ability of outside 
director with law and financial background to carry out their oversight duties appropriately may 
be affected when their appointments by management were to perform professional service for 
the firm. The significance of financial expert audit committee members with practising
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accountant experience has been emphasised by Knapp (1987), Libby and Frederick (1990), 
DeZoort (1997, 1998), DeZoort and Salterio (2001) and Carcello and Neal (2006), in their 
studies of the impact of audit committee financial expertise on audit committee effectiveness. 
Further, audit committee oversight of firm financial reporting practice required it to evaluate 
firm conformance to Securities Exchange and Securities Commission rules and accounting and 
auditing standards.
Thus, audit committee members with a legal background will be able to ensure that the 
information disclosed by companies in their annual report is properly presented to avoid any 
future litigation against the firm or its board of directors (see Chan and Lau, 2003). Also, legal 
expert advice and counsel (see Baysinger and Butler , 185 and Verschoor, 1993) is important in 
deciding and determining the committee’s actions when the audit committee and/or auditor have 
found a financial and/or regulatory fraud in the firm’s financial reporting procedures (see Uzun 
et al., 2004). Moreover, Chan and Lau (2003) recognised the significance of business lawyer 
knowledge in assisting other directors’ understanding of their legal duties in the firm.
On the other hand, OLS 6 results reported an insignificant impact between the proportion of 
audit committee members with accounting and finance background (NAUACF), 
business/management related background (NACBUS) and company secretary experience 
(NACSEC), and firm performance. Notably, technical knowledge and experience in accounting 
and auditing areas are significant to provide a good quality of financial assessment of the firm 
and in reporting and rules compliance (Tan and Kao, 1999; Gendron et al., 2004; Defond et al., 
2005, Carcello et al., 2006). Importantly, DeZoort (1998) argued, audit committee members who
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are able to contribute more related and sufficient inputs by highlighting other potential aspects 
and supplementing additional information to oversight tasks will strategically improve the 
credibility of the collective decisions made by the committee.
8.3 Nomination Committee and Firm Performance
The importance of the nomination committee in the firm and the impact of it establishment on 
firm performance was examined by research model OLS 7, whilst OLS 8 investigated the impact 
of nomination committee attributes on firm performance. The following sections discussed the 
results of OLS 7 and OLS 8.
8.3.1 Nomination Committee Establishment (NCEXIST) and Firm Performance -  OLS 7
Tables 8.22 and 8.23 respectively present the regression results for model OLS 6(a) [i.e. 
regression of NCEXIST and specified nomination committee establishment variables in 2002 
with respective firm performance 2002 and 2003] and model OLS 6(b) [i.e. regression of 
NCEXIST and specified nomination committee establishment variables in 2003 with respective 
firm performance 2003 and 2004].
HNC 1 hypothesised that the establishment of a nomination committee in the firm (NCEXIST) 
will have a positive impact on firm performance. Results for model OLS 7(a) [see Table 8.22] 
and OLS 7(b) [see Table 8.23] respectively indicated a significant negative relationship between 
NCEXIST in 2002 and NTobin’s Q in 2002 (J3 = -0.32 ; p  = 0.1), and between NCEXIST in 
2003 and NTobin’s Q in 2003 (fi = -0.37 ; p  = 0.05), and between NCEXIST in 2003 and 
NROE in 2003 (fi = -0.33 ;p  = 0.1) and NROE in 2004 (fi = -0.54 ;p = 0.01).
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Table 8 .22 : Nom ination Committee Establishm ent and Firm Perfo rm ance 
The Examination of N om ination Committee Establishm ent (NCEXIST)in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and 2003— OLS 7(a)
(The Testing of HNC 1)
NCEXIST = The establishment of nomination committee in the firm, SRI = Presence of senior independent director on the board, NFAMDI = Proportion of family-member directors, NFORS = Proportion o f specific foreign directors, NASET = Total Assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, 
NBDSZ = Size of Board of directors, PROP = Property Industry, CONSTR = Construction Industry, FIN -  Finance Industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 -  Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using 
Van der Waerden approach
/ Notes: I 'or the lest oj multicolhnearity, all independent variables indicated V ll • level below 5, condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); 1 'or tlx test oj autocorrelation of errors 
the significance level for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derived upper limit (dv); Statistical significance lent 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll Y-statistical values were significant at the 0.001 level)
■
A d jR 2 0.2477 0.1522 0.2268 0.1581
R2 0.3195 0.2331 0.3006 0.2385
F 4.4498 2.8809 4.0726 2.9677
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) 0.2689 1.1982 -0.2270 -0.9530 0.0456 0.2006 0.0124 0.0524
Explanatory Variables (j)
N CEXIST02 -0.3222 -1.9352* 0.0323 0.1828 -0.2404 -1.4242 -0.2570 -1.4594
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.2646 -2.8949*** 0.3727 3.8404*** -0.2477 -2.6727*** 0.3077 3.1821***
N D EQ 02 0.1641 2.3094** 0.3193 4.4317***
SRI02 0.3547 2.7012***
NFAM DI02 -0.1985 -2.1770**
NFORS02 0.1595 1.6624*
NBDSZ02 0.1268 1.6954*
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.8586 -3.8527*** -0.7378 -3.2655***
CO N STR 0.4971 2.0089** 0.5568 2.2195**
F IN -0.5360 -2.0585***
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Table 8 .2 3 :  Nom ination Committee Establishm ent and Firm P erfo rm ance 
The Examination of N om ination Committee Establishm ent (NCEXIST) in 2003 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2003 and 2 0 0 4 -  OLS 7(b)
(The Testing of HNC1)
NCEXIST = The establishment of nomination committee in the firm, NINED = Proportion of Independent Directors, SRI = Presence o f senior independent director on the board, EXCEO = Exclusion o f CEO, CFO, COO and Managing Director, CHIN = Board’s Chairman INED, NINSTL= 
Total Proportion o f Government Agencies', Public Listed Companies'/Corporations’ and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, NBDSZ = Size of Board of directors, NASET = Total Assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, PROP = Property Industry, CONSTR = Construction 
Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 03= Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable's acronym identified the variable that had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/  Notes: to r the test oj multicolhnearity, all independent rariahles indicated V ll ' lenl below 1, condition index less than 15 and not m m  than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); for the test of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance lenl for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derind upper limit (dv); Statistical significance lenl: 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll l ;-statistical values were significant at the 0.1 lenl/
A d jR ? 0.2733 0.2330 0.0471 0.1560
0.3427 0.3062 0.1401 0.2385
F 4.9400 4.1830 1.5057 2.8928
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) 0.0950 0.4208 0.1905 0.8216 -0.0542 -0.2075 0.2158 0.8780
Explanatory Variables (ff)
NCEXIST03 -0.3699 -2.1785** -0.3293 oo 00 00 -0.0313 -0.1591 -0.5391 -2.9161***
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.3269 -3.6033*** 0.4269 4.5806*** 0.2564 2.5950**
NDEQ03 0.3077 4.4716***
NINED03 0.1359 2.0729** -0.1732 -2.5722**
SRI03 0.3229 2.6421***
EXCEO03 0.3387 2.3573** 0.2759 1.8112*
CHIN03 0.3584 2.1508**
NINSTL03 0.2269 2.2305**
NBDZ03 0.1503 2.1388** 0.1648 2.2834** 0.1480 1.9347*
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.6395 -2.9284*** -0.3842 -1.7126* -0.4937 -1.9523*
CONSTR 0.5001 2.0032**
FIN
i -0.4824 -1.8531* -0.4927 -1.6791*
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8.3.2 N om ination  C om m ittee Independence Com position an d  S tructure , and F irm  Perform ance  
- O L S 8
Tables 8.24 and 8.25 respectively presents the regression results for model OLS 8(a) [i.e. 
regression of specified nomination committee attributes in 2002 with respective firm 
performance 2002 and 2003] and model OLS 8(b) [i.e. regression of specified nomination 
committee attributes in 2003 with respective firm performance 2003 and 2004].
HNC 3 posited that the presence of a senior independent director on the nomination committee 
(NCSIN) will have a positive impact on firm performance. Similar to previous results of OLS 
4(i), 4(ii) and 4(iii) on the impact of the presence of senior independent director on audit 
committee on firm performance (ACSIN), OLS 8(a) and OLS 8(b) model results [see Tables 
8.24 and 8.25] also revealed mixed findings. Specifically, OLS 8(a) indicated significant 
negative relationship between NCSIN in 2002 and NTobin’s Q in 2002 (ft = -0.24; p  = 0.1), and 
significant positive relationship between NCSIN in 2002 and NROE in 2003 {fi = 0.27; p  = 0.1). 
Whilst, OLS 8(b) model results revealed significant positive relationship between pointed 
NCSIN in 2003 and NROE in 2003 (fi = 0.32; p = 0.05).
With respect to the testing of HNC 5, OLS 8(a) and (b) respectively indicated that there was a 
significant negative relationship between the exclusion of CEO, Chief Financial Officer and/or 
managing director from nomination committee membership (NCXCEO) in 2002 and NTobin’s 
Q in 2002 (ft = -0.39; p  = 0.1) and NCXCEO in 2003 with NTobin’s Q in 2003 (fi = -0.52; p  = 
0.05).
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Table 8.24: Nom ination Committee A ttributes and Firm P erfo rm ance 
The Examination of N om ination Committee A ttributes in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and  2003—OLS 8(a)
(The Testing of HNC 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6  and  7)
NC = Nomination committee, NNCINED = Proportion of independent directors on nomination committee, NCSIN = Presence o f senior independent director on NC, NCFAM “ Presence o f  family members directors on NC, NCXCEO = The exclusion o f CEO, CFO and managing 
director from NC, NCHIN = NC chairman is independent director, EXCEO =■ Exclusion o f CEO, CFO, COO and Managing Director, NFAMDI = Proportion o f family-member directors, AUF5 = Firm’s external auditor is one o f the big 5 audit firms, NBDSZ * Size o f  Board of 
directors, NASET = Total Assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio ,, PROP = Property Industry, CONSTR = Construction Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym identified the variable that had been 
transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/  Notes: I'or the test of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated VIV kiel below 5, condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their re.pectin dimension (row); l :or the test of autocorrelation of 
errors the significance lei el for the statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson deriied upper limit (di); Statistical significance level: 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll V-statistical values are significant at the 0.001 level!
A d JR 2 0.2629 0.1453 0.2404 0.1511
R2 0.3332 0.2269 0.3129 0.2321
F 4.7363 2.7817 4.3150 2.8643
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) 0.1461 0.5525 -0.2506 -0.8799 -0.1282 -0.4776 -0.0952 -0.3353
Fxplanatory Variables (ft)
NNCINED02 -0.0028 -0.0245 -0.0275 -0.2225 -0.0744 -0.6391 -0.1289 -1.0477
NCSIN02 -0.2420 -1.7555* 0.0814 0.5486 -0.2260 -1.6147 0.2731 1.8461*
NCFAM02 0.1227 0.9948 0.0270 0.2035 0.1282 1.0234 -0.0042 -0.0319
NCXCEO02 -0.3853 -1.8059* 0.3749 1.6315 -0.2902 -1.3397 0.1814 0.7923
NCHIN02 0.0033 0.0208 -0.2038 -1.1896 0.1824 1.1298 -0.3038 -1.7793*
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.2794 -3.0676*** 0.3787 3.8622*** -0.2541 -2.7481*** 0.3221 3.2959***
NDEQ02 0.1446 2.0621** 0.2965 4.1663***
NFAMDI02 -0.1637 -2.0072**
AUF02 0.2417 1.7371*
NBDSZ02 0.1268 1.7206*
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.8373 -3.7563*** -0.7084 -3.1304***
CONSTR 0.4597 1.8128* 0.5610 2.1793**
FIN -0.5583 -2.1558**
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Table 8.25: Nom ination Committee A ttributes and Firm Perfo rm ance 
The Examination of N om ination Committee A ttributes in 2003 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2003 and  2004—OLS 8(b)
(The Testing of HNC 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,  and 7)
NC = Nomination committee, BOD = Board of directors, NNCiNED = Proportion of independent directors on nomination committee, NCSIN = Presence o f senior independent director on NC, NCFAM ^Presence o f family members directors on NC, NCXCEO = The exclusion o f 
CEO, CFO and managing director from NC, NCHIN =■ NC chairman is independent director, EXCEO = Exclusion o f CEO, CFO, COO and Managing Director, NFAMDI =■ Proportion o f family-member directors, NASET = Total Assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, NINSTL= Total 
Proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Listed Companies'/Corporations' and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, AUF5 = Firm 's external auditor is one of the big 5 audit firms, NBDSZ = Size of Board of directors, PROP = Property Industry, CONSTR = Construction 
Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 03= Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym indicated the variables had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/  Notes: Vor the test of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated VIY level below f  condition index less than / 5 and not m m  than one variance proportion greater than 0. SO in their respective dimension (row); I 'or the test oj autocorrelation of errors 
the significance level lor the statistic (d) indicated a value mater than the Durbin Watson dcrited upper limit (dy); Statistical significance level: 0 .1 (*), ()J)5(**), 0.0! (***); A l l /•'-statistical values are significant at the 0.1 letel)______________________________________
Performance Measure NTOBIN’S Q 2003_______________ NROE 2003 NTOBIN’S Q 2004__________________NROE 2004
A d jR 2 0.2711 0.1866 0.0512 0.1264
R2 0.3407 0.2642 0.1439 0.2117
F 4.8961 3.4031 1.5525 2.4808
C oefficient t-?tat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) -0.0606 -0.2508 0.0588 0.2305 -0.1500 -0.5382 -0.1982 -0.7418
Fxplanatory Variables ((1)
NNCINED03 0.1163 1.0635 -0.0017 -0.0150 0.0424 0.3362 -0.1936 -1.6001
NCSIN03 -0.1489 -1.1569 0.3221 2.3683** -0.1018 -0.6851 0.1196 0.8400
NCFAM03 0.1778 1.5066 -0.0427 -0.3425 0.0063 0.0255 0.1396 0.5905
NCXCEO03 -0.5241 -2.4521** -0.2087 -0.9242 0.0468 0.3438 -0.0989 -0.7576
NCHIN03 0.0466 0.2906 -0.0671 -0.3966 -0.0955 -0.5165 -0.0908 -0.5121
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.3543 -3.8268*** 0.4205 4.2995*** 0.2472 2.4139**
NDEQ03 0.3045 4.4180*** 0.1484 1.9462*
EXCEO03 0.2702 1.9002* 0.3309 2.2029**
NINSTL03 0.2416 2.3527**
AUF503 0.3282 2.3414** 0.3406 2.1059**
NBDSZ03 0.1503 2.0978** 0.1903 2.5138**
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.5902 -2.6859*** -0.4587 -1.8093* -0.4042 -1.6627*
CONSTR 0.4364 1.7730*
FIN -0.4702 -1.8519* -0.4893 -1.6704*
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As regards to HNC 7 testing, OLS 8(a) results showed a significant negative relationship 
between the appointment of a senior independent director as nomination committee chairman 
(NCHSIN) in 2002 and NROE in 2003 {fi = -0.30; p  = 0.1).
On the other hand, OLS 8(a) and OLS 8(b) model results were not statistically significant to 
support hypotheses HNC 2 [the proportion of independent director on nomination committee 
(NNCINED)] and HNC 4 [the presence of a family-member director on the nomination 
committee (NCFAM)].
Table 8.26 presents the summary of findings for the impact of nomination committee 
establishment and its attributes on firm performance.
Table 8.26: Summary of Findings of for the Impact of Nomination Committee Establishment 
and Its Attributes on Firm Performance
Hypothesis HNC
Postulated
Relationship
(+/-/?)
Results
HNC 1: The establishment o f a nomination committee in the firm  
[NCEXIST]
+ Not Supported
Hypothesis HNC
Postulated
Relationship
(+/-/?)
Results
HNC 2: The proportion o f  INEDs on NC [NCINEDJ + Not Supported
HNC 3: The presence o f a SRINED on NC [NCSIN] ? Supported
HNC 4: The presence o f FAMDI on NC [NCFAM] ? ?
HNC 5: The exclusion o f  CEO, CFO and MD from NC membership 
[NCXCEO]
+ Not Supported
HNC 6: The chairing o fN C  by IN  ED [NCHIN] + Not Supported
IN ED =Independent D irector; NC  =  Nomination Committee; SRJNED = Senior Independent Director; FAMDI =  Family- 
M ember D irector; C E O  = C h ie f Executive D irector; CFO  =  C h ief Financial Officer, M D = M anaging Director,
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8.3.3 Discussions of the Impact of Nomination Committee Establishment and Its 
Attributes on Firm Performance — OLS 7 and OLS 8 Results
(I) Nomination Committee Establishment and Firm Performance
The establishment of nomination committee has been related to the need to form formal and 
transparent procedures in the selection, replacement and critically, the regular evaluation of 
board members performance (Carson, 2002). In section 8.3.1, the results of OLS 7(a) and 7(b) 
models revealed that the impact of nomination committee establishment (NCEXIST) on firm 
performance was significantly negatively related. Uzun et al., (2004) reported a similar result 
when observing the impact of the existence of a nomination committee on the incidence of 
corporate fraud. The governing function of the nomination committee in their studies appeared 
to be less immediate than that of the audit and remuneration committee to have a positive impact 
on the monitoring of corporate fraud. Importantly, the establishment of a nomination committee 
by Malaysian listed companies was still in its early stage of development when the current study 
was conducted. Some companies may have decided to form the committee merely to comply 
with Best Practices of Code of Corporate Governance and hence may not have been fully 
committed to enforcing the committee’s governing potential.
With regard to the nomination committee’s activities, the committee may not have convened any 
meeting during the year [see sampled companies Corporate Governance Statement on 
Nomination Committee’s activities], even though one of the committee’s policies was to 
conduct at least one meeting in a year. Moreover, according to the Higgs Report (2003), which 
examined the corporate practice of FTSE 350 companies, the nomination committee was the 
least developed board subcommittee. It would appear that in the Higgs Report (2003) and the 
current study, FTSE 350 nomination committee members and nomination committee members
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of Malaysian listed firms respectively, were not clear of their governing roles in the firm. In 
mitigating this problem, the Higgs Report (2003) further proposed that the nomination 
committee should play an active role in the setting of recruitment and retirement programmes 
for the board members as well as management development and succession planning.
(II) Nomination Committee Attributes and Firm Performance
MCCG (2001) and Higgs Report (2003) contended that higher proportion of independent 
director presence in nomination committee composition is vital in the setting of proper and 
transparent procedures of board members’ selection and assessment. In addition, the nomination 
committee has a duty to identify the human capital need of the firm and the qualities of board of 
director candidates, namely, their diligence and vigilance, to ensure board members are highly 
committed and resourceful individuals [Vafeas, 1999(a)]. On the contrary, OLS 8 model 
findings revealed insignificant relationship between the proportions of independent directors on 
the nomination committee (NNCINED) on firm performance. Moreover, the impact of the 
appointment of independent director as the committee’s (NCHIN) on firm performance was 
significantly negatively related. These circumstances could be related to the lack of nomination 
committee activities and meetings (see companies’ Corporate Governance Statement on 
Nomination Committee activities) which may have affected their potential to contribute 
objectively to the governance of board members’ nomination and assessment process (see Higgs 
Report, 2003; Kulasingham, 2003; Uzun et al., 2004).
On the other hand, OLS 8 findings found significant positive relationship between the presence 
of a senior independent director on the nomination committee (NCSIN) and subsequent year
411
CHAPTER 8: ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION II - BOARD SUBCOMMITTEES AND
FIRM PERFORMANCE
firm performance. This result supported Fairchild and Li (2005) proposition that, outside 
directors with various specialist knowledge would be more critical in their valuation of 
management agendas, namely in this case the management choices of board candidatures and 
criteria of board members performance.
With respect to the impact of the exclusion of CEO from the committee’s membership 
(NCXCEO) on firm performance, OLS 8 model finding gathered that there was significant 
negative relationship between the two respective variables. Shivdasani and Yermack, (1997) 
posited that the dominant influence and involvement of the CEO in board members’ selection 
process will undermine the independence and impartiality of independent directors’ views and 
judgement. However, the presence of more than majority independent directors on the 
nomination committee and independent nomination committee chairman would establish 
appropriate governing mechanisms to monitor the discretions of the CEO in the nomination of 
board candidatures (see Long et al., 2000). In addition, when the system of firm’s internal 
control is reliable, Fama and Jensen [1983, (a)] found that the involvement of internal managers 
in the board members selection process is encouraged.
In addition, OLS 8 revealed that there was no significant relationship between the presence of 
family member directors on nomination committee (NCFAM) and firm performance. As 
indicated in Table 6.38 (see Chapter 6), less than 10% of the sampled companies had a family 
member on their nomination committee and this factor may have contributed to the insignificant 
result obtained on NCFAM relationship with firm performance. Moreover, family members’ 
influences on organisational process have much been examined at board level rather than at
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board subcommittee, indicating that it is more critical to monitor their domineering behaviour in 
board decision than subcommittee’s (see Allen and Panian, 1992; Boeker, 1992 Claessens et al, 
2000; Volpin, 2002).
8.4 Remuneration Committee and Firm Performance
The significance of the remuneration committee in the firm was examined by investigating the 
impact of its establishment (OLS 9) and attributes (OLS 10) on firm performance. The following 
sub-sections address these issues, respectively.
8.4.1 R em unera tion  C om m ittee E stablishm en t (RCEXIST) a n d  F irm  Perform ance -  OLS 9
Tables 8.27 and 8.28 respectively present the regression results for model OLS 9(a) [i.e. 
regression of RCEXIST and remuneration committee establishment in 2002 with respective firm 
performance 2002 and 2003] and model OLS 9(b) [i.e. regression of RCEXIST and specified 
remuneration committee establishment in 2003 with respective firm performance 2003 and 
2004].
HRC 1 hypothesised that the establishment of a remuneration committee in the firm (RCEXIST) 
will have a positive impact on firm performance. OLS 9(a) and OLS 9(b) model results 
respectively revealed a significant negative relationship between RCEXIST in 2002 and 
NTobin’s Q in 2002 (fi = -0.43; p  = 0.05), NTobin’s Q 2003 (fi = -0.35;p  = 0.05), and NROE in 
2003 {fi = -0.31; p  = 0.1). In addition similar relationship was also observed between RCEXIST 
in 2003 and NTobin’s Q in 2003 {fi = -0.42; p  =  0.05), and NROE in 2004 (fi =  -0.32; p  = 0.1).
41 3
C H A PTER  8: ANALYSIS & D ISCUSSIO N  II - BO ARD SUB C O M M ITT EES AND FIRM  PERFO RM ANCE
Table 8.27: R em uneration  Committee Establishm ent and Firm Perform ance 
The exam ination  of R em uneration  Committee Establishm ent (RCEXIST) in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2002 and  2003— OLS 9(a)
(The Testing of HRC 1)
RCEXIST = The establishment of remuneration committee in the firm, SRI = Senior Independent Director, NFAMDI = Proportion of family-member directors, NFORS = Proportion o f specific foreign directors, NBDSZ = Size o f Board of directors, NASET = Total Asset, NDF.Q = 
Debt to equity ratio, PROP = Property Industry, CONSTR ' Construction Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 02 = Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym indicated the variables had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden 
approach.
/  Notes: for the test of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated VII' leitl below 5, condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); I'or the test of autocorrelation of 
errors the significance leiel for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derived upper limit (dv); Statistical significance lei el: 0.1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A ll 1 ''-statistical values are significant at the 0.001 level!
A d jR 2 0.2571 0.1526 0.2348 0.1610
R2 0.3280 0.2335 0.3079 0.2411
F 4.6261 2.8863 4.2150 3.0110
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) 0.3853 1.6503 -0.2559 -1.0265 0.1603 0.6767 0.0736 0.2967
Explanatory Variables 0 )
RCEXIST02 -0.4289 -2.5124** 0.0632 0.3464 -0.3525 -2.0348** -0.3051 -1.6821*
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.2574 -2.8310*** 0.3714 3.8249*** -0.2415 -2.6167*** 0.3125 3.2345***
NDEQ02 0.1570 2.2192** 0.3124 4.3510***
SRI02 0.3562 2.7197***
NFAMDI02 -0.1970 -2.1751**
NFORS02 0.1664 1.7654*
NBDSZ02 0.1312 1.7556*
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.8590 -3.8790*** -0.7377 -3.2823***
CONSTR 0.5009 2.0397** 0.5633 2.2600**
FIN -0.5128 -1.9761**
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Table 8.28: Remuneration Committee Establishment and Firm Performance 
The Examination of Remuneration Committee Establishment in 2003 and Firm Performance 2003 and 2004— OLS 9(b)
(The Testing of HRC 1)
RCEXIST = The establishment of remuneration committee in the firm, NINED = Proportion of Independent Directors, SRI = Senior Independent Director, EXCEO = Exclusion of CEO, CFO, COO and Managing Director, CHIN = Board’s Chairman INED, NFORS = Proportion of 
specific foreign director, NINSTL= Total Proportion o f Government Agencies', Public Listed Companies’/Corporations' and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, NBDSZ -  Size of Board of directors, NASET = Total Asset, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, PROP = 
Property Industry, CONSTR = Construction Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym indicated the variables had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/  Notes: I'or the test oj multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated VII' level below i, condition index less than 11 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); I'or the lest of autocorrelation of 
errors the significance leiel for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson denied upper limit (da); Statistical significance leiel' 0 .1 (*), 0.0 !(**), 0.01 (***); A ll I'-statistical values an significant al the f t  1 lenlj
A d jR 2 0.2772 0.2234 0.0470 0.1317
R2 0.3462 0.2976 0.1401 0.2165
F 5.0184 4.0142 1.5048 2.5523
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t-stat
Intercept (a) 0.1425 0.6214 0.0896 0.3768 1.5048 1.5048 0.0653 0.2570
Explanatory Variables (j)
RCEXIST03 -0.4180 -2.4194** -0.1845 -1.0302 -0.0926 -0.3475 -0.3214 -1.6793*
Control Variables
NASET03 -0.3296 -3.6459*** 0.4210 4.4926*** 0.2470 2.4672**
NDEQ03 0.3163 4.6441*** 0.1346 1.7850*
NINED03 0.1340 2.0492** -0.1704 -2.5140**
SRI03 0.3108 2.5289**
EXCEO03 0.3314 2.2935** 0.2643 1.7113*
CHIN03 0.3361 1.9891**
NFORS03 0.1624 1.7815*
NINSTL03 0.2099 2.0469** 0.1892 1.6657*
NBDSZ03 0.1485 2.1349** 0.1478 2.0506**
Industry Dummy
PROP -0.6456 -2.9671*** -0.4005 -1.7755* .0.4974 -1.9688*
CONSTR 0.4876 1.9655*
FIN -0.4871 -1.8576* -0.4965 -1.6905*
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8.4 .2  Remuneration Committee Independence and Structure, and Firm Performance 
-  OLS 10
Tables 8 .29  and 8 .30  respectively present the regression results o f  m odel OLS 10(a) [i.e. 
regression o f  specified  remuneration com m ittee attributes in 2002  w ith respective firm 
perform ance 2 0 0 2  and 2003] and m odel OLS 10(b) [i.e. regression o f  specified  remuneration 
com m ittee attributes in 2003 w ith respective firm performance 2003 and 2004].
H ypothesis HRC 2 hypothesised that the proportion o f  independent directors on the 
remuneration com m ittee (N R C IN E D ) w ill have a positive impact on firm performance. OLS 10 
(a) and (b) results reported m ixed findings for the relationship betw een RCINED and firm 
performance. A s regards to N R C IN E D  in 2002 , a significant negative relationship was found 
with N R O E  in 2003  (fi -  -0 .18; p  = 0 .1). Sim ilarly, a significant negative relationship was also  
noted betw een  N R C IN E D  in 2003  and NR O E in 2003 (fi =  -0 .22; p  =  0 .05), and NR O E in 2004  
(fi =  -0 .19; p  =  0 .1). H ow ever, a significant positive relationship was identified betw een  
N R C IN E D  in 2003 and N T o b in ’s Q in 2004 (fi =  0.20; p  =  0 .1).
In addition, HRC 3 postulated that the presence o f  a senior independent director (RCSIN) in the 
remuneration com m ittee w ill have a positive impact on firm performance. Consistent with OLS 4 
and OLS 8 m odel findings on the impact o f  the presence o f  a senior independent director on their 
com m ittee on subsequent year firm performance, OLS 10(a) and 10(b) m odel results also showed  
a significant p ositive relationship betw een R CSIN and firm performance. Specifically, there 
existed sign ificant p ositive  relationship betw een R CSIN in 2002  and NR O E in 2003 (fi =  0 .31;/? =  
0.05) and, betw een  R C SIN  in 2003 and N R O E  in 2003 (fi= 0 .39; p = 0 .01).
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Table 8.29: R em uneration  Committee A ttributes and Firm Perfo rm ance 
The Examination of R em uneration  Committee A ttributes in 2002 and Firm Perfo rm ance 2003 and 2004—OLS 10(a) 
(The Testing of HRC 2 ,3 ,4 ,5  and  6)
RC = Remuneration committee, RCINED = Proportion of independent directors in remuneration committee, RCSIN = Presence o f  senior independent director on RC, RCFAM = Presence of senior independent director on RC, RCXCEO = The exclusion o f  CEO, CFO and managing 
director from RC, RCFIIN = RC chairman is independent director, NFAMDI = Proportion of family-member directors, NINSTL= Total Proportion of Government Agencies’, Public Listed Companies’/Corporations’ and Other Institutions' substantial equity holdings, NBDSZ = Size of 
Board of directors, NASET = Total Assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, PROP ■= Property Industry, CONSTR = Construction Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 02 - Year 2002, 03 = Year 2003, A letter N at the front of respective variable’s acronym indicated the variables had been 
transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ Notes: I'or the lest oj multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated V tt' leiel below 3, condition index less than 15 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respecliie dimension (row); io r  the test of autocorrelation oj 
errors the significance leiel for the Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than the Durbin Watson derived upper limit (dy); Statistical significance leiel: 0.1 (*), 0.0 5 (**), 0.0  / (***); A l l  I '-statistical values are significant al 0.001 leiel]
A d jR 2 0.2489 0.1487 0.2194 0.1661
R2 0.3206 0.2299 0.2939 0.2457
F 4.4721 2.8296 3.9452 3.0870
C oefficient t-stat C oefficient t C oefficient t C oefficient t
In tercept (a) -0.0045 -0.0199 -0.1374 -0.5690 -0.0792 -0.3428 -0.0345 -0.1443
Explanatory Variables (fi)
N R C IN E D 02 -0.0537 -0.5325 -0.0948 -0.8833 0.0403 0.3920 -0.1799 -1.6944*
RCSIN02 -0.0974 -0.6783 0.0810 0.5297 -0.0775 -0.5294 0.3062 2.0233**
RCFAM02 0.1200 0.7170 0.3489 1.9588+ -0.0178 -0.1042 0.1884 1.0685
RCXCEO02 -0.1745 -1.2612 0.1360 0.9232 -0.1175 -0.8331 0.0667 0.4575
R CH IN 02 -0.1783 -1.1149 -0.0645 -0.3785 -0.2361 -1.4479 -0.2180 -1.2936
Control Variables
NASET02 -0.2768 -3.0135+** 0.3981 4.0709*** -0.2540 -2.7123*** 0.3377 3.4891***
N D EQ 02 0.1773 2.5474++ 0.3220 4.5380***
NFAM DI02 -0.1661 -1.8804*
N IN STL02 0.1841 1.8025*
NBDSZ02 0.1230 1.6954*
Industry Dummy
PRO P -0.8948 -3.9291+* -0.7413 -3.1930***
CO N STR 0.5450 2.1890*+ 0.5818 2.2922**
F IN -0.4748 -1.7939*
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Table 8.30: R em uneration  Committee A ttributes and Firm Perform ance 
The Examination of R em uneration  Committee A ttributes in 2003 and  Firm Perform ance 2003 and  2004—OLS 10(b) 
(The Testing of HRC 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,  and 6)
RC = Remuneration committee, RCINED = Proportion o f independent directors in remuneration committee, RCSIN = Presence of senior independent director on RC, RCFAM = Presence of senior independent director on RC, RCXCEO = The exclusion o f CEO, CFO and managing 
director from RC, RCHIN = RC chairman is independent director, EXCEO = Exclusion of CEO, CFO, COO and Managing Director, NINSTL= Total Proportion of Government Agencies', Public Listed Companies’/Corporations’ and Other Institutions’ substantial equity holdings, AUF5 = 
Firm 's external auditor is one of the big 5 audit firms, NBDSZ = Size of Board of directors, NASET » Total Assets, NDEQ = Debt to equity ratio, PROP = Property Industry, CONSTR = Construction Industry, FIN = Finance Industry, 03 = Year 2003, 04 = Year 2004, A letter N at the 
front of respective variable’s acronym indicated the variables had been transformed to normal scores using Van der Waerden approach
/ Notes: I'or llse test of multicollinearity, all independent variables indicated VII ‘ letel below 5, condition index less than 1 5 and not more than one variance proportion greater than 0.50 in their respective dimension (row); For tlx test of autocorrelation of errors the 
significance leiel for tlx Durbin Watson statistic (d) indicated a value greater than tlx Durbin Watson derived upper limit (dy); Statistical significance leiel: 0 .1 (*), 0.05(**), 0.01 (***); A l l  V-statistical values are significant al 0.05 letel]
A d jR 2 0.2590 0.2102 0.0656 0.1205
R2 0.3297 0.2856 0.1568 0.2064
F 4.6613 3.7884 1.7185 2.4032
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
In te r c e p t  (a) -0.1975 -0.8579 -0.0428 -0.1801 -0.0434 -0.1661 -0.1848 -0.7293
Explanatory Variables ((f)
N R C IN E D 0 3 -0.0876 -0.9093 -0.2181 -2.1931** 0.1980 1.8104* -0.1923 -1.8138*
R C S IN 0 3 -0.1492 -1.1403 0.3858 2.8567*** -0.0932 -0.6275 -0.0549 -0.3816
R C F A M 03 -0.1733 -1.0543 -0.2372 -1.3976 -0.0265 -0.1420 0.0160 0.0884
R C X C E O 0 3 0.0258 0.1686 0.1139 0.7210 -0.1211 -0.6966 0.1531 0.9088
R C H IN 0 3 -0.0811 -0.5152 -0.0086 -0.0531 -0.2252 -1.2607 0.1025 0.5919
Control Variables
N A S E T 0 3 -0.3067 -3.2949*** 0.4567 4.7522*** -0.1749 -1.6552* 0.2449 2.3903**
N D E Q 0 3 0.3287 4.7414*** 0.1642 2.1507**
E X C E O 0 3 0.2863 1.8696*
N IN S T L 0 3 0.1973 1.8674*
A U F 503 0.2432 1.7228* 0.3551 2.2153**
N B D S Z 0 3 0.1837 2.5884**
Industry Dummy
P R O P -0.7260 -3.2262*** -0.4245 -1.8272* -0.4732 -1.9101*
C O N S T R 0.4409 1.7881* -0.4526 -1.6675*
F IN -0.4509 -1.7544*
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Furthermore, it w as hypothesised  by HRC 4 that the presence o f  a fam ily member on the 
remuneration com m ittee (R C FA M ) w ill have an impact on firm performance. OLS 10(a) results 
revealed a significant positive relationship betw een RCFAM  in 2002  and N R O E  in 2002 (/? = 
0.35; p  =  0 .1).
Results derived from testing HRC 5 (the exclusion  o f  CEO, CFO and/or m anaging director from  
the remuneration com m ittee) and HRC 6 (the appointment o f  independent director as 
remuneration com m ittee chairman) w ere not statistically significant. Subsequently, Table 8.31 
presents the sum m ary o f  findings for the impact o f  remuneration com m ittee establishm ent and 
its attributes on  firm performance.
Table 8.31: Summary of Findings of Remuneration Committee Establishment and Its 
Attributes on Firm Performance
Hypothesis HNC
Postulated
Relationship
(+/-/?)
Results
HNC 1: The establishment o f nomination committee in the firm  
[RCEXIST] + Not Supported
Hypothesis HNC
Postulated
Relationship
(+/-/?)
Results
HNC 2: The proportion o f INEDs on RC [RCINED] + Supported
HNC 3: The presence o f SRINED on RC [RCSIN] ? Supported
HNC 4: The presence o f FAMDI on RC [RCFAM] ? Positive
Relationship
HNC 5: The exclusion o f  CEO, CFO and MD from RC membership 
[RCXCEO] + Not Supported
HNC 6: The chairing ofRC  by INED [RCHIN] + Not Supported
IN ED =Independent D irector; RC  =  Remuneration Committee; SRINED = Senior Independent Director; FAMDI =  Family-Member 
Director; CEO = C h ie f Executive D irector; CFO = C h ief Financial Officer, M D  =  M anaging Director;
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8.4.3 Discussions of the Impact of Remuneration Committee Establishment and Its 
Attributes on Firm Performance — OLS 9 and OLS 10 Results
(I) Remuneration Committee Establishment and Firm Performance
Sim ilar to the O LS 7 finding o f  a significant negative impact o f  nom ination com mittee 
establishm ent on  firm performance, OLS 9 m odel results also revealed a significant negative 
relationship betw een  remuneration com m ittee establishm ent and firm performance. Likely the 
case, the form ation o f  a remuneration com m ittee by M alaysian listed com panies was part o f  
their com pliance w ith  M CCG  2001 B est Practices guidelines. W here com panies had decided not 
to im plem ent B est Practices, M B SB  listing rulings required them  to d isclose their reasons for 
non-com pliance in their corporate governance statement. The significance o f  the com mittee as a 
board governing com m ittee in the evaluation o f  execu tives’ com pensation policies, schem es and 
performance w ould  need tim e to develop  (see Yermack, 2004). M oreover, its members would  
need relevant training and exposure to the com m ittee’s underlying function, authority and their 
oversight role and responsibilities as w ell as clear objectives (see  Forker, 1992, Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992, Carson, 2002  and Agrawal and Chadha, 2 005), given  that the remuneration 
com m ittee function w as previously m anaged and administrated by the firm ’s board and/or top 
execu tives o f  the firm.
(0 ) Remuneration Committee Attributes and Firm Performance
Section 8 .4 .2  o f  O LS 10 m odel findings indicated that, the proportion o f  independent directors 
(NRCINED) on the remuneration com m ittee had a negative impact on firm performance. On 
the other hand, the research m odel further revealed o f  the insignificant relationship between the 
appointment o f  independent director as the com m ittee’s chairman (RCHIN) and firm
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performance. N otab ly , the presence o f  a h igh number o f  independent directors and independent 
chairman w ill ensure an objective and impartial evaluation o f  execu tives’ remuneration and 
perform ance (see  Forker, 1992; Greenbury, 1995). In the case o f  the current study, the 
exam ination o f  the com panies remuneration com m ittee activities (see sam pled com panies 
Corporate G overnance Statement on remuneration com m ittee) seem ed to pointed that the lack o f  
governing activ ities performed by remuneration com m ittee m em bers m ay have affected the 
potential o f  the independent director to contribute to the effectiven ess o f  the com m ittee and 
hence firm perform ance (i.e  more than h a lf o f  the sam pled com panies disclosed  the need for 
their nom ination com m ittee to convene at least one m eeting in a year, but in actual fact the 
m eeting w as not convened).
To further encourage the independent directors’ involvem ent and com m itm ent to undertake their 
remuneration com m ittee duties responsibly, it is equally important for the firm to ensure that the 
com m ittee’s m em bers have greater understanding and clarification o f  the function o f  the 
remuneration com m ittee. This w ould include providing them  with appropriate corporate 
governance induction programme to enhance their com prehension  o f  the significance o f  the 
com m ittee m em bers’ oversight role in governing ex ecu tiv es’ com pensation, and further, to 
establish  proper term s o f  reference and authority o f  the com m ittee. Accordingly, com m ittee’ 
m em bers w ill have a better prospect o f  accom plish ing their duties w ith diligence and vigilance.
On the other hand, the presence o f  a senior independent director (R C SIN ) on the remuneration 
com m ittee, respectively , had a positive impact on firm performance. Specifically, the presence 
o f  a senior independent director on the remuneration com m ittee (RCSIN ) w ill strengthen and
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enhance the objectivity, impartiality and credibility o f  independent directors’ judgem ents, as 
w ell as effec tiven ess, g iven  his/her significant corporate governance experience (see Libby, 
1985; Knapp, 1987; DeZoort et al., 2001).
With respect to the significant positive relationship betw een mem bership o f  fam ily-m em ber  
directors on the remuneration com m ittee (R C F A M ) and firm performance, this can be linked 
with their potential to  provide better m onitoring o f  non-fam ily m anagers’ actions. In particular, 
fam ily-m em ber d irectors’ history w ith the com pany (w hether as founder o f  the com pany or 
descendants o f  the founder o f  the com pany), m otivate them  to ensure proper governance in the 
com pany’s business transaction to ensure its prosperity and for the benefit o f  their next 
generation (see  D eA n g e lo  and D eA ngelo , 1985). M oreover, according to M cConaughy et al., 
(1998), a founder’s fam ily  m em bers have greater abilities to m anage the firm efficiently  than the 
founder since the form er w ill be able to use firm ’s past experience and information to improve 
current m anagem ent and operations o f  the business.
In addition, the study o f  Ho et al., (2004) on fam ily controlled firm s in H ong Kong Stock  
Exchange show ed  these com panies to be high performers. A ccording to Bruce (2006:88), 
fam ily-controlled  corporations had a greater tendency to inculcate a long-term earnings interest 
culture than n on-fam ily  businesses. H ence, the p ositive impact on firm performance o f  fam ily 
m em ber director presence on M alaysian listed com panies’ remuneration com m ittee may due to 
his/her aw areness o f  the need to enhance business prosperity with long term firm performance 
goal, which is im perative for shareholder value creation. H ow ever, due to the potentiality for 
fam ily-m em ber directors to act in their fam ily best interests rather than shareholders, a high
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proportion o f  independent directors and the presence o f  a w ell-respected senior independent 
director should provide appropriate governance o f  fam ily m em ber behaviours and conduct in the 
com m ittee’s activ ities and decisions.
In addition, the exclu sion  o f  CEO , CFO and m anaging director from remuneration com m ittee 
m em bership (RCXCEO) had no impact on firm performance (see  OLS 10). Specifically , the 
com position  o f  remuneration com m ittee by more than majority independent directors, the 
appointm ent o f  independent remuneration com m ittee chairman and the presence o f  senior 
independent director on the nom ination com m ittee, established formal and transparent 
procedures in the setting o f  execu tive remuneration and hence ensuring appropriate monitoring 
o f  CEO involvem ent in the setting o f  executive remuneration policies (See for instance 
Firstenberg and M alkiel, 1980; W eisbach, 1988; Daily and Dalton, 1993; Borokhovich et al., 
1994; Shivdasani and Yerm ack, 1999; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001;Ferris et al., 2003).
8.5 Robustness Tests on the Research Models’ Findings
Several studies have identified the endogeneity problem as one o f  the factors that may affect the 
relationship betw een  corporate governance attributes and firm ’s performance. For instance, 
Herm alin and W eisbach (1 9 8 8 ) and Agrawal and K noeber (1996) argue that a firm ’s 
reform ation o f  corporate governance practice may have been driven by the firm ’s poor or better 
perform ance in previous year. T his argument is a lso supported by Bhagat and Black (2002). On 
the other hand, B lack  (2 0 0 1 ) contended, when difference firm s adopted different governance
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measure for the optim ality o f  their business operation, there is no direct correlation between  
their corporate governance practice and firm value.
In the case o f  the current research, M alaysian listed firm s’ im plem entation o f  the Principles and 
B est Practices o f  the Corporate G overnance C ode in 2002 and 2003 were influenced by the 
mandatory requirem ent o f  M B SB  Listing R ulings 2001 (see  Chapter 15 o f  the M BSB Listing 
R ulings 2 0 0 1 ). A s a result, firm ’s adoption o f  the corporate governance practice w as not driven 
by internally determ ined decisions. Rather, it w as due to the external factor nam ely regulatory 
requirem ents. A ccord ingly , the endogeneity problem  w as less likely to affect the current study 
exam ination o f  relationship betw een firm ’s corporate governance practice and performance (see  
Black, 2 0 0 1 :9 7 ) .
In their study, D robetz et al., (2004), noted the impact o f  the endogeneity problem w hen  
studying the relationship betw een corporate governance variables and firm performance. They 
suggested  the use o f  appropriate control variables to m itigate the causality problem that may be 
inherent in the relationship betw een corporate governance variables and firm performance. By 
em ploying the control variables proposed by Shin and Stulz (2 0 0 0 ), Drobetz et al., 2004 used 
log total asset as the control variable on firm characteristics. In addition, Drobetz et al., (2004) 
im plem ented B lack  et a l.’s (2 0 0 3 ) control variable o f  firm characteristic, nam ely debt to capital 
ratio calculated as total debt plus equity. Drobetz et al., (2 0 0 4 ) also em ployed the index effect as 
another control variable.
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F ollow ing D robetz et al., (2004), the current study has em ployed  firm size, leverage and index  
effect as part o f  the research m odels control variables (see further Chapter 5: Research  
H ypotheses and M odels D evelopm ent). Further, from the regression results derived from the 
research m odels o f  board o f  directors (O LS 1, 2 and 3 in Chapter 7) and board subcom m ittees 
(OLS 4, 5, 6 , 7, 8, 9 and 10 in Chapter 8), in m ost cases the firm ’ size  and leverage variables had 
a significant im pact on firm performance (p = 0 .01) and hence provided further explanation o f  
other factors that m ay had a substantial influence on firm perform ance other than firm s’ internal 
governing m echanism s.
M oreover endogeneity  test w as carried out to observe potential endogeneous impact o f  firm 
perform ance on explanatory variable. N otably Barnhart et al., (1998) study on board 
com position  effect on  corporate performance found managerial ownership and board 
com position  variables w ere endogenous to firm performance. According to Bound et al., 
(1995:443) w hen this circum stance persist, the analyses o f  the predicted relationship will 
produce a bias and/or inconsistent estim ates o f  the causal effect o f  the independent variables on 
the dependent variables.
In reference to W ooldridge (2000 ,) the potential o f  endogeneity  problem to affect the causal 
relationship o f  corporate governance practice impact on firm performance were exam ined using 
tw o-stage least square (2S L S ) analyses o f  SPSS 12.0. The first step for implementing 2SLS  
analysis is to identify  the instrumental variable for the OLS m odel to be predicted. A ccording to 
Black et al., (2 0 0 6 ), ideally , an instrumental variable should be an exogenous variable which is
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impartial to dependent variable influence78 or have no direct association with the outcom e  
(Bound et al., 1995). In particular, instrumental variable should correlate c losely  with the 
endogenous variable to produce reliable and consistent estim ates o f  endogenous variable (B lack  
et al., 2 0 0 6 ). H ence, the instrumental variables should not have direct causal path to the 
endogenous variable w hose disturbance term is correlated w ith the problem atic causal variable. 
Correspondingly, 2S L S  procedures, an OLS regression analysis o f  the n ew  m odel, w ill produce 
new  predicted values for the endogenous explanatory variables.
For the current study, an instrumental variable o f  one year lag firm performance measure (i.e. 
T obin’s Qt.i and R O E t.i)  w as em ployed as an instrumental variable in the 2SLS analysis (See, 
further, W ooldridge, 2000: 289). According to M ain et al., (1996), the use o f  lagged dependent 
variable as instrumental variable w ill be able to capture the dynam ic o f  the dependent variable. 
Subsequently, the 2SL S  results obtained, indicated that the correlation betw een the residuals o f  
firm perform ance and explanatory variables w as not significant. This evidence provided further 
indicator o f  the low  potential effect o f  the endogeneity problem in the research m od els’ results.
In addition the robustness o f  the regression results m ay also be affected by the problems o f  
autocorrelation, m ulticollinearity and heteroskedasticity. A s indicated by OLS 1 to 10 model 
results (see  Table 7.1 to 8 .30), the VIF level (i.e. degree o f  collinearity am ongst independent 
variables) o f  the independent variables w as b elow  3. T his VIF level is within Hair et al., 
(1998:193) and Pallant (2 0 0 5 ) acceptable VIF value o f  b e low  10. Furthermore, collinearity 
diagnostics results o f  the independent variables reported a value o f  condition index less than 15
78 In Black et al., (2006) they explain, the influence that the instrumental variable has on the outcome is indirectly namely 
through its direct impact on the endogenous variables.
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and respectively , the value o f  the variance proportion in each o f  the variables’ dim ension (row) 
[based on the results obtained from their regression coefficien t variance-decom position matrix] 
w as not greater than 0 .50  in more than one cases. These results presented statistical evidence o f  
no m ulticollinearity problem am ongst independent variables (see  for instance B elsely  et al., 
1980, Hair et al., 1998 and Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001: 85, 98).
In terms o f  autocorrelation problem or correlation am ongst residual term, the regression results 
had produced a Durbin W atson statistical value (d) that w as higher than Durbin W atson derived  
upper lim it (du). A ccording to Field (2005) and M addala (2005:229), when Durbin-W atson  
statistical value (d) is higher than Durbin W atson upper lim it (du), the null hypothesis o f  no 
autocorrelation should not be rejected. M orever, with respect to the heteroskedasticity problem, 
the F or Lagrange M ultiplier (L M ) value com puted from the W hite Test for heteroskedasticity  
(see  section  6 .6 ) produced on average a p-value higher than 0 .12  . This result provided evidence  
that the O LS regression m odels did not violate their hom oscedasticity  assum ption (see  
W ooldridge, 2000). H ence, the current research regression results w ere robust and valid.
8.6 Conclusion
The current chapter has analysed and d iscussed study findings relating to the impact o f  board 
su bcom m ittees’ attributes on firm performance. In terms o f  the impact o f  audit com mittee 
independence on firm performance, the m od els’ significant findings indicated a significant 
negative relationship betw een  the presences o f  w h olly  independent directors (A U D F), more than 
majority independent directors (A U G M J) and majority independent directors (A U D M J) in the 
com m ittee’s com position  and firm performance. H ow ever, w hen the presence o f  a senior
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independent director (A C SIN ) and at least one independent or non-independent audit com mittee 
m em ber w ith  practising accountant experience (ACPI and A C PA C T ) and com panies’ 
transparency o f  the authority o f  the audit com m ittee to report any violation  o f  the Exchange 
ruling to the E xchange (R BR E), were investigated together in the audit com m ittee independence 
m odel, they w ere found to have a significant positive impact on firm performance [see Table 
8.7]. The effec tiv en ess o f  audit com m ittee independence w as significantly influenced by the 
presence o f  these respective factors and consequently the com m ittee’s independent com position  
had a significant im pact on firm performance.
With respect to the im pact o f  audit com m ittee leadership on firm performance, the leadership o f  
independent directors w ith accounting and finance background (A C H A C F) was shown to assist 
effective m anagem ent (see  Table 8.18). Com m ittee m em bers’ performance o f  financial 
oversight duties w ill be facilitated by the chairm an’s regular contact with board’s chairman, top 
m anagem ent executives and audit lead partner. Further, the proportion o f  audit com m ittee  
m em bers w ith practising accountant experience (N A C PA C T ) and law  background (N A C LA W ) 
w ill contribute to the efficien cy  and effectiven ess o f  the com m ittee’s performance o f  duties and 
hence firm perform ance (see  Table 8.21).
Findings a lso  revealed that, the establishm ent o f  nom ination (N C EX IST ) and remuneration 
(R C EX IST ) in firm s w as negatively related to firm perform ance (see Table 8.26 and 8.31 
respectively). S in ce these com m ittees were at their early stage o f  developm ent at the tim e o f  the 
study, tim e w as needed to establish their governing role in the firm and com m ittees’ members 
would require relevant exposure and training for their oversight role in the committee. With
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respect to the nom ination com m ittee’s attributes’ impact on firm performance, the presence o f  
senior independent director (N C SIN ) in the com m ittee w as show n to enhance the contribution o f  
the com m ittee to firm performance (see Table 8.6). H ow ever, exam ination o f  the exclusion o f  
CEO, CFO or m anaging director (N C X C E O ) from the com m ittee’s m embership and the 
appointm ent o f  independent remuneration com m ittee’s chairman (N C H IN ), on firm 
perform ance revealed significant negative relationship betw een the respective variables.
Further, the presence o f  senior independent director (R C SIN ) and fam ily member (RCFAM ) on 
the remuneration com m ittee w as show n to have a positive impact on firm performance. The 
presence o f  sen ior independent director can lead the independent director group with his/her 
corporate governance experience and s/he can appropriately control fam ily-m em ber director 
unwarranted dem ands. O n the other hand, the observation o f  the impact o f  the proportion o f  
independent director on the remuneration com m ittee (R C H SIN ) on firm performance indicated a 
significant negative relationship betw een the tw o variables. The lack o f  activities o f  
remuneration com m ittee explained the low  participation o f  independent director in the 
com m ittee’s oversight duties and hence the consequence o f  such circum stance on firm 
performance.
The d iscussion  on the im pact o f  board subcom m ittees’ attributes on firm performance has been 
limited to the sign ificant results derived from the individual research m odels. A s suggested  
earlier in chapter 7, the co llection  o f  more corporate governance data could extend the current 
study for tim e series research and further application o f  pooled regression analyses. The next 
chapter, 9, sum m arises the current research findings and indicates the research finding’
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contribution to assisting investor’s evaluation o f  firm ’s corporate governance practice and 
enhancing policy-m akers’ prospective corporate governance initiatives and rules setting. The 
lim itations o f  the current research and areas for future study are also identified.
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~Conclusions and ^ commendationsfor ‘Future <RgsearcH~
9.0 Introduction
This chapter first presents an overview  o f  study findings in relation to the research questions 
formulated in Chapter One and then indicates the research’s contribution to the corporate 
governance literature. The research fin d in gs’ contribution to enhancing policy-m akers’ 
perspective on  corporate governance initiatives and rule setting, and assisting investors’ 
evaluation o f  firm ’s corporate governance structure, and corporations’ full capitalisation o f  the 
value o f  independent d irectors’ experience, know ledge and aptitudes is then highlighted. The 
lim itations o f  the research and areas for future study are subsequently identified.
9.1 Research Findings
Research Question 1: Does the independence of board o f directors9 members from 
management influence affect a firm ys financial performance?
The current study found that board independence enhanced firm performance when a senior 
independent director and an independent board’s chairman w ere present on the board, and CEO, 
CFO, CO O  or M D  w as not a board member. The corporate governance experience o f  the 
independent director, contributed to his reputation and influence on the board as w ell as to the 
board’s d ecision  m aking. In addition, being the leader o f  the board, independent board chairman 
had greater control and authority to influence organisational process. M oreover, the absence o f  
top m anagem ent execu tives from the board provided independent directors
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with greater freedom  to express their independent v iew s or challenged managem ent decisions  
that w ere in con flict w ith shareholders interests.
Furthermore, the negative relationship betw een the proportion o f  fam ily m em ber director on the 
board and firm perform ance supported the im perativeness o f  higher independent director 
presence on the board. T hese findings provided empirical evidence in support o f  the significance  
o f  board independence as an effective governing m echanism  for m onitoring fam ily-m em ber 
director influence on  board decisions.
Research Question 2: Does the structure of the board o f directors affect a firm’s financial 
performance?
W ith respect to board leadership, the current study found that chairing o f  the firm ’s board by an 
independent director, a n on-executive director or founder o f  the com pany and separation o f  
board chairm an and CEO role, had a positive impact on  firm performance. Notably, the 
appointm ent o f  an independent board chairman established an environm ent conducive for fair 
debate o f  critical issues during board m eeting(s), setting o f  relevant and sufficient board agendas 
for board m eetings and appropriate m onitoring o f  board m em bers’ and m anagem ents’ conducts. 
In addition, n on-executive director’s business relationship w ith  the firm provided him/her with a 
better understanding o f  the firm ’s business operation and gave him /her the incentive to lead the 
com pany appropriately.
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On the other hand, the board led by the founder o f  the firm w ould  benefit from his/her business 
and m anagerial experience as w ell as enhance m onitoring o f  non-ow ner m anagers’ action. In 
addition, the separation o f  board chairman and CEO position w ould ensure orderly management 
o f  the organisation’s activities such that the firm ’s m anagem ent and control w as not dominated  
by one person. Thus, structure o f  the board had a significant im pact on firm performance.
Research Question 3: Do the knowledge and skills of the board of directors’ members affect a 
firm ’s financial performance?
Empirical findings indicated that board m em bers with a professional qualification and/or Doctor 
o f  P hilosophy w ould  enhance firm value g iven  their high level o f  know ledge and skills and 
industry experience. S pecifica lly , directors that had finance know ledge and skills and/or 
attended an execu tive m anagem ent programme held by top business universities such as 
Harvard, Stanford, IN S E A D , London B usiness School, etc. enhanced firm value with their 
acquirement o f  relevant technical and practical aspects o f  a firm ’s financial management. In 
addition, the presence o f  director(s) with law  qualifications provided important legal expert 
advisory service to assist board m em bers understanding o f  the leg islative and regulatory rules 
and procedures affecting the com panies’ activities and d irectors’ fiduciary obligations, and 
hence strengthened board m embers com m itm ent in overseeing  the firm activities. Thus, the 
em pirical find ings indicated that the provision o f  relevant board o f  director training programmes 
could enhance board o f  director m anagem ent capabilities and their subsequent decision-m aking  
and consequently  contribute to firm value creation activities.
43 3
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Research Question 4: Does the independence of audit committee members from management 
influence affect a firm ’s financial performance?
Empirical find ings pointed to the significant importance o f  an independent quorum on the audit 
com m ittee and their effectiveness. M oreover, the presence o f  a senior independent director on 
the audit com m ittee and com m ittee’s m em ber with practising accountant experience appeared to 
strengthen the influence o f  independent v iew s and effectiven ess as w ell as those o f  auditors 
given  his/her corporate governance experience and acquirement o f  relevant auditing and audit 
firm experience. H ow ever, the presence o f  a top m anagem ent executive (i.e. CEO, CFO and/or 
m anaging director) w ith  financial know ledge and skills on the com m ittee, would not endanger 
independent m em bers effectiven ess in performing their financial oversight duties objectively  
and w ith v ig ilan ce  and d iligen ce, given  that sufficient disclosure had been made about their 
respective appointm ent in the com pany’s Audit Comm ittee Report to warrant closer monitoring 
o f  their conducts on the com m ittee by independent members, regulators and investors.
W hilst, to gain market trusts o f  the beneficial aspect o f  the con ven ing o f  a separate m eeting  
betw een independent m embers o f  the audit com m ittee and external auditors, the credibility o f  
auditor’s op in ions and judgem ents need to be demonstrated justifiably. Further, the productivity 
o f  respective parties’ collaboration depended on the com m itm ent and effectiveness o f  the team  
w orking betw een  independent audit com m ittee m em bers and the external auditor in pursuing 
their financial oversight duties responsibly.
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The im portance o f  the audit com m ittee’s financial oversight duties in protecting shareholders’ 
interests w as further em phasised by its authority to report to the Exchange any breaches by the 
firm o f  regulatory rules or its failure to address issues raised by audit com m ittee members. 
A ccordingly , findings indicated that audit com m ittee m em bers’ independence from management 
influence affected  a firm ’s financial performance.
Research Questions 5: Does the leadership of the audit committee affect a firm's financial 
performance?
Empirical ev idence pointed to an enhancem ent in firm perform ance when the audit com m ittee’s 
chairman p ossessed  accounting and finance experience. Such experience enabled the chairman 
to lead and m anage audit com m ittee m em bers and their activities effectively  as w ell as ensured 
auditors’ productivity.
Research Question 6: Do the accounting and financial knowledge and skills of audit 
committee members affect a firm's financial performance?
The proportion o f  audit com m ittee m em bers w ith practical accounting experience and legal 
background appeared to elevate audit com m ittee m em bers’ aw areness and abilities to perform 
their financial oversight responsibilities efficien tly  and hence lead to better governance o f  
shareholders’ investm ents. M oreover, the appointment o f  financial experts to the committee with  
such experience a lso  contributed to the efficien cy  o f  com m ittee’s activities. Accordingly, the 
accounting and financial know ledge and sk ills o f  audit com m ittee members affected firm ’s 
financial perform ance.
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Research Question 7: Does the formation of nomination and remuneration committees affects 
a firm's financial performance?
Empirical findings suggested  that the nom ination and remuneration com m ittee oversight 
function o f  board candidates’ nom ination and m em bers performance, and executives’ 
com pensation p o lic ies and appraisal respectively, need to be properly established by firms with  
relevant induction program m es and training provided to these com m ittees m em bers to raise their 
awareness and clear understanding o f  their governing role and its significance in protecting 
shareholders’ interests. O nly then can their active participation in these com m ittees’ activities be 
assured and the full potential o f  each com m ittee’s oversight function be reached. Even though  
the em pirical ev id en ce did not indicate that the formation o f  nomination and remuneration 
com m ittees affected a firm ’s financial performance, how ever, these com m ittees do have the 
potential to contribute to firm value.
Research Question 8: Does the independence of nomination and remuneration committee 
members from management influence affect a firm's financial performance?
The independent v iew s and judgem ents o f  nom ination and remuneration com m ittee members 
w ill be enhanced w hen a senior independent director was present in the respective com m ittees. 
In addition, w hen  the top m anagem ent executive (i.e. CEO, CFO and managing director) and/or 
fam ily-m em ber director(s) w ere present on the respective com m ittees, it becam e critical to form 
more than m ajority independent directors on the nom ination and remuneration com m ittee to 
establish stronger independent stance. Specifically , appropriate and sufficient governance 
m easures w ere required to control top execu tives and fam ily-m em ber director(s) domineering
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influence on the nom ination process o f  board candidatures and the setting o f  executives and 
ow ner-m anager com pensation  level and policies.
Research Question 9: Does the structure o f nomination and remuneration committees affect a 
firm ’s financial performance?
The aforem entioned findings provide em pirical evidence for answ ering both Research Question  
8 and 9. The independence o f  nom ination and remuneration is im perative to establish objectivity  
and im partiality in com m ittees’ evaluations and decisions on board nom inees and executive  
com pensation  paym ent setting, given  that top m anagem ent executives (i.e. CEO, CFO or 
m anaging director) and fam ily-m em ber director may insist on their appointment to these 
com m ittees. M oreover, the appointm ent o f  an independent and experienced independent 
chairman to these com m ittees w ould strengthen the independent v iew s and judgem ents o f  other 
independent m em bers esp ecia lly  w hen top management execu tives and fam ily members are 
present in the com m ittee.
9.2  C o n tr ib u tio n s  o f  the S tudy
(I) Corporate Governance Literature
The current study m akes several important contributions to the corporate governance literature. 
N am ely , the current study to the author’s best know ledge, the first to exam ine the potential 
impact o f  fam ily-m em ber director oversight role in audit, nomination and remuneration 
com m ittees in M alaysian  corporations. In particular, this study has exam ined the impact o f  audit 
com m ittee m onitoring effectiven ess on firm performance by considering both fam ily-m em ber
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director presence on the com m ittee as w ell as their proportion on the firm ’s board. The study 
findings on fam ily-m em ber director governing role add to the body o f  know ledge on the 
corporate governance practice o f  fam ily-controlled listed com panies.
A dditionally , this study is the first em pirical study conducted in M alaysia to investigate the 
impact o f  a senior independent director’s governance experience in enhancing the board and its 
subcom m ittees’ objective and impartial judgem ents as w ell as leadership o f  the firm ’s governing 
body. P reviously , D eZoort (1997 , 1998) and DeZoort and Salterio (2 001) have exam ined the 
contribution o f  experienced independent directors on audit com m ittee effectiveness. The current 
study has extended their evaluation o f  the importance o f  independent director with corporate 
governance experience by exam ining the impact o f  senior independent director membership on 
nom ination and rem uneration com m ittee effectiveness and hence firm performance.
It is a lso the first study conducted in M alaysia to identity the need to appoint independent 
financial experts, not just financial experts, as audit com m ittee m em bers to safeguard and ensure 
independent m em ber evaluation o f  firm s’ reporting practice and internal control process.
(II) Policy Makers
The findings o f  this study contribute to policy-m akers’ prospective corporate governance 
initiatives and rule setting for the fo llow in g  reasons. Empirical evidence emphasised the 
importance o f  independent directors’ oversight duties on the board and its subcommittees. 
Specifica lly , the board and their subcom m ittees need to perform their respective responsibilities 
with com m itm ent, v ig ilan ce and diligence to ensure effective governing o f  firm activities and
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hence safeguarding o f  shareholders’ investm ent with the im plem entation o f  value enhancement 
activities by m anagem ent.
M oreover, regulatory bodies play a key role in governing firm s’ corporate governance with the 
institution o f  appropriate regulatory fram ework to monitor firm s’ corporate behaviours. N am ely, 
the M alaysia Securities C om m ission , M alaysia Bourse Securities Lim ited, M alaysia Accounting  
Standard Board and other professional bodies such as M alaysian Institute o f  Accountant and 
M alaysian A ssocia tion  o f  Institute Chartered and Secretarial Administrators have a pivotal role 
in d evelop ing  and establishing effective corporate governance regulatory framework that protect 
shareholders’ interests and at the sam e tim e encouraging managers to continually pursue their 
entrepreneurship m otives w ithout feeling being unnecessarily constrained.
For instance, the regulatory bodies support for firms to ensure that their independent directors 
obtained appropriate understanding and com prehension o f  the core activities o f  the firm by 
providing relevant training, site v isit and access to personnel and docum ents (w here necessary) 
w ould a llo w  the directors to perform their oversight duties e ffec tively . In particular, it w ould be 
useful for the regulatory bodies and public as a w hole i f  independent directors are required to 
produce a report to the Securities C om m ission and Stock E xchange o f  the assistance that they 
received w hen  perform ing their monitoring duties. In one hand, the regulatory bodies would be 
able to receive  updates o f  com panies com m itm ent to im plem ent the Codes o f  Corporate 
G overnance responsib ly , nam ely for prospective assessm ent o f  the effectiveness o f  current 
Codes Principles and B est Practices. On another, the independent directors w ould be protected
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against unforeseen legal liability for n egligen ce and this should boost their morale to perform  
their duties accordingly.
B esides that, M alaysia Institute o f  Corporate G overnance (M IC G ) also need to ensure that 
special continuing education and training programmes are set up for corporate directors and 
other corporate professionals. In particular, independent d irectors’ awareness o f  the importance 
o f  v ig ilan ce and d iligen ce in the performance o f  their oversight duties is critical and substantial 
for establishing credible and reliable governing body in the corporation.
The M alaysia Securities C om m ission , M alaysia Bourse Securities Limited, Companies 
C om m ission  o f  M alaysia  and M ICG should also gather inform ation about independent director’ 
view s on factors inhibiting their com m itm ent in the organisation given  that M BSB listing  
requirements assure them  o f  the firm ’s m anagem ent’s cooperation to provide adequate and 
relevant supply o f  inform ation, external independent professional consultation and funds to 
assist them  in m aking inform ed decisions. A lso , independent directors’ d issatisfaction with the 
financial incentives available to them  m ay have affected their perform ance o f  oversight role. In 
this case , policy-m akers need to com e up w ith a plan as to how  independent directors’ 
shareholdings in the firm can be raised to a substantial stake without affecting their 
independence, g iven  that current M BSB rulings do not a llow  them to ow n 5% or more shares in 
the firm.
In addition, M B S B  revision  o f  the financial expert requirement on the audit com m ittee with a 
supplem entary ruling o f  the presence o f  at least one independent financial expert on the
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com m ittee w ill enhance the objectivity and effectiven ess o f  the com m ittee. In particular, it w ill 
reduce the opportunity for a firm ’s m anagem ent and owner-m anagers to control the independent 
judgem ents and d ecisions on the com m ittee through the appointment o f  their financial expert to 
the com m ittee.
G iven the significant contribution o f  senior independent directors to strengthening firm s’ 
corporate governance practice, M alaysian policy  makers need to increase their efforts in 
prom oting the appointm ent o f  these h igh ly  reputable independent directors in the M alaysian  
corporations. A t the sam e tim e, policy-m akers need to properly monitor com panies description  
o f  their senior independent director because this study found tw o firm s had appointed their non­
executive director as sen ior independent director (possibly due to his/her independent director 
experience in other firm s).
To develop  and enhance nom ination and remuneration com m ittee m em bers’ performance o f  
their sp ecific  oversight duties, policy  makers need to increase their efforts in promoting their 
greater aw areness o f  and exposure to the significance o f  these com m ittees’ functions and further 
establish the proper authorities o f  the com m ittees. S ince previously (and was still the case in 
som e listed com panies in this study), board o f  directors and m anagem ent were primarily 
responsible for nom inating board candidates and setting ex ecu tiv es’ com pensation payments. 
Further, p o licy  m akers need to gather the responses and experiences o f  directors appointed to 
nom ination and rem uneration com m ittees to identify those factors that affect their oversight 
com m itm ent in the respective com m ittee so that appropriate action can be undertaken to address 
them.
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Finally policy-m akers efforts in establishing and enforcing credible corporate governance 
practice in the listed firm s m ay further encourage foreign investors’ participation and their 
confidence in the reliability and hence full potential o f  M alaysia’s capital market to provide 
them with m ore than average return on their investments.
(Ill) Investors
The study’s findings also have important im plications for investors. They should use the 
opportunity g iven  by firm s to contact the senior independent director directly, given firm s’ 
provision o f  the contact number and address o f  the director in the corporate governance 
statement o f  the annual report, to enhance their information need about the board’s activities as 
w ell as firm ’s internal activ ities (where appropriate) on a tim ely basis. In addition, they should  
increase their participation in annual general m eetings as they are able to com m unicate directly 
with the firm ’s board o f  directors regarding their efforts in enhancing shareholders’ value 
creation and establishing appropriate governance m echanism s to protect their interests. Even  
though the audit com m ittee chairm an’s com m unication w ith non-m anagem ent attendees during 
the annual general m eeting is conducted through the board’s chairman, investors should take this 
opportunity to ask specific questions in respect o f  any concern about the reliability and 
credibility o f  the firm ’s financial reporting information. Investors m ay also recommend that the 
com pany’s board supply additional information about the details o f  firm ’s strategic planning and 
investm ent activ ities so that they are able to evaluate h ow  such operations enhance firm 
performance.
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(IV ) Corporations
In order to capitalise fu lly  on the value o f  independent director’s know ledge, aptitudes and 
experience, corporations need to alter their v iew s on, attitudes towards and treatment o f  this 
human capital on firm ’s board beyond mere com pliance w ith governance practice guidelines. It 
is inevitable today that com pany w ill engage a certain number o f  independent directors on 
boards (due to progressive academ icians, institutional investors, regulatory and legislative  
bodies having dem onstrated their importance). Thus, firm s, shareholders and stakeholders 
should start d ev isin g  strategies to make such directors’ roles more productive and value-for- 
m oney in term s o f  board decisions and activities because their mandatory appointment com es at 
a cost: their fees and other reimbursement entitlem ents.
9 .3 L im ita tio n  o f  th e  S tu d y  and  F u tu re  R esearch
The current study has exam ined the impact o f  M alaysian listed com panies’ adoption o f  
Principles and B est Practices on the M alaysian Codes o f  Corporate Governance on board o f  
directors and board subcom m ittees as at financial year 2002  and 2003 w ith firm performance in 
2002 , 2003  and 2004, respectively. N evertheless, the potential benefits o f  a firm ’s 
im plem entation o f  good corporate governance practices m ay be better captured by its firm 
perform ance w hen the observation period is extended to five  years for instance. Yermack (2004) 
pointed to the im portance o f  conducting a study on board practice over a certain period o f  time, 
nam ely 5 years. H e argued that, such tim e frame w ill a llow  better understanding o f  how  outside 
directors’ sk ills  ev o lv e  w ith  tim e, given their lack o f  know ledge o f  the com pany’s operations 
when they first com m enced  their job  in the firm and their reputation’s dependence on their past 
and current w orking experience. Importantly, after certain period o f  time they may have
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accum ulated the required and relevant know ledge and sk ills to influence the firm ’s strategic 
decision. Future research on this subject m ay be better undertaken using questionnaires surveys 
and/or interview s approach to gather details understanding o f  how  directors working 
environm ent affected  their decision making.
M oreover, a longer period o f  observation o f  a firm ’s corporate governance practice will 
facilitate a m ore accurate assessm ent o f  the developm ent o f  the internal governing body, the 
board o f  director awareness o f  and com m itm ent to good corporate governance practices. 
Further, w ith  tim e com panies m ay be better able to evaluate and identify those elem ents o f  the 
Code that are particularly relevant to them and contribute to the better management o f  their 
business operations and procedures and are in accordance w ith shareholders’ best interests. 
A ccording to W estphal (1 9 9 9 ) there is a potential benefit inherent in the congruency between  
executive and independent directors’ aim s and objectives for generating higher firm value.
The current study has exam ined the contribution o f  independent directors to firm performance 
by linking the impact o f  directors’ significance in establishing impartial v iew  and judgem ents on 
the board and their related expertise on firm value creation. Future research may extend to 
include content analysis o f  the information d isclosed  and its dissem ination in the corporate 
governance statem ent section  o f  firm s’ annual report.
Another research avenue w ould  be to exam ine the im plications o f  firms disclosing related party 
transactions for the effec tiven ess o f  their internal control system  and administration. This type o f  
transaction also requires further identification, exam ination and disclosure o f  a com pany’s
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engagement with a wide range of related parties, for example, subsidiaries, directors, employees 
and suppliers, given the non-recognition of certain transactions by accounting measures, i.e. the 
provision of free business services by related parties, and potential creative accounting 
manoeuvres in the recognition and treatment of certain business transactions [see Gordon et al., 
2007].
9.4 Conclusion
The influence of corporations’ governance practices on firm performance has been examined at 
length, mainly due to the potential of the former to provide security through the monitoring and 
controlling of corporate misconduct. However, the effectiveness of the governing mechanisms 
implemented in firms will depend on the actions and commitment of the people designated to 
conduct such responsibilities (Daily and Dalton, 1993). Without their active, appropriate and 
sufficient enforcement of oversight duties, their presence in firms will merely fulfil companies’ 
compliance with the regulatory rules and this benefit will not extend to ensuring a safe 
investment environment for existing and potential investors. Hence, boards of directors and 
boards’ subcommittees’ members, especially independent outside directors, need to participate 
proactively in their discussion with management (Provan, 1980). If management are, however, 
not willing to disclose sufficient and appropriate information, then they are not fully utilising the 
advice that outside directors can provide, given their external experience and knowledge of the 
industry and other businesses, which are imperative for the objective evaluation of situations 
affecting the firm.
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Finally, in order for board and subcommittees’ members to be effective in their respective 
oversight role, companies as well as investors need to perceive their role as significant for the 
proper governance of the company’s activities in Malaysia.
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Appendix 2A: Malaysia Bourse Seeurities Limited (MBSB) Listing Requirements,
(Source: Malaysia Bourse Securities Listing Requirement, (January 2001; December 2006) www.klsc.eom.mv
Chapter 1: Part A Definition
Independent Director 
(pp 1.04-1.05)
•  Independence: Independent o f management, free from any business or other relationship which could interfere with the 
exercise o f independent judgement or the ability to act in the best interests o f an applicant or a listed issuer. This includes:
i. Not being an executive director of the applicant, listed issuer or any related corporation of the applicant and 
listed issuer;
ii. Within the last 2 years has not been an executive officer of the applicant, listed issuer or related corporation (See 
section 4 o f the Companies Act 1964 on ‘officer’)
iii. Not being a major shareholder of the applicant, listed issuer or any related corporation o f such applicant or listed 
issuer;
iv. Not being a relative of any executive director, officer or major shareholders o f the applicant, listed issuer or 
related corporation o f such applicant or listed issuer. Namely ‘relative’ encompasses the spouse, parent, brother, 
sister, child (including adopted or step child) and the spouse o f such brother, sister or child;
v. Not acting as a nominee or representative o f any executive director or major shareholder o f the applicant, listed 
issuer or any related corporation of such applicant or listed issuer;
vi. Is not engaged as a professional adviser by the applicant, listed issuer or any related corporation o f such applicant 
or listed issuer either personally or through a firm o company o f  which he is a partner, director or major 
shareholder where applicable; or
vii. Has not within the last 2 years and does not engage in any transaction with the applicant, listed issuer or any 
related corporation of such applicant or listed issuer, whether by himself or with other persons or through a firm 
or company o f which he is a partner, director or major shareholder, as the case may be, the value o f which 
exceeds RM250,000.
Major Shareholders
(pg. 1.06)
• This represents a person who has an interest or interests in one or more voting shares in a company and the nominal amount o f  
that share or the aggregate o f the nominal amounts o f those shares where such interest:
i. equal to or more than 10% of the aggregate o f the nominal amounts o f  all the voting shares in the company; or
ii. equal to or more than 5% o f the aggregate of the nominal amounts o f all the voting shares in the company where 
such person is the largest shareholder o f the company.
For the purpose of this definition, “interest in shares” shall have the meaning given in section 6A of the Companies Act 1965.
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Chapter 3: Admission
Issued and Paid-Up Capital 
(Part B: Para 3.04)
•  An applicant seeking a listing on the Main Board must have a minimum issued and paid-up capital o f RM60 million 
comprising ordinary shares of at least RM 0.10 each {previously in 2001 it was RM 1.00 each).
• An applicant seeking a listing on the Second Board must have a minimum issued and paid-up capital o f RM40 million 
comprising ordinary shares of at least RMO. 10 each {previously in 200lit was RM 1.00 each).
Shareholding Spread 
(Part B: Para 3.05)
•  An applicant must have at least 25% of its issued and paid- up capital in the hands o f minimum number o f public shareholders 
holding not less than 1000 shares each whereby companies with nominal value of issued and paid up capital o f :
i. Between RM 40 million to less than RM 60 million, the minimum number o f shareholders required are 750.
ii. Between RM 60 million to less than RM 100 million, the minimum number o f shareholders required are 1000.
iii. RM 100 million and above the minimum number o f shareholders required are 1250.
For the purpose o f complying with National Development Policy, the 25% spread can encompass up to 5% issued and paid capital 
of listed issuer held by employees and 10% of the issued and paid up capital o f listed issuer held by Bumiputera investors.
Chapter 7: Articles of Association
Remuneration o f Directors 
(Part K: Para 7.25)
• The non executive directors are paid fees o f fixed amount and not by a commission on or percentage o f profits or turnover
• The salaries payable to executive directors exclude commissions on or percentage o f turnover
Election of Directors 
(Part K: Para 7.28)
• An election of directors shall take place each year
• All directors shall retire from office once at least in each 3 years, but shall be eligible for re-election
Power of Managing Director 
(Part K: Para 7.31)
• A managing director shall be subject to the control o f the board o f directors
Compliance with Shareholding 
Spread Requirement 
(Part E: Para 8.15)
• A listed issuer must ensure that at least 25% of its total listed shares are in the hands of a minimum of 1,000 public shareholders 
holding not less than 100 shares each. The Exchange may accept a percentage lower than 25% of the total number o f listed 
shares if it is satisfied that such lower percentage is sufficient for a liquid market in such shares.
• A listed issuer must inform the Exchange immediately if it becomes aware that it does not comply with the required 
shareholding spread referred to in subparagraph (1).
A listed issuer which fails to maintain the required shareholding spread referred to in subparagraph (1) may request for an extension 
of time to rectify the situation. Where no extension o f time is granted by the Exchange, the Exchange may suspend
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Compliance with Shareholding 
Spread Requirement (Part E: Para 
8.15) (Continued...)
trading in the securities o f the listed issuer and/or de-list the listed issuer.
•  In the event the spread o f shareholdings o f  a listed issuer is equal to or below 10% o f the total number o f listed shares, the 
Exchange may suspend trading in the securities of such listed issuer.
•  In relation to a take-over offer for the acquisition o f the listed shares o f a listed issuer pursuant to the Code as defined under 
Chapter 11 or corporate proposals undertaken by or in relation to a listed issuer, upon 90% or more o f the listed shares o f the 
said listed issuer being held by a shareholder either singly or jointly with associates o f the said shareholder, an immediate 
announcement must be made by the listed issuer. Upon such announcement, all the securities o f the listed issuer may be 
suspended from trading and/or removed from the Official List o f the Exchange.
• Notwithstanding subparagraph (5) above, all the securities o f the listed issuer shall be removed from the Official List o f the 
Exchange:-
(a) in relation to a take-over offer, upon announcement by the listed issuer pursuant to subparagraph (5) above unless the
offeror has provided in the offer document:-
(i) its intention to maintain the listing status of the listed issuer and not to invoke the provisions under Section 34 
of the Securities Commission Act 1993; and
(ii) detailed plans, the complete implementation o f which would result in full compliance by the listed issuer with 
all the provisions o f the Listing Requirements.
(b) in relation to corporate proposals, upon announcement pursuant to subparagraph (5) above that:-
(i) 100% of the listed shares o f the said listed issuer are held by a shareholder either singly or jointly with the 
associates o f the said shareholder; and
(ii) the corporate proposals do not include any plans duly approved by the shareholders o f the listed issuer before 
the proposals were undertaken, the complete implementation o f which would result in full compliance by the 
listed issuer with all the provisions o f the Listing Requirements.
•  For the purpose o f subparagraphs (5) and (6) above:-
(i) “corporate proposals” shall include a reverse take-over, a very substantial acquisition or a scheme of
compromise, arrangement, amalgamation or reconstruction; and
(ii) “associates o f the said shareholder” shall have the meaning given in relation to “associates of directors or
shareholders” as set out in the definition “public” under paragraph 1.01.
•  Unless the context otherwise requires, the words or expressions used in this Part shall have the meanings given under the 
Section 33 o f the Securities Commission Act 1993 and the Malaysian Code on Take-Overs and Mergers 1998.
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Immediate Disclosure of 
Material Information 
(Part C: Para 9.03)
Chapter 9: Continuing Disclosure
•  A listed issuer must make immediate public disclosure of any material information, except as set out in paragraph 9.05 below.
• Information is considered material, if it is reasonably expected to have a material effect on:-
(a) the price, value or market activity of any o f the listed issuer’s securities; or
(b) the decision of a holder o f securities o f the listed issuer or an investor in determining his choice o f action.
• Without limiting the generality o f subparagraph (2) above, material information may include information which:-
(a) concerns the listed issuer’s assets and liabilities, business, financial condition or prospects;
(b) relates to dealings with employees, suppliers, customers and others;
(c) relates to any event affecting the present or potential dilution o f the rights or interests o f the listed issuer’s securities; or
(d) relates to any event materially affecting the size o f the public holding o f its securities.
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